SpeedOfSound wrote:

BWE wrote:Sos, maybe you already answered this, but "awareness" and "attention" don't seem to reduce all that well. For example, if you can be aware of a thought, that means that the signal is parsed and attention focused on it. The simple fact that attention works like it does seems to make at least the labeling of unconscious thought a reasonable term which can be used as a referent and decoded by a receiver. That stream of language which one can become aware of by careful internal observation.

That said, your mission makes more sense to me now and I think the goal is probably reasonable. The method is wrong I think, but the.outcome might be the.same either way. From my perspective you can't build an ontology which banishes ontologies through language.

Awareness is often confused with attention. They really are two different things in the brain and guys like Baars make a big dal out of that. Attention has to do with working memory and the thalamus and the basal ganglia and lots of powerful state changes.

Now I separate these as Aw and At. Sets that contain elements of awareness and elements of attention. I would insist that you can never figure out all the things and bits in Aw. To do so you have to drag each bit into Aw and then it is transformed and mediated. So I may have a thought but thinking I have a thought is an entirely additional process. This process of course creates new elements in the Aw set and we are back at the beginning. Always trying and never succeeding in figuring out what we are aware of.

Is that clear? Or confused?

Your Aw category seems to have nothing to do with the supposed 'Hard Problem' of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, it seems to fit the general description for 'sub-conscious' or 'un-conscious'. It's all the stuff that might come to conscious awareness, but is not currently something you are consciously aware of. We might say 'have access to', but it's not something we can consciously attend to at will. It might be more appropriate to say ' may be given access to' We can't take a look at what's happening in all our cortical columns, but that may come to consciousness by some other means. You may hate the terms, but in some circles it's distinguished as top-down or bottom-up attention.

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:No it's all a candidate for attention. Global awareness. It may not be the C you are used to but that shit doesn't actually exist anyway so no loss. If I am looking at something I have access to it.

If you see something you have access, but just looking at it does not guarantee that you will see it. So what's the difference between looking at and seeing?

This is a very good example of how the ghost in the machine is still lurking deep within how we structure language and our thinking.

What makes you think that this is a valid distinction?

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

BWE wrote:Sos, maybe you already answered this, but "awareness" and "attention" don't seem to reduce all that well. For example, if you can be aware of a thought, that means that the signal is parsed and attention focused on it. The simple fact that attention works like it does seems to make at least the labeling of unconscious thought a reasonable term which can be used as a referent and decoded by a receiver. That stream of language which one can become aware of by careful internal observation.

That said, your mission makes more sense to me now and I think the goal is probably reasonable. The method is wrong I think, but the.outcome might be the.same either way. From my perspective you can't build an ontology which banishes ontologies through language.

Awareness is often confused with attention. They really are two different things in the brain and guys like Baars make a big dal out of that. Attention has to do with working memory and the thalamus and the basal ganglia and lots of powerful state changes.

Now I separate these as Aw and At. Sets that contain elements of awareness and elements of attention. I would insist that you can never figure out all the things and bits in Aw. To do so you have to drag each bit into Aw and then it is transformed and mediated. So I may have a thought but thinking I have a thought is an entirely additional process. This process of course creates new elements in the Aw set and we are back at the beginning. Always trying and never succeeding in figuring out what we are aware of.

Is that clear? Or confused?

Your Aw category seems to have nothing to do with the supposed 'Hard Problem' of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, it seems to fit the general description for 'sub-conscious' or 'un-conscious'. It's all the stuff that might come to conscious awareness, but is not currently something you are consciously aware of. We might say 'have access to', but it's not something we can consciously attend to at will. It might be more appropriate to say ' may be given access to' We can't take a look at what's happening in all our cortical columns, but that may come to consciousness by some other means. You may hate the terms, but in some circles it's distinguished as top-down or bottom-up attention.

Another distinction. At will and unconscious promoters.

I do precisely have access to my entire visual field at will. This is because I can see. I swear, you must be a blind person?
Graham, I think you are trying to stuff a large group of disparate things into a couple of old suitcases. Shit keeps getting caught in the zippers and we have to start over.

Have you actually tried to just let go of this Unconscious genie, the favorite spirit of the atheist, and rethink all of this in a new set of categories?

