Andrew4Handel wrote:Spinozasgalt wrote:I think that's little more than a trick. On the view you offer, the epistemological role of this practical authority is taken up by our own discerning of proper function and
the ontological role by the sum of a natural teleology. The authoritativeness of the goals or purposes got out of a natural teleology, as opposed to the ones just dreamed up out of nowhere, is precisely what is supposed to recommend the view. Or am I to take it that this teleological view does not give us a way of discerning authoritative moral claims from non-authoritative ones?
I illustrated my general point with the Quote from Ogden and Richards.
"When we use it in the sentence, ''This is good,'' we merely refer to this, and the addition of ''is good'' makes no difference whatever to our reference""
Should I take the word of Ogden and Richards? You never quoted them at me, so I'm not sure what I was supposed to take from a reference you gave to someone else. Did you quote them to advance your case or merely because they phrase your case as you would like to phrase it or both?
Andrew4Handel wrote:This position is saying that words like "Good" and "wrong" etc. don't refer to anything. In the teleology example right and wrong can refer to things. The issue of authority is a separate issue.
How separate are these for you, really? Your position was that a realistic morality has to be teleological or it falters and this is made apparent, I think, by that the religious picture looked like this. But does a morality not also have to be authoritative at a similar pain of faltering? You've suggested so previously - that moral claims have to have an arbiter or authority. But then, your point about the religious narrative giving an illusory picture was supposed to hinge on teleology. How did the converse Christian moral picture give that same illusion without such a teleology? And if it did, we've lost yet another motivation to think that teleology is important to our moral claims.
But regardless, look, you're still begging the question. You acknowledge that if we have a teleology then somehow what usually wouldn't refer suddenly would, but this is because you think that teleology is the proper way to fill out an account of moral facts. And, given that you don't think such a teleology can be meaningful with the advent of evolution, you believe that there is no way to fill out an account of moral facts. But that teleology is the only worthwhile realist stance to take to an account of moral facts is precisely what I've taken issue with previously and at length. It's unmotivated. You haven't been able to make a case for it.
Andrew4Handel wrote:There is a way to link the two in that when a human designs something they become the authority on its teleology.
Small point, but it's easy to imagine a human designing something and yet that that thing's proper function being such through further discovery that a person who hasn't designed said thing becomes a more competent authority on its teleology that its original designer..
Andrew4Handel wrote:By the way I am not advocating any form of morality because I don't think any moral theory is correct. So I don't see where my positive moral claim has been.
You can say that you're not advocating a first-order moral theory, but you clearly have been advocating a second-order metaethical view: that there are no moral facts, that such and such a moral term does not refer, that moral claims are teleological or non-cognitive or error-theoretic, etc.
Andrew4Handel wrote:Spearthrower wrote:Andrew4Handel wrote:Moral nihilism is the default position until someone makes a valid moral claim.
You don't have to prove moral nihilism.
Moral Nihilism is a subclass of moral scepticism.
Nope.
"Moral skepticism divides into three subclasses: moral error theory (or moral nihilism)(..)"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_skepticism
Andrew, the moral skepticism that bears less of a burden than other positions is Pyrrhonian moral skepticism. It looks closer to the sort of atheism that people here have but about morals instead. And there is still a burden, depending on how it's framed or phrased. What you've been defending is non-cognitivism, something like Mackie's error theory or at least a dogmatic moral skepticism. Those are not moral skepticisms in the same sense and they share as much of a burden as other substantive moral views.