by lobawad wrote:Mick wrote:lobawad wrote:Mick wrote:
No, I am not asking anything like that. The hole and the peg are two distinct entities. My question is more like asking why the leg is round, but the obvious answer here is in reference to our intentionality. But a more thorough answer would talk explain why the peg was able to be round in the first place, and what makes it a peg.
As I mentioned earlier, the attempt here just pushes a question back. Why those properties? Why those patterns? Your attempts are futile unless you abandon the stress on mechanism alone.
I will post again later tonite or tomorrow.
Graham is answering what you are asking. He is responding by pointing out physical compossibilities.
I am afraid not. He roots his explanation in their properties. But I am asking this: why those properties? And why those "fittings"? Forms explain why matter acts this way or that way, and it explains its operations. But in the absence of form, that it acts some way or possesses some property, or is restricted and capable of acting in such-and -such way remains elusive. You can only push the question back; you can't answer it in mechanistic terms alone.
I am not entirely sure what he has in mind with his reference to geometry. But he needs to be careful not to make this a matter of necessitation. Otherwise, he risks no recourse in an explanation for the diversity of things.
I have already explained: physical compossibility. The properties Graham references arise from "fittings", the fittings from properties, all the way down to whatever the "stuff" of it all might be. Nothing more than some non-symmetry at some deep or deepest level is necessary in this model. You look for metaphysical answers to things and you would deny that the fittings of things must be compossible?
Physical compossiblilty only gets you as far as them being physically consistent together; it does not tell us why they are together. Look up the meaning of the word 'compossible'
