I am an Atheist. I do not accept the existance of a god and have yet to hear any arguement for god that is in any way convincing. So if you have an arguement for god that you think might convince me, give it a shot!

/thread

Spoof of god wrote:I am an Atheist. I do not accept the existance of a god and have yet to hear any arguement for god that is in any way convincing. So if you have an arguement for god that you think might convince me, give it a shot!

Since most people here don't believe in God either, it would seem rather a waste of their time and yours for you to attempt convincing one-another of something you both know is highly unlikely to be true.

Ian.

The Gale-Pruss Cosmological Argument (available at http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_P ... Cosmo.html)

1. If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and p2 are identical, then w1=w2.
2. p is the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact.
3. (W-PSR) For any proposition, p, and any world, w, if p is in w’s Big Conjunctive Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, and proposition, q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
4. If p is in the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
5. There is a possible world w1 and a proposition q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
6. w1=the actual world.
7. There is in the actual world a proposition q, such that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
8. q is either a personal explanation or q is a scientific explanation.
9. q is not a scientific explanation.
10. q is a personal explanation.
11. q reports the intentional action of a contingent being or q reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
12. It is not the case that q reports the intentional action of a contingent being.
13. q reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
14. q is a contingent proposition that reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
15. q1 is a contingent proposition that reports the free intentional action of a necessary being that explains the existence of the actual world’s universe.
16. The actual world’s universe displays a wondrous complexity due to its law-like unity and simplicity, fine tuning of natural constants, and natural purpose and beauty.
17. q1 is the contingent proposition that there exists a necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and good and freely creates the actual world’s universe.
18. It is contingently true that there exists a necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and good and freely creates the actual world’s universe.

[Alexander Pruss With Richard M. Gale. "A New Cosmological Argument." Religious Studies 35 (1999) 461–476.]

Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post). Also note that I do not necessarily accept this particular argument, as I am still working through it myself; however I would be interested in discussing it.

Nocterro wrote:The Gale-Pruss Cosmological Argument (available at http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_P ... Cosmo.html)

1. If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and p2 are identical, then w1=w2.
2. p is the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact.
3. (W-PSR) For any proposition, p, and any world, w, if p is in w’s Big Conjunctive Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, and proposition, q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
4. If p is in the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
5. There is a possible world w1 and a proposition q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
6. w1=the actual world.
7. There is in the actual world a proposition q, such that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
8. q is either a personal explanation or q is a scientific explanation.
9. q is not a scientific explanation.
10. q is a personal explanation.
11. q reports the intentional action of a contingent being or q reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
12. It is not the case that q reports the intentional action of a contingent being.
13. q reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
14. q is a contingent proposition that reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
15. q1 is a contingent proposition that reports the free intentional action of a necessary being that explains the existence of the actual world’s universe.
16. The actual world’s universe displays a wondrous complexity due to its law-like unity and simplicity, fine tuning of natural constants, and natural purpose and beauty.
17. q1 is the contingent proposition that there exists a necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and good and freely creates the actual world’s universe.
18. It is contingently true that there exists a necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and good and freely creates the actual world’s universe.

[Alexander Pruss With Richard M. Gale. "A New Cosmological Argument." Religious Studies 35 (1999) 461–476.]

Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post). Also note that I do not necessarily accept this particular argument, as I am still working through it myself; however I would be interested in discussing it.

Now here is a masterpiece of sophistry and philosophical obscurantism. I think i will dub this one the argument from incomprehensibility. What the hell is the "big conjunctive contingent fact." What is a"personal explanation?" This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade. Of course, I don't know everything, nor am I the world's foremost expert on modal arguments, but I'm fairly certain it means absolutely nothing at all.

King David wrote:What the hell is the "big conjunctive contingent fact." What is a"personal explanation?" This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade.

Umm...

Nocterro wrote:Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post).

