Mr.Samsa wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:So if I record you making a choice, then play it back and correctly predict what choice you made, then I've negated free will?

No, but you didn't know what the choice would be before it was made, you didn't predict it.

That's because I exist in time. If I existed outside of time, then what I know in the future will the same as what I know now and in the past.

First, where did the qualifier of existing "outside of time" come from? The question is about omniscience and free-will, not about a particular deity that is omniscient.

Secondly, the instant that the omniscient being entered our space-time, then that knowledge of the future would also exist in our space-time. In other words, if God has EVER been within this space-time, then there is no free-will possible after that point.

And, since another attribute of God is that he is also omnipresent, he does exist within this space-time as well as every place else.

That means that the knowledge of what you will do tomorrow is known in this space-time and that you can never do anything other than what God knows you will do.

If you can never do anything other that what God knows you will do, then you have no free-will.
If you can never do anything other than what God knows you will do, then every apparent choice that you make is nothing more than an illusion because you have no choice because you cannot do anything other than what God knows you will do.

GrahamH wrote:To consider 'a timeless omniscient god' invokes 'tense-less facts' (B-Theory). To talk of 'prediction' or 'fore-knowledge' is to stick with tensed facts (A-Theory). Any tensed proposition can be converted to a tense-less proposition.

Knowledge of every fact about the universe could be expressed in tense-less propositions.

No, it can't unless everything in the universe is eternal and unchanging.

Knowledge about anything that is not eternal and unchanging is temporally bound. It either exists (now), it did exist, or it will exist.

MrFungus420 wrote:

GrahamH wrote:To consider 'a timeless omniscient god' invokes 'tense-less facts' (B-Theory). To talk of 'prediction' or 'fore-knowledge' is to stick with tensed facts (A-Theory). Any tensed proposition can be converted to a tense-less proposition.

Knowledge of every fact about the universe could be expressed in tense-less propositions.

No, it can't unless everything in the universe is eternal and unchanging.

Knowledge about anything that is not eternal and unchanging is temporally bound. It either exists (now), it did exist, or it will exist.

I'm no expert on A/B-theories of time, but the link I gave states that tensed facts can be converted to tense-less facts.
A vs B Theory is not, AFAIK, a settled issue, either way.

Did you read the link? Do you understand B-Theory? Can you refute B-Theory?

Do you dispute that the terms of this topic take an A-Theory view of time?

IEP wrote:According to the newer B-theory of Mellor and Smart, if I am speaking to you and say, “It is now midnight,” then this sentence admittedly cannot be translated into tenseless terminology without loss of meaning, but the truth conditions can be explained with tenseless terminology. The truth conditions of “It is now midnight” are that my utterance occurs at the same time as your hearing the utterance, which in turn is the same time as when our standard clock declares the time to be midnight in our reference frame. In brief, it’s true because it’s uttered at the same time as the event it is about. Notice that no tensed facts were appealed to in the explanation of those truth conditions. Similarly, an advocate of the new tenseless theory could say it is not the pastness of the painful event that explains why I say, “Thank goodness that’s over.” I say it because I believe that the time of the occurrence of that utterance is greater than the time of the occurrence of the painful event, and because I am glad about this. Of course I’d be even gladder if there were no pain at any time. I may not be consciously thinking about the time of the utterance when I make it; nevertheless that time is what helps explain what I am glad about. Notice that appeal to tensed terminology was removed in that explanation.

ughaibu wrote:
Are you seriously maintaining that omniscience implies knowledge of the answer of all unformulated questions ?

If knowledge is not absolute then omniscience cannot be true and that would include unformulated questions

Since the definition of it is that which knows everything and so that would also then include the unknowable

This may seem like a logical paradox but it does not actually invalidate the definition of what omniscience is

Thommo wrote:A proposition is unknowable in the event it can't be assigned the state "true" or the state "false" under that definition.

Bullshit! If an assertion can be assigned a truth value, then that assertion either constitutes or expresses a proposition. If I am at home then the assertion "I am not at home" can be assessed as false, and as I am at home, it cannot be known that I am not at home.

surreptitious57 wrote:

ughaibu wrote:Are you seriously maintaining that omniscience implies knowledge of the answer of all unformulated questions?

