THWOTH wrote:Indeed. In the end 'God' is just that which meets the terms of definition for 'God' - God is omni-omni because whatever is omni-omni is God, etc.

“When we read about Creation in Genesis, we run the risk of imagining God was a magician, with a magic wand able to do everything. But that is not so,” Francis said.

Animavore wrote:But how can God know he has "true" omnipotence?

Thommo wrote:And so the merry-go round of epistemology goes.

Thommo wrote:This isn't anything to do with God though. You can be a sceptic to any and all claims of knowledge (Brains in vats! Evil Geniuses! Idealism! Solipsism!). So God can't know he's omnipotent you say? Well how do you know that? How are you going to show your knowledge is less fallible than God's hypothetically would be?

And so the merry-go round of epistemology goes.

Rumraket wrote:Why? Well because, while we cannot show that omniscience is logically impossible, we also cannot show it's logically possible either. Beyond the mere definition of being all-knowing, it cannot be shown that such an attribute is an achievable state of affairs.

A logically possible proposition is one that can be asserted without implying a logical contradiction. This is to say that a proposition is logically possible if there is some coherent way for the world to be, under which the proposition would be true.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_possibility

Rumraket wrote:So what we can say is that we cannot be in a position to rationally believe the claim that god's omnipotence is logically possible. We have to remain technically agnostic on the claim, and so should not believe either position.

Why? Well because, while we cannot show that omniscience is logically impossible, we also cannot show it's logically possible either. Beyond the mere definition of being all-knowing, it cannot be shown that such an attribute is an achievable state of affairs. Therefore I submit it cannot be rationally believed that god is omniscient. It must be beleived on faith, and faith is intrinsically irrational. Case closed.

Spinozasgalt wrote:God's knowledge is not usually construed as justified true belief, so I dunno.

GrahamH wrote:

Rumraket wrote:Why? Well because, while we cannot show that omniscience is logically impossible, we also cannot show it's logically possible either. Beyond the mere definition of being all-knowing, it cannot be shown that such an attribute is an achievable state of affairs.

If you can't show it to be logically impossible (it is not a contradiction), then it is locally possible.

THWOTH wrote:I think part of the reason these kinds of discussion drag on is becasue the God-narrative is such a well-established and ingrained cultural trope it seems to demand we go to more robust lengths in refutation than one would generally consider needed to refute the dragon-narrative, or the fairy-narrative, or even the god-narratives of more ancient or primitive cultures.

Thommo wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Rumraket wrote:Why? Well because, while we cannot show that omniscience is logically impossible, we also cannot show it's logically possible either. Beyond the mere definition of being all-knowing, it cannot be shown that such an attribute is an achievable state of affairs.

If you can't show it to be logically impossible (it is not a contradiction), then it is locally possible.

Do you mean "locally possible"? or is that a typo?

Nicholas Shackel wrote:A Motte and Bailey castle is a medieval system of defence in which a stone tower on a mound (the Motte) is surrounded by an area of land (the Bailey) which in turn is encompassed by some sort of a barrier such as a ditch. Being dark and dank, the Motte is not a habitation of choice. The only reason for its existence is the desirability of the Bailey, which the combination of the Motte and ditch makes relatively easy to retain despite attack by marauders. When only lightly pressed, the ditch makes small numbers of attackers easy to defeat as they struggle across it: when heavily pressed the ditch is not defensible and so neither is the Bailey. Rather one retreats to the insalubrious but defensible, perhaps impregnable, Motte. Eventually the marauders give up, when one is well placed to reoccupy desirable land.

For my purposes the desirable but only lightly defensible territory of the Motte and Bailey castle, that is to say, the Bailey, represents a philosophical doctrine or position with similar properties: desirable to its proponent but only lightly defensible. The Motte is the defensible but undesired position to which one retreats when hard pressed. I think it is evident that Troll’s Truisms have the Motte and Bailey property, since the exciting falsehoods constitute the desired but indefensible region within the ditch whilst the trivial truth constitutes the defensible but dank Motte to which one may retreat when pressed.

An entire doctrine or theory may be a Motte and Bailey Doctrine just by virtue of having a central core of defensible but not terribly interesting or original doctrines surrounded by a region of exciting but only lightly defensible doctrines. Just as the medieval Motte was often constructed by the stonemasons art from stone in the surrounding land, the Motte of dull but defensible doctrines is often constructed by the use of the sophists art from the desired but indefensible doctrines lying within the ditch.

