"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." - A Treatise Upon Human Nature

No he isn't.

The is/ought fallacy is when you take contingent facts about how the world is and try to derive conclusions from them about how the world ought to be.

Hume isn't saying that it is a contingent fact about our world that "reason is the slave of the passions and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them". He isn't saying that the world might have been different, that there might conceivably be a world where the dictates of reason are inherently motivating. He claims that this is impossible due to the very nature of reason and he would say that you misunderstand the nature of reason if you think otherwise.

'Ought' read as 'to my preference is' solves many problems.

Except, of course, it manifestly does not mean "my preference is".

Then you'd have a difficult task in front of you explaining what it, in actual use, does mean.

Possibly, but that doesn't make me entitled to make manifestly false assertions in order to make that task easier.

Preno wrote:Possibly

Give it a try. I'm willing to look at what you feel is so obvious.

Why should I? If I fail, you'll just take it as a demonstration of the fact that your analysis was correct, whereas in fact the correctness of your analysis has nothing to do with knowing of a suitable alternative. My point is simply that if "x ought to be the case" meant "it is my preference that x be the case", it would be impossible to disagree about oughts. For example, I would not be disagreeing with a neonazi claiming that Jews ought to be burned in ovens if I said that Jews ought not be burned in ovens - indeed, I would actually be forced to concede that his statement is true, because it is in fact true that his preference is that they be burned in ovens.

Preno wrote:My point is simply that if "x ought to be the case" meant "it is my preference that x be the case", it would be impossible to disagree about oughts. For example, I would not be disagreeing with a neonazi claiming that Jews ought to be burned in ovens if I said that Jews ought not be burned in ovens - indeed, I would actually be forced to concede that his statement is true, because it is in fact true that his preference is that they be burned in ovens.

Not impossible, no. Just impossible to tie to something mind-independent. So how is this dire picture that you've painted different from what we actually observe?

the PC apeman wrote:

Preno wrote:My point is simply that if "x ought to be the case" meant "it is my preference that x be the case", it would be impossible to disagree about oughts. For example, I would not be disagreeing with a neonazi claiming that Jews ought to be burned in ovens if I said that Jews ought not be burned in ovens - indeed, I would actually be forced to concede that his statement is true, because it is in fact true that his preference is that they be burned in ovens.

Not impossible, no. Just impossible to tie to something mind-independent. So how is this dire picture that you've painted different from what we actually observe?

Well, as I said, whether they view morality as objective or subjective or whether they think moral discourse is mistaken altogether, people normally don't say that the neonazi's statement is true, whereas according to your view, the statement would have to be as uncontroversially true as the claim that Tom thinks its Monday or that Colombo believes that Smith is the murderer.

Preno wrote:Well, as I said, whether they view morality as objective or subjective or whether they think moral discourse is mistaken altogether, people normally don't say that the neonazi's statement is true, whereas according to your view, the statement would have to be as uncontroversially true as the claim that Tom thinks its Monday or that Colombo believes that Smith is the murderer.

I don't see why you would be so disturbed that it can be described as uncontroversially* true that a neonazi has a certain preference - even a preference that you and I find revolting. It seems silly to pretend the state of affairs is otherwise. It seems to me that you are conflating the truth value of a person holding a view with the truth value of that view as a moral claim.

*fixed

the PC apeman wrote:'Ought' read as 'to my preference is' solves many problems.

Preno is right, they simply don't mean the same thing.

the PC apeman wrote:

Preno wrote:Well, as I said, whether they view morality as objective or subjective or whether they think moral discourse is mistaken altogether, people normally don't say that the neonazi's statement is true, whereas according to your view, the statement would have to be as uncontroversially true as the claim that Tom thinks its Monday or that Colombo believes that Smith is the murderer.

I don't see why you would be so disturbed that it can be described as uncontroversially* true that a neonazi has a certain preference - even a preference that you and I find revolting.

I'm not disturbed by the fact that "it can be described as uncontroversially* true that a neonazi has a certain preference", on the contrary, that's precisely my point. You and I disagree with his statement, yet according to the definition we'd have to agree that his statement is true. That doesn't make any sense, regardless of whether you're an emotivist or a cognitivist or an error theorist or what have you.

the PC apeman wrote:It seems to me that you are conflating the truth value of a person holding a view with the truth value of that view as a moral claim.

Er, except that's precisely what you are doing in defining "x ought to be the case" as "my preference is that x be the case".

Preno wrote:I'm not disturbed by the fact that "it can be described as uncontroversially* true that a neonazi has a certain preference", on the contrary, that's precisely my point. You and I disagree with his statement, yet according to the definition we'd have to agree that his statement is true.

There you go again. If a neonazi expressed "my preference is that x be the case" then there is no reason not to accept his statement as true, ie. it is true that this neonazi's preference is for x to be the case. This is surely uncontroversial. But so what if this is true? The truth or falsity of it has no bearing on the value of "x being the case".

Chrisw wrote:

the PC apeman wrote:'Ought' read as 'to my preference is' solves many problems.

