Bantay wrote:

Shrunk wrote:You, yourself, earlier said that "good" exists independent of God, in your attempt to resolve the Euthypro dilemma.

Did I? Was that really what I said? Let's see exactly what I said.

Bantay wrote:(C) The Eutypro Dilemna has been resolved for a long time. (insert - there is no need for the Christian to accept either of the traditional horns of the dilemma,when a third option is available)....namely, "Whatever a good God commands will always be good. "

That's very different from what you claimed I have said.

Haven't been following the thread or watched the debate (yet.) But my two cents worth:

On the contrary; the Euthyphro dilemma has not be resolved, not by a long shot (unless of course one means resolved as in what it reveals about the flaw in much theistic thinking on this matter.)
The attempt at an answer "Whatever a good God commands will always be good", a mainstay with unprincipled and/or philosophically weak apologists like WLC, comes down hard on one of the two "horns" of the dilemma. And is no "third option" as asserted.

The dilemma (just for clarity):
"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"

This response "Whatever a good God commands will always be good" clearly falls to the former. What else is a "good god" other than a god that is deemed good by some other means or criteria? Otherwise it would merely mean that a "good god" is a god that is loved by gods! Or within monotheism (as your telling capitalisation of "God" implies): A god that loves (approves of) itself.

So either that answer sides with the first ;"the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious", or it is self-referring nonsense saying nothing at all.
As offered as a third option, a way out of the dilemma, I would take it as the latter; white noise intended to befuddle and bedazzle, carrying no substance whatsoever.

Bantay wrote:

Shrunk wrote:even if we concede that "good" is an objective value, there is no reason to agree that it originates or depends on the existence of God.

Harris didn't give us the goods, maybe you can. What is the naturalistic mechanism responsible for the immaterial, transcendent, objectiveness of some moral values?

Are you claiming that if one can't explain it (assuming it is real in the first place!) therefore God?! Because it sure looks like it.

Bantay wrote:

Rumraket wrote: If you think he did, could you perhaps distill the evidence he must have summarized, for the existence of said objective morality?

He summarized it in the first 10 minutes of his first presentation, namely, the observation that some moral values, like goodness, love, kindness and equality, as well as rape, unjustly killing another innocent human being are either morally good, or morally wrong, even if somebody chooses to not believe it is so.

Yes, I have heard him use such examples before. But what can we find if we actually look at them, rather than just accept this assertion blindly? (as you at least appear to have done.)

goodness: So goodness is objectively good?! Come on now! That is an empty word, aimed to impress on an emotional non-thing level, nothing more. It says nothing.

love: An emotion, essentially (as related to this context) equating with having "good" thoughts/feelings about someone. Again adding nothing; "feeling good feelings is good."

kindness: Yet again; a term used to refer to acting in ways deemed "good" by those affected. "Doing good things for people is good."

equality: Too vague a term to be of much use. But comes down, not to objective truth, but relational. A decidedly subjective concept. Subjective as in tied to the relationships between subjects, not independent of those subjects. as 'evidence' of this; it is at least imaginable that some society could exist where the preferred status, according to all members, is a non-quality based system. Such as one where a group (for some physiological/psychological reason) is happiest as a servant class under the rule of another. In most human societies equality is seen as a good, only because equality for oneself tends to be what people prefer.

rape: Now it may appear at first glance that is one is a slam dunk for your (you and WLCs) case, and it is often the first and prime example brought up in such cases for that very reason. But it really isn't. You see "Rape" is a cover word for a more complex event, one including certain subjective caveats, which make all the difference. Rape involves (at least) one non-consenting participant, forced against their will into the act. It is this negative deeply subjective response that is the grounding of what makes rape so abhorrent. Take that away, remove the subjective (emotional) response, and it all falls apart.
Because; no, the rape doesn't cease to be immoral any more - it ceases to be rape at all! One could even refer to it as "unjustly having sex with another innocent (unwilling) human being", which of course brings us to the last.

unjustly killing another innocent human being: The "unjust" simply begs the question. Obviously "unjustly" doing anything counts as "immoral"; that is precisely what the word means.
In effect this sentence reads that it is immoral to "kill another innocent human being" in an unjust (i.e. immoral) fashion. Once again it adds nothing, says nothing, but "immoral things are always immoral."

