twistor59 wrote:Well I was just idly wondering whether the universe "is" just information

What is information, though? I was wondering whether it might be similar to what we mean by "structure" in maths. The point being that I wouldn't define what a structure is explicitly. The most I would ever say is, "things have the same structure when you can translate between them." Some folk call this "the way of abstraction." It's like an implicit definition. The most you'll get for an explicit definition is to say that a structure is an equivalence class under intertranslation.

AdS/CFT gives us the first hint that it may be possible to represent the whole damn thing in entirely different ways. And yes, there is a dictionary which allows you to translate between these two representations. Information is conserved under time evolution (whatever that is), this would somehow represent the integrity/stability/consistency of the universe. Dunno maybe just wibble.

It sounds cool. I can't fathom the article, and the wiki page asks for a clean-up job, so I assume I'm not expected to. In your last remark though, are you saying that conservation of information will be cashed out in different ways depending on the representation, like in terms of some other transformation?

Wibble from physicists is okay to me, by the way, especially if it might speak to the character of modern physics research, or be scoping out its possible future.

By the way I can't do category theory!

I can define a natural transformation, but I've no idea why anyone would want to. Some guy once told me that the whole point of category theory is to define the notion of "natural transformation", so I assume I'm screwed.

mangaroosh wrote:
A light signal reaching a distant observer is just an image of an event; indeed, the light hitting the retina of the observer is a separate event from the reflection event. It's like looking at a photograph and concluding that the scene, as represented in the photograph is still physically real, in a manner other than in the form of a photograph.

That's what I deny: that to see a distant planet or star, or generally to see an external object is to see a mental image of it.
Even if the moon suddenly ceased to exist before the light reflected from its surface reaches my eyes, what would be visually presented to me is the moon itself (as it was just before it ceased to exist) rather than a moon-image. Again, perception is not a form of imagination.

mangaroosh wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

mangaroosh wrote:But I can be described in terms of spacetime co-ordinates; that is, the number of events which make up "me" can be described in terms of spacetime co-ordinates, and we can speak about the simultaneity of those events using the shorthand "me".

... And that is why observers can see in a misleading light - they can get your simultaneity wrong.

but we can calculate the co-ordinates for all of the events and arrive at the conclusion that 50yr old me is simultaneous with the flashes in my rest frame, but not in the relatively moving frame, and hence I should have conflicting memories of the lightning events; unless the events in one of the reference frames are not valid. We don't need to rely on the questionable perception of any observer.

Again, you do not have any conflicting memories, because the only conflicts are between you as an observer and observers of your observing.

twistor59 wrote:
OK here's a diagram of your scenario:

Flashes.jpg

I claim that the event A enters the observer's (who is sitting at the origin drifting upwards in time) past at time tA, B at tB etc. This is according to the physics definition of past, i.e. the past is his past light cone.

You, however, would like to say that, actually, at, say, time t1 the three events are in his past. At time t1 I've drawn a horizontal blue line marking all the events at time t1. That's fine, the events are simultaneous and prior to t1 in his frame. But this information is unavailable to and can be of no consequence to him until a light signal reaches him. Causal influences must travel slower than light.

He has no way even of knowing, that those events are simultaneous in his frame, until the signals reach him. That's the first time he could ever possibly determine that they are simultaneous in his frame. (He might, for example, make this determination that they are simultaneous in his frame, because encoded in the light flash is a little signal giving the time, when the flash happened, of the clock which he had set up at that point in space, synchronized with his "at home" clock). But that's precisely the point at which they enter his past according to the physics definition of past.

So only the omniscient flying spaghetti monster could immediately know that those events are simultaneous in the observer's frame. Everybody else has to wait.

Thanks twistor, the graphic is certainly helpful.

Firstly, it is probably worth re-iterating the point that it isn't necessary for us to be able to know, or even determine, what specific events are simultaneous with our "now" to be able to deduce that those events which are - and there must be some that are - become our past, not when the light from them reaches us, but, for example at the line t1.

It seems that in the diagram you've provided that light from event A arrives at our retina at tA; at this point I presume that the scientific definition, at least, indicates that A enters our present at this time, but becomes our past at a time just after that. If that is the case, then there appears to be a fundamental issue, where the light signal from A is being confused with the event A itself. When the light from A reaches us, A doesn't enter our present at that moment, and become our past slightly after; the event of the light from A hitting our retina enters our present and it is that event which becomes our past, slightly after. To suggest that A enters our present (and then becomes our past) at tA (and slightly after) suggests that the light from the event A arrived at our retina instantaneously.


That we don't know which events are simultaneous is immaterial; we only need to know that there are simultaneous events and that light propagates at a finite speed to reason that spatially separated events, which are simultaneous with our "now" become our past before the light hits our retina, not at the moment it hits it.

Teuton wrote:That's what I deny: that to see a distant planet or star, or generally to see an external object is to see a mental image of it.
Even if the moon suddenly ceased to exist before the light reflected from its surface reaches my eyes, what would be visually presented to me is the moon itself (as it was just before it ceased to exist) rather than a moon-image. Again, perception is not a form of imagination.