I suggest you just start with a machine that has networks like our brains and then try and map out territories in it with your labels. Like Lewis and Clarke. Stick with a pure physical description and find the Unconscionable Divide.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:No it's all a candidate for attention. Global awareness. It may not be the C you are used to but that shit doesn't actually exist anyway so no loss. If I am looking at something I have access to it.

If you see something you have access, but just looking at it does not guarantee that you will see it. So what's the difference between looking at and seeing?

This is a very good example of how the ghost in the machine is still lurking deep within how we structure language and our thinking.

What makes you think that this is a valid distinction?

It seem self evident that pointing my eyes at a scene does not mean I experience seeing all that's there. Don't we all know well the experience of becoming aware of something in view that we hadn't noticed before? Don't we all know our experience of any perception of a stable stimulus changes over time? This would be impossible if we simply experienced everything that hit our sensory cortices.

What makes you think it is an invalid distinction?

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

BWE wrote:Sos, maybe you already answered this, but "awareness" and "attention" don't seem to reduce all that well. For example, if you can be aware of a thought, that means that the signal is parsed and attention focused on it. The simple fact that attention works like it does seems to make at least the labeling of unconscious thought a reasonable term which can be used as a referent and decoded by a receiver. That stream of language which one can become aware of by careful internal observation.

That said, your mission makes more sense to me now and I think the goal is probably reasonable. The method is wrong I think, but the.outcome might be the.same either way. From my perspective you can't build an ontology which banishes ontologies through language.

Awareness is often confused with attention. They really are two different things in the brain and guys like Baars make a big dal out of that. Attention has to do with working memory and the thalamus and the basal ganglia and lots of powerful state changes.

Now I separate these as Aw and At. Sets that contain elements of awareness and elements of attention. I would insist that you can never figure out all the things and bits in Aw. To do so you have to drag each bit into Aw and then it is transformed and mediated. So I may have a thought but thinking I have a thought is an entirely additional process. This process of course creates new elements in the Aw set and we are back at the beginning. Always trying and never succeeding in figuring out what we are aware of.

Is that clear? Or confused?

Your Aw category seems to have nothing to do with the supposed 'Hard Problem' of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, it seems to fit the general description for 'sub-conscious' or 'un-conscious'. It's all the stuff that might come to conscious awareness, but is not currently something you are consciously aware of. We might say 'have access to', but it's not something we can consciously attend to at will. It might be more appropriate to say ' may be given access to' We can't take a look at what's happening in all our cortical columns, but that may come to consciousness by some other means. You may hate the terms, but in some circles it's distinguished as top-down or bottom-up attention.

Another distinction. At will and unconscious promoters.

I do precisely have access to my entire visual field at will. This is because I can see. I swear, you must be a blind person?
Graham, I think you are trying to stuff a large group of disparate things into a couple of old suitcases. Shit keeps getting caught in the zippers and we have to start over.

Have you actually tried to just let go of this Unconscious genie, the favorite spirit of the atheist, and rethink all of this in a new set of categories?

I suggest you just start with a machine that has networks like our brains and then try and map out territories in it with your labels. Like Lewis and Clarke. Stick with a pure physical description and find the Unconscionable Divide.

I do tend to think in physical computing terms with all of this. All the concepts I try to discuss fit well with computational analogies. I might be open to criticism for that, but to suggest I'm not doing it is absurd.

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:No it's all a candidate for attention. Global awareness. It may not be the C you are used to but that shit doesn't actually exist anyway so no loss. If I am looking at something I have access to it.

If you see something you have access, but just looking at it does not guarantee that you will see it. So what's the difference between looking at and seeing?

This is a very good example of how the ghost in the machine is still lurking deep within how we structure language and our thinking.

What makes you think that this is a valid distinction?

It seem self evident that pointing my eyes at a scene does not mean I experience seeing all that's there. Don't we all know well the experience of becoming aware of something in view that we hadn't noticed before? Don't we all know our experience of any perception of a stable stimulus changes over time? This would be impossible if we simply experienced everything that hit our sensory cortices.

What makes you think it is an invalid distinction?

What makes you think it's valid? How about if there were three levels. Experiencing it fully, barely experiencing it, not experiencing at all? How about a hundred thousand levels? What makes you think you can find the physical correlate of the distinction you are making?

