So, as part of a long ongoing project I've written the following short essay explaining (my take on) the foundation of ethics. I'd appreciate any feedback, especially constructive criticism.

My purpose in writing this essay was to write a short piece that avoids getting mired in definitions and formalism, and is accessible to anyone without any prior knowledge in philosophy needed. I also do not aim at providing a full moral theory, merely the outlines of what it is and how to find it.



A Very Short Introduction to Bright Morality
Yair Rezek, v0.3, 2010.

People look to moral theories and teachers to provide them guidance in life – to teach them what they should do, what they shouldn't, and perhaps to provide them with the tools to accomplish this. Let this, then, be our starting point.

A moral theory must hence convince a person to act in a certain way. But how can anyone be convinced to act in a particular way? A person generally acts to fulfill his own desires, in light of his own beliefs. There are thus only two ways to convince someone – you can engineer within him beliefs that will make it apparent to him that acting in a certain manner is in his interest, or you can change his desires so that they will lead to the particular behavior.

Let us consider desires. The human psyche is a mixture of many, conflicting, feelings of suffering and pleasure. We are motivated by our expectations of alleviating or avoiding suffering and incurring pleasures. This is a universal truth, applying to all people and all actions. When we give to charity, we act to alleviate the suffering induced by our conscience and in expectation of the pleasures of giving; when a sadist tortures an innocent victim, he acts to release his psychological pressure and in expectation of the pleasure he will experience at the sight of his victim's pain. The noblest and the vilest of people, the wise and the foolish – all act our of aversion to suffering and attraction to pleasures in themselves.

What is it, then, that we do when we approach a moral teacher, or a psychologist, in the hope of changing our own desires? We are seeking to harmonize our psyche. Driven by more powerful or persistent desires, we seek to eliminate or suppress opposing desires that act in discord, inducing in us suffering. The tools we seek, hence, are not arbitrary – they are determined by the structure of our psyche. We seek tools that will strengthen our most consistent and powerful desires even further, and suppress our less consistent or weaker desires.

In principle, then, different people will seek out different moralities, since they have different psychological makeups. In practice, however, people are very much alike. Anger may be stronger in some more than in others, but fury is always a passing mental state that leaves much discord in its path; any person would, if offered the opportunity, seek to develop temperance that will allow him to keep his anger in check. We can therefore outline a "standard" human morality - the moral teachings and techniques we humans seek, due to our shared human nature. And this, we can call Humanism.

One of our deepest desires is truth. We do not wish to hold on to false beliefs – considerable doubt in important beliefs causes us great distress, and learning important truths can be very rewarding. False beliefs are also indirectly harmful, as they will lead to mistaken action, action that will cause suffering instead of alleviating it or that will fail to induce pleasure. We therefore also seek moral theories that are true.

Combining the last two paragraphs gives us the greatest tool in the humanistic toolbox – exposing the truths of our human nature is not only rewarding, it is also a major change in belief. Through science and introspection, and a host of psychological and meditative techniques (which must be used with care and skepticism, in light of reason and science, lest they lead us astray), it is possible to shed our folk conceptions and prejudices of how we work and what we are and arrive at a truer appreciation of ourselves. This, by itself, already clears much of the mental fog and allows us to more clearly think through our desires and our life, thereby changing our desires.

This does not suffice, however. Self-awareness can cause you to realize you want to change yourself, but actual change requires further effort and further tools. This is where practice is most important, and this is the most difficult part of morality to apply. And even granted full self-awareness and self-control, one must still know how the world works and think things through to come to the right conclusions on how to best further his harmonious desires.

We can therefore see that moral theory is built on five foundations: the philosophical understanding of what it is, outlined above; the actual practice of self-awareness techniques; the actual practice of self-change techniques; obtaining knowledge about the world; and thinking through the ramifications of our actions . Moral action, the good life, is built on these foundations.

In all the above I discussed morality from an autonomous point of view, of someone rationally seeking out how to behave. We have seen that this alone goes a long way, and in practice it comprises much of traditional moral and religious theory and practice - from philosophers extolling the virtues of some moral theory, to gurus offering self-enlightenment. We can note in passing that religion, as it lacks scientific rigor, should be considered a primitive attempt at fulfilling these needs, often filling the mind with delusions about the world or espousing false virtues due to lack of a philosophical understanding of what morality is.

What is to be done, however, regarding the desires and beliefs of our fellow man? Humanism, shared human nature, maintains that we would wish to respect their own autonomy. We generally do not wish to enforce our desires onto them, and do desire to let them exposure their own inner desires, letting a thousand flowers bloom . However, paradoxically, we wish to impose this desire, i.e. to curtail the desires of others to impose their own desires onto others. That all of this is true, like all moral truths, is something each person has to witness within himself.

We conclude, then, that one cannot be told what is moral – one must discover it for himself. Yet nevertheless, there is a true morality that is correct for nearly all people, and would be imposed by society if only people were enlightened enough, and this is Humanism.

Philosophical Considerations

The foundations of Bright morality, arising out of science and philosophy, have been described above. But for ages philosophers, bereft of modern scientific findings and led astray by religion, have understood morality in other ways. Many of these ways of thought are still common even amongst those who call themselves naturalists. Others use other semantics, which serves to increase confusion.

