The Idealists against the Wittgensteinians. Two men enter, one man leaves. Unless any of this would constitute private language. Then it gets fuzzy. I dunno. But yeahhhhh!!!

zoon wrote:If everyone is a p-zombie, then what, in your view, would be a basis for differentiating sentience? (I would have expected that everyone being a p-zombie is another way of saying that sentience doesn't exist.)

Perhaps I'm thinking in legal/moral terms: if there are laws about not driving roads through forests, and somebody then claims that forests don't exist, they are no more than the sum of the trees etc, then the laws are going to need to be rewritten to describe just what kind of collections of trees are to be protected from roads. If we are p-zombies, then just what kinds of collections of molecules are to count as sentient for social purposes?

Which laws depend on that? Suppose someone is in a coma that may or not be permanent. You go up and shoot them in the head. Does your belief in their lack of ability to feel pain affect the law? Does ontology appear in law? If so where?

This seems a confabulated problem.

zoon wrote:I do agree in principle that we are (almost certainly) no more than matter operating according to the laws of physics, but until we understand and can manage our brains as the essentially non-private mechanisms they are, we are stuck with the evolved guesswork of assuming for practical purposes that mental entities exist?

No more than we are stuck with assuming God-given absolute moral law if we can't provide a flawless alternative, or indeed any alternative at all. I think we've all seen that one before - "Without moral absolutes anyone could do what they want, kill anyone they like at any time". It's got almost the exact same form as this "sentient lump" talk.

zoon wrote:To follow your analogies, where people are concerned, we can only think effectively (so far) in terms of forests and waves; if we try to count the trees or understand the forces on water molecules we rapidly get lost?

I think that's stretching the analogy past breaking point, but regardless. This wouldn't justify the reification. If we don't know, they traditional response is "I don't know". But in terms of laws, there's certainly no problem unless there is an example of ontology coming up in court - in which case, if one occurs I'll be happy to think further and respond to it.

zoon wrote:Many of our social structures depend heavily on ignorance, on our inability to know or control exactly what is going on in another person's brain. Science may undermine that useful ignorance? It's not obvious how the resulting power struggles could play out.

This is incredibly vague and hand-wavey. What "social structure" is destroyed by lack of granting "qualia" or "subjective experience" separate ontological status, specifically?

jamest wrote:The point is that [probably] most words in any dictionary will be words devoid of 'extensional' meaning. Yet you're here suggesting that 'the I' (and its experiences/attributes) does not exist. So, deprived of this 'belief attribution' explanation (which I note zoon has objected to already), how does someone like you - an eliminativist, basically - explain the origin of not just many/most of the words within our dictionary, but also the behaviour we observe in humans as they play-out these definitions?

I'm not suggesting that the dictionary be purged of nouns that lack extension. You'll have noticed that I expressly mentioned goodness and numbers in the OP. Communication in a language that lacked non-referring nouns would be severely limited. I'm also not suggesting that the extension of a word must necessarily be physical or observable. There would be much to criticise in the view that soul, God or ghost had extensions but it wouldn't be immediately ruled out linguistically.

If you're willing to accept that words such as pain don't have extension (or perhaps that they have it only in the sense of words like intelligence or secrecy - that thing that is the case when...) then this is enough. What I have in my sights is the view most succinctly expressed by UndercoverElephant and which lives on in pl0bs's signature. One can only be incredulous about experience being produced by the brain if there's something there to be produced.

When you add coriander to your meal this involves you, your kitchen, the other ingredients, perhaps some scissors if you don't favour the coarsely hand-torn variety. The deed is done. Our ontology doesn't need to expand to accommodate a new entity called "the addition of coriander to James's meal." This is not controversial. Nobody makes such a claim.

Similarly, when you taste the meal this involves the food, cutlery, your taste buds, your brain. Perhaps you've chosen a wine that complements the food. Why should we now introduce a new entity called "the taste of the meal to James"? It's no more needed in this example than in the previous one.

logical bob wrote:...
Except that there isn't any stuff, and in conceding this point we allow scope for a smorgasboard of woo. The problem lies in assuming that nouns must be names and that their meaning must reside in their reference to something.
...

