It leads me to wonder if a being "outside of time" could interact with a Universe at various points in time to makes its observations and not change that Universe in some way.

GrahamH wrote:It only has foreknowledge if it is located in time before the events it knows about. I could know every detail of every frame of a movie, but I'm not in the movie. I don't exist in movie-time. This is obviously a weak analogy, but hopefully makes the point that foreknowledge is a relative concept that can only apply to a temporal being located in time before some event located later on that same time axis.

I don't buy it. If it is located outside time, then all times are equivalent, thus it knows at all times, regardless of time, in fact. Seems simple enough to me.

Either way, probably best to move on to more interesting things, not least because this entity can't exist outside time, so the point's rather moot.

scott1328 wrote:It leads me to wonder if a being "outside of time" could interact with a Universe at various points in time to makes its observations and not change that Universe in some way.

That would seem to fall foul of grandfather paradox type temporal loops. At least it opens the possibility that temporal feedback could be divergent so that the state of such a world is never decided.

An alternative I suggested earlier was for god to create infinitely many worlds where only those that meet some criteria will exist. Like rolling lost of cosmic dice and keeping the pairs. Does god eliminating any world where you made the 'wrong choice' mean that you had no free will at all? Perhaps.

hackenslash wrote:
If it can access all of time then it has foreknowledge and free will is defeated

Time may actually be infinite so that would invalidate that argument right away

But even if it is not is it logically sound to talk of God existing at the end of it anyway

Does that mean that his existence is finite in which case he cannot be omniscient for ever

Or his existence is infinite and so transcends time and is atemporal which makes no sense at all

Because if time stops then logic suggests nothing can exist beyond that point so that would include God

surreptitious57 wrote:

hackenslash wrote:
If it can access all of time then it has foreknowledge and free will is defeated

Time may actually be infinite so that would invalidate that argument right away

But even if it is not is it logically sound to talk of God existing at the end of it anyway

Does that mean that his existence is finite in which case he cannot be omniscient for ever

Or his existence is infinite and so transcends time and is atemporal which makes no sense at all

Because if time stops then logic suggests nothing can exist beyond that point so that would include God

The notion is not actually that god exists at the end of time. That was an into to a view as at the end of time. combine that with one theological proposition: that god created time and space. Accepting that for the sake of argument, such a god is not necessarily inside the time it creates.

Such a god's existence would not be measurable in temporal terms on our timeline. What it is your lifespan in the world of the Matrix? You don't live in the Matrix timeline. It's a meaningless question.

It doesn't seem helpful to postulate infinite time. The issue is only the free will of sentient beings. Even if we had good reason to suppose infinite time there could be a finite period when free will agents exist.

hackenslash wrote:this entity can't exist outside time

Well, if the universe isn't deterministic (i.e., predictable from initial conditions), then it seems to me that this entitity couldn't exist at any particular time in our universe either. Why? Because in order for it to be omniscient, it would have to be able to represent all this knowledge internally somehow, and if it is in the universe it would need to represent all the past and future of the entire universe, plus the universe at that time, using some subset of the universe at that time. That's not possible.

Some kind of peeking into time seems to be required for omniscience.

Mick wrote:

trubble76 wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:

SafeAsMilk wrote:It does. If someone knows what you are going to choose, to the extent that you cannot do other than make that choice, then you can't be said to have free will, only the illusion of it.

I don't see how that's true when applied to an entity that's supposed to exist outside of time. Essentially (as I say in the other thread) it's like me recording you making a choice and then watching the video over and over again whilst perfectly predicting which choice you'll make.

Being able to look back in time to see what you did freely choose cannot contradict the concept of free will.

If the outcome is already known then any choice is not a choice, surely? In a binary choice, yes or no, if someone already knows that the outcome will be a yes, then the option of a no is not available, meaning there is no choice and no free will. That's how it seems to me anyway.

I wonder if we should distinguish between causal determinism and fatalism. Even if everything I do is pre-determined, that I am fated to do those things does not suggest that something, even within my own mind, makes or forces (causal verbs) me to do those things. In the absence of this, why think that my free will is violated?

Because there is no free choice, only the appearance of a free-choice. I am happy to accept that omniscience can co-exist with the appearance of free will. However, if the outcome of a choice is known before the choice is made, there is no real choice and no real free will. The two concepts are mutually exclusive.