First are the various opinions that maintain that morality is dependent on god, such as the view that what is moral is what god commands. But even if a god exists and creates this thing which we can call G-Morality, what is it to us? We should no more seek it that we should seek some other creation of his. What we should seek is what is within our nature to seek, and therefore only investigating our own nature can reveal what is moral. One should note that religion often holds that the world works differently (e.g. there is an afterlife), which can lead to a practical difference about appropriate conduct. Fortunately, there is no good reason to believe any of those mythologies.

Similar concerns arise for moral realism, that sees moral truths as basic qualities of states, much like the electric charge. There is simply no place for such descriptions of nature within science, nor a way for naturally-evolved creatures (like us) to perceive them even if they exist. A more subtle form of moral realism identifies the moral with certain equilibria of game theory, berating any human deviations from them as immoral. But again such arbitrary definition of the “moral” is of no practical use to us – what we seek is not the theoretical equilibria, but our own idiosyncratic preferences.

Some seek to identify the moral with some particular ideal observer. This can be god, or some “perfectly rational” observer or so on. To the extent that this observer reflects the perfectly enlightened standard human, there is some truth to this point of view, but it must be taken for what it is – an abstraction. What each of us actually want is our own idiosyncratic mix of desires. We generally share a common human nature, but to equate this standard with what we want reminds one of the old joke about the statistician that died at a pool of water 1 inch deep on average. An ideal observer should be seen as no more than a semantic waypoint on the map of morality, an idealized person that bears only family resemblance to real humans and, therefore, to real morality.

Another, common, semantic trick in our age is to relate morality to the morality that society jointly tries to impose. Again, this bears only family resemblance to the morality we each seek, which is the morality stemming from our own nature. Granted, society has a great deal of influence on our desires and beliefs, but ultimately it can only nudge self-enlightened morality within very narrow borders. Since prehistoric times to the present, enlightened morality seems to be much more uniform than culture would allow, and all evidence points to it surpassing local cultural variance.

Then there are those that focus on the use of moral language instead of on morality as a human activity, and see it as expressing an emotional response, or a command, or so on. While there are elements of truth in all of this, these are not in conflict with the core of morality, noted above, which is the individual's search for how he, personally, should behave.

Others seek to limit the applicability of moral language to certain spheres. Perhaps morality only applies to the interactions of moral agents, or to universal prescriptions of action (ones that we wish to apply to all agents), or so on. These are, again, semantic differences. One can discuss only these aspects, and perhaps there would even be value in this. But such confinements of moral speech does not alleviate the importance of the more general domain of seeking how to act, that these aspects fall within.

Finally, there are those that deny that there is any sense to morality at all. Depending on how one defines morality, they may be right – if one refuses to call “moral” a theory that cannot convince another to act in a certain way, for example, than our conception of bright morality above is irrelevant. But this, again, is merely semantics. Morality, as defined above, is a most important occupation of humans, perhaps the most important and foundational one. Whether one wants to call it “morality” or something else is, ultimately, of little consequence.

And The Rest Is Details

The above text is filled with forcibly claimed empirical assertions and philosophical proclamations. But the details and proofs are missing. What, exactly, is this shared human nature? To what extent is there variability, and where do we want to draw the line between normal, Humanistic behavior and abnormal, non-Humanistic behavior? Just what is the extent of the influence the cultural environment has on our basic desires, and are we truly justified in believing enlightened morality largely escapes its influence? What, precisely, are all those psychological, meditative, and introspective techniques? What should be prohibited, what should be allowed, what should be praised, and why? And most importantly - what are we, in practice, to do?

These, and many other, questions are left unanswered. But the above does, I hope, provide an outline of what sort of answers are possible, how to search for them, and how to establish them. Establishing the actual answers is very much a scientific, and individual, enterprise, and is beyond the scope of this brief essay.

"A person generally acts to fulfill his own desires, in light of his own beliefs. There are thus only two ways to convince someone – you can engineer within him beliefs that will make it apparent to him that acting in a certain manner is in his interest, or you can change his desires so that they will lead to the particular behavior."

There is an assumption at work here that I find controversial. Perhaps you can help me.

Can you provide an example of an act that is not explicable by means of self-interest?

Yair wrote:So, as part of a long ongoing project I've written the following short essay explaining (my take on) the foundation of ethics. I'd appreciate any feedback, especially constructive criticism.

My purpose in writing this essay was to write a short piece that avoids getting mired in definitions and formalism, and is accessible to anyone without any prior knowledge in philosophy needed. I also do not aim at providing a full moral theory, merely the outlines of what it is and how to find it.



A Very Short Introduction to Bright Morality
Yair Rezek, v0.3, 2010.

People look to moral theories and teachers to provide them guidance in life – to teach them what they should do, what they shouldn't, and perhaps to provide them with the tools to accomplish this. Let this, then, be our starting point.

A moral theory must hence convince a person to act in a certain way. But how can anyone be convinced to act in a particular way? A person generally acts to fulfill his own desires, in light of his own beliefs. There are thus only two ways to convince someone – you can engineer within him beliefs that will make it apparent to him that acting in a certain manner is in his interest, or you can change his desires so that they will lead to the particular behavior.

Rather odd perspective. Various ethical theories have man as a rational being, where this rationality places certain restrictions and imperatives upon human behaviour. It's entirely possible that there are certain moral codes that people can not be convinced of, but are moral nonetheless. You have not shown that they are the same. Consequently, your entry into morality fails.

Let us consider desires. The human psyche is a mixture of many, conflicting, feelings of suffering and pleasure. We are motivated by our expectations of alleviating or avoiding suffering and incurring pleasures. This is a universal truth, applying to all people and all actions.

