Thommo wrote:Luis Dias wrote:Thommo wrote:Actually, it is. There is a question in every consistent logic of sufficient descriptive power which cannot be answered. So unless you plan to address the questions of the universe without logic then this is a very real possibility.
Hmm. But you are still reasoning under the assumption that we will never create a logical system that won't have Godel's problem. Mind, I'm not saying silly things here such as stating that such a system exists (or will exist), I'm asking how do you know that it will
never exist?
Because any such system would have to contain an isomorphic embedding of the standard logical system we use (or sacrifice such things as consistency). Thus it still proves the theorem.
If you sacrifice consistency, but end up with a better system, you'll end up with the theorem "proven", but irrelevant.
There, I've shown you a way to do it. Therefore, it is not *impossible*
Because it’s proven. I suppose you can doubt it, in the same way you might doubt that 1+1=2 in standard arithmetic.
No, I may not doubt 1+1 in "standard arithmetic", what I might doubt is its absoluteness.
Personally I won’t waste my time doubting either of those facts though.
Perhaps that's the problem with your assertions: you deem things impossible because you think that the human imagination is sufficiently good to state what is absolutely impossible or not. I dare be very skeptical of that. And this is why I asked you, provide such an example of an impossible answer.
Absolutely correct, stating it doesn’t make it true, the proof does. The proof is too long and technical to present here, but I can probably track down one on the net (there’s quite possibly a link from the page that got linked earlier in fact) if you think it would help.
I know it. Dealt above.
My reasoning isn’t faulty, if you think otherwise, you need to show where it’s faulty rather than just assert it.
You dare state an absolute truth. I dare say, you aren't saying anything meaningful.
On the topic of the answer for the existence of the universe, yes we may discover a good explanation. I hold out hopes we will, but no matter what our hopes or expectations we cannot shut out the possibility that we may not.
Sure, this is besides the point however.
This isn’t a suggestion not to try, it’s a suggestion not to dismiss options we simply don’t like - which is exactly what one is doing when one asserts that a position involving an “explanatory hypothesis” is a priori preferable to one that doesn’t, independently of evidence to support that “explanatory hypothesis”.
Your point was that there were questions for which we could *never* answer. I say, *bollocks* to that, not as a statement of faith of our ingenuity to find *all* the answers, but a statement of skepticism towards the absoluteness of your statement. Is this better worded?
How do you judge, what is your criteria of stating a priori which is the "best" possible answer? What do you mean by "best"? I understand your latter point, and I also prefer people shutting up than stating nonsensical things, and that's why I'm also challenging your apparent nonsensical demand for some kinds of answers being "impossible" to find out.
I am not stating what kinds of answers are impossible to find out. I am not stating that the existence of the universe
is such a problem. I am stating that it
might be such a problem (something I personally find unlikely, but I can’t actually justify why I find it unlikely, so I’ll retract it if challenged), and justifying why we have to consider such problems. If we can’t rule out that possibility then we can’t claim that it’s a priori epistemically inferior, which was specifically one of the claims in the first of the linked essays.
Did not understand this paragraph, I reread it, still don't...