(The background is that that I have a fair knowledge of probability theory, but my lack of knowledge of physics is lamentable. So can somebody with more knowledge comment on what follows?)

The 'Fine Tuning' argument seems to go like this:

We live in a universe which has a sufficiently complex chemistry for life to evolve. This is the case only because a number of different physical constants have values, each which falls within a narrow range. This is exceedingly unlikely to have happened by chance. Therefore, a conscious intelligence must have been involved in setting these values.

Can anybody (friend or foe of the Fine Tuning argument) unpack and expand the statement in italics: This is exceedingly unlikely to have happened by chance?

I may simply be showing my ignorance of physics, but can this statement be justified without incurring the 'equiprobability' fallacy? That is, the fallacy of assuming, on the basis of ignorance, each of a number of different outcomes is equally probable, or that all values within some particular range are equally probable.

(Example of the fallacy: Fred tells us that he has been clearing stones from his garden. The smallest weighed 100 grams and the largest 2000 grams. We jump to the conclusion that he cleared as many stones in the range 300-400 grams as he did in the range 800-900 grams, or in the range 1600-1700 grams. This conclusion is unsound because, of course, we know nothing about the frequency distribution involved.)

Of course, I know that the Fine Tuning argument can be attacked in other ways too, but I'm especially interested in the statement about probability.

The real problem with that statement is not probability but chance. Nobody suggests chance for a second, except the strawman arguments of cretinism. It presents a false dichotomy, because it rules out 'well-defined natural mechanisms'.

The best defeater to any fine-tuning argument is simply the fact that removing one of the four fundamental forces makes matter inherently more stable, allowing for the formation of even more complex carbon chains because more stable isotopes of carbon become available, thereby rendering life more likely. This is also not taking into account the fact that isotopes of other elements, by virtue of being inherently more stable, may also become able to form the sort of complex chains that are afforded carbon now, meaning that there may even be other chemical bases for life than simply carbon (and possibly silicone, because that is also capable of forming complex chains and is also able to store information).

As for dealing specifically with probability, see the 'one true sequence' fallacy. It only loosely applies, because it deals with requiring a very specific chain of events where such a requirement is not clear. This can also be said of the parameters we deem to be the finely tuned constants of the universe. It would more properly be labelled in this context the 'one true set of constants' fallacy. Certainly, the constants in the universe seem to be pretty close to their required value for life as we know it but it doesn't take into account that life as we know it is not necessarily the only way life can be.

I keep meaning to do a search, because there was some work done by somebody (I forget who, but it will come to me) that suggested that out of all sets of defining these constants, about 25% would give rise to life in one form or another. I'll try to find it and get back to you.

Even if it is very very very unlikely the fact that we are here means it's possible. It's like someone winning the lottery pondering the chances of winning after the fact and when they have no knowledge of the past or the lottery itself.

dylan wrote:Even if it is very very very unlikely the fact that we are here means it's possible. It's like someone winning the lottery pondering the chances of winning after the fact and when they have no knowledge of the past or the lottery itself.

In addition to what everyone else has said, your post reminded of something I believe Dawkins said once. I can't remember the exact phraseology, so I will paraphrase from my own thoughts: Imagine tossing a coin a couple of million times. You would have a seemingly random series of heads and tails. The probability of this EXACT sequence happening would be exceedingly small. Yet that doesn't discount the fact that it just happened.

hackenslash wrote:
The best defeater to any fine-tuning argument is simply the fact that removing one of the four fundamental forces makes matter inherently more stable, allowing for the formation of even more complex carbon chains because more stable isotopes of carbon become available, thereby rendering life more likely.

If you can find the original source, I'd be interested in seeing what was meant here. I assume they're referring to the removal of the weak force, which would mean neutrons couldn't decay via the weak interaction, hence heavier carbon atoms. I don't understand how heavier carbon nuclei facilitate more complex carbon chains, but then I'm not a chemist. Also the slight worry I have is how can you "remove" the weak force without also removing the electromagnetic force, since they're aspects of the same thing ? Or do they mean fiddling with the Cabibbo angle or something of that ilk ?

I found this. I need to read it now !

The probability assertion also runs aground by making the assumption there is only one universe.

There could be a large number of universes with differing constants. There could perhaps be an infinite number of them. In those cases the anthropic principle comes into play. We observe a universe with those constants because the universe had those constants. There is no one to observe universes that have constants set in such a way that life cannot form.

DanDare wrote:The probability assertion also runs aground by making the assumption there is only one universe.

There could be a large number of universes with differing constants. There could perhaps be an infinite number of them. In those cases the anthropic principle comes into play. We observe a universe with those constants because the universe had those constants. There is no one to observe universes that have constants set in such a way that life cannot form.

Yes, certainly. But that's based on conceding the theist's argument that it's very unlikely that any particular universe would have a set of constants which produced a chemistry capable of supporting life. As you say, given enough universes, the theist's argument loses its force.