Five years of studying psychology tell me this is a bit of a simplification. How many years have you dedicated to the study of psychology?

When we give to charity, we act to alleviate the suffering induced by our conscience and in expectation of the pleasures of giving; when a sadist tortures an innocent victim, he acts to release his psychological pressure and in expectation of the pleasure he will experience at the sight of his victim's pain. The noblest and the vilest of people, the wise and the foolish – all act our of aversion to suffering and attraction to pleasures in themselves.

Let's get this straight, I like Marxist materialism as much as the next guy, but it would be nice in this setting to see this fleshed out. Why do you believe it is relevant to discuss this specific 'idea' about psychology, and why do you believe so devotedly in its 'universal truth'?

What is it, then, that we do when we approach a moral teacher, or a psychologist, in the hope of changing our own desires? We are seeking to harmonize our psyche. Driven by more powerful or persistent desires, we seek to eliminate or suppress opposing desires that act in discord, inducing in us suffering. The tools we seek, hence, are not arbitrary – they are determined by the structure of our psyche. We seek tools that will strengthen our most consistent and powerful desires even further, and suppress our less consistent or weaker desires.

Psychoanalytic bullshit. I'm not going to get any more constructive than that. I have limited time, and psychanalysis gets very little of my time.

[qutoe]In principle, then, different people will seek out different moralities, since they have different psychological makeups. In practice, however, people are very much alike. Anger may be stronger in some more than in others, but fury is always a passing mental state that leaves much discord in its path; any person would, if offered the opportunity, seek to develop temperance that will allow him to keep his anger in check. We can therefore outline a "standard" human morality - the moral teachings and techniques we humans seek, due to our shared human nature. And this, we can call Humanism.[/quote]

Why humanism? Why are animals not included? Do chimpanzees not get angry? The differences you maintain between human is surely the same as between these two sorts of primates.. And any dividing characteristics are no greater than that between chimps and humans?

One of our deepest desires is truth.

Oh really?

We do not wish to hold on to false beliefs – considerable doubt in important beliefs causes us great distress, and learning important truths can be very rewarding. False beliefs are also indirectly harmful, as they will lead to mistaken action, action that will cause suffering instead of alleviating it or that will fail to induce pleasure. We therefore also seek moral theories that are true.

One of the innovations of Friedrich Nietzsche is that we move towards lies. Considering the history of religion and man, I don't think the guy is wrong per se.. Why aren't you exploring this issue in more breadth, or alternatively, leaving it be? I think you are bringing up too much unrelated material that detracts - by sheer irrelevance here and in philosophy - from your piece.

Combining the last two paragraphs gives us the greatest tool in the humanistic toolbox – exposing the truths of our human nature is not only rewarding, it is also a major change in belief. Through science and introspection, and a host of psychological and meditative techniques (which must be used with care and skepticism, in light of reason and science, lest they lead us astray), it is possible to shed our folk conceptions and prejudices of how we work and what we are and arrive at a truer appreciation of ourselves. This, by itself, already clears much of the mental fog and allows us to more clearly think through our desires and our life, thereby changing our desires.

Yeah.. I'm not sure it works like that. Most people respond relatively hostile because they are quite comfortable with their post-hoc rationalisations. Hence Nietzsche and the movement towards lying. I understand that you need this move to truth now, but that only makes it more problematic.

This does not suffice, however. Self-awareness can cause you to realize you want to change yourself, but actual change requires further effort and further tools. This is where practice is most important, and this is the most difficult part of morality to apply. And even granted full self-awareness and self-control, one must still know how the world works and think things through to come to the right conclusions on how to best further his harmonious desires.

We can therefore see that moral theory is built on five foundations: the philosophical understanding of what it is, outlined above; the actual practice of self-awareness techniques; the actual practice of self-change techniques; obtaining knowledge about the world; and thinking through the ramifications of our actions . Moral action, the good life, is built on these foundations.

In all the above I discussed morality from an autonomous point of view, of someone rationally seeking out how to behave. We have seen that this alone goes a long way, and in practice it comprises much of traditional moral and religious theory and practice - from philosophers extolling the virtues of some moral theory, to gurus offering self-enlightenment. We can note in passing that religion, as it lacks scientific rigor, should be considered a primitive attempt at fulfilling these needs, often filling the mind with delusions about the world or espousing false virtues due to lack of a philosophical understanding of what morality is.

What is to be done, however, regarding the desires and beliefs of our fellow man? Humanism, shared human nature, maintains that we would wish to respect their own autonomy. We generally do not wish to enforce our desires onto them, and do desire to let them exposure their own inner desires, letting a thousand flowers bloom . However, paradoxically, we wish to impose this desire, i.e. to curtail the desires of others to impose their own desires onto others. That all of this is true, like all moral truths, is something each person has to witness within himself.

We conclude, then, that one cannot be told what is moral – one must discover it for himself. Yet nevertheless, there is a true morality that is correct for nearly all people, and would be imposed by society if only people were enlightened enough, and this is Humanism.

You haven't shown anything past 'one must discover it for himself'.

Philosophical Considerations

The foundations of Bright morality, arising out of science and philosophy, have been described above. But for ages philosophers, bereft of modern scientific findings and led astray by religion, have understood morality in other ways. Many of these ways of thought are still common even amongst those who call themselves naturalists. Others use other semantics, which serves to increase confusion.

First are the various opinions that maintain that morality is dependent on god, such as the view that what is moral is what god commands. But even if a god exists and creates this thing which we can call G-Morality, what is it to us?