Bantay wrote:He used the nazis as an example. The nazis believed they were morally justified in doing the merciless atrocities against millions of people. However, even if the nazis had succeeded in converting or brainwashing every human being on the surface of the earth to naziism, it still would have been morally heinous to kill 6 million innocent men, women and children during the holocaust.

Good old Godwin's law eh?
How so? All this implies is that from our perspective, of not being "brainwashed" we find it abhorrent. Why? Because it is doing real harm in a fashion that 'displeases' some people - this is the underlying Subjectivity in the case. A subjectivity all those loaded terms ("merciless atrocities", "brainwashing", "innocent") are designed to invoke.
If it were the case that no one found those acts at all egregious, including those killed, then the the so-called objective immorality would likewise disappear.

Bantay wrote:This demonstrates that some moral values are objective in the philosophical sense of being valid and binding, even when nobody believes them to be.

That would be true, if it were at all the case that "nobody believes them to be" in any of those cases. Which it is not. And that the morality was not entirely tied up in those beliefs. Which it is.
Back to the classic fall back example; Rape is immoral because the victim feels it to be so. If they did not, then it would not be rape, just a consensual act between two people.

Bantay wrote:The objectiveness of these moral values is obviously transcendent to those who choose to believe or disbelieve.

Not only is that not obvious (if one bothers to actually think about it - a lot of fallacious things are "obvious" when one fails to critically consider them), it is something you simply assumed from the outset. Like many an apologist you have made the mistake of assuming the conclusion and (perhaps unwittingly) used it as the underpinning premise of that conclusion.

Bantay wrote:Since in an atheist universe there would be no transcendent source of morals,

Not that I think there is any reason to think there is such a source (no one has provided a case that is at all convincing on close examination) but you jump the gun by a long shot in that "atheist universe" remark. You are assuming your conclusion yet again; that the source of this "objective source of morality" must be a god! Not just this source must be sentient, but actually a god!

Bantay wrote:it follows then that since some moral values are objective in this way, therefore we don't live in an atheist universe.

Which leads to this absolute whopper of a Non Sequitur!
Not only is your premise entirely unfounded, but your conclusion doesn't follow from it even it it was.

Teuton wrote:

Shrunk wrote:You use the term "a good God." This means the adjective ("good") is independent of the object of that adjective ("God") and means it must be possible for a God to exist who is not good. Therefore, the quality of "goodness" exists idependently of God.

Craig's view boils down to the following definition:

X is a (morally) good/good-making property =def X is a property (essentially) exemplified by God

This means that the goodness or 'good-makingness' of a good or good-making property depends on its being had by God. That is, no property is good or good-making unless God has it. So no morally relevant property is intrinsically good or good-making independently of God's having it.

Right. Which further highlights the difficulties that this view of morality (and of God) raises.

Let's take a relatively trivial moral question, for which there is nonetheless no clear answer. e.g. "Suppose you find a $20 bill on the ground. You have no way of determining to whom it belongs. Is it moral to keep it for yourself?" Let's say God, as the exemplar of "goodness", says that the answer is "Yes." We can then imagine another being that is exactly like God in every way, except who would answer this question as "No." Now, on what basis do we say the the second God is less moral, less good than the first God, and therefore not God at all? It can't be because the answer is inherently good, by the definition used above. Yet I can't see why a being that created the universe, is all knowing, all powerful, incarnated himself as his son and sent himself down to earth to die and redeem man of his sins, etc. etc, is not worthy of being worshipped as God by Craig simply because he wouldn't pick up a $20 bill lying on the ground.

The more serious problem with the claim IMHO: It sets up a situation in which morality is simply conceived in terms of the entity from which it originates, with no concern for the inherent qualities of the principles that thereby arise. So it is trivially simple for me to state this: "Morality is determined by the functioning of particular circuits in the human brain, which have arisen thru evolution in response to selection pressures in the environment. 'Goodness' is therefore determined by the degree to which the moral judgements formed by this circuitry are consistent with those selection pressures." This fulfills the criteria for "objectivity" that Craig proposes. The selection pressures are objectively "out there" in the environment, regardless of whether any individual is subjectively aware of them, and the optimal "good" response is objectively determined by those selection pressures, even if a particular brain does not arrive at that response because its moral processing circuitry is not functioning properly (eg. in a psychopath) or is being interfered with by other circuitry (eg. that derived for immediate pleasure gratification.)

The scientific evidence for the existence of such circuitry is quite persuasive. But since this is not a scientific discussion, there is no need to go into it here.