Mick wrote:

trubble76 wrote:If a choice has been observed to have already been made, then it cannot be made differently. In other words, there is no choice.

I wonder if you're not confusing necessity de dicto and de re.

It must be that if the some future contingent is true, then that future contingent is true. Yet that does not suggest that it must be that that future contingent is true if some future contingent is true. Formally:

[](P --->P) does not imply P-->[]P

I am not familiar with those phrases, if you want a specific response, you will have to use more accessible English. In general however, if the outcome of a choice is already known before the choice is made, there can only be one outcome. There is no choice, only the appearance of a choice.

Mick wrote:Even if everything I do is pre-determined, that I am fated to do those things does not suggest that something, even within my own mind, makes or forces (causal verbs) me to do those things. In the absence of this, why think that my free will is violated?

If 'something within my own mind' is the cause of an action then can it be said that this 'makes or forces me'? How are you separating 'me' and 'mind' here?

The idea of free will is precisely that your own mind causes your action.

If your own mind is made up, and nothing external to your mind has coerced your will then how is your own free will not free for being consistent to itself?

If, for reasons of my free will, I like ice cream then it seems that some here would say my will is not free if I chose ice cream. Do I have to chose what I don't want to be free?

trubble76 wrote:

Mick wrote:

trubble76 wrote:If a choice has been observed to have already been made, then it cannot be made differently. In other words, there is no choice.

I wonder if you're not confusing necessity de dicto and de re.

It must be that if the some future contingent is true, then that future contingent is true. Yet that does not suggest that it must be that that future contingent is true if some future contingent is true. Formally:

[](P --->P) does not imply P-->[]P

I am not familiar with those phrases, if you want a specific response, you will have to use more accessible English. In general however, if the outcome of a choice is already known before the choice is made, there can only be one outcome. There is no choice, only the appearance of a choice.

All it says is that knowledge that there will be an outcome does not prove which specific outcome it will be.

Whether that actually addresses the situation of knowledge of what the specific outcome will be is another matter.

Mr.Samsa wrote:

trubble76 wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:

But the only way it was possible for the knowledge to exist at all is that the choice was freely made. We have a Back to the Future situation going on here.

You mean a contradiction? Yes, very much my point.

There's no contradiction there.

You are saying that a free-choice was necessary in order for the knowledge to exist. The existence of the knowledge of the outcome of the choice before that choice is made precludes the choice being free. Personally, I don't see the necessity of the "initial" free choice, all that is required is for a choice to be made, I don't see why it needs to be free.

trubble76 wrote:

The argument is based on the capabilities of a magical entity, any argument that attempts to exclude such abilities is meaningless. My arguments are convincing because they are logically consistent and based on sound reasoning. The truth of the concepts discussed is entirely irrelevant.

I do not find your arguments the least bit convincing, nor logically consistent, nor based on sound reasoning. You may award yourself those honours but I doubt they'll be much applause.

To be honest, I'm not that impressed with your logical skills in this thread so I'm not that hurt by your judgement of the validity of my arguments.

That's great. I feel similarly about your skills. How nice.

The argument is based on omniscience, you have introduced some other supposed attributes of this being and are insisting they must be accepted as a matter of definition. I am not convinced you are right to do so. The funny thing is, even if we accept the necessity of your extra attributes, the outcome is still contradictory and we are forced to reject the suggestion.

I haven't introduced any "attributes", it's how god is defined. I even asked you for other definitions of god that didn't include it and you didn't present any. The discussion is about omniscience, yes, and since my arguments undeniably demonstrate that there is no incompatibility in one conception of it then there cannot be a necessary incompatibility.

Really? Keep trying.
I do not need to provide a definition of a god in order to question yours.
Your arguments do not undeniably demonstrate that there is no incompatibility in one conception of omniscience, you seem unduly keen to slap yourself on the back.

The argument stemmed from an explicit comment about God (with the capital) and my comments have only centred around a timeless omniscient being. However, since I've demonstrated that this type of god doesn't contradict free will then I've necessarily shown that omniscience doesn't (necessarily) contradict free will in the broader sense as well (black swans and all that).

No one needs to agree on the attributes at all, just the fact that there is no contradiction when discussing a timeless god.

