Concepts in Atheism & Physicalism

Starro · **#161** by **Starro** » May 13, 2011 5:17 pm

Ok, well if I'm wrong here, fair enough, it was really off topic that I mentioned it and just a thought. If he wants to make a rock he isn't able to lift despite wanting to lift it, when he makes it he must want to lift it and also not lift it (so that his creation was successful). That's why I thought he would both want and not want to, but if it's wrong, no problem.

In response to both posts about whether I can do things I don't want to do or not having control. Maybe my understanding of 'things I don't want to do' is wrong? I mean, there are things I do because some situation forces me to, rather than wanting to do it. Eg. giving speeches. I don't want to do them but outside factors put me in a situation where I have to get on with it and do it. I was thinking that the rock challenge would be this god's outside factors. I still have the choice of refusing my speech, same as god could refuse to demonstrate his omnipotence, but if he begrudgingly accepted the challenge he'd be doing it without wanting to?

Starro · **#162** by **Starro** » May 13, 2011 5:23 pm

Oh, and the 2 contradicting things thing, if god's omnipotent surely he and his actions could be a paradox?

I'm guessing here, I don't know any to ask.

IIzO · **#163** by **IIzO** » May 13, 2011 5:30 pm

Starro wrote:Oh, and the 2 contradicting things thing, if god's omnipotent surely he and his actions could be a paradox? I'm guessing here, I don't know any to ask.

Sure ,one version of omnipotence makes god above all logic .

John P. M. · **#164** by **John P. M.** » May 13, 2011 5:33 pm

That's the nice thing about god; it's a concept, so it's not tied down to... anything, and it can do or be whatever the heck anyone wants it to do or be. It can even be 'subject to change', on the whims of the person constructing the specific version of the concept. It's a blob of jelly nailed to the wall.

Teuton · **#165** by **Teuton** » May 13, 2011 5:44 pm

Starro wrote:Teuton, I don't think I have a particular problem with you using the word encoded.

I didn't think you would have a problem with it.

Starro wrote:
I hope you're being humourous, otherwise, are you genuinely trying to disagree with me by saying ghosts exist? Like, really?

Don't worry, I believe neither in material nor in immaterial ghosts! (What would a material ghost be anyway—an alien or exotic animal?)

Panderos · **#166** by **Panderos** » May 13, 2011 6:49 pm

Starro wrote:I mean, there are things I do because some situation forces me to, rather than wanting to do it. Eg. giving speeches. I don't want to do them but outside factors put me in a situation where I have to get on with it and do it. I still have the choice of refusing my speech.

You could choose to refuse it, but you don't because it is still the most preferable option given your circumstances - i.e. it's what you want to do.

That's what I wrote the first time I typed a response, now I'm not so sure. I think it's because the word 'want' is fluffy.

Davian · **#167** by **Davian** » May 13, 2011 7:24 pm

fade wrote:<snip>
Neuroscience absolutely will, in time (probably over the next few decades), develop of a complete simulated model of the human brain right down to the absolute finest of detail. Every neuron, every synapse, every dendrite, every axon fully mapped. Their purpose and effect fully detailed and catalogued. Everything will be known about the brain, every thought, feeling, emotion, idea and memory will be associated with their requisite physical associations. It will cease to be any sort of mystery or wonder, at least in its function. And yet the problem will remain, we will still each have an internal first person, introspective awareness of existence and even with our perfect understanding of brain function at that time, it will still be insufficient to account for consciousness.

What if we only have the illusion of an internal first person?

fade wrote:
@fade: this reads like you are not up to speed on the other recent threads on this topic, so I will ask: Do you think of consciousness as a thing?

No.

Have you read through this thread? Are humans conscious? (Page 20)

Oldskeptic · **#168** by **Oldskeptic** » May 13, 2011 10:47 pm

fade wrote:Oldskeptic your post smacks of the usual cliché scientism; bold baseless claims with the belief that science will one day be there to explain all things in purely objective, empirical terms. I love science, it has explained much and will explain much more through its methods; but I know its limitations as a discipline. It is not, never has been and never will be a catch all, be all, end all process. The very notion that the scientific process (in the classical objective empirical sense) has universal explanatory power is so arrogant and based on belief, assumption and faith it might as well be a religion in its own right.

Neuroscience absolutely will, in time (probably over the next few decades), develop of a complete simulated model of the human brain right down to the absolute finest of detail. Every neuron, every synapse, every dendrite, every axon fully mapped. Their purpose and effect fully detailed and catalogued. Everything will be known about the brain, every thought, feeling, emotion, idea and memory will be associated with their requisite physical associations. It will cease to be any sort of mystery or wonder, at least in its function. And yet the problem will remain, we will still each have an internal first person, introspective awareness of existence and even with our perfect understanding of brain function at that time, it will still be insufficient to account for consciousness.

