GrahamH wrote:

zoon wrote:Presumably the whole point of free will, the reason why we feel it's so necessary, is that it makes it OK to punish people?

Is it?

Perhaps I should say a point, rather than the only one. I think it was after lawyers in America started getting their clients off the hook by claiming they couldn't help it that free will became part of the law again? What other practical effects do you have in mind? Perhaps the sense that in the end nobody else can control me? From your point of view, it's perhaps an abstract question, a matter of interest, so I might redirect your question to John Platko, why he considers it's important that we should have free will?

Doesn't the very notion of punishment rest on the understanding that choice can and should be coerced in various ways?

GrahamH wrote:Doesn't the very notion of punishment rest on the understanding that choice can and should be coerced in various ways?

Quite possibly, I’m not defending ultimate free will, but the common or garden variety, where we are fully determinate evolved machinery, but much of the time we are not externally coerced (or mentally ill) when carrying out particular actions. For that kind of free will, punishment which involves a measure of coercion isn’t a problem. My questions about punishment and free will were primarily aimed at John Platko, I am wondering why he feels so strongly that his kind of free will needs to be defended.

You weren’t happy with my somewhat unthought-through claim that being morally entitled to punish is the reason for wanting free will, what are the other reasons for wanting it which you have in mind?

GrahamH wrote:

archibald wrote:

John Platko wrote:Are our choices real or are we just imagining they are real. I see no reason not to believe they are real.

When people think that they have affected or to some extent controlled or can affect events in the world around them that they don't actually have any influence over, is that real or are they just imagining it? It feels real to them.

That's a rather dualistic view - a spirit self constrained by a physical world to do what the world determines,

Could you describe the kind of "a spirit self" that you are referring to?

but that's nonsense.
Humans are integral parts of the world, not passengers. If you have a thought to do X rather than Y that's the world doing that and through doing that an effect is brought about. The world that is you has an affect over other parts of the world and your experience of choosing relates to that. How is it not 'real'?
The illusion, if such it is, is that the experience of thinking the intentional thought is generated by your conscious mind that is somehow detached from the physical world, supervening on it in a way that it originates and has agency over and above the substrate. The subjective is not in control but it is relevant and humans have influence.

I get the impression that you really believe you know how this all must work. And here I am thinking no one does.

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:

Explain - I think you already get the concept of "multiple histories" and how they are being postulated in this application?
Is that not so?

Multiple deterministic histories are consistent with known science and logically consistent as List postulates them. If List wanted to jump of the deep end he could have just postulated, "then a fairy godmother" actually grants three real choices.

Not so. I described hypothetical alternate histories, a fiction genre, but those are what-if hypotheticals, not histories, not something that happened.

Please explain in what sense you mean "not something that happened"? You're setting a limit on that to one universe and one history. Even modern science does not have such a limited domain. And were in the philosophy section of the forum.

Specifically these are things that did not happen and are not historical.

They are not historical in this history and this universe where very specific laws of physics apply. But I see no reason not to believe that if other choices had been made they would have happened and be historical, but perhaps only in other histories and universes.

This guy makes short work of explaining the state of the art science on this. 3) seems to relate to n histories to me.

Right you are going full-on fringe QM.

Is Sean Carroll full-on fringe in your mind?

Now explain how what happens in a different universe, with different fundamental physics can possibly influence what

flavour ice cream you choose. That certainly beats astrology for woo factor.

Maybe you can find a fringe cosmologist to speculate about that.

Maybe we just go with man in the high castle.
That has multiple histories and characters can just phase between alternate worlds. Shall we just say that test's free will hypothesis is compatible with a novel by Philip K. Dick. I'm sure we can just assume free will.

Ahh yes, now that List has shown that it's possible for indeterminism to be at the agential level even though the agent is riding on a deterministic physical level you want to know how the agent exploits that possibility by making a choice. I find myself interested in that part of the matter now too - what I believe you call the secret sauce - although I think branching histories deserve some credit in the sauce too - let's call that the roux.

Anyway, I'm working on the sauce - I think the observed state of an electron might help clarify it- but I'm working on it.

