Cory Duchesne wrote:

To me it is more than the test of the model we create against the reality we are modeling. We make the test because we are curious. But why are we curious in the first place?

Because we are caused to be curious. As I said above, to get anymore specific than that, then one would have to do some science, or consult the science already done.

Just cherry picking to keep the conversation manageable...
So what is causation? It is dualism as cause and effect. This cause is yet another mystery until considered from a monist point of view. The past is a memory and the future an expectation - aspects of the mind trick in creating a sense of "I". In reality there is only now, and what is happening now. The effect we see is dependent on how we perceive. It is the process of perception that creates this thing called a cause. A cause is just a story we tell to explain the effect we perceive. The power of science is that it creates incredible precision in the ability of our story to predict results.

The limit of science is it cannot tell us anything about the unity of the world. It is rooted in duality. As a practice it may well teach selflessness - the process of peer review certainly encourages this by eliminating subjectivity. But it is the subjective that tells us what is valuable, what is meaningful and what is worthwhile. Is that real? Not in the absence of action. Science itself does not motivate - put things in motion. It is just the operating manual.

I think curiosity arises as a realization that something is missing. In terms of knowing it is knowing we don't know. It arises as we get tricked by the mind into seeing things in a dualistic way and I think there is a fundamental need to see things whole.

Cory Duchesne wrote:

Explore any work of a mystic and this understanding is the only way their ideas align with reality as we perceive it.

Are you sure you aren't committing the "no true Scotsman fallacy" here? If I were to tell you that I don't think it's rational to consider the subjective spiritual, would you then tell me that that's because I'm no true Mystic?

Want to explore the spiritual? Look inward.

I consider myself a very inward person, yet I see no reason why my subjective experience of myself and the world should be considered spiritual simply on the grounds of subjectivity alone.

Self absorbed is not the same as self aware. Self aware lets us see ourselves within the context of the whole, while self absorbed avoids the whole as it seems painful. That pain only changes by seeing things whole. The pain exists as a subjective motivator to take action. Take an appropriate action the pain goes away. Hot stove burns are much worse for self absorbed people.

You are quite free to think whatever you want about the rationality of this explanation, but please don't burn yourself in the process.

Steve wrote:Take an appropriate action the pain goes away. Hot stove burns are much worse for self absorbed people.

Nobody else has any evidence that your pain has actually "gone away". If self-awareness keeps you from complaining about it, no one else need be the wiser.

Cito di Pense wrote:

Steve wrote:Take an appropriate action the pain goes away. Hot stove burns are much worse for self absorbed people.

Nobody else has any evidence that your pain has actually "gone away". If self-awareness keeps you from complaining about it, no one else need be the wiser.

The difference in scar tissue can be easily verified. I suspect self preservation would not exist without self awareness. The only wisdom that matters is your own.

Cory Duchesne wrote:Have you ever asked yourself what it means to know and how it is you actual know what you think you know?
.

Your original conundrum appears to me without an objective answer. There is no definitive answer for what "knowledge" is for starters. I propose that not even science can give us an answer yet. I doubt it shall, for, what is one to do with subjectivity?
Until then, I propose that what we can do, as we are on this thread, is, at the minimum, ponder on and about it.

pearlgirl wrote:

Cory Duchesne wrote:Have you ever asked yourself what it means to know and how it is you actual know what you think you know?
.

Your original conundrum appears to me without an objective answer. There is no definitive answer for what "knowledge" is for starters.

But don't you see you've already provided the answer for what knowledge is? Every word you typed is a definition. And what is a definition? Isn't it knowledge? Knowledge is inescapable. The only way we can free ourselves from it is through complete unconsciousness.

I propose that not even science can give us an answer yet.

The thing about science is that cannot function without definitions. So the definitions come first, and then from there we ask detailed questions about our definitions. Whenever science ever embarks on a quest for knowledge, it is actually just attempting to build upon what it already knows.

pearlgirl wrote:There is no definitive answer for what "knowledge" is for starters.

"The standard account of knowledge, around which all recent work has been done, defines knowledge as justified true belief; it holds that a knows that p if and only if

1 p,
2 a believes that p,
3 a's belief that p is justified.