If you are walking around, irritated, looking all over the house for your car keys. How many distinct visual scenes do we have in such an endeavor? Maybe a thousand. Consider what consciousness if for in the first place. You can SEE. Doesn't mean you are going to stop on every little blob and ask a question is that my set of keys. In fact stopping on every blob would take you weeks.

So you decidedly are less awareness of every little blob and of average awareness of many different things. This is how I try and spend most of my life. At average cool awareness.

Now in that search which is now minutes old, what was I conscious of? The goal? That makes little sense to me if I consider attention to the goal. I was not attending the goal when I tripped over the cat. Did various objects float in and out of my attention as I looked? That seems right. But did they FLOAT IN or suddenly appear, dominate all and then blink out?

Do I even have any way of knowing what I was aware of and at what level in the minutes past? I can guess that what I remember seeing, the fleeing cat, the dining room table, was conscious because I can remember it. In my view I would say I remember it because it persisted in my attention at a higher level for some seconds. But then my house is something I know well and I could have imagined that I was consious of the table and the fact is I really can't decide on the fact.

So why not admit some new land masses and say we have a global sea of Aw that is all we sense and we have these icebergs that sometimes float close to the surface and other times break through and other times just far up above the sea? Then compare this multitudes of continuous shades of gray to an actual network in the head cheese.

Now try mapping the C/UnC distinction to the actual brain. Do you see the problem?

You have no evidence of this binary distinction in science. All of the evidence people think they have is based on the assumption of the distinction itself and plenty of bad assumptions about how test subjects can be tricked into showing which side of the false dichotomy they were sitting in.

All I am doing is saying, Hey!! What you are doing is taking everything I suggest and trying to stuff it into your assumption that the distinction is correct. As you put it "self evident". Where has self-evident got us to in these discussions? It's like saying "Best Burgers in Town!".

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Awareness is often confused with attention. They really are two different things in the brain and guys like Baars make a big dal out of that. Attention has to do with working memory and the thalamus and the basal ganglia and lots of powerful state changes.

Now I separate these as Aw and At. Sets that contain elements of awareness and elements of attention. I would insist that you can never figure out all the things and bits in Aw. To do so you have to drag each bit into Aw and then it is transformed and mediated. So I may have a thought but thinking I have a thought is an entirely additional process. This process of course creates new elements in the Aw set and we are back at the beginning. Always trying and never succeeding in figuring out what we are aware of.

Is that clear? Or confused?

Your Aw category seems to have nothing to do with the supposed 'Hard Problem' of phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, it seems to fit the general description for 'sub-conscious' or 'un-conscious'. It's all the stuff that might come to conscious awareness, but is not currently something you are consciously aware of. We might say 'have access to', but it's not something we can consciously attend to at will. It might be more appropriate to say ' may be given access to' We can't take a look at what's happening in all our cortical columns, but that may come to consciousness by some other means. You may hate the terms, but in some circles it's distinguished as top-down or bottom-up attention.

Another distinction. At will and unconscious promoters.

I do precisely have access to my entire visual field at will. This is because I can see. I swear, you must be a blind person?
Graham, I think you are trying to stuff a large group of disparate things into a couple of old suitcases. Shit keeps getting caught in the zippers and we have to start over.

Have you actually tried to just let go of this Unconscious genie, the favorite spirit of the atheist, and rethink all of this in a new set of categories?

I suggest you just start with a machine that has networks like our brains and then try and map out territories in it with your labels. Like Lewis and Clarke. Stick with a pure physical description and find the Unconscionable Divide.

I do tend to think in physical computing terms with all of this. All the concepts I try to discuss fit well with computational analogies. I might be open to criticism for that, but to suggest I'm not doing it is absurd.

Then tell me how the physical matches up with your C/UnC distinction. Exactly. Anatomically. Or even in a network that you imagine for a robot. What will C/UnC look like in the robot?

Don't you see that you are creating the mind body problem, not solving it?

Do the work. Show me the robots circuits and tell me whee these mythical places are exactly.

Let's try and experiment. When it starts I want you to wait a few moments, then at will, set your index finger hard down on the surface of your work place. Fix on the moment your finger hits the table, list all of the things you were conscious of at that moment and give me your proof in evidence that this was indeed the case. For each thing tell me what the shape of that conscious experience was. what was it like? I'll try and do it myself a few times today.