I fail to see what language has to do with it. Of course there isn't any "stuff", but what produces experience is neuronal circuit firings within the brain "stuff".

DavidMcC wrote:
I fail to see what language has to do with it. Of course there isn't any "stuff", but what produces experience is neuronal circuit firings within the brain "stuff".

Not only is that not very illuminating, all by itself, but you're not even addressing someone who believes consciousnessness comes from the Great Beyond, which is the only other possible function of some utterance so trivially taken for granted by anyone else who traffics in 'experience' in the first place. The point in saying there is no spoon is to quit talking about 'experience' like it was 'stuff', by using language like you did there, with 'produces'. Har har. The only one here having problems with 'experience' is you.

Cito di Pense wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:
I fail to see what language has to do with it. Of course there isn't any "stuff", but what produces experience is neuronal circuit firings within the brain "stuff".

Not only is that not very illuminating, all by itself, ...

You may pretend that it isn't, but actually, it should be. The problem may be that the question is in the wrong forum.

but you're not even addressing someone who believes consciousnessness comes from the Great Beyond,...

...
Too bad! Anyway, who here believes that crap, other than, perhaps, jamest?

which is the only other possible function of some utterance so trivially taken for granted by anyone else who traffics in 'experience' in the first place. The point in saying there is no spoon is to quit talking about 'experience' like it was 'stuff', by using language like you did there, with 'produces'. Har har. The only one here having problems with 'experience' is you.

I put it to you that you don't know what you are talking about. Just because the OP was misplaced in being in the phlosophy forum doesn't give you the right to hold forth as if it was an issue for philosophers to consider.

Misplaced? No, it's exactly where it needs to be. Even a single mention of "qualia" or "p-zombie" is enough to move a Detroit Diesel Repair Manual to the Philosophy sub-forum. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance isn't a technical manual, though he does talk about spark plug gaps and ignition timing.

This is the bit that is addressing the neuroscience and pshychology issue.

logical bob wrote:It always goes the same. There is mental stuff: experience, awareness, consciousness even. Some of us try to explain how this stuff arises from the physical while others bring arguments that it would be impossible for that to happen. If the stuff isn't physical then logically it must be non-physical, and if mental stuff is non-physical then implications follow...
...

I would agree that the rest of the post wanders off into philosophy.

Thommo wrote:

zoon wrote:If everyone is a p-zombie, then what, in your view, would be a basis for differentiating sentience? (I would have expected that everyone being a p-zombie is another way of saying that sentience doesn't exist.)

Perhaps I'm thinking in legal/moral terms: if there are laws about not driving roads through forests, and somebody then claims that forests don't exist, they are no more than the sum of the trees etc, then the laws are going to need to be rewritten to describe just what kind of collections of trees are to be protected from roads. If we are p-zombies, then just what kinds of collections of molecules are to count as sentient for social purposes?

Which laws depend on that? Suppose someone is in a coma that may or not be permanent. You go up and shoot them in the head. Does your belief in their lack of ability to feel pain affect the law? Does ontology appear in law? If so where?

The government of New Zealand passed a law last year recognising animals as sentient, reported in the Independent here:

The New Zealand Government has formally recognised animals as 'sentient' beings by amending animal welfare legislation.

The Animal Welfare Amendment Bill was passed on Tuesday.

The Act stipulates that it is now necessary to 'recognise animals as sentient' and that owners must ‘attend properly to the welfare of those animals'.

“Sentient” is defined in the online free dictionary:

1. Having sense perception; conscious:
2. Experiencing sensation or feeling.

The mental entities of sense perception, or of sensation or feeling, are recognised in New Zealand law.

I do agree with you, against the idealists, that all these mental terms are almost certainly reducible to physical ones. I also think that if/when science does enable us to understand our brains (and those of other animals) as physical mechanisms, then the mental terms would probably be discarded as crude, inaccurate and unnecessary. My argument is that for the time being we do not understand ourselves as physical mechanisms, instead we use the evolved prescientific concepts of mental entities, and those concepts do in fact work reasonably well for thinking about, predicting, and discussing each other. While that is the case, I think those mental entities may reasonably be regarded as having the same sort of reality as waves or forests?

laklak wrote:... "qualia" ...

