A Question
Moderators: kiore, Blip, The_Metatron
Calilasseia wrote:Since the entire magic man hypothesis is nothing more than a grand exercise in assertionism, it can safely be discarded, until a supernaturalist does the hard work of providing real evidence for such an entity. Even if a supernaturalist succeeds in this endeavour, there's no prior reason to suggest that said evidence will point to the magic entity of Aquinas, and adherents of Aquinas' particular brand of apologetics, which again pushes the entire question being asked above into the realm of speculation and fantasy. Not that this will stop supernaturalists from pretending otherwise, and pretending that their apologetic spells magically dictate how reality works.
Nebogipfel wrote:Isn't Natural Law just deriving an ought from an is?
(Not a rhetorical question BTW...)
Spinozasgalt wrote:Here it is, roughly.
Natural Law views of ethics are often theistic and the ones I have in mind here take the NL of Aquinas as paradigmatic: they reject particularism in favour of a principled approach to the right, hold that something's being good is best construed as its being perfecting or completing of a being, and affirm something like the natural goodness found in the work of Philippa Foot. I think some of these views make a stronger appeal to natural teleology than others (contrast Finnis with Feser with the latter being on the more teleological side of things) and it's with these that give this more gainful employment to teleological concepts that I'm concerned here. In particular, I'm wondering about the appeal and its prospects on an evolutionary picture.
Now, Foot's view has been met with quite a bit of criticism. The critics I have in mind have tended to suggest that the prospects for this "proper function" view of flourishing after the advances of evolutionary biology are uncontroversially forlorn. Theistic Natural Lawyers, however, like to borrow the detailed strengths of Foot's view and yet suggest with her critics that evolutionary science consigns her view to the dustbin. However, they take this consignment to be a nontheistic problem. That is, they suggest that theism has the resources necessary to save this view, and this view having much else to recommend is thus for its prospects on theism taken to be a good recommendation of theism. I'm interested in just what the theistic view does for natural goodness.
To begin with, I'd like to keep evolution in view here. So, if the theist is a creationist then they are not the theist I have in mind. I need theism and evolution together to bring out my question - even if there might be reasons to suspect that theism and evolution do not fit together. I suspect that many Christians who understand this Natural Law view are more likely to be "evolutionists", anyway.
My question is, how can the theist employ teleological concepts in non-arbitrary ways without appealing to evolutionary causal histories? I've seen one proponent on this view gesture vaguely towards a comment from Fodor, but that's hardly discharging the rather large explanatory debt here.
Maybe I should've made this thread before Mick was banned.
Spinozasgalt wrote:Here it is, roughly.
Natural Law views of ethics are often theistic and the ones I have in mind here take the NL of Aquinas as paradigmatic: they reject particularism in favour of a principled approach to the right, hold that something's being good is best construed as its being perfecting or completing of a being, and affirm something like the natural goodness found in the work of Philippa Foot. I think some of these views make a stronger appeal to natural teleology than others (contrast Finnis with Feser with the latter being on the more teleological side of things) and it's with these that give this more gainful employment to teleological concepts that I'm concerned here. In particular, I'm wondering about the appeal and its prospects on an evolutionary picture.
Now, Foot's view has been met with quite a bit of criticism. The critics I have in mind have tended to suggest that the prospects for this "proper function" view of flourishing after the advances of evolutionary biology are uncontroversially forlorn. Theistic Natural Lawyers, however, like to borrow the detailed strengths of Foot's view and yet suggest with her critics that evolutionary science consigns her view to the dustbin. However, they take this consignment to be a nontheistic problem. That is, they suggest that theism has the resources necessary to save this view, and this view having much else to recommend is thus for its prospects on theism taken to be a good recommendation of theism. I'm interested in just what the theistic view does for natural goodness.
To begin with, I'd like to keep evolution in view here. So, if the theist is a creationist then they are not the theist I have in mind. I need theism and evolution together to bring out my question - even if there might be reasons to suspect that theism and evolution do not fit together. I suspect that many Christians who understand this Natural Law view are more likely to be "evolutionists", anyway.
My question is, how can the theist employ teleological concepts in non-arbitrary ways without appealing to evolutionary causal histories? I've seen one proponent on this view gesture vaguely towards a comment from Fodor, but that's hardly discharging the rather large explanatory debt here.