The association of brain activity with mental states is just that, an association. In the endeavour to understand consciousness it doesn't mean a thing. Correlation is not causation is a saying overused, but even if correlation was causation it would make no difference. If mental events are the product of brain events and brain events produce mental events the claim that they are one and the same still fails. We all know that are not the same thing because it is the most basic of logical common sense. Electrical impulses travelling along nerve cells is not pain. Commonly you'll hear, 'it produces pain'. Great, still doesn't answer the question of what pain is. Likewise air vibrations affecting hair cells in the cochlea and producing electrical impulses is not music. Molecules hanging in the air which are detected by the olfactory system is not smell. The former of these are processes, the later of these are experiences. Sure they correlate, sure the later is caused by the former, but no the former and the later are not the same thing.

So I have to wonder exactly what people are expecting in the scientific search for what consciousness is. What do you think is going to be found? How processes work? Sure. How experiences work? Forget it. The question makes no sense in the context of what science is and what science does. Science tests the world 'out there', consciousness is the world 'in here'; claiming that one can and will use science to bridge the gap between introspection and extrospection when the scientific method itself is fundamentally extrospective in nature is to expand the scope of science into areas in which it cannot be applied, or to put it another way, it's nothing but a lousy appeal to scientism.

I happily say, leave the world 'out there' to science and the world 'in here' to philosophy. Science will ultimately explain the world 'out there' some day, and in regards to the world 'in here' philosophy will piss in the wind until the end of time. In any event Descartes fundamentally had it right with the Cogito, you can always doubt the 'out there', but the world 'in here' is indisputable.

That was very well written post, unfortunately there is little within it that I can agree with.

Oldskeptic wrote:
Consciousness is a product of a process that is entirely physical. It is not outside the remit of science.

Scientism is usually a pejorative term as is cliche, why do you use them in regards to a simple observation that consciousness is the product of a physical process, and therefore within the remit of science? All physical entities and processes are within the remit of science.

Oldskeptic wrote:
But consciousness is being studied objectively by many people. You might want to read something like Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works before you go on with this line of argument, because this type of argument simply ignores what is being studied and what is being discovered.

Saying that science can study and is studying something "mysterious" is not that same as saying that science has all of the answers or ever will. The only things that science cannot study are those things that people make up and define as completely non-physical.

There is no "out there vs in here." The human brain is an evolved biological machine that perceives and computes. Granted it is an extremely complicated machine, but that does not mean that it can't be studied or that study won't provide a good understanding of consciousness.

So, we're going to do pain again. "There is no answer to what pain is." Ok. You might want to read Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers by Robert Sapolsky, or this paper by Bruce Charlton http://www.hedweb.com/bgcharlton/awconlang.html.

Human like consciousness has to do with self-awareness and self-awareness has to do with being aware of internal states. Pain is an internal state. Absence of pain is an internal state. The pain happens at the location of the injury or condition. The pain is generally real. Burn your finger and the pain is in your finger, but your brain has evolved to a point were it is aware of where the pain is. When your tummy hurts the pain is in your tummy not your brain, but your brain is aware that the pain is in your tummy.

Sound, smell, light, and touch exist physically. They are what promoted the evolution of these senses. The ear would not evolved without the existence of sound, the sense of smell would not have evolved without molecules in the air that gave off different aromas, the eye would not have evolved without light being a physical thing. To reduce these senses to only things that exist in the mind is absurd. They have independent existence and what happens in the brain is observation/awareness of external rather than internal conditions/states.

Nothing that exists naturally is outside the remit of science. The brain is a natural product of evolution, and so is the consciousness/self-awareness that it produces. If you want to go with some speculation that consciousness is some kind of supernatural thingy then be my guest, but you have no evidential support for it.

By the way, Magarroosh tried the TV analogy in Theology is a Complete Waste of Space and went down in flames. And Stevebee in Why Stevebee is Wrong is latching onto this consciousness-senses-experience stupid argument.

I don't think that you are finding yourself in the best of company.

Teuton · **#169** by **Teuton** » May 13, 2011 11:32 pm

Oldskeptic wrote:There is no "out there vs in here."

I think mental phenomena are both 'out there' and 'in here' as psychophysical phenomena, i.e. they have both objective, 'heterophenomenal' and subjective, 'autophenomenal' aspects. There is no ontological gap between the mind and the body. Nature is One!

