zoon wrote:Where I’m disagreeing (though on definitions rather than on substance) is that I think the word “conscious” is more generally used to apply to the things that trigger our modelling ToM processes, whether those things are adult humans or non-human animals which almost certainly don’t model their own processes? Perhaps, since in common sense “consciousness” is taken to apply to some ineffable non-physical inwardness, those of us who don’t think there is any such thing are bound to be using the word in a non-standard way anyhow.

There is some disagreement there, because I think the word conscious cannot reasonably be separated from notions of potential responsiveness. I don't think the '-ness' can be the 'trigger' it has to be the 'modelling', the active responsive functional capacity to act act with 'awareness'.

You seem content to call a puppet conscious (but only while it's being animated by the puppeteer?)
The parallel would be that the brain attributes consciousness to the 'body puppet' when it is animating it (awake).

We may also differ on the related issue of self-consciousness. Hard Problem doesn't require self-consciousness of the sort that newborn humans and most animals lack. That suggests some conscious events or thoughts of 'this is me'. All that the HP requires is that the entity 'knows what pain feels like' (models that there is a self in pain). I'd feel comfortable assuming that at least all mammals have that capacity.

... And you conclude, what, exactly? It only seems to show the unsrprising result that different kinds of awareness have something in common, neurally.

DavidMcC wrote:... And you conclude, what, exactly? It only seems to show the unsrprising result that different kinds of awareness have something in common, neurally.

I conclude that the semantic content of the neural 'information processing' in the brain makes all the difference between being conscious and unconscious. To solve the Hard Problem work out the semantics generated in the neural circuits.

It's a very difficult reverse engineering task.

Determining what someone is visualising by scanning their visual cortex would be the general direction, but just because there is a pattern in the VC doesn't necessarily reveal what the person is conscious of. We have to understand how attention works. How responses in the brain can come in or out of consciousness. The modelling hypothesis suggests this would be changing information context. X is happening vs X is happening to I (I is attending to X) (I is experiencing X).

The idea then is that in modelling a neural response as a subjective event other systems have new 'data' to respond to that allow complex predictive responses. It's 'integrated information', but just any old unspecified 'information'. It's information about a (virtual) subject and it becomes possible to adaptively plan actions around these models of subjective states.

GrahamH wrote:...

Nobody is disputing that 'feedback loops' are significant in realising consciousness, but nothing about feedback loops addresses the Hard Problem......

That's because there is no such thing as the 'Hard Problem' it's a figment of Chamlers twisted and non-scientific mind.

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:...

Only systems that can model and attribute can sensibly be classed as conscious. The puppet can't attribute consciousness to me. The puppet is not conscious. Follow the functional capacity rather than the reference.

The mistake here seems to be to identify "consciousness"" with "attribution of consciousness", which really is IS a circular definition.

A thermostat has no mechanism that could sense objects, let alone the cognitive machinery to model them as agents with minds. Thermostats can't attribute attention, therefore they are not conscious.

Yes. completely circular and exactly why the philosophers love it.

And he still doesn't 'get it' with regard to the thermostat and its system/environment. Of course a thermostat senses objects, that's
exactly it's function to sense one particular object - the temperature - and provide feedback to the system as a whole.

Graham can't seem to understand how to break down/divide up a complex system it its simpler subcomponents. This is the entire crux of his lack of understanding what consciousness is, he wants to arbitrarily define it as some extremely high-level thing which simply is not true.

GrahamH wrote:

zoon wrote:Where I’m disagreeing (though on definitions rather than on substance) is that I think the word “conscious” is more generally used to apply to the things that trigger our modelling ToM processes, whether those things are adult humans or non-human animals which almost certainly don’t model their own processes? Perhaps, since in common sense “consciousness” is taken to apply to some ineffable non-physical inwardness, those of us who don’t think there is any such thing are bound to be using the word in a non-standard way anyhow.

There is some disagreement there, because I think the word conscious cannot reasonably be separated from notions of potential responsiveness. I don't think the '-ness' can be the 'trigger' it has to be the 'modelling', the active responsive functional capacity to act act with 'awareness'.

You seem content to call a puppet conscious (but only while it's being animated by the puppeteer?)
The parallel would be that the brain attributes consciousness to the 'body puppet' when it is animating it (awake).