The guy made us, with a unique plan and a unique purpose. Our nature, and true happiness can only follow from keeping to his path. This is elementary theology, Watson.

We should no more seek it that we should seek some other creation of his. What we should seek is what is within our nature to seek, and therefore only investigating our own nature can reveal what is moral. One should note that religion often holds that the world works differently (e.g. there is an afterlife), which can lead to a practical difference about appropriate conduct. Fortunately, there is no good reason to believe any of those mythologies.

Yeah, like I said. God made us, God defines our nature, an inquiry into our nature leads to God. Platonic love in the medieval conception, loving God through loving Man. Again, fairly elementary theology.

Similar concerns arise for moral realism, that sees moral truths as basic qualities of states, much like the electric charge. There is simply no place for such descriptions of nature within science, nor a way for naturally-evolved creatures (like us) to perceive them even if they exist. A more subtle form of moral realism identifies the moral with certain equilibria of game theory, berating any human deviations from them as immoral. But again such arbitrary definition of the “moral” is of no practical use to us – what we seek is not the theoretical equilibria, but our own idiosyncratic preferences.

Some seek to identify the moral with some particular ideal observer. This can be god, or some “perfectly rational” observer or so on. To the extent that this observer reflects the perfectly enlightened standard human, there is some truth to this point of view, but it must be taken for what it is – an abstraction. What each of us actually want is our own idiosyncratic mix of desires. We generally share a common human nature, but to equate this standard with what we want reminds one of the old joke about the statistician that died at a pool of water 1 inch deep on average. An ideal observer should be seen as no more than a semantic waypoint on the map of morality, an idealized person that bears only family resemblance to real humans and, therefore, to real morality.

Another, common, semantic trick in our age is to relate morality to the morality that society jointly tries to impose. Again, this bears only family resemblance to the morality we each seek, which is the morality stemming from our own nature. Granted, society has a great deal of influence on our desires and beliefs, but ultimately it can only nudge self-enlightened morality within very narrow borders. Since prehistoric times to the present, enlightened morality seems to be much more uniform than culture would allow, and all evidence points to it surpassing local cultural variance.

Then there are those that focus on the use of moral language instead of on morality as a human activity, and see it as expressing an emotional response, or a command, or so on. While there are elements of truth in all of this, these are not in conflict with the core of morality, noted above, which is the individual's search for how he, personally, should behave.

Others seek to limit the applicability of moral language to certain spheres. Perhaps morality only applies to the interactions of moral agents, or to universal prescriptions of action (ones that we wish to apply to all agents), or so on. These are, again, semantic differences. One can discuss only these aspects, and perhaps there would even be value in this. But such confinements of moral speech does not alleviate the importance of the more general domain of seeking how to act, that these aspects fall within.

Finally, there are those that deny that there is any sense to morality at all. Depending on how one defines morality, they may be right – if one refuses to call “moral” a theory that cannot convince another to act in a certain way, for example, than our conception of bright morality above is irrelevant. But this, again, is merely semantics. Morality, as defined above, is a most important occupation of humans, perhaps the most important and foundational one. Whether one wants to call it “morality” or something else is, ultimately, of little consequence.

And The Rest Is Details

The above text is filled with forcibly claimed empirical assertions and philosophical proclamations. But the details and proofs are missing. What, exactly, is this shared human nature? To what extent is there variability, and where do we want to draw the line between normal, Humanistic behavior and abnormal, non-Humanistic behavior? Just what is the extent of the influence the cultural environment has on our basic desires, and are we truly justified in believing enlightened morality largely escapes its influence? What, precisely, are all those psychological, meditative, and introspective techniques? What should be prohibited, what should be allowed, what should be praised, and why? And most importantly - what are we, in practice, to do?

These, and many other, questions are left unanswered. But the above does, I hope, provide an outline of what sort of answers are possible, how to search for them, and how to establish them. Establishing the actual answers is very much a scientific, and individual, enterprise, and is beyond the scope of this brief essay.

It's rather useless without an example, don't you think? What is this morality supposed to look like?

Comte de St.-Germain wrote:Rather odd perspective. Various ethical theories have man as a rational being, where this rationality places certain restrictions and imperatives upon human behaviour. It's entirely possible that there are certain moral codes that people can not be convinced of, but are moral nonetheless. You have not shown that they are the same. Consequently, your entry into morality fails.

I invoke Hume's "Reason is, and must be, a slave to the passions" [probably misquoting him, but hey...]. Do you feel this needs to be done explicitly? I don't believe a person unfamiliar with Kantian or similar moves will even consider that rationality can result in imperatives, but perhaps I'm mistaken.

Five years of studying psychology tell me this is a bit of a simplification. How many years have you dedicated to the study of psychology?

None. I do, however, consider this to be true. Can you give an example where this is not true?

Let's get this straight, I like Marxist materialism as much as the next guy, but it would be nice in this setting to see this fleshed out. Why do you believe it is relevant to discuss this specific 'idea' about psychology, and why do you believe so devotedly in its 'universal truth'?

I think it's an important step in the development because it is invoked later in the praxis of using self-change tools. That makes it a crucial part of the infrastructure of the proposed metaethical theory.

I believe it is true largely due to thinking about the biological evolution and nature of decision making and consciousness, and the positive and negative feedback loops that are endemic at every level at neuroscience.

Psychoanalytic bullshit.

Not at all. Psychoanalysis is merely one way people try to do reach inner harmony, contentment, eudaimonia. I think rather poorly of it, and it was not my intent to invoke it.