Shrunk wrote: The more serious problem with the claim IMHO: It sets up a situation in which morality is simply conceived in terms of the entity from which it originates, with no concern for the inherent qualities of the principles that thereby arise.

I just want to clarify that I only see this as a "problem" for someone who is advocating for Craig's position. I personally see no reason morality could not be defined in this manner.

Panderos wrote:Actually he said the art of persuasion is truth independent. I.e. how good you are at persuading people, as opposed to how likely you are to persuade someone something in particular.

It's amazing the trivialities we can get bogged down on in this forum!

Isn't it!

Panderos wrote:As for your post earlier Thommo, I'm going to take that as 'there aren't really any good moral systems that are not based on human well-being'. To be honest, I think if we had utilitarianism enforced it would make everyone happier apart from the philosophers.

No, that isn't really a fair representation of what I said. No more than saying "I'm going to take that as 'there aren't really any good moral systems that are based on human well-being'".

Philosophical theories of ethics being enforced from the outside is a nonsense, you can't force someone to value something. Brands of utilitarianism in particular could result in some hideous monstrosities if an attempt to enforce one of them was made (cf. examples such as the repugnant conclusion and the sadistic conclusion).

You don't need to force people to value anything, any more than we have to force people to value not murdering in order to have a law against murder.

If utilitarianism resulted in hideous monstrosities, then those hideous monstrosities would count big time against the 'score' of any particular outcome, so surely they wouldn't happen? If everyone thinks 'wow this outcome is awful for some people, we really don't like it', then their feelings will count against the score.

Panderos wrote:You don't need to force people to value anything, any more than we have to force people to value not murdering in order to have a law against murder.

I can't quite imagine how you intend to enforce utilitarianism then.

Perhaps you could give an example of some rules/laws you would impose that aren't currently in place, and how they could be enforced?

Panderos wrote:If utilitarianism resulted in hideous monstrosities, then those hideous monstrosities would count big time against the 'score' of any particular outcome, so surely they wouldn't happen? If everyone thinks 'wow this outcome is awful for some people, we really don't like it', then their feelings will count against the score.

All I can suggest is that you look up (for example) the repugnant conclusion or some of the other similar flaws with utilitarianism. It just doesn't quite work out how you might hope.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/repugnant-conclusion/

Watching now. It still amazes me that the arch-fuckwit Kraig doesn't see that the phrase 'objective moral values' is a fucking oxymoron. Values are necessarily subjective.

Still a fucking idiot.

Edit: Oh, and I see that he now asserts that the holocaust was a bad thing, contrary to his previously expressed opinions that genocide is morally good for the victims.

Dirty, weaselly little cunt of a snotbag. He's a fucking oxygen thief.

hackenslash wrote:He's a fucking oxygen thief.

.

ADParker,

thank you for your reply. However well written, most of it is simple flourish and hand waving. I will go down your post, point by point and show you why you are mistaken in much of it.

On your reply that there is no option to the two horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, that is simply wrong. You then stated the 3rd option I did provide is "unprincipled" and only "philosophically weak" apologists would use. Then you claimed that such a 3rd option would land on the first horn of the dilemma. That is false. This is why.

On the first horn, the Christian does not believe that morality is an arbitrary function of God, somehow detached from God. On the second horn, the Christian does not believe that God is subject to some external morality that is detached and presumably morally superior to Him. Thus, both horns of the dilemma are inconsistent with Christian belief. The 3rd option that I'm sure you and others here wish would go away, is that "Anything a good God commands will always be good". This option avoids the first horn (arbitrary morality), since an objective standard of morality exists (in God). It avoids the second horn (morality external to God) because it internalizes goodness in the character of God. As such, goodness and God are inseparable. Goodness is simply part of God's character and only good commands can flow from Him.

Though you and others may balk at this, and undoubtably there will be some who make the baseless assertion "there is no 3rd option", it will only illustrate a truth that many of you may come to know someday but presently would not understand. The Euthyphro dilemma is not a dilemma for the Christian, but for the non-Christian.


Now, on to your attempted deconstruction of the moral argument. Here you appear to be confusing moral semantics with moral ontology. We already know morals exist, and that some morals are objective in the philosophical sense. Ontologically, the case is won. However, a good rhetorician always has a back door. Might as well stoop to redefining terms, or introducing subjective, relativistic definitions..and yes, this is what you have attempted to do. It's really quite sophomoric. I believe it was you who accused some apologists of being philosophically weak, but your attempt to deconstruct the words (not the ideas or concepts the words convey) I think shows your position to be philosophically weak. My replies are in bold.

goodness: So goodness is objectively good?! Come on now! That is an empty word, aimed to impress on an emotional non-thing level, nothing more. It says nothing.

