kennyc wrote:
This thread was started in the Science area because that is what it was intended to be about. Please stick to the science.

If science is essentially and exclusively objectivistic, then there can be no science of consciousness, because consciousness has an irreducible subjective aspect: the phenomenal side of consciousness.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Let's see what people think.

In scene (a) I am focusing on a red stop sign while driving my car.
In scene (b) I am focusing on a red ball of the exact same hue, saturation, and brightness, while sitting on a park bench.

At the moment of the focus, say a two hundred msec window, is there any reason to assume that I am having exactly the same conscious experience in the two scenes?

I really want to see some response to this. Hammer(cough ) aside.

Teuton wrote:

kennyc wrote:
This thread was started in the Science area because that is what it was intended to be about. Please stick to the science.

If science is essentially and exclusively objectivistic, then there can be no science of consciousness, because consciousness has an irreducible subjective aspect: the phenomenal side of consciousness.

You not knowing how it reduces is not the same as it not being possible to know how it reduces.

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
It is an undeniable fact that subjective phenomenal knowledge (to know what it's like, how it appears/feels) is not inferrable from objective neurophysical knowledge. ..

This I disagree with in part. I disagree completely in principle.

Then you're completely wrong! For example, a blind person can possess all objective scientific knowledge about colours, but this knowledge doesn't enable her to come to know how colours appear to seeing persons.
How could you possible know how lemon tastes without ever having tasted lemon or something else tasting like lemon?

That depends on what consciousness is. If it is a form of evaluated model then the 'what its like' is a particular model state . It can be the case that no objective view data can generate that particular model state because that is not the mechanism by which the model is operated.

Quite simply you are making unjustified claims that presume things about the nature of consciousness that are unjustified.

Do you think you have to taste a real lemon to experience a lemon taste? The minimum required would seem to be an appropriate neural stimulation. Who can say what limits must apply to generating that class of stimulation?

GrahamH wrote:

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
It is an undeniable fact that subjective phenomenal knowledge (to know what it's like, how it appears/feels) is not inferrable from objective neurophysical knowledge. ..

This I disagree with in part. I disagree completely in principle.

Then you're completely wrong! For example, a blind person can possess all objective scientific knowledge about colours, but this knowledge doesn't enable her to come to know how colours appear to seeing persons.
How could you possible know how lemon tastes without ever having tasted lemon or something else tasting like lemon?

That depends on what consciousness is. If it is a form of evaluated model then the 'what its like' is a particular model state . It can be the case that no objective view data can generate that particular model state because that is not the mechanism by which the model is operated.

Quite simply you are making unjustified claims that presume things about the nature of consciousness that are unjustified.

Do you think you have to taste a real lemon to experience a lemon taste? The minimum required would seem to be an appropriate neural stimulation. Who can say what limits must apply to generating that class of stimulation?

And it is that model state that I want to draw your attention to in this query:
http://www.rationalskepticism.org/psych ... l#p1996572

kennyc wrote:

Teuton wrote:
It is an undeniable fact that subjective phenomenal knowledge (to know what it's like, how it appears/feels) is not inferrable from objective neurophysical knowledge. ,,,,,

Wrong. We've been over this any number of times. It's quite simple. If we could monitor and know exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in a brain, then it is not only inferrable, but measurable.

You're the one who's wrong, because, e.g., monitoring and knowing exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in the brain of a person suffering from clinical depression doesn't enable you to know what it's like or how it feels to be depressed.

"Knowing what it is like to have a certain kind of experience requires one to make an empirical connection with the experience."

(Kirk, Robert. The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 168)

As far as phenomenal knowledge is concerned, the only possible way to make an empirical connection with the experience is to undergo the experience. Phenomenal knowledge about the subjectively appearing contents of experience is in principle non-inferrable from objective knowledge about the neuropsychology of experience.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
How could you possible know how lemon tastes without ever having tasted lemon or something else tasting like lemon?

Your category error is pathetically obvious. You and Jackson should get a room in a tawdry motel and share your shame privately.

Please answer my question!

SpeedOfSound wrote:

CharlieM wrote:...

Here are some problems pointed out by Hameroff in the video:

Problems with neurocomputation 1 to 4.jpg

...

