hackenslash wrote:Yes, because asking navel-gazers will get to the nub of it.

hackenslash wrote:You might try actually dealing with the post in question. If you have to go check with somebody else, you really aren't up to the challenge.

hackenslash wrote:Edit: You could even check an English corpus to find out what a privative is, and how one is denoted using standard prefixes and suffixes.

We have talked above in a way that might give the impression that predication is an activity that we perform, e.g., when we say or think that a certain apple is red. Although some philosophers might think of it in this way, predication is typically viewed as a special link that connects a property to a thing in a way that gives rise to a proposition, understood as a complex featuring the property and the thing as constituents with different roles: the latter occurs as logical subject or argument, as is often said, and the former as attributed to such an argument. A proposition is also typically viewed as a mind-independent entity that exists whether we think of it or not and that may be true or false. If true (the predication is veridical), the argument instantiates (exemplifies) the property and is called an instance of that property. For example, if there is a red apple, the proposition in which the apple occurs as logical subject and the property red as attributed to it is veridical; the apple thus exemplifies this property and is an instance of it. It is often assumed nowadays that, when an object exemplifies a property, there is a further (complex) entity, a state of affairs, having the property (or perhaps some counterpart of it in the natural world; see §5.4) and the object as constituents (Armstrong 1997); states of affairs are typically taken to fulfill the theoretical roles of truthmakers (the entities that make true propositions true) and causal relata (the entities connected by causal relations). Not all philosophers, however, distinguish between propositions and states of affairs; Russell (1903) acknowledges only propositions and, for a recent example, so does Gaskin (2008).

Sadegh wrote:Indeed, why ask philosophers about a philosophy question?

I've never heard anything so ridiculous.

You've been extremely antagonistic to anything I say at all from the get-go, to the point that I think you have an axe to grind, so I'm trying something a little bit different.

I did find the following:

"a privative attribute, quality, or proposition"

I might check a thesaurus (no this is not what corpora are for) and see what possible synonyms for "attribute" or "quality" are out there.

Sadegh wrote:But while we're on the subject of "navel-gazers" it doesn't look like any of the criteria for something being a property here exclude "atheism":

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/

E.g.:

We have talked above in a way that might give the impression that predication is an activity that we perform, e.g., when we say or think that a certain apple is red. Although some philosophers might think of it in this way, predication is typically viewed as a special link that connects a property to a thing in a way that gives rise to a proposition, understood as a complex featuring the property and the thing as constituents with different roles: the latter occurs as logical subject or argument, as is often said, and the former as attributed to such an argument. A proposition is also typically viewed as a mind-independent entity that exists whether we think of it or not and that may be true or false. If true (the predication is veridical), the argument instantiates (exemplifies) the property and is called an instance of that property. For example, if there is a red apple, the proposition in which the apple occurs as logical subject and the property red as attributed to it is veridical; the apple thus exemplifies this property and is an instance of it. It is often assumed nowadays that, when an object exemplifies a property, there is a further (complex) entity, a state of affairs, having the property (or perhaps some counterpart of it in the natural world; see §5.4) and the object as constituents (Armstrong 1997); states of affairs are typically taken to fulfill the theoretical roles of truthmakers (the entities that make true propositions true) and causal relata (the entities connected by causal relations). Not all philosophers, however, distinguish between propositions and states of affairs; Russell (1903) acknowledges only propositions and, for a recent example, so does Gaskin (2008).

Well atheism certainly meets the predication criterion for something a property.

hackenslash wrote:Feel free to go and check with your mates

scott1328 wrote:a predicate is not a property

hackenslash wrote:I've seen philosophy stack exchange. Teuton would love it. More ISBN numbers than you can shake a stick at.

hackenslash wrote:Anyhoo, while it's broadly a philosophy question, more narrowly it's a semantic question. Again, all dealt with in that post. Did you even bother to read it beyond scanning for something you thought an easy knock-down?

Sadegh wrote:

hackenslash wrote:Anyhoo, while it's broadly a philosophy question, more narrowly it's a semantic question. Again, all dealt with in that post. Did you even bother to read it beyond scanning for something you thought an easy knock-down?

Yeah, read the whole thing. Still don't think babies are atheists.

hackenslash wrote:Well, apart form the fact that you only went and quoted Stanford in true Mick fashion (not a well-regarded source among real thinkers, not least because it gets so much wrong)

hackenslash wrote:I'm not seeing in there where it lists 'not a theist' as a predicate or a property.

hackenslash wrote:

Sadegh wrote:

hackenslash wrote:Anyhoo, while it's broadly a philosophy question, more narrowly it's a semantic question. Again, all dealt with in that post. Did you even bother to read it beyond scanning for something you thought an easy knock-down?

Yeah, read the whole thing. Still don't think babies are atheists.

Can't actually raise a single coherent counter, undercutter, rebuttal or even sentence that wasn't already dealt within that very post.

Sadegh wrote:

scott1328 wrote:a predicate is not a property

You're right, a predicate isn't a property. It's what relates a subject and a property, e.g. "Bertrand Russell was an atheist" (had the property of not being a theist).

hackenslash wrote:FIFY for accuracy.

If "is a theist" is a property, then so must be "is an atheist". In other words, if P is a property, then so is not(P). This question was addressed recently here : http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/que ... a-property The answer given by Shane is most satisfactory. It is not at all clear why your friend would think that atheism is the "lack" of a property.

Sadegh wrote:

hackenslash wrote:FIFY for accuracy.

However you want to word it, it's still a property.

hackenslash wrote:

Sadegh wrote:

hackenslash wrote:FIFY for accuracy.

However you want to word it, it's still a property.

I corrected that. Look again. Is 'not blue' a property?

Sadegh wrote:Oh look, my first answer:

http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/que ... individual

If "is a theist" is a property, then so must be "is an atheist". In other words, if P is a property, then so is not(P). This question was addressed recently here : http://philosophy.stackexchange.com/que ... a-property The answer given by Shane is most satisfactory. It is not at all clear why your friend would think that atheism is the "lack" of a property.

lmao