Maybe I should've made this thread before Mick was banned.
zoon wrote:The sense that some things are naturally right or wrong does seem to be deeply embedded, it’s almost impossible for an atheist (like me) to argue for some ethical position without taking something of the kind for granted. I think in the end this sense does have to come down to our evolution as social animals, and especially our unique ability to predict each other by guesswork based on the assumption that we operate teleologically.
The idea that some things are 'naturally' right or wrong is certainly attractive
zoon wrote:By “non-arbitrary” do you mean without bringing God’s dictates into the question?
kennyc wrote:Yoko Ono! What do I win?
Spinozasgalt wrote:Nah, I have something else in mind. I'll see if I can get it across. You see, the Natural Lawyer (at least on derviationist and derivationist/inclinationist hybrid views) has to tell a certain kind of metaphysical story about human nature to furnish their view with ends and proper functions, but the more and more that this story is based in our biology then the more potent becomes the threat that biological science will intrude upon the metaphysical story. To make matters worse, the explanatory success of the biological sciences is so attractive to a view of ethics that is looking to avail itself of theoretical virtues. And if, as many suspect, evolutionary biology and natural goodness have rival heroes, then the stories have to maintain their separateness or else one will overwhelm and fracture the narrative of the other.
tolman wrote:Spinozasgalt wrote:Nah, I have something else in mind. I'll see if I can get it across. You see, the Natural Lawyer (at least on derviationist and derivationist/inclinationist hybrid views) has to tell a certain kind of metaphysical story about human nature to furnish their view with ends and proper functions, but the more and more that this story is based in our biology then the more potent becomes the threat that biological science will intrude upon the metaphysical story. To make matters worse, the explanatory success of the biological sciences is so attractive to a view of ethics that is looking to avail itself of theoretical virtues. And if, as many suspect, evolutionary biology and natural goodness have rival heroes, then the stories have to maintain their separateness or else one will overwhelm and fracture the narrative of the other.
How do people manage to create language-based definitions of 'regions of behaviour' to label Right and Wrong which don't undermine the whole process. With such definitions being either oversimplistic or hedged around with qualification, how can they be claimed to be both useful and 'natural'.
Spinozasgalt wrote:I'm not sure I understand your question(s). Are you asking how moral principles as the Natural Lawyer employs them can ever hope to be complex enough to range over the "regions of behaviour" that they're taken to range over?
Nebogipfel wrote:Isn't Natural Law just deriving an ought from an is?
(Not a rhetorical question BTW...)
... all teleological concepts (purpose, ends, meaning, etc.) are determined by the nature of those things to which purpose and ends pertain; therefore, what-is does determine what-ought-to-be.
Nebogipfel wrote:Isn't Natural Law just deriving an ought from an is?
(Not a rhetorical question BTW...)
tolman wrote:If this:
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09076a.htm
is an example of 'Natural Law' thinking, then I'm puzzled who could possibly take it seriously.
For example, to nourish our bodies is right; but to indulge our appetite for food to the detriment of our corporal or spiritual life is wrong. Self-preservation is right, but to refuse to expose our life when the well-being of society requires it, is wrong.
Eating is good, as long as someone doesn't eat too much.
Self-preservation is right, Sometimes.
That's as much use as a cookery book telling people to beat a cake mix to the right consistency and then to cook it for long enough, but not too long.
Not necessarily wrong, but utterly useless.
Nebogipfel wrote:tolman wrote:If this:
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09076a.htm
is an example of 'Natural Law' thinking, then I'm puzzled who could possibly take it seriously.
For example, to nourish our bodies is right; but to indulge our appetite for food to the detriment of our corporal or spiritual life is wrong. Self-preservation is right, but to refuse to expose our life when the well-being of society requires it, is wrong.
Eating is good, as long as someone doesn't eat too much.
Self-preservation is right, Sometimes.
That's as much use as a cookery book telling people to beat a cake mix to the right consistency and then to cook it for long enough, but not too long.
Not necessarily wrong, but utterly useless.
And apart from anything else, it's all based on the assumption that the universe has a purpose and exists for a reason.
Users viewing this topic: No registered users and 1 guest