Preno is right, they simply don't mean the same thing.

A rather silly statement. Admittedly, not as silly as the original post which is plainly well, very silly. There are clearly meta-ethical doctrines that say just that ethical statements (which might be indicated by ought) are simply statements of preference or attitude. His suggestion that this solves many problems does not make any further claims on the veracity of that ethical perspective and can therefore be understood only as a statement in perfect consistency with meta-ethical theory. That is to say, your objection is bollocks.

Ought can either mean "how I think it should be" or "how the creator says it should be." There may be more than these two ways but I can't think of any.

When one rejects the possibility of the second d/t lack of evidence, it leaves the former (again, as long as there's no third way of defining it).

num1cubfn wrote:Ought can either mean "how I think it should be" or "how the creator says it should be." There may be more than these two ways but I can't think of any.

When one rejects the possibility of the second d/t lack of evidence, it leaves the former (again, as long as there's no third way of defining it).

The problem with such a dichotomous argument is that it posits the dichotomy from a negative, namely, the assumption that there is no third - which is an argument from ignorance, i.e. a fallacy. Consequently, tertium non datur - without proper substantion - is a fallacy. Indeed, tertium non datur as an assumption is very weak, as an assertion, it is only as strong as its empirical predictions - in my eyes, at least.

Comte de St.-Germain wrote:

Chrisw wrote:

the PC apeman wrote:'Ought' read as 'to my preference is' solves many problems.

Preno is right, they simply don't mean the same thing.

A rather silly statement. Admittedly, not as silly as the original post which is plainly well, very silly. There are clearly meta-ethical doctrines that say just that ethical statements (which might be indicated by ought) are simply statements of preference or attitude.

Preference or attitude, you are already expanding the definition. Quite possibly ethical statements can be reduced to attitudes of some sort but they are more complicated than simple preferrences. Obviously I can have all sorts of preferences for all sorts of things that have no moral significance to me at all. Moral statements involve something more or something different.

Chrisw wrote:

Comte de St.-Germain wrote:

Chrisw wrote:

the PC apeman wrote:'Ought' read as 'to my preference is' solves many problems.

Preno is right, they simply don't mean the same thing.

A rather silly statement. Admittedly, not as silly as the original post which is plainly well, very silly. There are clearly meta-ethical doctrines that say just that ethical statements (which might be indicated by ought) are simply statements of preference or attitude.

Preference or attitude, you are already expanding the definition.

You really think this will work on me? You don't post for a month and they treat you like a newbie. No, I did not move the goalposts, remove 'or attitude', and my post is just as on the point. 'expanding the definition', when it wasn't a definition anyway, is inconsequential and does nothing to defend your post.

Quite possibly ethical statements can be reduced to attitudes of some sort but they are more complicated than simple preferrences.

Interesting perspective, but it does not demolish that calling ethical statements preferences is a perspective that solves many problems. You could have said that his post wasn't particularly well-worked out, in which case you would be right. Don't back-pedal, admit you made a mistake.

Obviously I can have all sorts of preferences for all sorts of things that have no moral significance to me at all. Moral statements involve something more or something different.

This has nothing to do with what you said or what PC man said. Whether or not non-cognitivism or emotivism is a decent meta-ethical theory has nothing to do with what PC man said. And really, do you want to argue meta-ethics with me?

Comte de St.-Germain wrote:

Chrisw wrote:

Comte de St.-Germain wrote:

Chrisw wrote:

the PC apeman wrote:'Ought' read as 'to my preference is' solves many problems.

Preno is right, they simply don't mean the same thing.

A rather silly statement. Admittedly, not as silly as the original post which is plainly well, very silly. There are clearly meta-ethical doctrines that say just that ethical statements (which might be indicated by ought) are simply statements of preference or attitude.

Preference or attitude, you are already expanding the definition.

You really think this will work on me? You don't post for a month and they treat you like a newbie. No, I did not move the goalposts, remove 'or attitude', and my post is just as on the point. 'expanding the definition', when it wasn't a definition anyway, is inconsequential and does nothing to defend your post.

You added 'or attitude'. PC apeman's statement just said 'preference'.

Quite possibly ethical statements can be reduced to attitudes of some sort but they are more complicated than simple preferrences.

Interesting perspective...

Absolutely standard perspective actually.

...but it does not demolish that calling ethical statements preferences is a perspective that solves many problems. You could have said that his post wasn't particularly well-worked out, in which case you would be right. Don't back-pedal, admit you made a mistake.

Eh?? I said he was factually wrong, that "oughts" and "preferences" just aren't the same thing. Why would I want to backpedal on that? It's utterly basic stuff.

Obviously I can have all sorts of preferences for all sorts of things that have no moral significance to me at all. Moral statements involve something more or something different.

This has nothing to do with what you said or what PC man said.

It shows that "oughts" can't just be "preferences".

Whether or not non-cognitivism or emotivism is a decent meta-ethical theory has nothing to do with what PC man said.

He takes "oughts" to be "preferences".

And really, do you want to argue meta-ethics with me?

Oh for God's sake grow up.