I was trying to go back a stage, and was querying there's any reason to concede the theist's argument in the first place. Again, I stress I'm no physicist, but it seems to me that the argument depends on making bald assumptions about the probability that a given constant will have some particular value - and, at present, these are just assumptions and not based on any knowledge of what's going on.

Will S wrote:(The background is that that I have a fair knowledge of probability theory, but my lack of knowledge of physics is lamentable. So can somebody with more knowledge comment on what follows?)

The 'Fine Tuning' argument seems to go like this:

We live in a universe which has a sufficiently complex chemistry for life to evolve. This is the case only because a number of different physical constants have values, each which falls within a narrow range. This is exceedingly unlikely to have happened by chance. Therefore, a conscious intelligence must have been involved in setting these values.

Can anybody (friend or foe of the Fine Tuning argument) unpack and expand the statement in italics: This is exceedingly unlikely to have happened by chance?

I may simply be showing my ignorance of physics, but can this statement be justified without incurring the 'equiprobability' fallacy? That is, the fallacy of assuming, on the basis of ignorance, each of a number of different outcomes is equally probable, or that all values within some particular range are equally probable.

Yes it does incur such a fallacy. Since we have no knowledge of the physics of other universes, or whether they even exist, and no knowledge of any of the physics at work outside the universe, we have no basis from which to assign probabilities to different sets of original constants, or even any way to know which values are even possible. It could be that our own set of values is the only possible set, or it could be that it is one of a small group of possible sets of values, or it could be there are infinitely many possible sets of values. We have no basis from which to draw conclusions and no way to know the probabilities of each scenario. I think part of the problem is that people, especially theists misunderstand our quantification scheme. We assign certain numerical values to certain forces based on their relative sameness or difference to other known values. If our number system were different the numerical values would be different yet the underlying relationships between the magnitudes of the forces of nature would be the same. For instance take Planck's constant roughly 6.626x10-34(not sure how to use superscripts here). People see the very specific numerical value and assume that it could have been any other number they can conceive.They imagine someone sitting outside the universe with a random number generator throwing out values of the constants of nature. In comparison to all the other numbers in our mathematical language they can imagine the probability of it randomly being that exact value is indeed very small. But the problem is that our numerical quantification scheme is simply a language which we have developed to quantify the relationships between forces of nature. There are no "numbers" in nature, only interrelationships of sameness and difference. All these possible numerical values don't "exist" in nature, and they don't precede the universe, rather they are only byproducts of the mathematical language we have developed to better understand the relationships in nature. There are lots of numerical values which don't represent in nature anything at all. Hopefully that made sense, some things are difficult for me to put in words. Even without that fallacy, the fine tuning argument fails miserably for many other reasons stated before.

There is also the problem of anthropocentersim. There are bacteria that could surive far more hostile enviroments than our own that live in the bottom of volcanons wouldn't they be better suited for a warmer planet? They recently found a shrimp like creature at the bottom of arctic Ice shelves. Then there is the fact that most of the earth is not sutible for human life anyways.Its a non starter in every possible way.

Assigning probabilities is a load of bollocks, since there's no decent foundation upon which to do so. We're left with the simple position of recognising that such an argument could be made by any conglomeration of superficially complex interactions that might be able to fall within the necessarily essentially (in a broader sense) meaningless definition of 'life'. It's largely as meaningless (and as meaningful) as 'consciousness', and as far as I can see materially inseparable from it.

King David up there ^ has the right of it, too, as do others upthread.

King David wrote:

Will S wrote:Can anybody (friend or foe of the Fine Tuning argument) unpack and expand the statement in italics: This is exceedingly unlikely to have happened by chance?

I may simply be showing my ignorance of physics, but can this statement be justified without incurring the 'equiprobability' fallacy? That is, the fallacy of assuming, on the basis of ignorance, each of a number of different outcomes is equally probable, or that all values within some particular range are equally probable.

Yes it does incur such a fallacy. Since we have no knowledge of the physics of other universes, or whether they even exist, and no knowledge of any of the physics at work outside the universe, we have no basis from which to assign probabilities to different sets of original constants, or even any way to know which values are even possible. It could be that our own set of values is the only possible set, or it could be that it is one of a small group of possible sets of values, or it could be there are infinitely many possible sets of values. We have no basis from which to draw conclusions and no way to know the probabilities of each scenario. I think part of the problem is that people, especially theists misunderstand our quantification scheme. We assign certain numerical values to certain forces based on their relative sameness or difference to other known values. If our number system were different the numerical values would be different yet the underlying relationships between the magnitudes of the forces of nature would be the same. For instance take Planck's constant roughly 6.626x10-34(not sure how to use superscripts here). People see the very specific numerical value and assume that it could have been any other number they can conceive.They imagine someone sitting outside the universe with a random number generator throwing out values of the constants of nature. In comparison to all the other numbers in our mathematical language they can imagine the probability of it randomly being that exact value is indeed very small. But the problem is that our numerical quantification scheme is simply a language which we have developed to quantify the relationships between forces of nature. There are no "numbers" in nature, only interrelationships of sameness and difference. All these possible numerical values don't "exist" in nature, and they don't precede the universe, rather they are only byproducts of the mathematical language we have developed to better understand the relationships in nature. There are lots of numerical values which don't represent in nature anything at all. Hopefully that made sense, some things are difficult for me to put in words. Even without that fallacy, the fine tuning argument fails miserably for many other reasons stated before.