Well, you've made a lot of shit up, perhaps you think that counts? Your argument is essentially "I can imagine a hypothetical being that can use magic to defeat causality and logic, therefore I win".
Somewhat unsurprisingly, I remain unimpressed.

You have demonstrated nothing of the sort.
Again, it was you that introduced the concept of timelessness, up until then we were simply looking at omniscience but even with the timelessness accepted, the result is a contradiction. It does not work, nor can it.

Empty assertions in the face of my logic which disproves you..

Oh logic? Is that what you call it? Charming. I don't consider it an empty assertion to point out that a choice with only one possible outcome is not really a choice at all. Even when you start arguing about magic.

trubble76 wrote:
I have never ever seen a single definition of god which stated anything about Cause and Effect simultaneously being true and untrue.

You've never heard of a god existing outside of time?! Wow, okay. Again, please educate me on these concepts of god.

Well, I've heard plenty of descriptions of god working magic, it rarely makes for a convincing position in the discussion of logic.

trubble76 wrote:As we both agree that it is absurd and incoherent, it necessarily means that any hypothesis resting on it must similarly be absurd and incoherent, and that is exactly what we find with your argument about omniscience and free will not being mutually exclusive.

No, you are jumping the gun (as I've already explained). We can reject the argument as whole because the initial concepts and premises are absurd and incoherent, yes, but that has nothing to do with a conflict between omniscience and free will. If we want to show that that conflict exists, then we need to accept the premises and concepts for the sake of argument. When we do that, my argument disproves the claim of an incompatibility.

No, it does no such thing. If you want me to except the possibility of magic making anything possible therefore proving that anything is possible, then I'm afraid you will be disappointed.
As it stands, your argument is utterly worthless in demonstrating any sort of compatibility between omniscience and free will.

trubble76 wrote:If we are willing to grant that magic means anything could be true and logic need not apply, then what is the point in the discussion, you can just skip all the middle part and claim that omniscience and free will are compatible because of magic. That seems to be the thrust of your argument anyway.

We don't grant that magic means anything could be true. We are granting that even supernatural entities need to be logically consistent, which is what my position is based on.

No, nothing about magical beings using magic to make two incompatible things compatible is logically consistent. Your position is based on the acceptance of magic and literally anything being able to claimed as true. It's ridiculous.

trubble76 wrote:
No, I don't think so.
If he knows it before you choose it, then you cannot choose anything else, you are not free to pick the other options, you have no choice and no free will.

Except he only knows it because you chose it, freely.

No, if he knew the outcome before the choice, there was no choice because the other option was unavailable. In the place of the free choice was the appearance of a free choice which was in fact not free.

trubble76 wrote:
Can't you read?

I can. I can also avoid personal attacks. Can you?

Yes, I try to. I was not implying illiteracy on your part, I was hinting as to where the evidence was to be found.

trubble76 wrote:
That is clearly not my complaint, why do you keep repeating the same inaccurate representation of my argument even after correction? My complaint is not that the choice is fixed after being chosen, it is that the choice is fixed before being chosen. It must be fixed before because that knowledge is in existence before the choice is made.

If you keep making the same flawed argument then that's all I can respond to. If you disagree with your own position then stop presenting it.

I already pointed out where you were going wrong but you keep repeating your mistake. Clearly I don't disagree with my own position, I disagree with yours.

trubble76 wrote:

It seems to work okay for you against me. Annoying isn't it?

Except I explicitly and demonstrably don't hold the position Hack is assigning to me. You have repeatedly stated the position I summarised you as holding. You still haven't said anything that contradicts it.

No, I have not. I keep pointing out where you are going wrong and you keep repeating the error. I hesitate to make any assumptions about your motives for doing so but I would ask you again to stop doing it.

Thommo wrote:

trubble76 wrote:

Mick wrote:

trubble76 wrote:If a choice has been observed to have already been made, then it cannot be made differently. In other words, there is no choice.

I wonder if you're not confusing necessity de dicto and de re.

It must be that if the some future contingent is true, then that future contingent is true. Yet that does not suggest that it must be that that future contingent is true if some future contingent is true. Formally:

[](P --->P) does not imply P-->[]P

I am not familiar with those phrases, if you want a specific response, you will have to use more accessible English. In general however, if the outcome of a choice is already known before the choice is made, there can only be one outcome. There is no choice, only the appearance of a choice.