What we commonly refer to as "goodness" is rather a culmination of many good things or characteristics. One can reasonably say that "goodness" is good, but one cannot reasonably say "goodness is evil".

love: An emotion, essentially (as related to this context) equating with having "good" thoughts/feelings about someone. Again adding nothing; "feeling good feelings is good."

I hate to do this, but you need to know that your definition of love is purely subjective. Not everyone agrees that love is an emotion, but everyone agrees that love is morally good, even if they themselves are not loving.

kindness: Yet again; a term used to refer to acting in ways deemed "good" by those affected. "Doing good things for people is good."

Is there any denying that even if being kind is not useful for our own interests or even beneficial to anyone, that it is still morally good? Of course not. Nobody in their right mind is going to say "kindness is evil!", and expect to be taken seriously.


equality: Too vague a term to be of much use. But comes down, not to objective truth, but relational. A decidedly subjective concept. Subjective as in tied to the relationships between subjects, not independent of those subjects. as 'evidence' of this; it is at least imaginable that some society could exist where the preferred status, according to all members, is a non-quality based system. Such as one where a group (for some physiological/psychological reason) is happiest as a servant class under the rule of another. In most human societies equality is seen as a good, only because equality for oneself tends to be what people prefer.

Again, you seem to be attempting to impose a purely utilitarian definition upon the word, when the context is moral and philosophical. As long as you mention subjective terms, your own assessment of the term "equality" as being "too vague" is also subjective. I see this as a rhetorical device on your part, with the near paragraph length of imaginary blush provided for effect. Now let's be realistic. The person who is persecuted for being different in some way, has less personal liberties, is prohibited from personal freedoms due to such inequality discrimination, or is otherwise denied the same equality that others enjoy, if given the choice, would always prefer equality over discrimination. We all know this, even if you don't want to admit it in a public forum. If you feel the need to invent or suggest hypothetical societies where people willfully subjugate themselves to others in the hopes that such burdensome things as personal, individual freedoms and equal liberties are removed, only show vacuous your own position is on the subject and to what lengths of ridiculousness you feel you need to go to deny that equality is not morally good.

rape: Now it may appear at first glance that is one is a slam dunk for your (you and WLCs) case, and it is often the first and prime example brought up in such cases for that very reason. But it really isn't. You see "Rape" is a cover word for a more complex event, one including certain subjective caveats, which make all the difference. Rape involves (at least) one non-consenting participant, forced against their will into the act. It is this negative deeply subjective response that is the grounding of what makes rape so abhorrent. Take that away, remove the subjective (emotional) response, and it all falls apart. Because; no, the rape doesn't cease to be immoral any more - it ceases to be rape at all! One could even refer to it as "unjustly having sex with another innocent (unwilling) human being", which of course brings us to the last.

On rape, here you have confused the act with rape with the emotional response to it. It is not the emotional response that we are discussing, so most of your little rant there is just a red herring and easily dismissed. Nobody in their right mind will point to a nearby woman and say "I'm going to rape that woman, then beat her to a pulp and drop her into that ditch over there"...and expect anyone to say "Oh! That's very kind of you!". Rape is always a morally heinous act and we all know it. Even if the world was filled with men who only raped instead of engaging in consensual sex, it would still be morally heinous. Ever wonder why we don't refer to carnivorous animals "murdering" other animals? Or more social animals "stealing" from each other? Or some animals "raping" their female counterparts? We don't use those terms for other animals. Those who do, do so because they are imposing an anthropocentric view on animal behavior. Non-human animals do not reflect on moral issues, they have no sense of moral duties and obligations. They are not moral, we are.

unjustly killing another innocent human being: The "unjust" simply begs the question. Obviously "unjustly" doing anything counts as "immoral"; that is precisely what the word means.
In effect this sentence reads that it is immoral to "kill another innocent human being" in an unjust (i.e. immoral) fashion. Once again it adds nothing, says nothing, but "immoral things are always immoral."

Justice and moral good are two separate terms, two separate definitions. But we don't need to lower ourselves to petty semantic ducking and weaving do we? Obviously, justice exists, and it is morally good. Can one reasonably deny that the unjust killing of an innocent human being is morally wrong?