John Platko wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:

felltoearth wrote:Game Theory will in no way support a claim of free will.

As the author explains, this the way Game Theory supports a claim of free will:

...
The decision-theoretic or game-theoretic explanation of many social phenomena relies crucially on the assumption that the agents’ action-or strategy sets contain more than one option. Sometimes the addition or removal of options can make a significant difference to what the agents are predicted to do even if these options are not ultimately chosen. Unless we accept that there is at least a thin, technical sense in which such options could have been chosen, it is hard to make sense of those effects.

Why does he find that problematic? Being able to model probabilities for various actions influences what action is actually taken. Of course it is. Awareness of hypotheticals can feature in behaviour without requiring 'multiple histories' or 'realy-o-truly-o free will choice'.

I think this was his punch line:

But if we hold a naturalistic ontological attitude, this instrumentalist view is not available to us. To the extent that free will, in the sense of being able to choose from more than one option, is explanatorily indispensable in our best scientific theories of agency, we have to take it at face value.41

Once again, having an option does not imply free will. Making a choice does not imply free will. If free will exists, I suspect that it would fuck with the system so much that it would make game theory useless. If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?

I go back to my earlier observation, that introducing free will in an evolutionary system seems to be a non-starter as it is not in fact a stable enough a system itself for the overall system to work. It's a poor survival tactic.

archibald wrote:

John Platko wrote: But all I got to work with is my brain. If I think it's always fooling me and messing with my mind then what options do I have? How can I ever be sure that I can separate illusion from truth? I don't buy into this fool me once, I'm always fooled reasoning.

Well, it doesn't have to get that out of hand. It isn't always fooling you. That said, some might say it is but what I mean is, it isn't always a problem. I've always had a strong almost forensic interest in 'what makes me tick' (possibly driven along by having and wanting to fix quite a few mental health issues in my 20's, mostly anxiety and depression) so, for me, it's both fun and rewarding to understand myself better.

To analogise, talk therapy, which I attended for many years, very often involved opening cans of worms and taking them out and examining them in the light of day. The great thing was, once they were out of the can, they weren't as scary or as unpalatable as I thought and in fact, it was possible to reconcile with them and gain acceptance and even, sometimes, to learn to love them, or sometimes just turn them to an advantage. And I guess some of that rubs off on my thinking that the idea of not having free will is.....ok, in the end, and possibly even an opportunity.

As I read that I couldn't help but think you created new knowledge with your therapy process and that gave you more options to choose from which effectively increased your freedom - or apparent freedom if you prefer. In either case - well done!

I gave talk therapy a go for about 8 months many years ago but when I opened my can of worms things got a bit sticky - to make a long story short, I ended up marrying my therapist - even though many, many people were convinced we didn't, or shouldn't, have had a free choice to do so.

GrahamH wrote:Now, if our choices are determined by what happens to other people in other worlds then we have even less agency in our own lives here and now in this universe than local physical determinism allows. At least in that case we can see our choices as tied to our lives and environment.

Interesting theory but I'm not quite following you, GrahamH, could you elaborate on how our choices could be determined by what happens to other people in other worlds?

zoon wrote:

John Platko wrote:…And free will, or no free, will I'm still on board for love and compassion all around. Even if we have free, there is evidence that we are not completely in control, therefore we can't be sure if anyone really had a branch point or they were a victim of an unfortunate history that stacked the deck against them.

If there has been a branch point and someone made the wrong, immoral choice, what happens next?

That would be completely determined by the physical laws of the history they branched to unitl/unless there was another branch point, where a new choice would presumably decide what happens next.

Does it become a moral requirement for the rest of us, that we punish that agent?

Well it seems to me that the best choice of what to do when someone makes a for sure wrong choice is to teach them why it's wrong. We don't punish a child when they write "there" instead of "they're" on their composition - do we? I think the same reasoning applies. Of course, we have to keep the other children safe while they learn so time-outs might be necessary.

