Thommo wrote:

Should it? I only excluded you because you didn't say it and as far as I can see everyone else who expressed an opinion did. I could have said "everyone" or "almost everyone" but since Ughaibu just mentioned your position I thought I'd be explicit.

Fair enough, I misunderstood. I thought you were saying that it was an argument against my earlier position and I couldn't see how it was relevant. My bad, continue.

ughaibu wrote:

trubble76 wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

trubble76 wrote:As for the future freely willed actions, I addressed this both at the beginning and the end of my previous post to you.

No you didn't, you asked me some irrelevant stuff about gods.

Oh, you didn't bother to actually read it then. Fine, suit yourself.

Here are the beginning and end of the post mentioned:

trubble76 wrote:As mentioned before, the classification of what is knowable and what isn't seems problematic.
If, in a non-deterministic world, the future is unknowable and thus beyond the ken of an omniscient god, this causes a mismatch between the omniscient god which satisfies your philosophical criteria and the omniscient god which is actually worshipped. How do you resolve this problem?

trubble76 wrote:Your position that no omniscient entity has to know the unknowable, seems sensible but the unknowable is problematic, isn't it? To rehash my initial point, if the future is unknowable, in order to allow omniscience and free will to coexist, does that not create a schism between your understanding of omniscience and that of actual believers? Are you describing a god in which no-one believes? If you have to create a new god in order to defend the proposition from claims of contradiction, surely that means the proposition is defeated anyway?

The first point, about what's knowable and what isn't has been dealt with, if there is no fact, then there is nothing to know. You've had your chance on that, if you can't understand it, tough shit.

You think what you did counts as "dealing with" it? What a low standard you appear to apply.

The rest is irrelevant questions about gods and believers in gods. You have not in any way addressed the question of future freely willed actions. You have exactly one remaining chance to do so.

Haha, I love how you sit on high, giving out chances like favours. As ridiculous as it is hilarious.

Nevertheless, as you have apparently failed to understand my points in even the most basic sense, I'll give you one more chance. Generous, aren't I?
You have addressed the meaning of omniscience, introducing the set of unknowable things, which is fine, let's accept it and move on. You seem (and please do correct me if I have misunderstood your position here) to be attempting to argue for the peaceful coexistence of omniscience and free will by claiming that omniscience doesn't apply to the future as the future is not yet determined and therefore in the set of unknowable things. Thus you claim to have both omniscience and free will.
My objection to this is the happily coexisting result does not bear any kind of resemblance to what is understood by the term "omniscience" in the context of a omniscient god who is supposed to have created us with our free will. It seems to me that the proposed god with it's proposed omniscience remains impossible but the god which you have created for the purposes of this argument is saved but looks particularly anaemic.
You have attempted to make them compatible by making omniscience fundamentally irrelevant and in doing so, you appear to have supported my position beautifully.

trubble76 wrote:My objection to this is the happily coexisting result does not bear any kind of resemblance to what is understood by the term "omniscience" in the context of a omniscient god who is supposed to have created us with our free will.

And this is, of course, irrelevant.

trubble76 wrote:It seems to me that the proposed god with it's proposed omniscience remains impossible but the god which you have created for the purposes of this argument is saved but looks particularly anaemic.

I haven't created a god, we are analysing the concepts of omniscience and free will, that's all.
Anyway, it seems likely that the explanation for you having posted idiocies such as that an omniscient entity must know the unknowable, is that you were doing so for religious reasons. Par for the course at this site.

Thommo wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

hackenslash wrote:There can't.

Which is why, in a non-determined world, the future freely willed actions of its inhabitants are unknowable, even to the omniscient.

Which oddly enough is what pretty much everyone except Mr. Samsa said from the start.

To be quite clear about this, particularly as it appears to be contradicted here:

hackenslash wrote:

ughaibu wrote:But in a non-determined world they have no truth value before they are made, so there is nothing to know, and if there is nothing to know, then "it" is unknowable.

This is where it falls down. If there is a point in time at which it is knowable, there is something to be known, even prior to the decision being made. To a timeless entity for which there is total temporal symmetry, there is no time at which this is not knowable.

1) does everyone, apart from the two who have yet to retract the claim that an omniscient entity must know the unknowable, hold that in a non-determined world, such as is required by incompatibilist realists about free will, there are future freely willed actions which are unknowable to any omniscient entity?
2) does everyone hold that in a determined world, such as compatibilist realists about free will would accept, an omniscient entity can know all facts obtaining at any time?
If so, what, if any, is the supposed inconsistency between omniscience and free will?

ughaibu wrote:

trubble76 wrote:My objection to this is the happily coexisting result does not bear any kind of resemblance to what is understood by the term "omniscience" in the context of a omniscient god who is supposed to have created us with our free will.