Thanks. I'm not sure that I fully understand everything you're saying, but it seems that you're raising an even more fundamental objection than the one I was going for.

I certainly had, as you put it, a mental image of 'a random number generator throwing out values of the constants of nature'. My concern was that we don't seem to know the first damn thing about the behaviour of this random number generator, and, specifically, we don't know what probability distributions are built into it. So we can't possibly have an opinion of whether a universe is certain to have the constants we observe in our universe, or, at the other extreme, very, very unlikely to have them. (The question: 'I threw 50 heads on the trot. How probable is that?' has different answers depending on whether the penny I threw was a normal one or a double-headed one. )

But you're saying that even the metaphor of the random number generator is faulty. Perhaps I'd better study some physics ...

twistor59 wrote:I found this. I need to read it now !

I read it sometime ago, it was cool

DanDare wrote:The probability assertion also runs aground by making the assumption there is only one universe.

But still, there is zero evidence to suggest that there is more that one universe. So it's probably a safe assumption to make.

rEvolutionist wrote:

DanDare wrote:The probability assertion also runs aground by making the assumption there is only one universe.

But still, there is zero evidence to suggest that there is more that one universe. So it's probably a safe assumption to make.

Quantum physics is based on evidence and confirmed. Several of the interpretations of such physics necessitate many universes. The pilot wave concept being one of the few that doesn't should, to my mind, make it the best one to accept until evidence is found to say otherwise, but many physicists go with the other ways for reasons that get a bit too complex for my layman's level of knowledge.

DanDare wrote:Several of the interpretations of such physics necessitate many universes.

I think that sentence sums it up. They are interpretations. I'm not saying that one day one of these wild (or less wild) interpretations might not stack up, but at the moment I don't believe they do. Read some Penrose or Lee Smolin for a skepticists ( ) view of these things.

Will S wrote:Of course, I know that the Fine Tuning argument can be attacked in other ways too, but I'm especially interested in the statement about probability.

Then you'll probably find the following paper interesting:

http://homepage.mac.com/mcolyvan/papers/finetuning.pdf

"Abstract: The argument from fine tuning is supposed to establish the existence of God from the fact that the evolution of carbon-based life requires the laws of physics and the boundary conditions of the universe to be more or less as they are. We demonstrate that this argument fails. In particular, we focus on problems associated with the role probabilities play in the argument. We show that, even granting the fine tuning of the universe, it does not follow that the universe is improbable, thus no explanation of the fine tuning, theistic or otherwise, is required."

First off there is no evidence or any reason to think that the universe, its laws, or its constants could be different than they are. Multiple universes are mathematical constructs that only say that modern physics does not disallow the possibility, but it does not mandate the reality.

Anyone wondering about why we are here and how the universe seems so fine tuned that we can be here to wonder about it should find a way to immerse their selves in Douglas Adams mud puddle.

hackenslash wrote:The real problem with that statement is not probability but chance. Nobody suggests chance for a second, except the strawman arguments of cretinism. It presents a false dichotomy, because it rules out 'well-defined natural mechanisms'.

The best defeater to any fine-tuning argument is simply the fact that removing one of the four fundamental forces makes matter inherently more stable, allowing for the formation of even more complex carbon chains because more stable isotopes of carbon become available, thereby rendering life more likely. This is also not taking into account the fact that isotopes of other elements, by virtue of being inherently more stable, may also become able to form the sort of complex chains that are afforded carbon now, meaning that there may even be other chemical bases for life than simply carbon (and possibly silicone, because that is also capable of forming complex chains and is also able to store information).

As for dealing specifically with probability, see the 'one true sequence' fallacy. It only loosely applies, because it deals with requiring a very specific chain of events where such a requirement is not clear. This can also be said of the parameters we deem to be the finely tuned constants of the universe. It would more properly be labelled in this context the 'one true set of constants' fallacy. Certainly, the constants in the universe seem to be pretty close to their required value for life as we know it but it doesn't take into account that life as we know it is not necessarily the only way life can be.

I keep meaning to do a search, because there was some work done by somebody (I forget who, but it will come to me) that suggested that out of all sets of defining these constants, about 25% would give rise to life in one form or another. I'll try to find it and get back to you.

I think I have the research paper, hack

The paper can be found here at http://www.mediafire.com/?kmzkyyiguyd , thanks to cdk007.