And I certainly tend to feel a responsibility to do so. And I must admit that I don't always feel like I have a conscious choice of doing so, it's like it's been programmed into my being. I think when I was young I was highly influenced by stories about woodworker who had a tendency to forgive people who didn't know what they were doing - and those people did some really bad shit. But a bit later Captain Kirk added to my choices of how to deal with such things.

If so, why are we required to punish them?

I don't think we are required to punish, we are free to make other choices - we can teach with love and compassion instead of punish - I think we choose punish because it's easier from a personal psychological and economic standpoint. And I've noticed how this punish/teach choice gets made often depends on the relationships of the people involved. In the long run, the best for all is to teach, not punish; but that's a choice humanity must make, there is no almighty requiring we make it.

Or is there some superagency that takes care of the punishment?

After carefully studying that possibility I think not. And when I pray, the God that responds in my imagination is more of a gentle and kind being.

If there’s no way to be sure that they didn’t have the deck stacked against them, should punishment be eschewed altogether, is punishing people when we don’t know if they were truly free always immoral?

I think we know for a fact that people are not completely free - the deck is always stacked to some extent. If a person is abused as a child the evidence suggests that can statistically effect their future probability of abusing people. At this time we can't know their complete history so we can't know if they could have chosen otherwise in any situation. So yes, punishment

Presumably the whole point of free will, the reason why we feel it's so necessary, is that it makes it OK to punish people?

I always thought it was to make life more enjoyable.

GrahamH wrote:Doesn't the very notion of punishment rest on the understanding that choice can and should be coerced in various ways?

No. Punishments serve to increase the cost of pursuing certain courses of action. You are still free to choose to act badly.

An example of coercion is when a judge locks up a person until (s)he agrees to comply with an order.

felltoearth wrote:

John Platko wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:

As the author explains, this the way Game Theory supports a claim of free will:

Why does he find that problematic? Being able to model probabilities for various actions influences what action is actually taken. Of course it is. Awareness of hypotheticals can feature in behaviour without requiring 'multiple histories' or 'realy-o-truly-o free will choice'.

I think this was his punch line:

But if we hold a naturalistic ontological attitude, this instrumentalist view is not available to us. To the extent that free will, in the sense of being able to choose from more than one option, is explanatorily indispensable in our best scientific theories of agency, we have to take it at face value.41

Once again, having an option does not imply free will. Making a choice does not imply free will. If free will exists, I suspect that it would fuck with the system so much that it would make game theory useless. If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?

Let's do a thought experiment.

One day an ice cream shop owner decided he was going to test if people actually had free will. He erased his flavor board and wrote in today's flavors, there were only two: chocolate and shitsucker. The chocolate was homemade and delicious, the shitsucker was also homemade but not so tasty. The shop owner proudly predicted that (+ or - experimental error) everyone who bought an ice cream from the store that day would choose chocolate and this would prove once and for all that people couldn't possibly have free will because he reasoned: "If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?" Things went as he predicted and he was very

The moral of the story is that you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances because people don't like to eat shitsucker and being able to not do so is the whole point of free will.

That's a shitty thought experiment not even vaguely related to the game theory.

One day I will find that I have flipped to a universe where John has made a coherent argument and realized that free will is actually an incoherent concept especially in a universe that constantly bifurcates. Of course we don't choose which bifurcation we find ourselves in ... that is simply a probability based on the state of any given universe. This type of universe is an anathema to most concepts of free will that I am aware of.

The interesting thing is there are an infinity of universes where this flipping has already happened. Why am I stuck in this one?

romansh wrote:One day I will find that I have flipped to a universe where John has made a coherent argument and realized that free will is actually an incoherent concept especially in a universe that constantly bifurcates.

Why do you think that? It seems to me that it depends on the reason it bifurcates.

Of course we don't choose which bifurcation we find ourselves in ... that is simply a probability based on the state of any given universe.

Interesting, you seem to know a great deal about multiple universes and how they work. Do tells us more. We have at least one member who is very skeptical of such things.

This type of universe is an anathema to most concepts of free will that I am aware of.

The interesting thing is there are an infinity of universes where this flipping has already happened. Why am I stuck in this one?

Which one would you rather be stuck in?