Not necessarily a word that dooms the article to the philosophy forum, but it does depend on your understanding of the word.

zoon wrote:
The mental entities of sense perception, or of sensation or feeling, are recognised in New Zealand law.

And that's given, regardless of whether these words signify anything coherent in the prosecution, interpretation, or marketing of the law. What you need are test cases to cite, and then we can see if you (or your favourite authority) are presenting anything other than an argument from ignorance.

DavidMcC wrote:

laklak wrote:... "qualia" ...

Not necessarily a word that dooms the article to the philosophy forum, but it does depend on your understanding of the word.

Really, David? The meaning of a word depends on your understanding of the meaning of the word? Who knew?!?!?

Cito di Pense wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

laklak wrote:... "qualia" ...

Not necessarily a word that dooms the article to the philosophy forum, but it does depend on your understanding of the word.

Really, David? The meaning of a word depends on your understanding of the meaning of the word? Who knew?!?!?

I know it may seem obvious, but some words allow different interpretations, while others do not.

DavidMcC wrote:

Cito di Pense wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

laklak wrote:... "qualia" ...

Not necessarily a word that dooms the article to the philosophy forum, but it does depend on your understanding of the word.

Really, David? The meaning of a word depends on your understanding of the meaning of the word? Who knew?!?!?

I know it may seem obvious, but some words allow different interpretations, while others do not.

And so what happens to your assertions if some of the words you use allow different interpretations? I know you can tell us what you meant to say, but so the fuck what? That's what you meant to say, and somebody else has found it wanting. Cry me a river. If you want to carry the day with your assertions, you're just going to have to try something where words don't allow different interpretations. FTL FTL FTL FTL. Interpret it however you like. It means Faulty Thermocouple Lead.

Cito di Pense wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

Cito di Pense wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:
Not necessarily a word that dooms the article to the philosophy forum, but it does depend on your understanding of the word.

Really, David? The meaning of a word depends on your understanding of the meaning of the word? Who knew?!?!?

I know it may seem obvious, but some words allow different interpretations, while others do not.

And so what happens to your assertions if some of the words you use allow different interpretations? I know you can tell us what you meant to say, but so the fuck what? That's what you meant to say, and somebody else has found it wanting. Cry me a river.

Major derail, from Cito, the MoD (Master of Derails)! Still, I expected nothing less in a thread with "Spoon" in the title!

If there's an opportunity to turn a thread into a word game, you can be sure that Cito will be there, like a shot!

Back on topic, what LB probably meant by "mental entity" is "non-corporeal being", in which case he is correct, because such entities cannot exist.

DavidMcC wrote:Back on topic, what LB probably meant by "mental entity" is "non-corporeal being", in which case he is correct, because such entities cannot exist.

No, that's not what I meant, although picking the right words is difficult. By entity I mean something that exists, in the sense Quine* meant when he said that to be is to be the value of a variable.

*Another philosopher in my topic that's been "misplaced" in the philosophy forum. Sorry about that.

logical bob wrote:No, that's not what I meant, although picking the right words is difficult.

My rule of thumb is to pick Old English and proto-Germanic words over Latin or French derivatives. Wiktionary is your friend.

logical bob wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:Back on topic, what LB probably meant by "mental entity" is "non-corporeal being", in which case he is correct, because such entities cannot exist.

No, that's not what I meant, although picking the right words is difficult. By entity I mean something that exists, in the sense Quine* meant when he said that to be is to be the value of a variable.

*Another philosopher in my topic that's been "misplaced" in the philosophy forum. Sorry about that.

To have a quantity associated, even if it's boolean, or to have a termination, if it's a string, and at least to have an address. The more I think about that, the more I get what you wrote about in the OP. The other stuff, not addressable, can be referenced all you like, if you like crashing and burning and dying and burning some more.