My feeling is still that this discussion is a bit like asking what exactly constitutes a “living” thing, consciousness is another term with an apparently clear-cut common sense meaning which doesn’t have a clear scientific basis, so it’s even more vague around the edges than most words. For example, sometimes it makes sense to talk of a “live” virus as opposed to a heat-treated inactivated one, while at other times it may equally reasonably be argued that viruses are never “alive” because they don’t actually do anything, they just set the infected cell’s machinery to producing more viruses. The science is clear, but the terminology involving the word “life” isn’t, because the word is still associated with a pre-scientific view of the world?

I would not generally be tempted to call puppets or thermostats conscious, though I can have some sympathy with those who do. I was thinking more of the continuum from ants to frogs to rats to chimps to people. If we limit consciousness to things which can indisputably have a Hard Problem, we would stay with adult humans. There’s certainly a case to be made for limiting the word “conscious” to creatures which do some self-modelling (though we know very little about which animals do, and how much), but it seems to me that this would involve a redefinition? – again, my main feeling is that “conscious” implies a world view which I don’t agree with, so if we continue to use the word we’ve redefined it anyway. A frog may not model itself, but it can certainly suddenly become aware of a wriggling worm in front of its nose, and predicting a frog successfully generally involves mental concepts, e.g. it’s afraid of something, or it believes the worm is edible.

I certainly agree with you that the Hard Problem is about human brains modelling themselves, where I’m disagreeing is that I don’t think the word “conscious” as it’s ordinarily used necessarily maps neatly on to creatures that model themselves, in the way that “water” maps to dihydrogen monoxide, it’s more like the way “reptile” turns out not to be a clade, so the word “reptile” is still used, but not in scientific classification.

GrahamH wrote:We may also differ on the related issue of self-consciousness. Hard Problem doesn't require self-consciousness of the sort that newborn humans and most animals lack. That suggests some conscious events or thoughts of 'this is me'. All that the HP requires is that the entity 'knows what pain feels like' (models that there is a self in pain). I'd feel comfortable assuming that at least all mammals have that capacity.

We know very little about whether, or to what extent, non-human animals model themselves, or work with the concept of a self. My suspicion is that we use Theory of Mind (ToM) processes to predict e.g. dogs, because this kind of prediction works well (far better than any attempt to follow their brain activities, which would get nowhere with current technology), and that because we are using ToM we easily project more of our own way of thinking on to the dog than is in fact the case. I suppose I’m not really disagreeing about whether dogs actually model themselves, rather that I think we think of them as conscious (“knowing there is a self in pain”) for other reasons? I do agree with you that the Hard Problem involves modelling oneself, I think you’ve probably identified a disagreement in that I would limit the Hard Problem to the kind of self-modelling that’s (so far) limited to adult humans, except to the extent that when using ToM we automatically attribute consciousness and all attendant problems to other creatures as well as to ourselves.

?

Well said Zoon.

zoon wrote:...
We know very little about whether, or to what extent, non-human animals model themselves, or work with the concept of a self.
...

There are, of course, the famous mirror experiments, in which various animals have been tested to see if they realise that an image of themselves in a mirror is, indeed, themselves:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_test#Reactions_of_other_animals_to_mirrors
Note the problem applying the test to dogs, as an example of an animal for whom vision is only the third most important sense. Thus, the test is not considered valid for such animals.
I remember that a jumping spider (for whom vision is very important) was once tested, and failed!

DavidMcC wrote:

zoon wrote:...
We know very little about whether, or to what extent, non-human animals model themselves, or work with the concept of a self.
...

There are, of course, the famous mirror experiments, in which various animals have been tested to see if they realise that an image of themselves in a mirror is, indeed, themselves:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_test#Reactions_of_other_animals_to_mirrors
Note the problem applying the test to dogs, as an example of an animal for whom vision is only the third most important sense. Thus, the test is not considered valid for such animals.
I remember that a jumping spider (for whom vision is very important) was once tested, and failed!

Young Humans also fail the mirror test.

kennyc wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

zoon wrote:...
We know very little about whether, or to what extent, non-human animals model themselves, or work with the concept of a self.
...

There are, of course, the famous mirror experiments, in which various animals have been tested to see if they realise that an image of themselves in a mirror is, indeed, themselves:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_test#Reactions_of_other_animals_to_mirrors
Note the problem applying the test to dogs, as an example of an animal for whom vision is only the third most important sense. Thus, the test is not considered valid for such animals.
I remember that a jumping spider (for whom vision is very important) was once tested, and failed!