Since the definition of it is that which knows everything and so that would also then include the unknowable

Of course it wouldn't!!!! You've written yourself "knows everything", in the case of the unknowable there is no thing to be known. How the hell can anyone not understand something this fucking simple?

Normally when there's a bunch of people posting this kind of embarrassingly idiotic bullshit, I've been able to figure out, eventually, the motives behind it, but this thread has me really puzzled. There's no threat to scientism, you're already engaging in metaphysics, you're not in any danger of overlapping with religion, so what the fuck is it all about? The only thing I can think of is a desire to disagree with Mick about everything.

Could it be you are using an esoteric definition of "knowledge" and "knowable"

A better way to say that would be that omniscience invalidates any notion of unknowability
To assume otherwise is false because if omniscience is true then everything must be known
So at that point the concept of unknowability no longer exists even in a hypothetical sense
So I would not say that with omniscience the unknowable is known for that is just illogical

scott1328 wrote:Could it be you are using an esoteric definition of "knowledge" and "knowable"

No. Knowledge is usually held to be a species of JTB, so only true propositions can be known, and it is propositional knowledge that is relevant for this question. If you think otherwise, specify a model of knowledge and justify using it.

ughaibu wrote:

scott1328 wrote:Could it be you are using an esoteric definition of "knowledge" and "knowable"

No. Knowledge is usually held to be a species of JTB, so only true propositions can be known, and it is propositional knowledge that is relevant for this question. If you think otherwise, specify a model of knowledge and justify using it.

The problems with JTB are well known. I.e. Gettier counter examples.

scott1328 wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

scott1328 wrote:Could it be you are using an esoteric definition of "knowledge" and "knowable"

No. Knowledge is usually held to be a species of JTB, so only true propositions can be known, and it is propositional knowledge that is relevant for this question. If you think otherwise, specify a model of knowledge and justify using it.

The problems with JTB are well known. I.e. Gettier counter examples.

"A species of JTB", or are you suggesting that epistemologists have generally reacted to Gettier by removing the truth condition for knowledge? If so, please specify the model of knowledge which is both truth independent and has sufficient consistency to allow future knowledge.

Omniscience can hardly be 'belief' and could not require 'justification'. Surely omniscience is absolute direct knowledge of the facts.
If there is any uncertainty, if the knowledge is only probably true, that implies unknowns and therefore it is not omniscience.

scott1328 wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

scott1328 wrote:Could it be you are using an esoteric definition of "knowledge" and "knowable"

No. Knowledge is usually held to be a species of JTB, so only true propositions can be known, and it is propositional knowledge that is relevant for this question. If you think otherwise, specify a model of knowledge and justify using it.

The problems with JTB are well known. I.e. Gettier counter examples.

Yeah...not so much.

Every Gettier counter-example that I have seen seems to be fallacious. According to Wikipedia his two cases are:

Wikipedia wrote:Case 1: Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as it happens, Smith (unknowingly and by sheer chance) also had 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" was justified and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.

This one pulls a bait-and-switch. The belief was not simply "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket". The belief was, "Jones will get the job and he has 10 coins in his pocket". If Jones does not get the job, then the belief is not true, therefore, no JTB.

Wikipedia wrote:Case 2:
Smith, it is claimed by the hidden interlocutor, has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of disjunction introduction) that "Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona", even though Smith has no knowledge whatsoever about the location of Brown.

In fact, Jones does not own a Ford, but by sheer coincidence, Brown really is in Barcelona. Again, Smith had a belief that was true and justified, but not knowledge.

And again.

"Jones owns a Ford" may have been justified, but it was not true, therefore, it is not a JTB.

So, how is it that examples of things that are NOT justified true beliefs can be examples of problems WITH justified true beliefs?

ughaibu wrote:

Thommo wrote:A proposition is unknowable in the event it can't be assigned the state "true" or the state "false" under that definition.

Bullshit! If an assertion can be assigned a truth value, then that assertion either constitutes or expresses a proposition. If I am at home then the assertion "I am not at home" can be assessed as false, and as I am at home, it cannot be known that I am not at home.

surreptitious57 wrote:

ughaibu wrote:Are you seriously maintaining that omniscience implies knowledge of the answer of all unformulated questions?