Don't know why the quote system wont allow your jpg.

But in the first hammercoff problem picture where is the research on number 3? The quantum fluctuation being 'required' for spike firing and an x-factor affecting threshold? Threshold to fire the neuron from the hillock or threshold to continue the AP along the axon?

It did allow my jpg.

He talks about the research at about 20 minutes into the video referencing Nauntorf et al Nature 2007 and others. Also see their paper here

SpeedOfSound wrote:I want to know more about this microtubule computation as well.

Well watch the video and read his papers.

Teuton wrote:

kennyc wrote:
This thread was started in the Science area because that is what it was intended to be about. Please stick to the science.

If science is essentially and exclusively objectivistic, then there can be no science of consciousness, because consciousness has an irreducible subjective aspect: the phenomenal side of consciousness.

Wrong. Take your belief to the philosophy forum. You appear to have no real knowledge of cognitive science.

SpeedOfSound wrote:And it is that model state that I want to draw your attention to in this query:
http://www.rationalskepticism.org/psych ... l#p1996572

I don't see the relevance. You are asking about the identity of qualia, when few, if any, discussing here think qualia are more than 'illusions'. Is that pareidolia face the exact same pareidolia face as this one? Who cares?
You might as well ask if the brain activity of a repeated action, such as catching a ball, is identical every time. The important question is whether / how the ball is caught, or whether the brain activity is interpreted as this or that class of experience.

Teuton wrote:

kennyc wrote:

Teuton wrote:
It is an undeniable fact that subjective phenomenal knowledge (to know what it's like, how it appears/feels) is not inferrable from objective neurophysical knowledge. ,,,,,

Wrong. We've been over this any number of times. It's quite simple. If we could monitor and know exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in a brain, then it is not only inferrable, but measurable.

You're the one who's wrong, because, e.g., monitoring and knowing exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in the brain of a person suffering from clinical depression doesn't enable you to know what it's like or how it feels to be depressed.
.....

Wrong. Learn some science.

the 'knowing what it feels like' is bullshit and irrelevant to consciousness...as we have been over an endless number of times.

Please take your krap beliefs to the philosophy forum and leave the science to the scientists.

Teuton wrote:

kennyc wrote:

Teuton wrote:
It is an undeniable fact that subjective phenomenal knowledge (to know what it's like, how it appears/feels) is not inferrable from objective neurophysical knowledge. ,,,,,

Wrong. We've been over this any number of times. It's quite simple. If we could monitor and know exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in a brain, then it is not only inferrable, but measurable.

You're the one who's wrong, because, e.g., monitoring and knowing exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in the brain of a person suffering from clinical depression doesn't enable you to know what it's like or how it feels to be depressed.

"Knowing what it is like to have a certain kind of experience requires one to make an empirical connection with the experience."

(Kirk, Robert. The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 168)

As far as phenomenal knowledge is concerned, the only possible way to make an empirical connection with the experience is to undergo the experience. Phenomenal knowledge about the subjectively appearing contents of experience is in principle non-inferrable from objective knowledge about the neuropsychology of experience.

But, if you have your brain thoroughly measured, to assess what each of your neural firing patterns "feels like" to you, then you have a kind of look-up table for your own subjective experiences, surely? This would be very, very complicated, and might not be possible to extend to understanding someone else's SE's.

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
How could you possible know how lemon tastes without ever having tasted lemon or something else tasting like lemon?

Your category error is pathetically obvious. You and Jackson should get a room in a tawdry motel and share your shame privately.

Please answer my question!

It's irrelevant to this discussion.

DavidMcC wrote:

Teuton wrote:

kennyc wrote:

Teuton wrote:
It is an undeniable fact that subjective phenomenal knowledge (to know what it's like, how it appears/feels) is not inferrable from objective neurophysical knowledge. ,,,,,

Wrong. We've been over this any number of times. It's quite simple. If we could monitor and know exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in a brain, then it is not only inferrable, but measurable.

You're the one who's wrong, because, e.g., monitoring and knowing exactly the state and operation of each neuron and synapse in the brain of a person suffering from clinical depression doesn't enable you to know what it's like or how it feels to be depressed.

"Knowing what it is like to have a certain kind of experience requires one to make an empirical connection with the experience."