As such, visual perception dictates that that be the case; visual perception is based on processing [to put it crudely] light signals to create a visual representation in the mind, or the brain, whatever you will; whatever we see is a mental representation of sensory stimuli; the only question is whether the mental image is an accurate representation of what is out there - it's basically just Kant's (is it?) noumena/phenomena question. But visual perception dictates that what we observe is a mental image.

When you see the moon, what happens is light that was reflected from the moon a while previously hits your retina now; if the moon suddenly ceased to exist then what hits your retina isn't the moon itself - as that would probably kill you - but light that was reflected; your brain processes the information that arrives in the form of that light and forms a mental image; but it isn't the moon as it is now, it is, at best, the moon as it was a while ago.

Light reflected from the moon is materially different from the celestial body which does the reflecting.

DavidMcC wrote:Again, you do not have any conflicting memories, because the only conflicts are between you as an observer and observers of your observing.

Then that implies that the event, as represented by the reference frame S', is less valid than the same event represented in S.

mangaroosh wrote:

Firstly, it is probably worth re-iterating the point that it isn't necessary for us to be able to know, or even determine, what specific events are simultaneous with our "now" to be able to deduce that those events which are - and there must be some that are - become our past, not when the light from them reaches us, but, for example at the line t1.

Have I understood correctly: your claim is that the observer can determine at time t1 that events A, B and C occurred at an earlier time than t1, i.e are in the observer's past at that time?

How can he do this?

mangaroosh wrote:
As such, visual perception dictates that that be the case; visual perception is based on processing [to put it crudely] light signals to create a visual representation in the mind, or the brain, whatever you will; whatever we see is a mental representation of sensory stimuli; the only question is whether the mental image is an accurate representation of what is out there - it's basically just Kant's (is it?) noumena/phenomena question. But visual perception dictates that what we observe is a mental image.
When you see the moon, what happens is light that was reflected from the moon a while previously hits your retina now; if the moon suddenly ceased to exist then what hits your retina isn't the moon itself - as that would probably kill you - but light that was reflected; your brain processes the information that arrives in the form of that light and forms a mental image; but it isn't the moon as it is now, it is, at best, the moon as it was a while ago.
Light reflected from the moon is materially different from the celestial body which does the reflecting.

Direct realists about perception do not claim that perception is causally direct but that it is cognitively direct in the sense that when I see an external object, I see the external object itself rather than a mental image of it.
There certainly are physical and neurophysiological intermediaries between the object seen and my seeing it. But this doesn't mean that the primary object of perception is not a mind-independent, nonmental object.

"In holding that external objects or events are immediate or direct objects of perception, Direct Realists deny that perception of these external objects or events must be mediated by a prior awareness of causal intermediaries in the causal series eventuating in perception. Even if, say, the photoisomerisation of rhodopsin photopigment molecules in one’s eyes is a nomically necessary intermediary event in one’s visual perception of external objects or events, it does not follow, on Direct Realism, that one must be aware of that event (or any other intermediary event or object) when one perceives external physical objects or events.
In this light, consider the following two claims:

(i) perception is indirect in the sense that it involves a series of causal intermediaries between the external object (or event) and the percipient;
and
(ii) perception is indirect in the sense of involving a prior awareness of something other than the external object (or event).

Claims (i) and (ii) thus distinguished, Direct Realists can argue that it does not follow from the fact that perception is indirect in the sense of (i) that it is indirect in the sense of (ii). What the Causal Argument establishes is only the causal indirectness of perception in the sense of (i), not the cognitive indirectness in the sense of (ii). Hence, this argument does not refute Direct Realists not committed to denying the indirectness of perception in the sense of (i). Thus, lest they fall prey to this argument, Direct Realists should be careful to distinguish between causal indirectness and cognitive indirectness."

(Le Morvan, Pierre. "Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them." American Philosophical Quarterly 41.3 (2004): 221-234: http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/DR_web.pdf)

"Science does not refute naive [direct] realism. To say that because we can give a causal account of how it comes about that we see the real world, it follows that we do not see the real world, is to commit a famous fallacy. It is called the genetic fallacy. ...
[T]he form of the genetic fallacy in the theory of perception goes as follows. We can show that when you apparently see your hand in front of your face, what is actually happening is that light reflected from the hand is causing you to have a visual experience, which you take to be a visual experience of your hand. Because we can explain why you think you are seeing a hand, we can show that you did not really see a hand in front of your face but only the visual experience, which was the effect of the neurobiological processes.
So stated, I hope it is obvious that this is a fallacy. The causal account of how I come to see my hand in front of my face does not show that I do not really see my hand in front of my face."