SpeedOfSound wrote:If you are walking around, irritated, looking all over the house for your car keys. How many distinct visual scenes do we have in such an endeavor? Maybe a thousand. Consider what consciousness if for in the first place. You can SEE. Doesn't mean you are going to stop on every little blob and ask a question is that my set of keys. In fact stopping on every blob would take you weeks.

That's the point! We don't use consciousness for that. We can do, on occasion, but as you say its very slow. If we have to experience all the details to find something it's very inefficient. If you are looking for something move your view over areas where it might be and it may just pop out. Then you see it! There is no conscious blob matching. When that happens it isn't that your keys just jumped into view. It's that you suddenly notice them. You suddenly become aware of them. You suddenly begin experiencing seeing of keys. Searching for Lost keys aren't the best example here. Just look at any unfamiliar scene and you keep seeing new things in it.

Are you really trying to argue that doesn't happen?

GrahamH wrote:
If you are not specifically aware of a stimulus after neural processing
has taken place are you still calling that a subjective experience

At what point does subjective experience begin ? Is it when the sense organ registers it or is it when it has passed through the thalamus to the specific brain region that processes it ? One could argue that this is academic as the time frame is so small as to be practically non existent. Rather like the time it takes for a light to go on after the switch has been activated. But while it may appear to be instantaneous from a human perspective an electrical charge still has to travel the distance between the switch and the light. And this is a particularly appropriate analogy with respect to the brain as the firing of neurons is exactly the same as an electrical charge travelling along a cable save for the fact that the paths may be multiple rather than singular and angular rather than straight

I think it impossible for any sense perception not to be a subjective experience since that would suggest that some are not processed by the brain. But if everything that is experienced has to pass through the thalamus for processing then nothing is going to be disregarded. It may be that the brain has to function as a filter in being able to distinguish between stimuli that need a response and stimuli that do not. As it cannot distinguish in advance then it has to process all information it receives from sense perception even if some or most of it does not require a response beyond simple recognition. But that would still qualify as a subjective experience regardless of whether it registered as conscious or not. Otherwise that would suggest that not all sense perception is conscious experience. Since all perception is conscious [ and subjective ] experience by definition then that cannot be so

This is why I think that consciousness is on a single spectrum. The problem with the dichotomy of conscious and unconscious is there is no clear demarcation between these two. If a particular sense perception for example does not register a specific response from the brain is that conscious or unconscious ? It could actually qualify as both under such a model. But since all perception is by definition conscious then logically there can be no such thing as the unconscious. For that could only be a non existent experience which was not referenced by either sense perception or brain processing. So there are degrees of consciousness but nothing specifically unconscious as such

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:If you are walking around, irritated, looking all over the house for your car keys. How many distinct visual scenes do we have in such an endeavor? Maybe a thousand. Consider what consciousness if for in the first place. You can SEE. Doesn't mean you are going to stop on every little blob and ask a question is that my set of keys. In fact stopping on every blob would take you weeks.

That's the point! We don't use consciousness for that. We can do, on occasion, but as you say its very slow. If we have to experience all the details to find something it's very inefficient. If you are looking for something move your view over areas where it might be and it may just pop out. Then you see it! There is no conscious blob matching. When that happens it isn't that your keys just jumped into view. It's that you suddenly notice them. You suddenly become aware of them. You suddenly begin experiencing seeing of keys. Searching for Lost keys aren't the best example here. Just look at any unfamiliar scene and you keep seeing new things in it.

Are you really trying to argue that doesn't happen?

You are still making attention synonymous with awareness. Not surprising, it's how this whole mess got started in the first place. What is surprising is the fervor with which good physicalists hold on to the myth.

GrahamH wrote:... So what's the difference between looking at and seeing?

That's the Hard Problem.

no really.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:If you are walking around, irritated, looking all over the house for your car keys. How many distinct visual scenes do we have in such an endeavor? Maybe a thousand. Consider what consciousness if for in the first place. You can SEE. Doesn't mean you are going to stop on every little blob and ask a question is that my set of keys. In fact stopping on every blob would take you weeks.

That's the point! We don't use consciousness for that. We can do, on occasion, but as you say its very slow. If we have to experience all the details to find something it's very inefficient. If you are looking for something move your view over areas where it might be and it may just pop out. Then you see it! There is no conscious blob matching. When that happens it isn't that your keys just jumped into view. It's that you suddenly notice them. You suddenly become aware of them. You suddenly begin experiencing seeing of keys. Searching for Lost keys aren't the best example here. Just look at any unfamiliar scene and you keep seeing new things in it.