Since the definition of it is that which knows everything and so that would also then include the unknowable

Of course it wouldn't!!!! You've written yourself "knows everything", in the case of the unknowable there is no thing to be known. How the hell can anyone not understand something this fucking simple?

Normally when there's a bunch of people posting this kind of embarrassingly idiotic bullshit, I've been able to figure out, eventually, the motives behind it, but this thread has me really puzzled. There's no threat to scientism, you're already engaging in metaphysics, you're not in any danger of overlapping with religion, so what the fuck is it all about? The only thing I can think of is a desire to disagree with Mick about everything.

If you are struggling to divine a hidden motive, perhaps that means there is no hidden motive? Perhaps it is not actually idiotic bullshit to argue that omniscience and free will are mutually exclusive? Perhaps it is actually idiotic bullshit to argue that they are compatible? Perhaps it is idiotic bullshit to scream and cry and shit on the chess board when you are disagreed with? Have you considered experimenting with debating styles that don't involve little hissy fits every couple of posts?

If you want to keep discussing the topic, you could try explaining more about how omniscience as you see it works in a non-determinate universe. If an omniscient being has no knowledge of the future, would that being still be thought of as omniscient in the normal theological sense? Would it still qualify as a god if it didn't know anything about the future? It seems to me that adopting this method of combining omniscience and free will is a little like tearing off a piece of a jigsaw puzzle to make it fit. In doing so, we miss the point of the exercise. You seem to have torn off a piece of omniscience in order to make it fit with free will and in doing so have gone some way to showing that the two concepts (as commonly understood) are really incompatible.

What do you think? Do you think the "clarifications" of the meaning of "omniscience" are unproblematic? Or would you prefer to continue your proclamations of the superiority of your understanding?

Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

The un-tensed facts of this scenario, with a bit less vagueness:

On Wednesday 9th April 2014 Smith, a man with 10 coins in his pocket, is appointed as head bottle washer at XYZ Co of Winchester, UK .
On Monday 7th April 2014 Jones, a man with 10 coins in his pocket, applies for a job as head bottle washer at XYZ Co of Winchester, UK.
On the morning of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, interviews Smith and Jones for the position of head bottle washer.
On the evening of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, decides to appoint Smith as head bottle washer.
On the afternoon of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, decides to appoint Jones as head bottle washer.

ughaibu wrote:

Thommo wrote:A proposition is unknowable in the event it can't be assigned the state "true" or the state "false" under that definition.

Bullshit! If an assertion can be assigned a truth value, then that assertion either constitutes or expresses a proposition. If I am at home then the assertion "I am not at home" can be assessed as false, and as I am at home, it cannot be known that I am not at home.

Are you upset that I used proposition in either a loose or a logical rather than linguistic sense there? Fine, substitute the word "statement" or "assertion".

As it stands you've engaged in an embarrassing rant simply because you misunderstand what is said. The misunderstanding is ok, these things happen. The rant, well that seems a bridge too far.

GrahamH wrote:

Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

The un-tensed facts of this scenario, with a bit less vagueness:

On Wednesday 9th April 2014 Smith, a man with 10 coins in his pocket, is appointed as head bottle washer at XYZ Co of Winchester, UK .
On Monday 7th April 2014 Jones, a man with 10 coins in his pocket, applies for a job as head bottle washer at XYZ Co of Winchester, UK.
On the morning of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, interviews Smith and Jones for the position of head bottle washer.
On the evening of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, decides to appoint Smith as head bottle washer.
On the afternoon of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, decides to appoint Jones as head bottle washer.

Untensed? You have merely used a moving present to keep all verbs in the present tense, which is cheating, IMO!

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

The un-tensed facts of this scenario, with a bit less vagueness:

On Wednesday 9th April 2014 Smith, a man with 10 coins in his pocket, is appointed as head bottle washer at XYZ Co of Winchester, UK .
On Monday 7th April 2014 Jones, a man with 10 coins in his pocket, applies for a job as head bottle washer at XYZ Co of Winchester, UK.
On the morning of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, interviews Smith and Jones for the position of head bottle washer.
On the evening of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, decides to appoint Smith as head bottle washer.
On the afternoon of Tuesday 8th April 2014 Walker, HR manager of XYZ Co of Winchester, UK, decides to appoint Jones as head bottle washer.

Untensed? You have merely used a moving present to keep all verbs in the present tense, which is cheating, IMO!

