GrahamH wrote:Teuton wrote:The intuition is the justification. The concept of an experiencerless experience, an experience which is experienced by nothing/nobody just doesn't make any rational sense.
Intuition is not reason. Of all things, given how the mind is not open to it's own nature, there is no strong reason to suppose that intuitions about mind are reliable. I think there are rational alternatives well worth consideration, but we do have to lay aside our intuition to entertain them.
You don't have to agree with Dennett in general to see his point here:Dennett wrote:A closing observation: I find that some philosophers think that my whole approach to qualia is not playing fair. I don’t respect the standard rules of philosophical thought experiments. “But Dan, your view is so counterintuitive!” No kidding. That’s the whole point. Of course it is counterintuitive. Nowhere is it written that the true materialist theory of consciousness should be blandly intuitive. I have all along insisted that it may be very counterintuitive. That’s the trouble with “pure” philosophical method here. It has no resources for developing, or even taking seriously, counterintuitive theories, but since it is a very good bet that the true materialist theory of consciousness will be highly counterintuitive (like the Copernican theory--at least at first), this means that “pure” philosophy must just concede impotence and retreat into conservative conceptual anthropology until the advance of science puts it out of its misery. Philosophers have a choice: they can play games with folk concepts (ordinary language philosophy lives on, as a kind of aprioristic social anthropology) or they can take seriously the claim that some of these folk concepts are illusion-generators. The way to take that prospect seriously is to consider theories that propose revisions to those concepts.Teuton wrote:GrahamH wrote:Mind you, if all you mean by that is that experience requires an animal it isn't really saying much.
To say that experiences are subject-dependent is not to say that subjects of experience are animals or material things at all. For instance, Berkeley agrees with me that experiences (what he calls "ideas") depend on experiencers which are not experiences themselves, but he believes that experiencers are immaterial things rather than material ones.
You don't claim experiencers are immaterial things, do you? Are you claiming experiencers are human animals? If you are only saying the humans experience you aren't saying much.Teuton wrote:GrahamH wrote:But perhaps all Harris is saying, and what you are responding to , is merely that he can lose a sense of being somewhere and lose a sense of being a thinker.
There may be phenomenological cases of nonpathological meditation or pathological delusion in which the subject loses its sense of ownership, i.e. the sense of being the owner, haver, and bearer of its experiences and thoughts, getting into a state of decentered "self-forgetfulness", in which it is deeply immersed in and absorbed by "pure experience". But the possibility of phenomenally "selfless" experience doesn't entail the possibility of ontically "selfless", i.e. subjectless, experienceGrahamH wrote:Harris wrote:If you turn consciousness upon itself in this moment, you will discover that your mind tends to wander into thought. If you look closely at thoughts themselves, you will notice that they continually arise and pass away. If you look for the thinker of these thoughts, you will not find one. And the sense that you have — “What the hell is Harris talking about? I’m the thinker!”— is just another thought, arising in consciousness.
Perhaps you don't have those senses anyway, and have a all-in-one sense of just being a 'human animal', drawing no distinction between thought and action. It seems unlikely. I suspect that most people have a very strong sense of being a thinker, and thought driving action. That sense is open to challenge. I have that sense that I am thinking. It doesn't seem to me that there are thoughts. But rationally I think that makes more sense, that there is not a subject thinker thinking thoughts. The subject is probably just another 'thought' that a human animal creates that really doesn't need a subject to also have/experience the thought.
My being a thinker is independent of my thinking that I am a thinker. I certainly don't find the thinker I am among my thoughts, because thinkers aren't thoughts—only thoughts about thinkers are. Thinkers are represented in thought by "thinker-thoughts", but the represented thinkers are thought-transcendent entities.
We only think there is a thinker because of the thought that there is a thinker.
The thing about the thinker is that is is not inherently conscious of producing thought. What we call thinking is a stream of concepts, linkages and sense of authorship, but we are incapable of digging down to a full account of how thoughts are formed. Thoughts contain meaning and have structure, but the creation of the meaning and structure is not done consciously. There is no subjective guarantee that a subject thinker made any thought, even if we suppose that a subject experienced the content of the thought and the sense of authorship.
That is indeed counter intuitive, but how can you tell if any thought is a creation of your subjective mind (or human animal if you prefer)?
An idea or perhaps a tune might come to mind and we will experience ownership of it unless we are explicitly aware of some other source for the content. It is a common occurrence to have something come to mind only to later realise that the content was most likely from some other source.
I'm not suggesting here that thoughts are beamed into our minds from outside. I'm pointing to the possibility that our intuitions could be deeply wrong about how thoughts arise and it cannot be certain that the subjective mind is the thinker of the thoughts it appears to experience.
Suppose for a moment that every thought a subjective mind experiences is 'beamed in'. What are the implications of that for the certain intuition that the subject mind knows it's own reality?
Anyway, this could go on a long way. Just please question your strongest intuitions about mind.
There ya go.