King David wrote:

Nocterro wrote:The Gale-Pruss Cosmological Argument (available at http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_P ... Cosmo.html)

1. If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and p2 are identical, then w1=w2.
2. p is the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact.
3. (W-PSR) For any proposition, p, and any world, w, if p is in w’s Big Conjunctive Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, and proposition, q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
4. If p is in the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
5. There is a possible world w1 and a proposition q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
6. w1=the actual world.
7. There is in the actual world a proposition q, such that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.
8. q is either a personal explanation or q is a scientific explanation.
9. q is not a scientific explanation.
10. q is a personal explanation.
11. q reports the intentional action of a contingent being or q reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
12. It is not the case that q reports the intentional action of a contingent being.
13. q reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
14. q is a contingent proposition that reports the intentional action of a necessary being.
15. q1 is a contingent proposition that reports the free intentional action of a necessary being that explains the existence of the actual world’s universe.
16. The actual world’s universe displays a wondrous complexity due to its law-like unity and simplicity, fine tuning of natural constants, and natural purpose and beauty.
17. q1 is the contingent proposition that there exists a necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and good and freely creates the actual world’s universe.
18. It is contingently true that there exists a necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and good and freely creates the actual world’s universe.

[Alexander Pruss With Richard M. Gale. "A New Cosmological Argument." Religious Studies 35 (1999) 461–476.]

Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post). Also note that I do not necessarily accept this particular argument, as I am still working through it myself; however I would be interested in discussing it.

Now here is a masterpiece of sophistry and philosophical obscurantism. I think i will dub this one the argument from incomprehensibility. What the hell is the "big conjunctive contingent fact." What is a"personal explanation?" This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade. Of course, I don't know everything, nor am I the world's foremost expert on modal arguments, but I'm fairly certain it means absolutely nothing at all.

Do we not have a philosophy section here, where people who enjoy philosophy can talk amongst themselves, and where the rest of us can steer well clear?

Ian.

Nocterro wrote:

King David wrote:What the hell is the "big conjunctive contingent fact." What is a"personal explanation?" This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade.

Umm...

Nocterro wrote:Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post).

I did read the so called "defense" of the premises. It is actually not so much a defense as it is a proof that my earlier statement "This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade" still holds true.

King David wrote:

Nocterro wrote:

King David wrote:What the hell is the "big conjunctive contingent fact." What is a"personal explanation?" This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade.

Umm...

Nocterro wrote:Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post).

I did read the so called "defense" of the premises. It is actually not so much a defense as it is a proof that my earlier statement "This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade" still holds true.

If you really read it, you would know what a fucking big conjunctive contingent fact is. It's defined in the paper.

Why does it need such a complex argument?

Paul G wrote:Why does it need such a complex argument?

Not everything has an easy/simple answer.

Nocterro wrote:

King David wrote:

Nocterro wrote:

King David wrote:What the hell is the "big conjunctive contingent fact." What is a"personal explanation?" This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade.

Umm...

Nocterro wrote:Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post).

I did read the so called "defense" of the premises. It is actually not so much a defense as it is a proof that my earlier statement "This argument is so full of unproven assertions, assumptions, ill defined abstract terms, and modal nonsense that I doubt even the people who wrote it know what it means, much less anyone whom they are trying to persuade" still holds true.

If you really read it, you would know what a fucking big conjunctive contingent fact is. It's defined in the paper.

Yes I saw that the first time:

The argument makes use of certain technical notions that need to be defined and explained at the outset. A possible world is a maximal, compossible conjunction of abstract propositions. It is maximal in that, for every proposition p, either p is a conjunct in this conjunction or its negation, not-p, is, and it is compossible in that it is conceptually or logically possible that all of the conjuncts be true together. Let us call the maximal, compossible conjunction that a given possible world is identical with the Big Conjunctive Fact of that world.[2] The Big Conjunctive Fact for a given world comprises all the propositions that would be true if this world were to be actualized

Just as I said-spooky modal nonsense filled with assumptions and ill defined abstract terms which don't represent anything in reality. And my other question has yet to be addressed. What does "personal explanation" mean? On what basis can you claim "personal explanations" for events in nature actually exist?

It's interesting that the conjuctive propositions clearly can't be formed about any infinite universe, or, say collection of finite universes with no fixed upper limit on size.

Before you even get half way through the definitions there are some pretty massive assumptions.

(Propositions have to be composed of finitely many conjuncts in propsitional logic on which modal logic is built)

Nocterro wrote:The Gale-Pruss Cosmological Argument (available at http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_P ... Cosmo.html)

1. If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and p2 are identical, then w1=w2.

It already does not follow. Why would two worlds both have to be identical if they have an identical contingent fact?