English is a tensed language, and it's hard to write English sentences without verbs . By all means remove 'is'. These are simply statements of fact without reference to a time of forming those statements. They are timelessly true or false.
Rather than 'decided', 'decides', 'will decide' we could write 'choice:...' and state the decision, who, time and place etc.

We can express propositions as absolute, rather than relative to a person, time or place of formation, so that moving in time or space, or changing identity do not affect the truth value.

trubble76 wrote:Perhaps it is not actually idiotic bullshit to argue that omniscience and free will are mutually exclusive?

I didn't suggest that it is. The most conspicuously idiotic bullshit on this thread is the claim that an omniscient entity knows the unknowable. You get exactly one more chance, from me, to get your head around why this is idiotic.
Assume that Sorensen is correct and that whether or not a person is bald is decided exactly by the presence or absence of a single hair. Of course, for we fallible humans, who suffer from vagueness, it's impossible tell whether or not a certain person is bald, in many cases. But for an omniscient entity there is no problem, they infallibly know that any given person is bald, if they are, or is not bald, if they aren't. So, the assertion "the present king of France is bald" could be awarded the correct truth value by an omniscient entity, and if it were true the omniscient entity would know that the present king of France is bald, whereas if it were false, the omniscient entity would know that the present king of France is not bald. The problem is that there is no present king of France, so the assertion "the present king of France is bald" is neither true nor false, so it does not constitute or express a proposition. And this is exactly the case with the future freely willed actions of agents in a non-determined world, those actions do not exist, so assertions about them do not express propositions.
Presumably you do understand that no omniscient entity has to know either that the present king of France is bald or that the present king of France is not bald? Or to put it in general terms, no omniscient entity has to know the unknowable.

An omniscient entity would have to know the baldness of every king of France.

ughaibu wrote:

trubble76 wrote:Perhaps it is not actually idiotic bullshit to argue that omniscience and free will are mutually exclusive?

I didn't suggest that it is. The most conspicuously idiotic bullshit on this thread is the claim that an omniscient entity knows the unknowable. You get exactly one more chance, from me, to get your head around why this is idiotic.

My gratitude is endless, oh wise and beneficent leader!
As mentioned before, the classification of what is knowable and what isn't seems problematic.
If, in a non-deterministic world, the future is unknowable and thus beyond the ken of an omniscient god, this causes a mismatch between the omniscient god which satisfies your philosophical criteria and the omniscient god which is actually worshipped. How do you resolve this problem?

Assume that Sorensen is correct and that whether or not a person is bald is decided exactly by the presence or absence of a single hair. Of course, for we fallible humans, who suffer from vagueness, it's impossible tell whether or not a certain person is bald, in many cases. But for an omniscient entity there is no problem, they infallibly know that any given person is bald, if they are, or is not bald, if they aren't. So, the assertion "the present king of France is bald" could be awarded the correct truth value by an omniscient entity, and if it were true the omniscient entity would know that the present king of France is bald, whereas if it were false, the omniscient entity would know that the present king of France is not bald. The problem is that there is no present king of France, so the assertion "the present king of France is bald" is neither true nor false, so it does not constitute or express a proposition. And this is exactly the case with the future freely willed actions of agents in a non-determined world, those actions do not exist, so assertions about them do not express propositions.
Presumably you do understand that no omniscient entity has to know either that the present king of France is bald or that the present king of France is not bald? Or to put it in general terms, no omniscient entity has to know the unknowable.

That would seem to me to be a problem with poorly phrased propositions rather than with the limits of knowledge. Surely an omniscient being, when faced with the assertion "the present king of France is bald" and knowing the facts of the matter, would say that the assertion is false. As there is no present King of France, he cannot be bald.
As I pointed out earlier, the definition of "omniscience" tends to revolve around "unlimited knowledge", I'm not sure how trick questions, like your example, impact on that.

Your position that no omniscient entity has to know the unknowable, seems sensible but the unknowable is problematic, isn't it? To rehash my initial point, if the future is unknowable, in order to allow omniscience and free will to coexist, does that not create a schism between your understanding of omniscience and that of actual believers? Are you describing a god in which no-one believes? If you have to create a new god in order to defend the proposition from claims of contradiction, surely that means the proposition is defeated anyway?