[qutoe]Why humanism? Why are animals not included? Do chimpanzees not get angry? The differences you maintain between human is surely the same as between these two sorts of primates.. And any dividing characteristics are no greater than that between chimps and humans?[/quote]
Because we're human, and we're the one choosing and contemplating how to act. Whether other animals are similar to us is besides the point.

One of the innovations of Friedrich Nietzsche is that we move towards lies. Considering the history of religion and man, I don't think the guy is wrong per se.. Why aren't you exploring this issue in more breadth, or alternatively, leaving it be? I think you are bringing up too much unrelated material that detracts - by sheer irrelevance here and in philosophy - from your piece.

I can't say I'm familiar with that Nietzschian move. At any rate I need truth to establish a truthful ethics, rather than a placating one. I think I'm devoting lots of words to it already, I don't think an essay in this length can explore the issue in greater depth.

You haven't shown anything past 'one must discover it for himself'.

I think I have. Proved? No. Shown? Yes.

The guy made us, with a unique plan and a unique purpose. Our nature, and true happiness can only follow from keeping to his path. This is elementary theology, Watson.

Yes. I was going to avoid this issue, but perhaps you're right and I should include a sentence on that.

It's rather useless without an example, don't you think? What is this morality supposed to look like?

I think the "five foundations" paint the picture of how it works well enough, and the "let a thousand flowers blossom" is example enough of what the conclusions would supposedly be. That's pretty much why these texts are there. I don't think I can do more in such a brief essay - or, really, at all without considerable effort.

I guess I'm not going to get my example...

Anyone?

Looking for falsifiability here. Or are we all lost in self-interest qua god concept?

dglas wrote:Can you provide an example of an act that is not explicable by means of self-interest?

Define "self-interest". If you mean selfish-interest, then giving anonymously to charity. If you mean contrary to your desires, then giving to charity in the expectation that it will raise your social status only to find out that no-one is impressed. If you mean contrary to your best judgment of what will further your desires, at the time that you act - my contention is precisely that there is no such act.

For a counter-case, consider a person with Tourette syndrome, so that his body speaks without willful intent; he is no longer really a single "person", IMO, his mental processes are fragmented, so that his ticks and swearing (typically) behavior is not influenced by his desires (at least not in the normal ways). So yes, there are counter-cases. Generally, however, stronger and more consistent desires are what drives action.

Edit: For a counter case of action motivated by desire as-such, reflexes come to mind.

Yair wrote:

dglas wrote:Can you provide an example of an act that is not explicable by means of self-interest?

Define "self-interest".

You are the one presenting a theory of morality. You are the one appealing to the idea. You tell me what your definition is.

Yair wrote:
If you mean selfish-interest, then giving anonymously to charity.

Yair wrote:
If you mean contrary to your desires, then giving to charity in the expectation that it will raise your social status only to find out that no-one is impressed.

So a misapprehension of intended results changes the "moral" quality of the act?

Yair wrote:
If you mean contrary to your best judgment of what will further your desires, at the time that you act - my contention is precisely that there is no such act.

Can you explain to me how you reconcile this with your statement I have italicized above?

But let's take this on face value. And among my little flurry of questions, this is the most important one:
Why do you contend this?

Yair wrote:
For a counter-case, consider a person with Tourette syndrome, so that his body speaks without willful intent; he is no longer really a single "person", IMO, his mental processes are fragmented, so that his ticks and swearing (typically) behavior is not influenced by his desires (at least not in the normal ways). So yes, there are counter-cases. Generally, however, stronger and more consistent desires are what drives action.

Using Tourette syndrome (as you describe it here) seems something of a dodge to me. You are going to say actions without willful intent are moral actions? A rock rolling down a hill strikes another rock; this is a moral act?

Yair wrote:
Edit: For a counter case of action motivated by desire as-such, reflexes come to mind.

it is noteworthy that this example comes after your appeal to Tourette Syndrome. You are now classing involuntary actions as moral ones?

dglas wrote:You are the one presenting a theory of morality. You are the one appealing to the idea. You tell me what your definition is.

I never appealed to the idea.

Can you explain to me how you reconcile this with your statement I have italicized above?

You seem to be identifying "self-interest" with "following your own desires". That kind of definition will mean no one is "really" selfless, they're just looking to have pleasure so they're really selfish. That's not a useful definition. It is better to identify "self-interest" with "following your selfish desires".

So a misapprehension of intended results changes the "moral" quality of the act?

Where do you get off on "moral quality"? You asked about an act that is not explicable in terms of self-interest. I never used that term, but gave what answer I could. I didn't give such *moral* acts, nor *immortal* acts - just acts.

The OP didn't get to the point of making the fine distinctions between good-intentioned acts and plain good acts.

And among my little flurry of questions, this is the most important one:
Why do you contend this?

Because I cannot see any other possible source of motivation. Or, in other words, I don't see any kind of possible motivation that cannot be abbreviated as "desire".

Using Tourette syndrome (as you describe it here) seems something of a dodge to me. You are going to say actions without willful intent are moral actions? A rock rolling down a hill strikes another rock; this is a moral act?

No, I'm going to say actions without willful intent are not actions that a person takes to fulfill his desires. Moral decisions aren't like that, hence moral acts aren't like that; and that doesn't mean that all acts that aren't like that are moral acts.

it is noteworthy that this example comes after your appeal to Tourette Syndrome. You are now classing involuntary actions as moral ones?