Because there are three parts to this definition it is called the tripartite definition or the tripartite account; it defines propositional knowledge, knowledge that p; it does not define knowledge by acquaintance as in 'a knows James' nor knowledge-how, e.g. knowledge how to ride a bicycle, unless these can be shown to reduce to knowledge-that."

(Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. p. 23)

Teuton wrote:

pearlgirl wrote:There is no definitive answer for what "knowledge" is for starters.

"The standard account of knowledge, around which all recent work has been done, defines knowledge as justified true belief; it holds that a knows that p if and only if

1 p,
2 a believes that p,
3 a's belief that p is justified.

Because there are three parts to this definition it is called the tripartite definition or the tripartite account; it defines propositional knowledge, knowledge that p; it does not define knowledge by acquaintance as in 'a knows James' nor knowledge-how, e.g. knowledge how to ride a bicycle, unless these can be shown to reduce to knowledge-that."

(Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. p. 23)

I do not think so, as, conditions have to met to justify that belief--otherwise known as a Gettier problem. See the following link please. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problems

Knowledge is limited to the present moment direct experience and is limited to the capacity of the knower. In the "cow in the field" scenario in Gettier link the farmer sees a black and white shape he recognizes as his cow. As explained he may be mistaken, but even so - as soon as he leaves the field he no longer knows he merely believes. All he has is a memory. Daisy may have wandered out an open gate or through a hole in the fence.

There is an intimate and necessary connection between the capacity of the knower to know and claims to that knowledge. They are not separate. The bird in the top of the tree between the cow and the farmer with its superb eyesight had no knowledge as it was paying all its attention to the insects it was chasing. As far as it knew - there was no farmer and no cow. If it turned its attention to the farmer then it would have no knowledge of the insects - just memories and expectations.

pearlgirl wrote:

Teuton wrote:
"The standard account of knowledge, around which all recent work has been done, defines knowledge as justified true belief; it holds that a knows that p if and only if

1 p,
2 a believes that p,
3 a's belief that p is justified.

Because there are three parts to this definition it is called the tripartite definition or the tripartite account; it defines propositional knowledge, knowledge that p; it does not define knowledge by acquaintance as in 'a knows James' nor knowledge-how, e.g. knowledge how to ride a bicycle, unless these can be shown to reduce to knowledge-that."

(Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. p. 23)

I do not think so, as, conditions have to met to justify that belief--otherwise known as a Gettier problem. See the following link please. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problems

I'm aware of the Gettier problems, but the definition above is nevertheless the relevant definition "for starters".
Here's one (a fallibilist one) that takes the Gettier problems into account:

"S knows P iff
(a) S believes P,
(b) S's belief in P is fallibly justified,
(c) P is true,
(d) (b) ensures that (a)-and-(c) are not jointly an accident.
…
In a nutshell, propositional knowledge consists in believing true propositions on the basis of fallible evidence which ensures that one has not accidentally believed the truth."

(Sturgeon, Scott. "Knowledge." In Philosophy: A Guide through the Subject, edited by A. C. Grayling, 10-26. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. p. 17)

Teuton wrote:

pearlgirl wrote:There is no definitive answer for what "knowledge" is for starters.

"The standard account of knowledge, around which all recent work has been done, defines knowledge as justified true belief; it holds that a knows that p if and only if

1 p,
2 a believes that p,
3 a's belief that p is justified.

Because there are three parts to this definition it is called the tripartite definition or the tripartite account; it defines propositional knowledge, knowledge that p; it does not define knowledge by acquaintance as in 'a knows James' nor knowledge-how, e.g. knowledge how to ride a bicycle, unless these can be shown to reduce to knowledge-that."

(Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. p. 23)

You're barking up the wrong tree here, Teuton (we've met elsewhere, haven't we?)

The fundamental fact about "knowledge" is that it happens in a mind. "Knowing" is a quale, with all the ambiguity it provides.

The lower level construction is then that knowing X means that my brain has the disposition to direct my actions in certain ways which make more sense (to me, at least) in terms of predicting the consequences of X being true. But being a quale (of/for/about proposition X), a private disposition unavailable to the world at large, a portion of "knowledge" is going to remain unamenable to semantic analysis.