"The nature of conscious mental events is such that despite being perfectly natural, objective states of affairs, they have as part of their essential nature their subjective feel. Call this basic idea subjective realism.
Subjective realism says that the relevant objective state of affairs in a sentient creature produces certain subjective feels for that creature. The subjective feel is produced and realized in an organism by virtue of the relevant state of affairs obtaining in that organism. It, the subjective feel, is, as it were, no more than the relevant objective state of affairs obtaining in a creature that feels things. However, since the relevant objective state of affairs is only described or captured as the thing it is, in this case, a conscious mental event, as it is captured or felt by the organism itself, a completely third-person neural description of it doesn't capture it. The reason is that third-person descriptions don't capture feels. Certain third-person states of affairs are the realizations of feels, but the feels are only had or captured by (or in) the creatures in whom those states of affairs obtain.
Thus one may be committed to the truth of physicalism without being committed to the claim that the essence of an experience is captured fully by a description of its neural realizer. It produces a mental cramp to think that mental events are neural events but that their essence cannot be captured completely in neural terms. Such is the power of objective realism, a doctrine that applies to most types of things in the universe but not to experiences. The cramping can be eased, I think, by accepting that the subjective realist is claiming nothing supernatural. It is simply a unique but nonmysterious fact about conscious mental states that they possess a phenomenal side. If you don't mention that, and possibly how, these states appear first-personally, you have failed to describe one, possibly two, of their essential features. Your metaphysics is incomplete. If you see things in the Janus-way recommended here, the intuition that there is an unbridgeable explanatory gap between conscious mental states and their realizers is deflated. Possibly it disappears."

(Flanagan, Owen. The Problem of the Soul: Two Visions of Mind and How to Reconcile Them. New York: Basic Books, 2003. pp. 89-90)

Oldskeptic · **#170** by **Oldskeptic** » May 13, 2011 11:50 pm

Teuton wrote:
Oldskeptic wrote:There is no "out there vs in here."

I think mental phenomena are both 'out there' and 'in here' as psychophysical phenomena, i.e. they have both objective, 'heterophenomenal' and subjective, 'autophenomenal' aspects. There is no ontological gap between the mind and the body. Nature is One!

I have no fucking idea whether you are agreeing with me or disagreeing, and I don't fucking care. Go off with your philosophical wordiness and have a good time.

Teuton · **#171** by **Teuton** » May 13, 2011 11:57 pm

Teuton wrote:
I think mental phenomena are both 'out there' and 'in here' as psychophysical phenomena, i.e. they have both objective, 'heterophenomenal' and subjective, 'autophenomenal' aspects.

"[Daniel] Dennett suggests a useful taxonomy for talking about these matters. He distinguishes between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology. Autophenomenology is commentary on a psychological system from the inside, by an insider, namely, the owner. Autophenomenology is necessarily performed from what Thomas Nagel calls the 'subjective point of view.' Heterophenomenology, on the other hand, is commentary on a psychological system from an outsider's point of view (even the owner can take this point of view). Heterophenomenology, therefore, is performed from what Nagel calls an 'objective point of view.'
The 'phenomenology' is by way of emphasizing that whether we take the 'auto' or 'hetero' point of view, we are dealing with appearances—from which we will then try to infer transcendentally the hidden realities.
The advantage of this 'auto-hetero' taxonomy is that it carries no connotations and begs no questions regarding the relative accuracy or relative degree of eyewitnessing involved in the two forms of studying mind. Borrowing from literary theory, Dennett suggests that we think of both the autophenomenology and heterophenomenology as producing a text or a story. The epistemological project is to discern any patterns in the relative veridicality of the two sorts of stories, and to be open to the possibility that in certain cases the outsider, that is, the critic, may understand the story better than the author does."

(Flanagan, Owen. The Science of the Mind. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. pp. 193-94)

Cito di Pense · **#172** by **Cito di Pense** » May 14, 2011 12:00 am

fade wrote:The question makes no sense in the context of what science is and what science does.

You know how I describe the process of 'making sense'? Here's how:

You give someone some instructions for performing a task. If someone completes the task to your satisfaction, you say "the instructions make sense" or that "someone made sense of the instructions". It's not something you define after the fact, and gives you some responsibility for how you deliver the instructions.

'Consciousness studies' is like having an archery competition where you don't say what the target is before you loose the arrow. If you can give me instructions (that make sense) for 'knowing what science is and what science does', I promise to kiss my own arse. IOW, the usual philosophical practice of saying a question makes no sense is pure rhetoric.

fade · **#173** by **fade** » May 16, 2011 2:35 pm

Panderos wrote:Fade, are you in agreement with UndercoverElephant? Because if so, I think we've been through this all before.