And this is, of course, irrelevant.

So you say. If you don't want to converse, why would you post? I suppose it's just easier to assert and run. See you then, thanks for your utter lack of contribution.

trubble76 wrote:It seems to me that the proposed god with it's proposed omniscience remains impossible but the god which you have created for the purposes of this argument is saved but looks particularly anaemic.

I haven't created a god, we are analysing the concepts of omniscience and free will, that's all.

Are my words really that difficult to understand? so much so that you can't even attempt to address my points? How dreary and pointless.

Anyway, it seems likely that the explanation for you having posted idiocies such as that an omniscient entity must know the unknowable, is that you were doing so for religious reasons. Par for the course at this site.

Okay, you really haven't understood have you? You clearly didn't even read my last post to you where I said the exact opposite to your dishonest claims.That's your last chance gone. Please stop clogging up this thread with your idiotic lack of comprehension. You obviously have nothing intelligent to add to the topic. If t makes you feel grander, please enact your threat about my last chance. Consider it spent, please give me no more chances. Please stop wasting both our times with your utterly foolish posts.

An omniscient entity would know all the outcomes to any possible action, as this constitutes the key defining feature of "omniscience" which is "to know everything." So there are two options.

1 - The omniscient entity perceives occurrences in multiple realities for all possible outcomes of an action. In that sense, individuals do not have free will, because all of the outcomes are predetermined and known by an omniscient entity.
2 - The omniscient entity perceives only the most likely outcome to any possible action, which is that action that occurs. As there is only one action and one outcome, both of which are known to the omniscient entity, there is no free will.

The moment you start applying any constraints to the omnisicent entity, it ceases to be so.

Sendraks wrote:An omniscient entity would know all the outcomes to any possible action, as this constitutes the key defining feature of "omniscience" which is "to know everything."

Then in a non-determined world, an omniscient entity knows both P and not-P, and for that to be the case P and not-P must be true. Your definition is self-contradictory.

ughaibu wrote:1) does everyone, apart from the two who have yet to retract the claim that an omniscient entity must know the unknowable, hold that in a non-determined world, such as is required by incompatibilist realists about free will, there are future freely willed actions which are unknowable to any omniscient entity?

I can't see what the other one of the two people you referred to said, but it's worth noting that what Hackenslash said in that quote doesn't show that he doesn't agree "Which is why, in a non-determined world, the future freely willed actions of its inhabitants are unknowable, even to the omniscient." since he thinks that omniscience in such a world is a contradiction assuming I've read him correctly - you also think there's a contradiction between omniscience so defined (and thus refuse to define it that way), so I can't see any major problem here.

Having already spoken for one more person than I probably should I won't endeavour to speak for everyone, but I certainly agree that (assuming there are freely willed actions) in a non-determined world there are future freely willed actions which are unknowable to any omniscient entity. This follows either from defining omniscience to exclude the unknowable or from a contradiction, depending how one has defined omniscience (it may have been defined with an implicitly determined world in mind - which is what Trubble76 seems to contend is usual practice on the part of theists in his experience).

ughaibu wrote:2) does everyone hold that in a determined world, such as compatibilist realists about free will would accept, an omniscient entity can know all facts obtaining at any time?
If so, what, if any, is the supposed inconsistency between omniscience and free will?

I'm not sure compatibilism requires a determined world, but again, speaking for myself I hold that in a determined world an omniscient entity can know all facts obtaining at any time.

The supposed inconsistency is in whether the (implicit) definition provided by various theists or schools of thought matches those you've assumed here. If you ask a theist you may well find they are (effectively) compatibilist AND believe in some form of libertarian free will, which doesn't fit the schema you've lain out.

Spot on.

Thommo wrote:you also think there's a contradiction between omniscience so defined (and thus refuse to define it that way)

No, I don't think there's a contradiction. An omniscient entity knows everything, regardless of whether it is in a determined or a non-determined world. However, the number of propositions that constitute "everything", is vastly different according to whether or not the world is determined, because a non-determined world has less facts.

Thommo wrote:If you ask a theist you may well find they are (effectively) compatibilist AND believe in some form of libertarian free will

Why the hell would I care if my interlocutor is a theist or an atheist? And regardless of their stance apropos gods, if their position involves libertarian free will in a determined world, then it is this mixing of ontologies in their position which is inconsistent, not any mooted inconsistency between omniscience and free will.

ughaibu wrote:

Thommo wrote:you also think there's a contradiction between omniscience so defined (and thus refuse to define it that way)

No, I don't think there's a contradiction. An omniscient entity knows everything, regardless of whether it is in a determined or a non-determined world. However, the number of propositions that constitute "everything", is vastly different according to whether or not the world is determined, because a non-determined world has less facts.

