pl0bs wrote:Spinozasgalt wrote:I thought
2. was quite good.
1. and
3. tell us that attributing further to already counted entities counts against simplicity (let's not torture Ockham), but rather than countenancing how a description of God as a mind with an attribution of various powers has us committed to doing just what we found problematic in
1. and
3. it sneaks these attributes in through a vague description of minds and their doings. That
is an apologetic trick.
If you combine the argumentative weight of refutations 1,3 and 4, ignore point 2, then the sum still does not support the position of an existing creature that is more plausible than known natural forces such as those that can be found in many organisms with minds (it doesnt even matter whether one is a physicalist, idealist, panpsychist, or whatever else). But ok, suppose we ignore 1 and 4... does that make 3 sufficient to carry the burden of proof required to accept the existence of it? What if we ignore 3 too and only 2 is left? If all else is ruled out, should we not accept the only remaining option? I dont think anyone reading this still believes the elephant explanation.
There are problems with all of these points, of course. Here we will speak fluently and brilliantly to defence of the elephant case.
1. We are not clear that we should say a new attribute in an already confirmed entity is equivalent to a new type of entity, particularly if we have independent reasons for positing the former where we lack said reasons for positing the latter. We may want to test such a principle when applied to cases if we were faced with a stark choice between these two cases with nothing further to tilt the scales in favour of one or the other, but we've already seen why we should prefer an invisible elephant to God. So, we shall take that point as conceded by the theist.
2. We continue to suspect that God is an extra entity and a metaphysically extravagant one. We might construe him as a mind to make him somethwhat familiar, but if so he is also a timeless mind with omni- attributes possessed by no other mind. He is not even one of a kind - he isn't a kind at all. If God, for all his difference, does not count as an extra entity, then we are convinced that nothing should so count. He is about as extravagant an entity as one might posit. Next to God, our old fashioned platonism looks earthy. We shall take this point as conceded, too.
3. The two vehicles furthest over and clustered together actually move first and the third vehicle further away moves later. The elephant need only move the first two into each other in such a way that they continue to bound with each other while it moves onto the third vehicle and our view is maintained. We also note that some mystery of movement is given room on our view because of our positing's state of visibility, whereas the theist cannot say why only these three cars should move and not the others. We are further perplexed as to why something's size turns it into more than one entity without a better statement of such a principle. We shall also take this point as conceded.
4. As with points the other points offered, we note with disappointment that the fourth does not remotely follow. So we shall take all points as conceded.
We thus conclude that the case for the God of theism fails and that the invisible elephant remains the most powerful explanatory contender for this case. We may, however, supplement such a view with CIA magnets should such a supplement be required. We shall also consider how a case for camouflage may give an already sheer simple theory a further advantage over its rivals.