The Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius proposed the doctrine, view, or whatever you'd like to call it, that one should believe only what there are good reasons for holding to be true. He called this the maxim of intellectual morality.

Does this doctrine have a name? I for one find it a very reasonable one.

Doesn't anybody who believes anything believe that there are good reasons for believing what they believe?

jamest wrote:Doesn't anybody who believes anything believe that there are good reasons for believing what they believe?

Usually one at least tries to find good reasons far what one believes in retrospective at least.

Mazille wrote:

jamest wrote:Doesn't anybody who believes anything believe that there are good reasons for believing what they believe?

Usually one at least tries to find good reasons far what one believes in retrospective at least.

I see no value in the aforementioned doctrine. I know of nobody who chose their beliefs out of a hat.

ETA: I suppose the doctrine does question the beliefs of those who were indoctrinated as youths, but one has to consider that even they have questioned their beliefs from time to time and have considered alternative belief systems, so that they still have reason to maintain their beliefs as adults.

Hugin wrote:The Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius proposed the doctrine, view, or whatever you'd like to call it, that one should believe only what there are good reasons for holding to be true. He called this the maxim of intellectual morality.

Does this doctrine have a name? I for one find it a very reasonable one.

From the link:

The language theory postulate: It must be possible to communicate the religious comprehension and experience even to non-believers.

If we cannot communicate what red looks like to us, what hope is there of communicating about religious experience? I agreed with the other two postulates, but this one I have to reject. Why must religious experience be communicable to non-believers?

UndercoverElephant wrote:[If we cannot communicate what red looks like to us, what hope is there of communicating about religious experience? I agreed with the other two postulates, but this one I have to reject. Why must religious experience be communicable to non-believers?

Yes. The bottom-line is that science doesn't communicate to us the depth of experience. It certainly falls-short of providing pertinent metaphysical facts. Therefore, what reasons are really forthcoming for doubting God/religion/etc.? The Swede talks as though he is privy to rationale that justifies beratement of specific metaphysical beliefs. He just comes across as philosophically-naive, to me.