I think you've misread, I used the words "so defined" and you've then defined omniscience differently, albeit somewhat ambiguously - it would be quite possible to regard "knowing everything" as "knowing the outcome of all events".

ughaibu wrote:

Thommo wrote:If you ask a theist you may well find they are (effectively) compatibilist AND believe in some form of libertarian free will

Why the hell would I care if my interlocutor is a theist or an atheist?

How many atheists do you know of who go around asserting the existence of omniscient entities and claiming they know all sorts of things about them?

ughaibu wrote:And regardless of their stance apropos gods, if their position involves libertarian free will in a determined world, then it is this mixing of ontologies in their position which is inconsistent, not any mooted inconsistency between omniscience and free will.

"Implicit", "Effectively".

What you'll find is that they don't outright state "I believe in libertarian free will the way Ughaibu defines it and I believe in determinism the way Ughaibu defines it" but rather make statements from their own definitions and own beliefs, often about God and specific things God knows and can do. This might involve the contention that free will allows for us to choose free from all constraint between multiple physical possibilities all of which are physically realisable but that God will still know what we are going to choose in advance.

Thommo wrote:it would be quite possible to regard "knowing everything" as "knowing the outcome of all events".

But, this is constrained to that which is knowable, isn't it? No entity, omniscient or otherwise, can known the unknowable.

ughaibu wrote:Then in a non-determined world, an omniscient entity knows both P and not-P, and for that to be the case P and not-P must be true. Your definition is self-contradictory.

If you'd read the rest of my post, rather than cherry picked one part of it, you'd see that there is nothing self-contradictory.

Off you go.

ughaibu wrote:But, this is constrained to that which is knowable, isn't it? No entity, omniscient or otherwise, can known the unknowable.

Nothing is unknowable to an omniscient entity. Hence, as per my post, they know all possible outcomes. They are not limited to the view of a single timestream unless they choose to do so.

ughaibu wrote:

Thommo wrote:it would be quite possible to regard "knowing everything" as "knowing the outcome of all events".

But, this is constrained to that which is knowable, isn't it? No entity, omniscient or otherwise, can known the unknowable.

I can see why you say that - to avoid the contradiction. I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm saying that the question in the OP of the thread assumes a certain context in which people may not manage to avoid the contradiction (after all the thread is asking this very question about whether people avoid it!).

It would be like discussing whether "water" can be "dry" or whether that's a contradiction. A lot of people are just going to assume a definition of "dry" (something like "not in contact with water") and say that of course dry water is a contradiction. If we apply the assumption that we don't want a contradiction then we can of course redefine "dry" (let's say "a non-water substance is dry if it is not in contact with water"), but unless this is what is actually meant by people using the word "dry" it's not clear what this avoidance of the contradiction achieves.

We can easily end up with two people, one saying they contradict and one disagreeing and all it comes down to is that they mean different things by "dry". If we substitute "omniscience" back in, I think that adequately describes what has inadvertently taken place in this thread.

Edit: Omitted words all over the place. Needs more coffee.

ughaibu wrote:

Thommo wrote:it would be quite possible to regard "knowing everything" as "knowing the outcome of all events".

But, this is constrained to that which is knowable, isn't it? No entity, omniscient or otherwise, can known the unknowable.

Only unknowable according to a particular definition of free will (or other indeterminacy) that is 'impossible to predict'.

Sendraks wrote:Nothing is unknowable to an omniscient entity.

So an omniscient entity can know that you're posting uninteresting naive nonsense. Fair enough.

GrahamH wrote:Only unknowable according to a particular definition of free will

No. Unknowable under any model of knowledge which restricts knowable propositions to true propositions. Haven't you been following the thread?

ughaibu wrote:So an omniscient entity can know that you're posting uninteresting naive nonsense. Fair enough.

In the same way that the omniscient entity knows you are moving the goalposts to support your argument and also rather ruefully noting your lack of faith in their omniscience. For which they may decide to send you to the fiery place.

If they existed.

Of course.

And also for your failure to respond coherently to the point made.
Can you explain why an omniscient entity wouldn't know the outcome to all possible actions? Given that they know everything.

Sendraks wrote:For which they may decide to send you to the fiery place.

What in the living fuck are you on about?