Thomas Eshuis wrote:https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/Atheism and Agnosticism
First published Wed Aug 2, 2017
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1. Definitions of “Atheism”
“Atheism” is typically defined in terms of “theism”. Theism, in turn, is best understood as a proposition—something that is either true or false. It is often defined as “the belief that God exists”, but here “belief” means “something believed”. It refers to the propositional content of belief, not to the attitude or psychological state of believing. This is why it makes sense to say that theism is true or false and to argue for or against theism. If, however, “atheism” is defined in terms of theism and theism is the proposition that God exists and not the psychological condition of believing that there is a God, then it follows that atheism is not the absence of the psychological condition of believing that God exists (more on this below). The “a-” in “atheism” must be understood as negation instead of absence, as “not” instead of “without”. Therefore, in philosophy at least, atheism should be construed as the proposition that God does not exist (or, more broadly, the proposition that there are no gods).
First of all, according to the
platonistic concept of a
proposition, it is an
abstract object, viz.
the language-independent meaning of a declarative sentence. Such propositions are expressible by sentences belonging to the same language or to different languages, and they can even exist without being expressed by any sentence in any language. For instance, the English sentence "Snow is white" and the German sentence "Schnee ist weiß" express the same proposition.
[To be more precise, there is a
strong and a
weak platonistic conception of propositions: According to the strong one, propositions are neither rigidly nor generically dependent on language; that is, they are not only independent of a particular language such as English but also of
all languages, such that their existence is independent of the existence of languages. According to the weak conception, propositions aren't rigidly but generically dependent on languages; that is, they don't depend on a particular language such as English, but they cannot exist unless there is one language at least. For the distinction between rigid and generic existential dependence, see
this!]
I find it pretty odd to call theism a proposition. One of Draper's reasons for doing so is that "this is why it makes sense to say that theism is true or false;" but if theism is defined as a belief, it makes equally sense to say that it is true or false, since beliefs can be true or false. Propositions are often regarded as the primary bearers of truth-values, but e.g. Bertrand Russell thought otherwise: "Truth is a property of beliefs, and derivatively of sentences which express beliefs." (
Human Knowledge, 1948, 135)
One may call <God exists>/<Gods exist>
the theistic proposition, but theism isn't this proposition but a certain
propositional attitude toward it, viz.
affirmation or
belief. To be a theist is not just to entertain the thought that God exists/gods exist, but to entertain it
"combined with a yes-feeling" (Russell). (Correspondingly, if you disbelieve that p, then you entertain the thought that p combined with a "no-feeling".)
"Perception does not exhaust our contact with reality; we can think too." – Timothy Williamson