I am not familiar with the views of that poster.

nunnington wrote:Science makes observations, and then constructs model/theories about those observations, which can be tested via further observations. However, to then go on and argue that these models are to do with reality or 'the world', is not a scientific claim, but a philosophical one, isn't it? In that sense, it is not falsifiable, except via logical means.

So I would venture to suggest that not only can science not describe first person consciousness (since it is couched in the third person), but it cannot describe reality, and in fact, does not set out to do that. It contains a methodology, not a metaphysics, and scientists in fact rarely speculate about the nature of reality, except in QM, where it seems inevitable.

Yes nicely put. I completely agree.

Starro wrote:However, I was wondering why Fade seems to imply, from the comments about clay and the TV analogy, that humans get their consciousness from an outside source and that we are only vessels that received it (like the TV)? Have you got anything other than "it's subjective" to explain why you think this?

Clearly it was a bad analogy after all because people seem to be getting the wrong idea with it. The notion that we're vessels receiving the 'signal' of consciousness is not correct. Instead consider that this consciousness is foundational to reality itself and everything that comes from it, i.e. matter, is intertwined with it.

So consider this analogy instead - matter and gravity are synonymous, let's say matter and 'mind' are similarly synonymous for sake of argument. That is, as matter and gravity are fundamentally intertwined so is matter and mind. This mind though is an empty slate; it takes matter to evolve into something like a brain with a complex sensory input system to get the emergence of an individualised consciousness. This also suggests that things like A.I are certainly possible as well.

The prevailing view is basically consciousness arises because atoms are arranged in specific configurations and we give them fancy names like neurons or whatever. The atoms in a star and the atoms in a brain are the same basic fundamental constituents of matter just organised differently; so why should the organisation of matter make one bit of a difference to consciousness? At best humans should be empty shells, giving all the outward appearance of consciousness but having nothing going on inside. And that's the problem, why is there or does there need to be a first person subjective aspect to reality at all? There doesn't.

So this is the basic difference between me and most of the forum. You'll argue for the spontaneous generation of consciousness from inanimate matter which is about as bright as the long discredited theory of the spontaneous generation of life, while I argue that consciousness doesn't emerge because it is there, always was there and is fundamentally ubiquitous.

About consciousness. Yes, it's subjective, but I thought about this and I don't think it tells me much. The reason for this is that although they vary a little, our subjective experiences and reactions to similar situations tend to be very similar. I don't need to explain how people have things in common with each other and relate to each other. I don't think that experience is subjective is that significant?

Nearly all of our behaviour is entirely unconscious, just going through the motions. Yet, the fact that there is subjective experience at all is what matters.

fade · **#174** by **fade** » May 17, 2011 8:36 am

Davian wrote:What if we only have the illusion of an internal first person?

What does this even mean? I know I exist and have phenomenal experiences. There's nothing illusory about that.

Oldskeptic wrote:Scientism is usually a pejorative term as is cliche, why do you use them in regards to a simple observation that consciousness is the product of a physical process, and therefore within the remit of science? All physical entities and processes are within the remit of science.

Because you're making a scientific claim (that consciousness is the product of a physical process) in the complete absence of any evidence to support such a conclusion. You have nothing more than a belief that you're trying to fob off as accepted science, and that is scientism at worst, pseudo science at best.

There is no "out there vs in here." The human brain is an evolved biological machine that perceives and computes. Granted it is an extremely complicated machine, but that does not mean that it can't be studied or that study won't provide a good understanding of consciousness.

Gee, thoroughly refuted that one didn't you? I covered all this extensively when I explained how a perfect knowledge of brain functionality will still not be sufficient to explain consciousness. Where is your response to the details of that argument? Oh, there isn't one, just a response tantamount to 'I disagree, you're wrong, the end...' Great.

Try harder or don't try at all; and familiarise yourself with the hard problem of consciousness by David Chalmers as well - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_probl ... sciousness

Human like consciousness has to do with self-awareness and self-awareness has to do with being aware of internal states. Pain is an internal state. Absence of pain is an internal state. The pain happens at the location of the injury or condition. The pain is generally real. Burn your finger and the pain is in your finger, but your brain has evolved to a point were it is aware of where the pain is. When your tummy hurts the pain is in your tummy not your brain, but your brain is aware that the pain is in your tummy.

'Consciousness has to do with self-awareness and self-awareness has to do with being aware of internal states self-aware'. Surely you can see just how circular this is? I'm spinning in circles just reading it.

Sound, smell, light, and touch exist physically.

