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BWE wrote:This is related to his ongoing work in folk psychology which is basically the.centerpiece of eliminative materialism. The idea is that physicalism is metaphysically "true".
So ideas like love and hate, curiosity and boredom simply don't have real states associated with them and are therefor not "real" because reality is only available to stuff we can model reductively. Which seems totally bizarre to me because material reduces to fields and then we have pure math and suddenly we aren't avoiding falling rocks, we are solving equations and the stupid bomb explodes in our face and all we can do is laugh at our determination to nail experience down long enough for us to.get a good look at it once we realize that is impossible and misguided.
http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LpJSeLY8cWs
zoon wrote:,,, May I point out here that this is exactly what mirror neurons in monkey brains do ? ...
BWE wrote:It may be. But simply tossing folk psychology seems pretty misguided to me. I just look at it all as different ways to model the same thing. Models all have purposes. When you can identify the purpose, you understand the model imo.
SpeedOfSound wrote:
Mistake or not a good video. I think she called her husband a chimp.
In the first part she alludes to my biggest axe to grind, the multiple mechanisms that add up to being conscious.
SpeedOfSound wrote:BWE wrote:It may be. But simply tossing folk psychology seems pretty misguided to me. I just look at it all as different ways to model the same thing. Models all have purposes. When you can identify the purpose, you understand the model imo.
Folk psychology is the domain of discourse. The thing we would like to figure out. It's a myth like any other and certainly works well. Sweeping it under the carpet will create no understanding at all.
BTW. Myth to me is not quite the ordinary usage. More like model. Myths persist precisely because they work.
BWE wrote:SpeedOfSound wrote:
Mistake or not a good video. I think she called her husband a chimp.
In the first part she alludes to my biggest axe to grind, the multiple mechanisms that add up to being conscious.
Yeah, and he gave the typical strawman objection to reductionism and responded with the ideologically pure response too. I have a lot of respect for what they do, but IMO neuroscience is a physical model (and should be) and so has no real place suggesting interpretations for our poetic and emotional lives. Those interpretations are simply at a different level. Neither more true nor more false. Just physical rather than poetic.
Here's an assertion I doubt I can defend. Art is about metaphor. Science borrows metaphor from art. Thus art defines our world and science follows in a type of collection or applied use of those metaphors.
DavidMcC wrote:zoon wrote:
As Dennett says:Dennett Content and Consciousness p40 wrote:The task of avoiding the dilemma of Intentionality is the task of somehow getting from motion and matter to content and purpose – and back.
I think, in evolutionary terms, the simplest guess is that early animals with brains set up models of their bodies in the world in order to control those bodies better, then later animals with bigger brains can (through gradual evolution) extend those models in order to reverse engineer what another conspecific’s goals are. For example, if a monkey (a large-brained animal) already has a well-developed system in its brain for modelling and controlling its arm and hand when it reaches out with the goal of picking something up, then when it sees another monkey reaching out towards an object, the watching monkey can reverse engineer the model and work out quickly that the other monkey’s goal is to pick that object up. May I point out here that this is exactly what mirror neurons in monkey brains do ? - or rather, the mirror neurons are at the end point of a chain of processing that gives hard-wired understanding of conspecifics in terms of goals.
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Re my bold - what makes you think that it's as complicated as that? Mirror neurons simply allow the monkey to imitate what it sees, without necessarily understanding why the action is occurring.
Wikipedia wrote:Many studies link mirror neurons to understanding goals and intentions. Fogassi et al. (2005)[51] recorded the activity of 41 mirror neurons in the inferior parietal lobe (IPL) of two rhesus macaques. The IPL has long been recognized as an association cortex that integrates sensory information. The monkeys watched an experimenter either grasp an apple and bring it to his mouth or grasp an object and place it in a cup.
In total, 15 mirror neurons fired vigorously when the monkey observed the "grasp-to-eat" motion, but registered no activity while exposed to the "grasp-to-place" condition.
For 4 other mirror neurons, the reverse held true: they activated in response to the experimenter eventually placing the apple in the cup but not to eating it.
Only the type of action, and not the kinematic force with which models manipulated objects, determined neuron activity. It was also significant that neurons fired before the monkey observed the human model starting the second motor act (bringing the object to the mouth or placing it in a cup). Therefore, IPL neurons "code the same act (grasping) in a different way according to the final goal of the action in which the act is embedded".[51] They may furnish a neural basis for predicting another individual’s subsequent actions and inferring intention.[51]
SpeedOfSound wrote:zoon wrote:SpeedOfSound wrote:I think the main theme for Dennett is that the intentional stance gives us predictive power that no other method avails us. That would be TheoryOfMind territory. As a model it's well-honed and incredibly useful.
Now if we want to take it further and worry it for it's truth value we have problems. It's not about that. It's a useful myth nearly as useful, and most certainly more often successfully used, than our myth of atom-balls.
So far I do not see what anyone could criticize Dennett for.
Dennett is already discussing “intentionality” and a stance which is compatible with evolution and “carries a minimum of metaphysical baggage” (page 19 C and C) in “Content and Consciousness”, published in 1969, well before any of the current work on Theory of Mind (Premack coined the term “theory of mind” in 1978; Robert Gordon’s article on simulation theory was in 1989). As you say, it’s basically the same idea, but I haven’t come across Dennett saying that the intentional stance consists of using one’s own brain processes to predict others. Instead, he speaks of assuming rationality in the other person, e.g. page 21 of the Intentional Stance:
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He actually says what I said he said on page 23. 'it gives us predictive power we can get by no other means'
SpeedOfSound wrote:
Classifying a neuron by presumed function is bad. Misleading. We don't need this kind of trouble in the public's perception of neuroscience.
Why did you hide under a chair when you said it? Yup!
BWE wrote:I think mirror neurons are pretty solidly in the functional category by now.
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