No, I'm classing involuntary reflexive actions as ones not being motivated by any desire, even a subconscious one. Which is arguably false, but at least sounds plausible.

Comte de St.-Germain wrote:God made us, God defines our nature, an inquiry into our nature leads to God. Platonic love in the medieval conception, loving God through loving Man.

That's easy for you to say

Yair wrote:So, as part of a long ongoing project I've written the following short essay explaining (my take on) the foundation of ethics. I'd appreciate any feedback, especially constructive criticism.

My purpose in writing this essay was to write a short piece that avoids getting mired in definitions and formalism, and is accessible to anyone without any prior knowledge in philosophy needed. I also do not aim at providing a full moral theory, merely the outlines of what it is and how to find it.



A Very Short Introduction to Bright Morality

Bright morality?

Isn't that the group of whiners, "I don't believe in God, but I don't want to be associated with those mean old atheists. I know, I'll come up with some pretentious name that implies that I am better and smarter and brighter than everybody else."

Yair wrote:So, as part of a long ongoing project I've written the following short essay explaining (my take on) the foundation of ethics. I'd appreciate any feedback, especially constructive criticism.

Wow, that's an impressive argument for intelligent design, but oops, hold on, you're an atheist.

Your problem is that you been drinking too much of the kool-aid of teleological beliefs, that human beings possess some sort of 'true' essence that leads us to realize that being a moral person is the inherent purpose for our existence, and all deviations from this are lies, delusions, products of ignorance.

Children are prone to teleological beliefs, they believe that pointy rocks are there for animals to scratch themselves on. It's a sort of delusion brought on by being self-conscious and instinctual. Religions have grounded their understanding of man on this magical thinking, in beliefs of man as here to serve some transcendental purpose, a true way, that separate the men of vice from those of virtues.

Our dewy-eyed humanist, such as yourself, are just borrowing from this religious foundation, in your compositions of morality, without realizing it's just magical thinking.

MrFungus420 wrote:Bright morality?

Isn't that the group of whiners, "I don't believe in God, but I don't want to be associated with those mean old atheists. I know, I'll come up with some pretentious name that implies that I am better and smarter and brighter than everybody else."

I'd say it's more group of whiners that want to say they're naturalists without being confused with nudists But to each his own.

theidiot wrote:[Your problem is that you been drinking too much of the kool-aid of teleological beliefs, that human beings possess some sort of 'true' essence that leads us to realize that being a moral person is the inherent purpose for our existence, and all deviations from this are lies, delusions, products of ignorance. .

Thanks you for your feedback. I assure you I haven't been drinking the telelogical lemonade, but thanks anyways.

Yair wrote:
Thanks you for your feedback. I assure you I haven't been drinking the telelogical lemonade, but thanks anyways.

It's quite clear that you are, but when you chose to explain more about your views of human nature, and morality that are on display in the OP, you let me know.

Yair, what is a moral act?

THWOTH wrote:Yair, what is a moral act?

Well, roughly - "a deliberate act that is knowingly directed towards furthering the desires of an enlightened normal human, committed by that person". This is from the subjectivist perspective; you could use other semantics, however, such as "an act that said person would want to see universally applied in similar circumstances" (going on the universal prespectivist angle here), "an act that said person would want to encourage" (going on emotionism here), and so on. The question is too vague in that it doesn't distinguish different meanings of "moral", and I'm not sure which the best one to use in practice if no particular one is explicitly assumed. That is a semantic, in the sense of 'philosophically immaterial', problem; the core problem is how to conduct ourselves, which is answered by the OP IM(NS?)HO.

Yair, thanks for your response to my leading question. I bet you thought I had forgotten about it. As you can see, you have inspired me to considerable thought on the matter.

Yair wrote:

THWOTH wrote:Yair, what is a moral act?

Well, roughly - "a deliberate act that is knowingly directed towards furthering the desires of an enlightened normal human, committed by that person". This is from the subjectivist perspective; you could use other semantics, however, such as "an act that said person would want to see universally applied in similar circumstances" (going on the universal prespectivist angle here), "an act that said person would want to encourage" (going on emotionism here), and so on. The question is too vague in that it doesn't distinguish different meanings of "moral", and I'm not sure which the best one to use in practice if no particular one is explicitly assumed. That is a semantic, in the sense of 'philosophically immaterial', problem; the core problem is how to conduct ourselves, which is answered by the OP IM(NS?)HO.

I'd put it more simply; a moral act is one which conforms to the conditions of a moral code (and then talk naturally turns to identifying and explicating those conditions).

In your opening post you proposed five conditions for the development of a personal moral theory...

In the OP Yair wrote:We can therefore see that moral theory is built on five foundations: the philosophical understanding of what it is, outlined above; the actual practice of self-awareness techniques; the actual practice of self-change techniques; obtaining knowledge about the world; and thinking through the ramifications of our actions . Moral action, the good life, is built on these foundations.

This five-point-plan describes a moral outlook necessarily dependent on ongoing personal, psychological self-assessment and development. Leaving aside the specific contents of any particular moral code, your ideal suggest that morality is something to be arrived at, and then only by a sustained act of intellectual effort. The objective of such an effort is to deliberately shift the moral pitch of an individual from a relatively unthinking or 'low' state of moral impropriety towards a considered or 'high' state of relative rectitude. This also implies, to some extent, that a moral act only occurs when the individual deliberately and knowingly chooses to act in a moral manner. Though I have re-framed it somewhat, I do not think I have miss-represented your view in this regard.