Bantay wrote:He used the nazis as an example. The nazis believed they were morally justified in doing the merciless atrocities against millions of people. However, even if the nazis had succeeded in converting or brainwashing every human being on the surface of the earth to naziism, it still would have been morally heinous to kill 6 million innocent men, women and children during the holocaust.

How so? All this implies is that from our perspective, of not being "brainwashed" we find it abhorrent. Why? Because it is doing real harm in a fashion that 'displeases' some people - this is the underlying Subjectivity in the case. A subjectivity all those loaded terms ("merciless atrocities", "brainwashing", "innocent") are designed to invoke.
If it were the case that no one found those acts at all egregious, including those killed, then the the so-called objective immorality would likewise disappear.

What it implies is that we as observers are able to see what is objectively moral from a transcendent, observer perspective, while those who engage in such atrocious acts (such as took place during the Holocaust) are doing so believing they are somehow morally justified, obviously deep in self-delusion. The Holocaust example demonstrates that some moral values are objective, even when everybody doesn't believe they are or responds to moral duties and obligations in a way that corresponds to the more objective standard. It also illustrates that the objectiveness of some moral values transcends the subjective choices people make. In other words, the objectiveness of some moral values exists independently of whether we believe in them or not.

Bantay wrote:Since in an atheist universe there would be no transcendent source of morals,

Not that I think there is any reason to think there is such a source (no one has provided a case that is at all convincing on close examination) but you jump the gun by a long shot in that "atheist universe" remark. You are assuming your conclusion yet again; that the source of this "objective source of morality" must be a god! Not just this source must be sentient, but actually a god!

Is there any denying, that in an atheist universe, there would be no objectiveness to morality? Of course not. In an atheist universe, there would be no basis for morality being anything more than evolved, inherited behaviors that are only beneficial and serve no further value except our own selfish well-being. But do we live in this kind of universe? No. We recognize that some moral values really are objective, even when we try to avoid the implications of it. Additionally, even the atheist lives as if some moral values are objective in this way.

In an atheist universe, there would be no transcendent, immaterial impetus that imposes itself upon our consciences. It would be purely deterministic, instinctual behavior that has no objective, foundational framework from which all other (universal, relativistic) morality would fall under. Do we live in this kind of universe? No. There is no metaphysically natural origin for the transcendent, objective quality of some moral values. Nature does not impose abstract concepts like "good and evil" upon our conscience.

In an atheist universe, morality would not be valid and binding, even when we believe it is not. In an atheist universe, it would be meaningless to say "unjustly killing an innocent human being is morally wrong". In an atheist universe, it wouldn't be really "wrong" to rape a woman and leave her beaten and bloodied body in a ditch. It would just be un-useful or at worst, create a low level social disadvantage. Do we live in this kind of universe? No. It follows then that since we don't live in an atheist universe, we must live in a theist universe.

What we commonly refer to as "goodness" is rather a culmination of many good things or characteristics. One can reasonably say that "goodness" is good, but one cannot say "goodness is evil".

This option avoids the first horn (arbitrary morality), since an objective standard of morality exists (in God).

seriously , that use of circular logic is impressive .

It avoids the second horn (morality external to God) because it internalizes goodness in the character of God.

Yes Goodness is Good because Goodness is God and God is Goodness ! God and Goodness is the same thing !

As such, goodness and God are inseparable.

Yes !

Goodness is simply part of God's character and only good commands can flow from Him.

Yes !And they are Good not because they are good , but because god's imposed nature is goodness basically god do it because goodness is greater that god ,wich means that god isn't actually omnipotent ,he can't do bad stuff while we obviously can .

hackenslash wrote:Watching now. It still amazes me that the arch-fuckwit Kraig doesn't see that the phrase 'objective moral values' is a fucking oxymoron. Values are necessarily subjective.

Still a fucking idiot.

Edit: Oh, and I see that he now asserts that the holocaust was a bad thing, contrary to his previously expressed opinions that genocide is morally good for the victims.

Dirty, weaselly little cunt of a snotbag. He's a fucking oxygen thief.

You know, the majority of philosophers are moral realists. Subjectivism is an anti-realism. What you say of Craig would also apply to most philosophers and even Harris.

You're hatred for Craig is often times creepy.

IIzO wrote:

This option avoids the first horn (arbitrary morality), since an objective standard of morality exists (in God).

seriously , that use of circular logic is impressive .