Are you really trying to argue that doesn't happen?

You are still making attention synonymous with awareness. Not surprising, it's how this whole mess got started in the first place. What is surprising is the fervor with which good physicalists hold on to the myth.

When you are looking for your keys, the only reason that you don't have to "stop on every blob" is that your unconscious "key recognition function" is fast and accurate enough to do it "on the fly", in most cases. It is only unconscious (and therefore fast) due to what you could call "practice makes perfect".

EDIT: The "practice" being at looking for something that you can easily recognised when you see it, not necessarily your keys.

SpeedOfSound wrote:
You are still making attention synonymous with awareness

There are sense experiences which when processed by the brain do not require any response beyond a simple
recognition of the experience itself. They can be regarded as examples of attention without awareness. And
there are sense experiences that do require a response beyond simple recognition. They can be regarded as
as examples of attention with awareness. The two are therefore not always synonymous only sometimes so

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:No it's all a candidate for attention. Global awareness. It may not be the C you are used to but that shit doesn't actually exist anyway so no loss. If I am looking at something I have access to it.

If you see something you have access, but just looking at it does not guarantee that you will see it. So what's the difference between looking at and seeing?

This is a very good example of how the ghost in the machine is still lurking deep within how we structure language and our thinking.

What makes you think that this is a valid distinction?

In ordinary usage, an unconscious thought process occurs when a person acts in some way that is clearly under the control of their brain, but that person cannot talk about what they are doing, they don’t have introspective access to that process. It seems to me that this is an operationally useful distinction, rather than a fundamental one; but it is useful, it’s not nonsense. An example of that definition is here:

L M Augusto (2010) wrote:In the cases where subjects exhibit behaviours that indicate that they possess knowledge but seem both unaware of that possession and unable to verbalize it, we assume that they have unconscious, or implicit knowledge. ...... Unconscious knowledge refers to knowledge that is revealed by task performance alone, subjects being unaware that they are accessing it, whereas we speak of conscious knowledge when subjects are aware of possessing and accessing it (Schacter, 1992). A useful way of characterizing this epistemic availability in the face of conscious inaccessibility is by appealing to metaknowledge (e.g., Dienes & Perner, 2002): One can speak of unconscious knowledge when subjects lack metaknowledge concerning their own positive epistemic states, that is, states in which they possess knowledge. In other words, subjects cannot form a higher order representation about a lower order one. For instance, a subject with blindsight (see below) who, when forced to guess, correctly identifies a cross on a screen, has a lower order representation that there is a cross on the screen; however, this subject is incapable of representing this information to themselves with a higher order representation. That is, the subject cannot say, “I see a cross on the screen”; seeing the cross on the screen is not a conscious thought in this case (e.g., Rosenthal, 2005, p. 185). Returning to the availability-accessibility distinction, we can say that while the sight of a cross on a screen is available to the subject with blindsight, it is not consciously accessible to them.

In practice this is largely a social definition that depends on language (though there are grey areas); it does become more or less useless for non-human animals and for the kind of cognition that SpeedOfSound describes in his timelines. Since SpeedOfSound’s timelines for human brain activity resolutely exclude speech or social cognition, it’s probably the case that the conscious/unconscious distinction doesn’t matter for them. On the other hand, since speech and social cognition are central aspects of human behaviour, I would say that SpeedOfSound’s timelines are missing out the parts of human brain activity that are of interest in the study of consciousness.

OK the timelines describe how we could interact with non-agents like trees without needing the concepts of folk psychology, but how are we to extend this absence of folk psychology to the cases where we are dealing with folk (which is most of the time, for example, when posting here)? Is there any way for me to interact with SpeedOfSound without assuming SoS is the unitary centre of awareness which the Theory of Mind processes in my brain automatically create?

SpeedOfSound wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:If you are walking around, irritated, looking all over the house for your car keys. How many distinct visual scenes do we have in such an endeavor? Maybe a thousand. Consider what consciousness if for in the first place. You can SEE. Doesn't mean you are going to stop on every little blob and ask a question is that my set of keys. In fact stopping on every blob would take you weeks.