No they don't. Sound is an instantiation in the mind, it is our conscious interpretation of air vibrations. In the absence of an observer, to talk of sound is completely meaningless. Same thing with smell, light (colour) and touch. You can talk of things in the external world that give rise to mental states (like air vibrations causing sound), but to say air vibrations ARE sound is completely wrong.

I can see why you don't understand the problem of consciousness when you are having trouble with the basics.

Nothing that exists naturally is outside the remit of science. The brain is a natural product of evolution, and so is the consciousness/self-awareness that it produces. If you want to go with some speculation that consciousness is some kind of supernatural thingy then be my guest, but you have no evidential support for it.

And you have no evidential support for your position, just baseless assumptions and beliefs. The difference is I'm honest and consistent; I admit my position is philosophical. For me to claim my position was one of science would be to insult science. I'll leave that one to you since you seem to be doing such a dandy job of it so far.

Teuton · **#175** by **Teuton** » May 17, 2011 4:01 pm

fade wrote:
Davian wrote:What if we only have the illusion of an internal first person?

What does this even mean? I know I exist and have phenomenal experiences. There's nothing illusory about that.

Yes, if it seems to me that I am conscious, then I am conscious.

Teuton · **#176** by **Teuton** » May 17, 2011 5:17 pm

fade wrote:So this is the basic difference between me and most of the forum. You'll argue for the spontaneous generation of consciousness from inanimate matter which is about as bright as the long discredited theory of the spontaneous generation of life, while I argue that consciousness doesn't emerge because it is there, always was there and is fundamentally ubiquitous.

So you're a panpsychist. But do you really, seriously believe that all nonbiological objects down to molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles are conscious, sentient things, i.e. things which have feelings?

"The irreducible minimum involved in mentality would seem to be the fact which we express by the phrase 'feeling somehow', e.g., feeling cross or tired or hungry. It seems to be logically possible that this characteristic, which we might call 'sentience', could belong to a thing or event which had no other mental characteristic."

(Broad, C. D. The Mind and its Place in Nature. 1925. Reprint, Abingdon: Routledge, 2000. p. 634)

Davian · **#177** by **Davian** » May 17, 2011 6:04 pm

fade wrote:
Davian wrote:What if we only have the illusion of an internal first person?

What does this even mean? I know I exist and have phenomenal experiences. There's nothing illusory about that.

Did the "I" making that claim (bolded) exist while your body slept last night?

Unless you are a dualist, and think there is an actual internal 'person' inside you?

I don't mean 'illusion' as in an attempt at trickery, but as in a simulation, something constructed by the brain for its own use.
from Youtube: "Thomas Metzinger is the Director of the Philosophy Group at the Department of Philosophy at Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. His research focuses on philosophy of mind, especially on consciousness and the nature of the self. "
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mthDxnFXs9k[/youtube]

fade wrote:
Oldskeptic wrote:<snip>
Nothing that exists naturally is outside the remit of science. The brain is a natural product of evolution, and so is the consciousness/self-awareness that it produces. If you want to go with some speculation that consciousness is some kind of supernatural thingy then be my guest, but you have no evidential support for it.

And you have no evidential support for your position, just baseless assumptions and beliefs.

Do you have a more parsimonious explanation for consciousness than that provided by Oldskeptic?

fade wrote:The difference is I'm honest and consistent; I admit my position is philosophical. For me to claim my position was one of science would be to insult science. I'll leave that one to you since you seem to be doing such a dandy job of it so far.

So you have a non-scientific philosophical postion on a question of biology. Of what value is it?

Teuton · **#178** by **Teuton** » May 17, 2011 6:24 pm

Davian wrote:
Did the "I" making that claim (bolded) exist while your body slept last night?

It depends on what you think the referent of "I" is. I think it is a human animal, and human animals don't cease to exist when they fall asleep.

Davian · **#179** by **Davian** » May 17, 2011 8:04 pm

Teuton wrote:
Davian wrote:
Did the "I" making that claim (bolded) exist while your body slept last night?

It depends on what you think the referent of "I" is. I think it is a human animal, and human animals don't cease to exist when they fall asleep.

I do not think I could nominate someone more familiar with the concept of quotation than yourself.

That in mind, I am not sure what to make of you quoting me out of context and proving a nonsensical comment.

Tell me, Teuton, are there other animals that cease to exist when they fall asleep?

Teuton · **#180** by **Teuton** » May 17, 2011 8:14 pm

Davian wrote:
That in mind, I am not sure what to make of you quoting me out of context and proving a nonsensical comment.

What do you think is nonsensical about it?

Davian wrote:
Tell me, Teuton, are there other animals that cease to exist when they fall asleep?

No.

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