It avoids the second horn (morality external to God) because it internalizes goodness in the character of God.

Yes Goodness is Good because Goodness is God and God is Goodness ! God and Goodness is the same thing !

As such, goodness and God are inseparable.

Yes !

Goodness is simply part of God's character and only good commands can flow from Him.

Yes !And they are Good not because they are good , but because god's imposed nature is goodness basically god do it because goodness is greater that god ,wich means that god isn't actually omnipotent ,he can't do bad stuff while we obviously can .

There's no circularity. God is Goodness itself on Craig's account. God is also essentially Goodness itself; it is His nature. And if, say, his commands are just expressions of His nature, as Craig believes, then it's hard to see how the charge of arbitrariness applies. For they'd be the commands delimited by Goodness itself.

Yes !And they are Good not because they are good , but because god's imposed nature is goodness basically god do it because goodness is greater that god ,wich means that god isn't actually omnipotent ,he can't do bad stuff while we obviously can

I don't see how this impacts his omnipotence. God has the power to do evil although he doesn't in any possible world.

Mick wrote:You know, the majority of philosophers are moral realists.

The majority of philosophers are irrelevant. Perhaps you haven't worked it out yet that the majority of philosophy is bollocks.

Subjectivism is an anti-realism.

Ism? Who said anything about an 'ism'? Either way, care to support this bollocks, or is it going to go the way of the rest of your posting history, and result in nothing more than you asserting your superior ability at emptying your intellectual bowels?

What you say of Craig would also apply to most philosophers and even Harris.

And what makes you think I agree with Harris? And what makes you think that what philosophers have to say is remotely interesting? Frankly, while philosophy is a useful tool, philosophers are simply tools.

You're [sic] hatred for Craig is often times creepy.

Hatred? I don't hate the guy, I just wish he'd stop lying, and asserting that the immoral little cunt he apologises for is in any fucking way good, because your magic man is a turd, whether he exists or not, and we'd be better off without the concept. That I call Kraig a weaselly, lying little shit is not an indication of hatred, it's an indication of him being a weaselly, lying little shit.

FYI, I don't do hatred, I only do arse-kicking.

There's no circularity.

When we ask why God is good, you reply that God is good because God is being good it's identical to say that god is objective goodness because god is objective goodness.

God is Goodness itself on Craig's account.

He needed to explain why God god is goodness , and why Goodness couldn't simply be itself .

God is also essentially Goodness itself; it is His nature.

Wich doesn't explain why goodness couldn't be goodness itself , what you are saying is that goodness is omnipotent and omniscient . If goodness is an ontological something then it need not be a part of god and has an ontology of itself (wich in this scenario is something human can have in themsleves)

And if, say, his commands are just expressions of His nature, as Craig believes, then it's hard to see how the charge of arbitrariness applies.

It's the same regardless of where you place the ontology of goodness , once you have it objectively exists you can't have it be arbitrary per definition .

For they'd be the commands delimited by Goodness itself.

Wich mean that goodness is an entity of it's own right that is not God ,it's even bigger than God ,if it wasn't there would be no goodness outside of God.
It's so fun to make that kind fo shit up

I don't see how this impacts his omnipotence.

That's why i describe myself as omnipotent all the time .

God has the power to do evil although he doesn't in any possible world.

The same goes for me ,i have the power to do everything ,althought i don't in any possible world...

IIzO wrote:

There's no circularity.

When we ask why God is good, you reply that God is good because God is being good it's identical to say that god is objective goodness because god is objective goodness.

Who'd answer in that way? If someone were to ask me that and if I were Craig, I'd tell them that it's a slightly improper question. God is goodness itself, He is not good. Or, if He is, it is not in the usual sense of the term. To the question as to why God is goodness itself, I'd direct you to read from the classical theists. Craig doesn't address the question much. He uses it as a proposed model which better explains its grounding, normativity, etc.

He needed to explain why God god is goodness , and why Goodness couldn't simply be itself .

He addresses these question in his debate book entitled Is Goodness with God Enough? or a title similar to that.

Wich doesn't explain why goodness couldn't be goodness itself

It was not supposed to.

, what you are saying is that goodness is omnipotent and omniscient

Yes, that'd be a position of classical theism. God is his intelligence which is his goodness which is his omnipotence, etc. Before ridiculing it, you should try understanding why it's believed to be true and what sense they make of it.