If, on the understanding that to be a moral person living a moral life one must first engage in the type of personal 'moral quest' you have outlined, and that without this willing and wilful movement towards higher moral ground one otherwise undertakes a life lacking some suitable quality or amount of moral fibre, then a couple of issues arise.

Firstly, though this type of self-developing procedure may lead the individual to a considered and practicable set of moral notions it does not follow axiomatically that any developmental affectations will be, or are, innately or inherently moral as a result.

Secondly, it does not not acknowledge that an individual may perform a perfectly moral act (in the sense of an act which would generally be considered as unambiguously 'good') without undertaking the type of personal development program outlined.

Furthermore, though we might accept that person A has performed an action which bears all the hallmarks of one conforming to an appropriate or applicable moral code, their personal intentions, impetuses and/or justifications may have no reference to that code - they may simply have acted without thinking, or to service a particular desire or express a particular whim on impulse as it were, or they may have just done what they were asked, told, or compelled to do by others. What does this do for person A's moral status, or the status of their deeds, when they can act so causally and without aforethought?

However, in saying this I would not like to give the impression that I hold reflective contemplation to be somehow unnecessary to a moral life, just that it is not an imperative to a moral act. In my view, morality does not exist as the product of your five-point-plan, of specific philosophical knowledge plus individual self-awareness plus an individual's proficiency in 'self-change techniques' plus particular knowledge of the world, and thought about the ramifications of action - all acting together and working in combination. However, I would concede that it the last of your conditions (reflection) is necessary for a moral life, the rest being somewhat arbitrary and dependent on the individual, their capacities, interests, and circumstance etc,. In fact, matters of philosophical understanding, self-awareness, self-change techniques, and particular knowledge and thought, can all be encompassed within the idea of reflective contemplation - and therefore reflective contemplation is the only necessary condition to the kind of moral development you propose..

If one is going to deliberately choose to act morally one must (at some point) assess the content of any moral action along with the impetuses for and consequences of it. Mere conformity or adherence to a code does not and cannot impart one's actions with rectitude automatically, no matter how sincerely one claims or believes otherwise. Morality natural concerns judgements, and to act without judgement it to act as an unthinking automaton and not as an autonomous, rational agent, and so, in this instance, reflective contemplation appears as a necessary condition of any personal morality in general. Quite simply, your ideal suggests that one must think about one's actions and the reasons for doing them.

What is not clear is how the reflective contemplation of moral notions in relation to impetuses and outcomes will lead to an expression of a moral act, or inspire or guide one to be a more moral individual than one would have been otherwise. One might rightly and fairly claim to have reflected on some issue in order to arrive at the best, most practicable, most morally justifiable of acts, and yet one's justifications, though personally compelling, may still result in an act of extreme moral infamy. Consider the sincerity and commitment to act morally of the religiously motivated suicide bomber, or of those who sought to build and populate gas chambers in the middle of the last century - no doubt many of these individuals were committed to their actions on the basis reflective contemplation and considered that such actions were good, just, right, and for the best in some way.

Self-justifications based on self-reflection might therefore be seen to have a limited scope in representing a moral action-set as one's justification for action cannot be easily separated from its outcomes and consequences (of course, this depends to some extent on where one considers the 'good' of an act to properly reside; is an act adjudged 'good,' and therefore moral, exclusively by and for the benefit of the individual, or can the 'good' for an individual be legitimately considered for the 'bad' of others, therefore rendering it less moral, or immoral?) I would suggest that an act is generally considered a moral one if it's ramifications are generally acceptable to the moral codes of others, with it's justification being a secondary consideration. In this way morality is not so much an individual virtue but a social one, not an individual judgement but a social judgement. You deal with this in part in your OP...

In the OP Yair wrote:[...] Another, common, semantic trick in our age is to relate morality to the morality that society jointly tries to impose. Again, this bears only family resemblance to the morality we each seek, which is the morality stemming from our own nature. Granted, society has a great deal of influence on our desires and beliefs, but ultimately it can only nudge self-enlightened morality within very narrow borders. Since prehistoric times to the present, enlightened morality seems to be much more uniform than culture would allow, and all evidence points to it surpassing local cultural variance.

Hmm. Enlightenment(?) Self-enlightened morality(?) Are these not culturally variable notions as well as notions variable to individuals, their circumstances and experience? How might or does culture disallow these notions? What is the nature of the imposition society seeks to burden the individual with in this case?

This approaches talk of a specific moral code, referred to as 'the morality stemming from our own nature.' If 'our own nature' refers to us each as individuals, then I would recognise that we each have our unique perspective on life resulting from the unique set of circumstance by which we experiencing it - this is the nature of individuality, to be separate and distinguishable from others. However, this is distinct from the 'our own nature' which refers to us as a collective, as a set of communities, or of us as a species in which our individuality is merely a component of our grouping by type. So, it is not immediately clear to which 'our own nature' you might be referring to here.

However, in this paragraph you are clearly speaking against the notion of a morality defined by social agreement and. as you see it, unduly imposed upon the individual. In placing the seat of morality squarely within the scope of the individual you raise a specific, and unavoidable issue. If one is to hold that the highest possible morality stems from our individual nature as uniquely distinct and distinguishable autonomous human beings, then presumably the morality of the individual trumps or supersedes the morality of the group at every turn and in every instance. Though you grant that society may 'nudge' an individual to act morally you imply that this has little real effect in defining 'the moral,' and that this ineffectuality of society to properly define morality is the natural state of human affairs, and has been since 'prehistoric times.'