-- TWZ

ColonelZen wrote:The fundamental fact about "knowledge" is that it happens in a mind. "Knowing" is a quale, with all the ambiguity it provides.

I'd say, to know something is to be in a certain mental state. Such cognitive states might have qualia, but is there really something it is like to know something?

Teuton wrote:

ColonelZen wrote:The fundamental fact about "knowledge" is that it happens in a mind. "Knowing" is a quale, with all the ambiguity it provides.

I'd say, to know something is to be in a certain mental state. Such cognitive states might have qualia, but is there really something it is like to know something?

Given my deconstruction of Nagel and specification that the where of likeness are is the individual's memories, and (for propositional knowledge) "knowing" for such knowledge means pulling it from memory, I'd have to say that is a very tautological affirmative. There's even a noticeable contrasting emotional reaction to wanting/needing information which you don't have in memory (and the totally different one when you know it's there but temporarily can't get at it).

In keeping with that, I'd say "knowing" is probably clearest possible case of a quale by that "definition" ... and perhaps the granddaddy of all qualia. Can you have a red quale without *knowing* red?

-- TWZ

ColonelZen wrote:
In keeping with that, I'd say "knowing" is probably clearest possible case of a quale by that "definition" ... and perhaps the granddaddy of all qualia. Can you have a red quale without *knowing* red?

No, to have a perception or experience is to know its qualia; but that's a case of perceptual or experiential knowledge by acquaintance ("knowledge-what-it's-like"), not a case of propositional knowledge ("knowledge-that").
And it doesn't make sense to say that experiential knowledge of qualia is itself a quale.
By the way, there is a third kind of knowledge: practical (behavioral, agential) knowledge ("knowledge-how").

Steve wrote: But why are we curious in the first place?

dopamine.

Cory Duchesne wrote:I actually don't mind this way of thinking too much, but to me, "spiritual", if I were to define it in a way that made sense to me, would mean to be not of the world.

It is a pity to have it defined that way. It leaves us without a word to define a certain human condition which is definitely OF this world.

Interesting thoughts Cory. I suggest compatibilism?

I'm reading a paper right now on a theory of how we come to know things biologically. It amazes me how much dander and word salad results from any other approach to an understanding of something so simply human(or simply animal?)

Teuton wrote:

ColonelZen wrote:
In keeping with that, I'd say "knowing" is probably clearest possible case of a quale by that "definition" ... and perhaps the granddaddy of all qualia. Can you have a red quale without *knowing* red?

No, to have a perception or experience is to know its qualia; but that's a case of perceptual or experiential knowledge by acquaintance ("knowledge-what-it's-like"), not a case of propositional knowledge ("knowledge-that").
And it doesn't make sense to say that experiential knowledge of qualia is itself a quale.
By the way, there is a third kind of knowledge: practical (behavioral, agential) knowledge ("knowledge-how").

No, we're at cross purposes here. I'm asserting that "knowing" as a brain state, independent of the proposition which is the subject of it, is the quale. Just as red is a "quale" associated with my pickup, knowing is a quale associated with "water is H20". I'm saying, perhaps creating - though I'm sure some "real" philosopher must have been here first - the idea that there is a "what it's like" of knowing (for a given proposition, X) means being motivationally configured to act upon the verity of X.

I know that there is a stop sign at the corner of Keebler and First. I have the quale of being motivated by that knowledge, in this case to slow down and stop as approaching that intersection while driving. And I am aware of that. It is tautological that I have the perception that I should stop and at that point, else I would not be motivated to do so.

The true point of interest here is that it is possible and common to have the "knowing quale" about propositions which are not true, and in some cases demonstrably false.

But the immediate point is that "knowing" - in human beings - imputes some unsharable (and as yet indecipherable in neurophysiology) state of brain *about* a proposition, ergo discussions about knowledge in the abstract are always going to leave out a part of what it means - and we as knowers will have an intuitive recognition of that fact - until and unless we include a description of what it means to the mind that has that knowledge, i. e. how it affects that mind.

The counterpoint is that we computer programmers write programs dependent upon "knowledge" all the time. But the program is their "motivation" to act this way or that dependent upon what knowledge is available. But data only becomes "knowledge" in the context of the program, i. e. being motivated to do something with it.

-- TWZ