Though I'm unsure if Craig would also hold to this. Divine simplicity and aseity are tricky topics.

If goodness is an ontological something then it need not be a part of god and has an ontology of itself (wich in this scenario is something human can have in themsleves)

So you claim.

It's the same regardless of where you place the ontology of goodness , once you have it objectively exists you can't have it be arbitrary per definition .

Right, and it's not arbitrary. You should also recognize that Craig delimits objectivity to people. He does not claim otherwise. Given the nature of God, if he exists, there's not too many facts which do not depend on him in some way.

The same goes for me ,i have the power to do everything ,althought i don't in any possible world...

Yes, you do. Do you know what you're talking about with this possible world lingo?

He's talking about Yarbollocks-conceivability, the functional equivalent of rectal evacuation.

hackenslash wrote:
Ism? Who said anything about an 'ism'? Either way, care to support this bollocks, or is it going to go the way of the rest of your posting history, and result in nothing more than you asserting your superior ability at emptying your intellectual bowels?

Even a tad bit of research into subjectivism would show you that i'm right. Give it a try.

And what makes you think I agree with Harris? And what makes you think that what philosophers have to say is remotely interesting? Frankly, while philosophy is a useful tool, philosophers are simply tools.

Is there an irony icon?

Hatred? I don't hate the guy.

Mick wrote:

IIzO wrote:

This option avoids the first horn (arbitrary morality), since an objective standard of morality exists (in God).

seriously , that use of circular logic is impressive .

It avoids the second horn (morality external to God) because it internalizes goodness in the character of God.

Yes Goodness is Good because Goodness is God and God is Goodness ! God and Goodness is the same thing !

As such, goodness and God are inseparable.

Yes !

Goodness is simply part of God's character and only good commands can flow from Him.

Yes !And they are Good not because they are good , but because god's imposed nature is goodness basically god do it because goodness is greater that god ,wich means that god isn't actually omnipotent ,he can't do bad stuff while we obviously can .

There's no circularity. God is Goodness itself on Craig's account.

And until he provides proper, substantive evidence that this entity actually exists, every other assertion erected about this entity, such as the above, is mere speculation and fantasising.

Mick wrote:God is also essentially Goodness itself; it is His nature.

Once again, until the existence assertion is converted into an evidentially supported postulate, the above is merely another piece of assertionist fantasising.

Mick wrote:And if, say, his commands are just expressions of His nature, as Craig believes, then it's hard to see how the charge of arbitrariness applies. For they'd be the commands delimited by Goodness itself.

Congratulations on missing the point by several light years. Namely, that Craig is appealing to asserted "properties" of an asserted entity in order try and magic his asserted entity into existence.

Mick wrote:

Yes !And they are Good not because they are good , but because god's imposed nature is goodness basically god do it because goodness is greater that god ,wich means that god isn't actually omnipotent ,he can't do bad stuff while we obviously can

I don't see how this impacts his omnipotence.

Excuse me, but one cannot assert in one breath, that an entity is somehow "innately good", then claim that the inability of said entity to commit an evil act as a result of the asserted "innate goodness" of this entity fails to impact upon the asserted omnipotence of said entity, because you've just defined a class of actions that this entity cannot perform with the first assertion. To state otherwise is to disappear up the rectal passage of one's self-contradiction. Not that this has stopped supernaturalists in the past of course ...

Mick wrote:God has the power to do evil although he doesn't in any possible world.

Excuse me, but if one asserts that a certain entity is "innately good", and by definition cannot commit evil acts, because doing so would constitute a violation of the essential nature of said entity, then claiming that this does not impact upon the asserted omnipotence of said entity is nonsense, because with the first assertion, you've defined an entire class of acts that are impossible for this entity to perform as a result of the assertion that this entity is "innately good". If, on the other hand, you assert that this entity has the power to commit evil acts, then this drives a fucking tank battalion through the assertion that said entity is "innately good", because any entity falling into this category cannot commit evil acts by definition. What part of this elementary concept do you not understand?

Why do supernaturalists not understand basic logic?

Bantay wrote:Goodness is simply part of God's character and only good commands can flow from Him.

The denial that God could do or command bad or evil things conflicts with God's omnipotence and free will.

Bantay wrote:Is there any denying, that in an atheist universe, there would be no objectiveness to morality? Of course not.

Yes, there is, because atheism does not entail moral antirealism!
Even if it did, moral antirealism does not entail the view that morality is "illusory" and nonobligatory.