Diagnosis of a philosophical doctrine as being a Motte and Bailey Doctrine is invariably fatal. Once made it is relatively obvious to those familiar with the doctrine that the doctrine’s survival required a systematic vacillation between exploiting the desired territory and retreating to the Motte when pressed.

THWOTH wrote:I think part of the reason these kinds of discussion drag on is becasue the God-narrative is such a well-established and ingrained cultural trope it seems to demand we go to more robust lengths in refutation than one would generally consider needed to refute the dragon-narrative, or the fairy-narrative, or even the god-narratives of more ancient or primitive cultures.

Nicko wrote:One thing I encountered recently is the idea of "Motte and Bailey Doctrines". Full article here (it's actually a critique of postmodernism).

Nicholas Shackel wrote:A Motte and Bailey castle is a medieval system of defence in which a stone tower on a mound (the Motte) is surrounded by an area of land (the Bailey) which in turn is encompassed by some sort of a barrier such as a ditch. Being dark and dank, the Motte is not a habitation of choice. The only reason for its existence is the desirability of the Bailey, which the combination of the Motte and ditch makes relatively easy to retain despite attack by marauders. When only lightly pressed, the ditch makes small numbers of attackers easy to defeat as they struggle across it: when heavily pressed the ditch is not defensible and so neither is the Bailey. Rather one retreats to the insalubrious but defensible, perhaps impregnable, Motte. Eventually the marauders give up, when one is well placed to reoccupy desirable land.

For my purposes the desirable but only lightly defensible territory of the Motte and Bailey castle, that is to say, the Bailey, represents a philosophical doctrine or position with similar properties: desirable to its proponent but only lightly defensible. The Motte is the defensible but undesired position to which one retreats when hard pressed. I think it is evident that Troll’s Truisms have the Motte and Bailey property, since the exciting falsehoods constitute the desired but indefensible region within the ditch whilst the trivial truth constitutes the defensible but dank Motte to which one may retreat when pressed.

An entire doctrine or theory may be a Motte and Bailey Doctrine just by virtue of having a central core of defensible but not terribly interesting or original doctrines surrounded by a region of exciting but only lightly defensible doctrines. Just as the medieval Motte was often constructed by the stonemasons art from stone in the surrounding land, the Motte of dull but defensible doctrines is often constructed by the use of the sophists art from the desired but indefensible doctrines lying within the ditch.

Diagnosis of a philosophical doctrine as being a Motte and Bailey Doctrine is invariably fatal. Once made it is relatively obvious to those familiar with the doctrine that the doctrine’s survival required a systematic vacillation between exploiting the desired territory and retreating to the Motte when pressed.

The KCA is merely Craig's attempt to establish a "Motte": in this case, the idea that the universe had a cause. As I've stated elsewhere, I have major problems with even the idea of atemporal causation, but this is his initial goal with the KCA. He then works out from this - by rather tenuous reasoning assertion to the idea that the universe had a Creator.

Craig's "Bailey" is of course Evangelical Christianity with all its prescriptions, proscriptions, commandments, dogma and - most importantly - authority. That's where he, like the feudal lord, he wishes to actually spend his time. The KCA is a rhetorical "fortress" he retreats to when his wider ideology comes under attack. For an even more blatant example of this strategy, check out Sy Ten Bruggencate's bullshit.

THWOTH wrote:I think part of the reason these kinds of discussion drag on is becasue the God-narrative is such a well-established and ingrained cultural trope it seems to demand we go to more robust lengths in refutation than one would generally consider needed to refute the dragon-narrative, or the fairy-narrative, or even the god-narratives of more ancient or primitive cultures.

GrahamH wrote:

Rumraket wrote:Why? Well because, while we cannot show that omniscience is logically impossible, we also cannot show it's logically possible either. Beyond the mere definition of being all-knowing, it cannot be shown that such an attribute is an achievable state of affairs.

If you can't show it to be logically impossible (it is not a contradiction), then it is logically possible.

A logically possible proposition is one that can be asserted without implying a logical contradiction. This is to say that a proposition is logically possible if there is some coherent way for the world to be, under which the proposition would be true.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_possibility

Isn't whether something is an achievable state of affairs about practical possibility?

John Platko wrote:Could you explain what the atemporal causation in Craig's argument is? I understand how the Aquinas's argument is atemporal but I thought Craig's was more straight forward.