If we are then to grant the individual the ultimate responsibility to arrive at and express their own individual morality according to their own particular nature, and to place that ideal above all other moral notions, then how can we (collectively) ensure that their nature will not be expressed deleteriously and lead to conflict with other's rights to do the same? In claiming absolute moral autonomy for ourselves as individuals surely we must also grant the same right of responsibility to others (for to do otherwise would be, erm, immoral), but as mentioned following a self-generated, self-justifying, self-authenticated moral code does not imbue one's actions with rectitude automatically.

It seems that some expression of social morality is necessary, one which might be placed at least on a par with individual moral notions, if not higher, and which might safely arbitrate conflicting moral outlooks and lessen the deleterious effect to others of any particular individual's personal moral code. Again, this casts morality as a social virtue ahead of an individual virtue, and if one is going to actively work towards a practicable moral code for oneself it seems sensible that first and foremost it should be compatible with the good of the many as much as it must be for the good of the one.

As for the relative state of enlightenment of an individual, their Brightness if you like, well, as far as I can tell this notion would be better served by the term 'alignment,' for what you refer to as a self-enlightened morality is really just a morality which is in alignment with your own expressed view.

Your essay seeks to represent a view of 'Bright' morality as chiefly concerned with identifying and explicating what type or kind of person any moral theory should guide us toward being. But does it really matter what type of person person A is; whether they are 'Bright' or not? Regardless of their relative level of intellectual, emotional, or political illumination are their good acts not simply just good acts just as their bad ones are bad? Is their moral brightness or dimness the result of a their willingness to be good or their ability to be bad? Even when person A thinks they themselves have done a bad thing, have knowingly acted in a selfish and ill-considered manner, might others not still consider the same action laudable - and/or visa-versa - for any number of competing reasons?

In the OP Yair wrote:[...] We conclude, then, that one cannot be told what is moral – one must discover it for himself. Yet nevertheless, there is a true morality that is correct for nearly all people, and would be imposed by society if only people were enlightened enough, and this is Humanism.

This seems to counter your previous comment concerning the undue social imposition of moral notions. Are you simply not seeking to make a case that others should align themselves with your view or that the imposition of your considered moral view is good where others are bad? And yet your conclusion, though not necessarily a description of Humanism, does warrant some merit I think.

Humanism, as it is most commonly understood, is a bit of a catch-all term which encompasses various views. These 'humanistic' views seek to place a significant, though differing, amount of emphasis on an understanding of human nature and how this can inform and influence an ethical, moral and social outlook. What amounts to 'human nature,' and what factors may influence it, and to what extent, is very much contested, and so perhaps a humanistic outlook is better seen as a point of departure rather than a point of arrival; as an informative set of principles as opposed to a set of explicit definitives. For this reason I prefer to drop the proper-name status of the term and simply refer to humanism or humanistic views.

If one is to recognising that morality is at its root a social virtue one might recognise that there already exists a mechanism by which society arrives at, imposes and enforces (where necessary) the 'moral consensus' for the good of all (at least in a functioning democracy that is); the law.

I would suggest that calls for the development of a 'Bright' morality (that is, a morality which negates the self-declared imperatives of religious, political, or other partial interest-groups or individuals) is in fact a call for the development and implementation of a secular morality, and that is; that the morality expressed by social agreement should be reasoned and rational and apply to all equally and without exception, and that this in turn should facilitate the development of a personal morality by granting as much individual autonomy as practicable. After all, though a person may be free to develop their personal set of unique moral principles which will inform their life, their thoughts, their actions and interactions, the secular principle holds that they may not use these personal notions to eschew certain social or legal requirements or niceties, or to claim immunity from same, or to secure exceptional rights or privileges under same.

The secularist holds that self-assured self-justifications for morality do not trump, or supersede the consensus morality expressed through social conventions and institutions like the law. A secularist acknowledges that everybody has a right to believe and act however they see fit, as long as in so doing they do not impinge on another's right to do the same, or compel or coarse other's to adopt their views or way of life. An individual's self-declared moral stance or membership of any particular social group in no way immunises them from their responsibility to the the other members of society, just as it does not justify claims which might seek to limit for other's the rights and/or freedoms such groups would otherwise claim for themselves.

If this nebulous notion of a moral consensus is to be expressed through social conventions like the law then secularism (not humanism) is duty-bound to provide a reasoned, rational and evidenced view which might serve the best interests of all and protect all equally and without exception.

It's my view that the function of any moral theory is to help guide us toward identifying and explicating the contents of a rational and practicable moral code, and that this code should in turn help guide our choices regarding what we can, or should be required, forbidden, or permitted to do. In my view, to opine that morality, and the moral life, is dependent on the 'right' kind of personal psychological/intellectual development places undue conditions on what can, will, or should count as goodness or virtuous and how that can, will, or should be expressed in an individuals interactions with others and with the world. To prescribe such conditions as the five-point-plan mentioned negates claims for individual autonomy in defining, and expressing through action, the rules and principles by which one might lead 'a good life,' and which in turn (hopefully) might lead us all towards 'the good life.'

I offer these thoughts not as a counter to your views, but merely as a counter-point to them, and it is my earnest hope that my semantic machinations have only been employed to reduce confusions and not to increase them - but somehow I doubt it! I look forward to your reply.

B-)


BTW: what does IM(NS?)HO mean?

Yair
Last visited: Mar 08, 2010 8:10 pm

Ah. Oh well.