All in all, I'll take this comment as progress. We now at least have multiple universes, with different histories, firmly on the discussion table.

felltoearth wrote:That's a shitty thought experiment not even vaguely related to the game theory.

But it certainly shows that:

If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?

Is arsewater.

Not quite John.
If these things exist? Either way I don't choose which universal thread I follow ... quantum sauce does that for me.

Either way some cosmic dice shaker causing me to be in a particular universal thread is not what I mean free will. Is that free will for you?

John Platko wrote:

If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?

Is arsewater.

I am not sure we can predict people's behaviour in the absolute sense. But we do think we can predict people's behaviour to some degree and influence it to some degree as well. This belies a deep belief in cause and effect.

Lets say I caused someone to change their mind and choose not to have ice cream. And that person thought they chose not to because of their own free will. Did they choose of their own free will?

John Platko wrote:

felltoearth wrote:

John Platko wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Why does he find that problematic? Being able to model probabilities for various actions influences what action is actually taken. Of course it is. Awareness of hypotheticals can feature in behaviour without requiring 'multiple histories' or 'realy-o-truly-o free will choice'.

I think this was his punch line:

But if we hold a naturalistic ontological attitude, this instrumentalist view is not available to us. To the extent that free will, in the sense of being able to choose from more than one option, is explanatorily indispensable in our best scientific theories of agency, we have to take it at face value.41

Once again, having an option does not imply free will. Making a choice does not imply free will. If free will exists, I suspect that it would fuck with the system so much that it would make game theory useless. If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?

Let's do a thought experiment.

One day an ice cream shop owner decided he was going to test if people actually had free will. He erased his flavor board and wrote in today's flavors, there were only two: chocolate and shitsucker. The chocolate was homemade and delicious, the shitsucker was also homemade but not so tasty. The shop owner proudly predicted that (+ or - experimental error) everyone who bought an ice cream from the store that day would choose chocolate and this would prove once and for all that people couldn't possibly have free will because he reasoned: "If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?" Things went as he predicted and he was very

The moral of the story is that you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances because people don't like to eat shitsucker and being able to not do so is the whole point of free will.

What do we make of those that choose shitsucker? is that more or less free will?

romansh wrote:Not quite John.
If these things exist? Either way I don't choose which universal thread I follow ... quantum sauce does that for me.

Either way some cosmic dice shaker causing me to be in a particular universal thread is not what I mean free will. Is that free will for you?

Nope, the dice shaker won't do. But perhaps we can tease out a bit more precise model, with the addition of multiple histories, for how quantum effects might work that don't involve dice.

Here's were I think you've jumped the tracks: I think you're confusing a very useful model that we have for reality (QM) with that actual reality. But as useful as that model is for many things, it lacks the precision we need for others.

I see no other way to proceed than to clear up this apparent confusion that you, and perhaps others, have about this matter. Fortunately, that's easily done because the heavy mental lifting as already been done for us by David Deutsch. He explains, why dice are crude metaphors for what actually is afoot in reality (and does some game theory debunking too while he's at it) in this lecture: Physics Without Probability. (It's not Constructor Theory lecture but - well just what the title says. )

And , I can't explain all that he says in a short comment so thanks ahead of time for not asking me to.

romansh wrote:

John Platko wrote:

If you can predict people's behavior under a set of circumstances, how can that possibly be free will?

Is arsewater.

I am not sure we can predict people's behaviour in the absolute sense. But we do think we can predict people's behaviour to some degree and influence it to some degree as well. This belies a deep belief in cause and effect.

Or at least a deep belief that people don't want shitsucker ice cream.

Lets say I caused someone to change their mind and choose not to have ice cream. And that person thought they chose not to because of their own free will. Did they choose of their own free will?

I think that question is just a red herring word game, a vapid sophist's trick, that distracts us from the real issues, which are:

1) Are our behaviors fully determined by physical states and the laws that govern them with no possibility of branching, or are there possible branch points?

2) Can agents exploit these branch points in a way that gives them real choices - that is, they pick A but they really could have picked a B.

3) Can humans do this?