logical bob wrote:Hey zoon,
You seem to be making two contradictory points at the same time.
a) Mental events are actually physical events. Future neuroscience will pin down exactly what those effects are. Mental language refers to these physical events.
b) We can safely assume that other peoples' subjective sensations are similar to ours. Mental language refers to classes of sufficiently similar sensations.
I presume you can tell that these aren't the same, so I don't know which one you're in favour of.
Hey logical bob,
I’m with DavidMcC on this one: I agree that those two statements are not the same, I fail to see why they contradict each other.
Supposing mental events are actually physical events, it’s entirely possible, indeed highly likely, that the evolved brain of one individual in a species very often reacts to a stimulus (e.g. biting into coriander) in the same, or a very similar, way as the brain of another individual of the same species. There is much evidence that we have evolved to take advantage of this similarity, and to guess on that basis what is going on in another person’s brain.
logical bob wrote:I think a) is going to encounter significant problems being stated as a hypothesis rather than a statement of faith, but if you accept this then you've essentially accepted my point that there are no private mental events, so I'll settle for that.
Yes, as a physicalist, I use the working assumption (I like to think it's not faith) that physicalism is correct, and accordingly I agree with you that there are (almost certainly) no essentially private mental events. I don’t think we have any disagreement about the essential facts of the case, I’m in no way trying to argue that mental entities exist in some non-physical realm, or that they cause physical objects to behave independently of the laws of physics as described by science.
logical bob wrote:Regarding b), the best response is the one from Cito above. What does it even mean to understand another person talking about their mental events? You're just imagining your own mental events, which is no evidence of anything. Unless you're one of the small percentage of people who find that coriander tastes soapy, you don't know what that taste is. You can imagine what soap tastes like to you, but I doubt someone who has that taste will say that the taste of coriander is the same as the taste of soap, any more than every kind of exotic meat is indistinguishable from chicken and pinot noir really has blackberry notes and a structured floral finish. It's just the best description available (except for the wine tasting one, which is bollocks). You genuinely don't have access to that sensation, any more than a blind man has access to colour. This subjective-but-objective category doesn't exist. How could you ever compare your sensations to someone else's? It would require you to be in their body in a sort of Freaky Friday way that's incoherent on any kind of physicalist view. How can you tell when two of your own sensations are the same? What metric is used and with what margin of error? I can only repeat, sensations are too flimsy a thing to be put into equivalence relations and correspondences.
It seems to me that your entire argument here presupposes that mental events such as sensations are essentially private, which is what we agreed above is almost certainly not the case? If mental events are physical (that is,
not essentially private), then why would it be meaningless for one person to access the mental events of another person? OK we can’t actually do it yet in accurate detail, because neuroscience is not advanced enough, but why are you arguing that guesses have to be meaningless because “my” sensations are so utterly separate from another person’s? If you say the taste of coriander to me is something essentially private which no other person can possibly compare to their own, so that it’s not even meaningful to talk about the possibility, then you are claiming that subjective events like sensations have an essentially non-physical nature.