(Kirk, Robert. The Conceptual Link from Physical to Mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 168)

As far as phenomenal knowledge is concerned, the only possible way to make an empirical connection with the experience is to undergo the experience. Phenomenal knowledge about the subjectively appearing contents of experience is in principle non-inferrable from objective knowledge about the neuropsychology of experience.

But, if you have your brain thoroughly measured, to assess what each of your neural firing patterns "feels like" to you, then you have a kind of look-up table for your own subjective experiences, surely? This would be very, very complicated, and might not be possible to extend to understanding someone else's SE's.

Right, something like fingerprints or dna.... and irrelevant to consciousness in general.

also given the ability to stimulate/recreate those neuro-chemical patterns it would result in the same experience for the subject stimulated in that manner.

CharlieM wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

CharlieM wrote:...

Here are some problems pointed out by Hameroff in the video:

Problems with neurocomputation 1 to 4.jpg

...

Don't know why the quote system wont allow your jpg.

But in the first hammercoff problem picture where is the research on number 3? The quantum fluctuation being 'required' for spike firing and an x-factor affecting threshold? Threshold to fire the neuron from the hillock or threshold to continue the AP along the axon?

It did allow my jpg.

He talks about the research at about 20 minutes into the video referencing Nauntorf et al Nature 2007 and others. Also see their paper here

Try it on edit. Not sure but I couldn't get it to popup on quoting you.

I will do my best to digest Hammerwhack's paper. Gonna take some time and I have ten irons in the fire.

GrahamH wrote:Do you think you have to taste a real lemon to experience a lemon taste? The minimum required would seem to be an appropriate neural stimulation. Who can say what limits must apply to generating that class of stimulation?

This question is irrelevant to my point that you cannot (come to) know the taste of lemon without undergoing a corresponding gustatory experience (however caused).

Teuton wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Do you think you have to taste a real lemon to experience a lemon taste? The minimum required would seem to be an appropriate neural stimulation. Who can say what limits must apply to generating that class of stimulation?

This question is irrelevant to my point that you cannot (come to) know the taste of lemon without undergoing a corresponding gustatory experience (however caused).

I like how you are both wrong at the same time.

Charlie's reference: How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will

Conscious “free will” is problematic because (1) brain mechanisms causing consciousness are unknown, (2) measurable brain activity correlating with conscious perception apparently occurs too late for real-time conscious response, consciousness thus being considered “epiphenomenal illusion,” and (3) determinism, i.e., our actions and the world around us seem algorithmic and inevitable.
...

So, Hameroff is propagating the same mistake as Libet: to assume that all our responses to sensory input must be unconscious, just because some responses cannot be delayed long enough for a conscious response to suppress the unconscious one befor any action. That's absurd, because we only react "immediately" to certain stimuli, that punch through to rapid, unconscious action (eg, the eye gets unconsciously directed towards the source of a flash of light, say). If Hameroff is right, we would never think about consequences at all before we acted, and we would all be permanent delinquents! Of course, the "free will" that we have os only the biological free will that I have described elsewhere on this site, but even that would not be allowed by Hameroff, it seems.

Teuton wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Do you think you have to taste a real lemon to experience a lemon taste? The minimum required would seem to be an appropriate neural stimulation. Who can say what limits must apply to generating that class of stimulation?

This question is irrelevant to my point that you cannot (come to) know the taste of lemon without undergoing a corresponding gustatory experience (however caused).

The premise is that stimulating the 'model', configured in a particular way, will result in the experience. It is assumed that the normal means by which the 'model' is configured to generate that experience is a combination of genetic factors and past exposure.

I think what you are referring to amounts to laying down a memory of having had the experience. The question then arises - can a memory be laid down that does not have a prior stimulus. I don't see why not, in principle. It won't happen in practice.

The implication is that one could elicit a typically low-intensity echo of a sensory experience that one has never had, and that subsequently being exposed to that stimulus will elicit a sense of a familiar, and now vivid, experience.

What is impossible about that?

I suggest a further possibility, that a person could, in principle, be sure they had experienced something, that they 'know what it's like' without being able to call the supposed 'what it's like' clearly to mind. None of which would require exposure to the stimulus or an actual experience.