Nocterro wrote:2. p is the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact.

Assuming that there actually is a "p"

If we grant the assumption that "p" exists, then the argument is done here, there is no need to continue.

Nocterro wrote:3. (W-PSR) For any proposition, p, and any world, w, if p is in w’s Big Conjunctive Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, and proposition, q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q explains p.

Here we jump (again) from "if" to "is".

I'm sorry, but this is one of the shittiest attempts to make sense of the Cosmological Argument that I have seen.

It fails on the same points that the Cosmological Argument always falls afoul of. It does not differentiate between "if" and "is". It does not even allow for a differentiation between "possible", "probable" and "actual". It assumes that "possible" (as the argument describes it) is the same as "actual".

It's a shitty argument. Always has been, always will be.

Paul G wrote:Why does it need such a complex argument?

Because that is the easiest way to sound profound while actually just spouting a mass of incoherent babble.

MrFungus420 wrote:

Paul G wrote:Why does it need such a complex argument?

Because that is the easiest way to sound profound while actually just spouting a mass of incoherent babble.

And a convenient way to disguise errors in reasoning by obscuring them.

Nocterro wrote:The Gale-Pruss Cosmological Argument (available at http://bearspace.baylor.edu/Alexander_P ... Cosmo.html)

1. If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and p2 are identical, then w1=w2.
2-17. Massive similar amounts of bullshit.
18. It is contingently true that there exists a necessary supernatural being who is very powerful, intelligent, and good and freely creates the actual world’s universe.

[Alexander Pruss With Richard M. Gale. "A New Cosmological Argument." Religious Studies 35 (1999) 461–476.]

Now, I have given only the syllogism here. There is defense of the premises in the paper. Please do not just arbitrarily deny the premises; rather, offer an objection to the defense of the premises found in the paper (linked at the top of this post). Also note that I do not necessarily accept this particular argument, as I am still working through it myself; however I would be interested in discussing it.

Almeida and Judisch reply to Gale and Pruss in A New Cosmological Argument Undone, the abstract (and first two related endnotes) of which reads:

Almeida and Judisch wrote:There is an intriguing recent effort to develop a valid cosmological argument
on the basis of quite minimal assumptions.1 Indeed, the basis of the new
cosmological argument is so slight that it is likely to make even a conscientious
theist suspicious – to say nothing of our vigilant atheists. In Section 1 we
present the background assumptions and central premises of the new cosmological
argument. We are sympathetic to the conclusion that there necessarily
exists an intelligent and powerful creator of the actual universe, but we show
in Section 2 that the new cosmological argument cannot establish this claim.
Specifically, we show by reductio ad absurdum that the new argument is
unsound, and that every plausibly modified version of the argument is also
unsound.2 We close our discussion with a diagnosis of what went wrong in
the new cosmological argument. Our conclusion is that this intriguing new
argument promises considerably more than it can show.

Notes
1. See Richard M. Gale and Alexander R. Pruss, ‘A New Cosmological Argument’, Religious
Studies 35 (1999), pp. 461–476. Throughout our discussion, ‘the authors’ refers to
R.M. Gale and A.R. Pruss.
2. Graham Oppy has shown that the new cosmological argument makes assumptions no
weaker than older cosmological arguments. Specifically, he shows that the weak principle
of sufficient reason (below) entails the strong principle of sufficient reason. But the new
cosmological argument has far more serious problems. Among those problems is the fact
that the weak principle of sufficient reason entails what we might call the “ultra-strong
principle of sufficient reason” (i.e., that every world which has a possible explanation
q, necessarily has an explanation q). But cf. “On ‘A New Cosmological Argument’,”
Religious Studies 36 (2000), pp. 345–353.

I'm afraid I'm one of the guys who would prefer that an actual discussion of this be moved to the Philosophy section, but it looks like the Gale-Pruss Cosmological Argument is already toast. That would tend to reinforce its perceived utility as something with which to clobber people into submission by intellectual bullying, hoping that the average layman cannot come up with the refutations promised in Almeida and Judisch.