All it says is that knowledge that there will be an outcome does not prove which specific outcome it will be.

Whether that actually addresses the situation of knowledge of what the specific outcome will be is another matter.

If that's what it means, it seems a silly pointless waste of words to me. The omniscience we are discussing doesn't relate to claims about knowledge about whether or not a choice is made but about the specific and unalterable knowledge of what the outcome will be.

trubble76 wrote:If that's what it means, it seems a silly pointless waste of words to me. The omniscience we are discussing doesn't relate to claims about knowledge about whether or not a choice is made but about the specific and unalterable knowledge of what the outcome will be.

I'm inclined to agree.

Or to pseudo-formalise it and follow suit.

If "P" is an axiom of your system, then your system proves "[]P". Well, in a normal modal logic at least.

If anyone knows an omniscient entity, maybe they could just ask it?
It's answer will of course begin with, I knew you were going to ask me that...

Surely "timelessness" renders impotence? For without time, action is rendered a meaningless concept.

trubble76 wrote:In general however, if the outcome of a choice is already known before the choice is made, there can only be one outcome.

Compatibilists disagree, they hold that there can be free will in a determined world, so they have no problem with future knowledge.

trubble76 wrote:There is no choice, only the appearance of a choice.

But you appear to be an incompatibilist, you appear to hold that there can be no free will in a determined world. This entails that if there are freely willed actions then there are no future truths, so there is no future knowledge. In short, omniscience doesn't include knowledge of the future.
Clearly compatibilism and incompatibilism are inconsistent with each other, so, if you think that omniscience is inconsistent with free will, you have to keep them separate and deal with the problem within consistent frameworks.

ughaibu wrote:

trubble76 wrote:In general however, if the outcome of a choice is already known before the choice is made, there can only be one outcome.

Compatibilists disagree, they hold that there can be free will in a determined world, so they have no problem with future knowledge.

They'd have to demonstrate how that's possible.
Merely asserting it is, doesn't make it so.

ughaibu wrote:

trubble76 wrote:There is no choice, only the appearance of a choice.

But you appear to be an incompatibilist, you appear to hold that there can be no free will in a determined world. This entails that if there are freely willed actions then there are no future truths, so there is no future knowledge. In short, omniscience doesn't include knowledge of the future.

Correction.
In short, omniscience cannot exist in a determined world.
What you're saying is, in a flat universe 3D isn't 3 dimensional.

ughaibu wrote:

trubble76 wrote:In general however, if the outcome of a choice is already known before the choice is made, there can only be one outcome.

Compatibilists disagree, they hold that there can be free will in a determined world, so they have no problem with future knowledge.

Sure. Those compatibilists would have to give some pretty strong reasons to agree with them though. The idea seems pretty nonsensical to me. I haven't seen any strong reasons to agree yet.

trubble76 wrote:There is no choice, only the appearance of a choice.

But you appear to be an incompatibilist, you appear to hold that there can be no free will in a determined world. This entails that if there are freely willed actions then there are no future truths, so there is no future knowledge. In short, omniscience doesn't include knowledge of the future.

Omniscience that doesn't include knowledge of the future doesn't sound like omniscience to me. I thought omniscience meant knowing everything without exception, what do you take it to mean?

Clearly compatibilism and incompatibilism are inconsistent with each other, so, if you think that omniscience is inconsistent with free will, you have to keep them separate and deal with the problem within consistent frameworks.

I don't understand this part. I am arguing that the concepts of omniscience and free will are mutually exclusive. Knowledge of the outcome of a choice means that the alternative options are not available to be chosen, which in turn means that the free choice is not free, it only appears to be free. If, somehow, the chooser were able to exert his free will and choose an alternative, the prior knowledge would be proved wrong and omniscience falsified. I don't know if that is what you mean by dealing with the problem within consistent frameworks or not but it is the only rational conclusion, in my opinion.

Compatibilists don't define free will the way I did. It's trivially obvious that if you are content that there can be a free choice where only one outcome is possible then free will and determinism don't conflict.

If you worry only about identical external factors (i.e. the current internal mental states and their physical correlates can vary) at the moment of choice then it's clear we all make lots of free choices (which may or may not be determined in advance, we don't know). The difficulty here is that the definition potentially captures too much.