Young Humans also fail the mirror test.

How young? Certainly, new-born babies aren't even considered conscious, so it would not be surprising if they failed the test.
Here's one of the more bizarre criticisms of the mirror test, showing that it is possible to design a simple machine to pass it:
Reflections of Consciousness: The Mirror Test
I think that the above-linked article misses the point that a machine designed specifically to pass a particular test does not have to be conscious to pass that test. No animals were ever "designed" to pass it, so, if they never-the-less do pass it, it shows self-awareness, IMO.

How young?

It's in the wiki article you linked to..... jeeze....

DavidMcC wrote:

zoon wrote:...
We know very little about whether, or to what extent, non-human animals model themselves, or work with the concept of a self.
...

There are, of course, the famous mirror experiments, in which various animals have been tested to see if they realise that an image of themselves in a mirror is, indeed, themselves:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_test#Reactions_of_other_animals_to_mirrors
Note the problem applying the test to dogs, as an example of an animal for whom vision is only the third most important sense. Thus, the test is not considered valid for such animals.
I remember that a jumping spider (for whom vision is very important) was once tested, and failed!

There you go jumping in that the high-end again. To extrapolate a self model to an image is a highly advanced capability.

More interesting is to think about how an animal manages to integrate touch and vision to be able to look a limb stung by a wasp.
How do you know that the object in sight is your hand?
How does a squirrel manage to jump from branch to branch?

These are 'integrated information' or 'body map' issues.

GrahamH wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

zoon wrote:...
We know very little about whether, or to what extent, non-human animals model themselves, or work with the concept of a self.
...

There are, of course, the famous mirror experiments, in which various animals have been tested to see if they realise that an image of themselves in a mirror is, indeed, themselves:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mirror_test#Reactions_of_other_animals_to_mirrors
Note the problem applying the test to dogs, as an example of an animal for whom vision is only the third most important sense. Thus, the test is not considered valid for such animals.
I remember that a jumping spider (for whom vision is very important) was once tested, and failed!

There you go jumping in that the high-end again. To extrapolate a self model to an image is a advanced

What does that even mean? Perhaps you should re-type it more carefully, so that others can understand what you meant to say.

More interesting to think about how an animal manages to integrate touch and vision to be able to look a limb stung by a wasp.
How do you know that the object in sight is your hand?
How does a squirrel manage to jump from branch to branch?

These are 'integrated information' or 'body map' issues.

They are, indeed, but apparently, self-recogntion in a mirror is not.

... Oh, I see, you decided to change the subject, because you like body maps more than self-recognition. In that caes, shouldn't you start a new thread?
... One thing you can say about body maps from this thread is that they don't work well in reflection!
EDIT: This is probably because body maps aren't visual.

DavidMcC wrote:... Oh, I see, you decided to change the subject, because you like body maps more than self-recognition. In that caes, shouldn't you start a new thread?
... One thing you can say about body maps from this thread is that they don't work well in reflection!
EDIT: This is probably because body maps aren't visual.

The topic is consciousness, not self-consciousness.

It's a shame you have nothing to contribute.

Clearly body maps do integrate with the visual system, since we recognise our own body parts and can direct gaze to them without a any conscious effort at all. Do you have a clue how that works? Do you have a feel for how complex a task it is?

If you could grasp this you would begin to think about how consciousness might work. See Damasio, Graziano and others. It begins with bodily control via models/maps. It's very interesting stuff. Why are you so antagonistic to it?

GrahamH wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:... Oh, I see, you decided to change the subject, because you like body maps more than self-recognition. In that caes, shouldn't you start a new thread?
... One thing you can say about body maps from this thread is that they don't work well in reflection!
EDIT: This is probably because body maps aren't visual.

The topic is consciousness, not self-consciousness.

It's a shame you have nothing to contribute.

Wrong again Graham.

Here's something:

....The self-recognition ability in octopus arms is one such simplifying principle. Applying it to a robot should be possible, says Laschi, although it would probably be a mechanical system rather than a chemical one, as is likely the case in the octopus......

http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com ... r-science/

This is much more interesting and relevant.

P.S. the thread is actually about thermostats if you really want to know.

I love how you make the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness when it fits your agenda.