That's the point! We don't use consciousness for that. We can do, on occasion, but as you say its very slow. If we have to experience all the details to find something it's very inefficient. If you are looking for something move your view over areas where it might be and it may just pop out. Then you see it! There is no conscious blob matching. When that happens it isn't that your keys just jumped into view. It's that you suddenly notice them. You suddenly become aware of them. You suddenly begin experiencing seeing of keys. Searching for Lost keys aren't the best example here. Just look at any unfamiliar scene and you keep seeing new things in it.

Are you really trying to argue that doesn't happen?

You are still making attention synonymous with awareness. Not surprising, it's how this whole mess got started in the first place. What is surprising is the fervor with which good physicalists hold on to the myth.

Given that we are both using a notion of diffuse attention, not a singular strand exclusive version, just what distinction do you, or Baars, make between them? (Remember that Baars had quite a bit to say about the unconscious in GWT)

surreptitious57 wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:
You are still making attention synonymous with awareness

There are sense experiences which when processed by the brain do not require any response beyond a simple
recognition of the experience itself. They can be regarded as examples of attention without awareness. And
there are sense experiences that do require a response beyond simple recognition. They can be regarded as
as examples of attention with awareness. The two are therefore not always synonymous only sometimes so

Interesting. Not sure I would tie it to "requiring a response" but the two certainly different and certainly related to consciousness, unconsciousness sensory operation. There are also responses to sensory input that are non-conscious such as heart beat/rate and bloodpressure, breathing and knee-jerk reactions, that last one applying to a lot of what SOS says.

surreptitious57 wrote:

GrahamH wrote:
If you are not specifically aware of a stimulus after neural processing
has taken place are you still calling that a subjective experience

At what point does subjective experience begin ? Is it when the sense organ registers it or is it when it has passed through the thalamus to the specific brain region that processes it ? One could argue that this is academic as the time frame is so small as to be practically non existent. Rather like the time it takes for a light to go on after the switch has been activated. But while it may appear to be instantaneous from a human perspective an electrical charge still has to travel the distance between the switch and the light. And this is a particularly appropriate analogy with respect to the brain as the firing of neurons is exactly the same as an electrical charge travelling along a cable save for the fact that the paths may be multiple rather than singular and angular rather than straight

I think it impossible for any sense perception not to be a subjective experience since that would suggest that some are not processed by the brain. But if everything that is experienced has to pass through the thalamus for processing then nothing is going to be disregarded. It may be that the brain has to function as a filter in being able to distinguish between stimuli that need a response and stimuli that do not. As it cannot distinguish in advance then it has to process all information it receives from sense perception even if some or most of it does not require a response beyond simple recognition. But that would still qualify as a subjective experience regardless of whether it registered as conscious or not. Otherwise that would suggest that not all sense perception is conscious experience. Since all perception is conscious [ and subjective ] experience by definition then that cannot be so

This is why I think that consciousness is on a single spectrum. The problem with the dichotomy of conscious and unconscious is there is no clear demarcation between these two. If a particular sense perception for example does not register a specific response from the brain is that conscious or unconscious ? It could actually qualify as both under such a model. But since all perception is by definition conscious then logically there can be no such thing as the unconscious. For that could only be a non existent experience which was not referenced by either sense perception or brain processing. So there are degrees of consciousness but nothing specifically unconscious as such

Yes.

surreptitious57 wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:
You are still making attention synonymous with awareness

There are sense experiences which when processed by the brain do not require any response beyond a simple
recognition of the experience itself. They can be regarded as examples of attention without awareness. And
there are sense experiences that do require a response beyond simple recognition. They can be regarded as
as examples of attention with awareness. The two are therefore not always synonymous only sometimes so

What meanings are you using there for attention and awareness? I assume they are not both meant in the subjective sense, since you surely can't consciously attend to something without conscious awareness of it.

There are non-subjective physiological uses of the word attention, but I don't think you mean that.
e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_sensor ... _attention
You could say the visual system attends to a stimulus if the eyes orient to it, or the motor system reacts to it, but this does not necessitate that there is a conscious experience of seeing the stimulus. See blindsight.

If There are sense events which when processed by the brain do not requires any response... then why are those sense events 'experiences'? It is reasonable to suppose that recognition (identification/classification) of stimuli could potentially occur without conscious awareness or conscious attention. Many sensorimotor actions would seem to fit this category - 'automatic movements'.

These words are really problematic in such a discussion as this.