(Searle, John. Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 270-1)

Hi everybody, I'm new to this forum. I am quite impressed how mangaroosh defends block universe. I know how difficult a job that is!
I think it is a bit late to join the discussion, but I wanted do drop a line supporting mangaroosh. I understand what he writes and I agree with the meaning behind it. I see that even the tricky questions are not avoided: the meanig or interpretation of 'real' and 'exist'. And indeed that's part of the relativity physics. Let me summarize it as follows:

If -I repeat : IF- one calls the simultaneous events for one observer 'real' (whatever the definition), then you HAVE TO accept that similtaneous events for an observer moving relative to the other are also 'real'. If you call your 3D world (=simultaneous events) 'real' then my 3D world (simultaneous events), different of your 3D world because of our relative speed, is also 'real'.
This leads automatically to a 'real' block Universe.

Mangaroosh, I can do no better than your posts in trying to convey that 4D block insight.

VDam wrote:Hi everybody, I'm new to this forum. I am quite impressed how mangaroosh defends block universe. I know how difficult a job that is!
I think it is a bit late to join the discussion, but I wanted do drop a line supporting mangaroosh. I understand what he writes and I agree with the meaning behind it. I see that even the tricky questions are not avoided: the meanig or interpretation of 'real' and 'exist'. And indeed that's part of the relativity physics. Let me summarize it as follows:

If -I repeat : IF- one calls the simultaneous events for one observer 'real' (whatever the definition), then you HAVE TO accept that similtaneous events for an observer moving relative to the other are also 'real'. If you call your 3D world (=simultaneous events) 'real' then my 3D world (simultaneous events), different of your 3D world because of our relative speed, is also 'real'.
This leads automatically to a 'real' block Universe.

Mangaroosh, I can do no better than your posts in trying to convey that 4D block insight.

Welcome VDam

But I still don't see the problem. Minkowski space is a block universe in the sense that it's all layed out in one big manifold, and you can compute what any observer who lived in that spacetime would measure in any experiment. I don't see that as a problem.

VDam wrote:Hi everybody, I'm new to this forum. I am quite impressed how mangaroosh defends block universe. I know how difficult a job that is!

Given special relativity, it's not difficult.

mangaroosh wrote:

twistor59 wrote:
OK here's a diagram of your scenario:

Flashes.jpg

I claim that the event A enters the observer's (who is sitting at the origin drifting upwards in time) past at time tA, B at tB etc. This is according to the physics definition of past, i.e. the past is his past light cone.

You, however, would like to say that, actually, at, say, time t1 the three events are in his past. At time t1 I've drawn a horizontal blue line marking all the events at time t1. That's fine, the events are simultaneous and prior to t1 in his frame. But this information is unavailable to and can be of no consequence to him until a light signal reaches him. Causal influences must travel slower than light.

He has no way even of knowing, that those events are simultaneous in his frame, until the signals reach him. That's the first time he could ever possibly determine that they are simultaneous in his frame. (He might, for example, make this determination that they are simultaneous in his frame, because encoded in the light flash is a little signal giving the time, when the flash happened, of the clock which he had set up at that point in space, synchronized with his "at home" clock). But that's precisely the point at which they enter his past according to the physics definition of past.

So only the omniscient flying spaghetti monster could immediately know that those events are simultaneous in the observer's frame. Everybody else has to wait.

Thanks twistor, the graphic is certainly helpful.

Firstly, it is probably worth re-iterating the point that it isn't necessary for us to be able to know, or even determine, what specific events are simultaneous with our "now" to be able to deduce that those events which are - and there must be some that are - become our past, not when the light from them reaches us, but, for example at the line t1.

It seems that in the diagram you've provided that light from event A arrives at our retina at tA; at this point I presume that the scientific definition, at least, indicates that A enters our present at this time, but becomes our past at a time just after that. If that is the case, then there appears to be a fundamental issue, where the light signal from A is being confused with the event A itself. When the light from A reaches us, A doesn't enter our present at that moment, and become our past slightly after; the event of the light from A hitting our retina enters our present and it is that event which becomes our past, slightly after. To suggest that A enters our present (and then becomes our past) at tA (and slightly after) suggests that the light from the event A arrived at our retina instantaneously.

That we don't know which events are simultaneous is immaterial; we only need to know that there are simultaneous events and that light propagates at a finite speed to reason that spatially separated events, which are simultaneous with our "now" become our past before the light hits our retina, not at the moment it hits it.

Mangaroosh, I think there you hit the crux of the problem!
I hope it doesn't mean that some members in this thread are solipsists, i.e. they do not accept there is something 'out there'. The only existence (reality) to them is what happens in their brain. That's all. That's why they do not understand 'events, 'real' events 'existing' out there.
I have the impression that when Twister 95 draws his lightcones, the only event that is real is his own 'now' event (the intersecion of the past/future lightcones. No other events that are simultaneous to that now. Or indeed, even worse, events of his past lightcones are considered as 'now'/simultaneous! That's really an amazing statement.
Twister talks about events in 'his' past. As if the past is only those events that are in his lightcone, denying the existence of events outside the lightcone but in the past. Again, I hope I got it all wrong, but I took some time reading the thread over again and that's the impression I get. Correct me where I'm wrong. (I think the solipsists point of view comes form QM... But applying a solipsist view on Special Relativity is definitely not what Einstein/Minkowski had in mind!)

twistor59 wrote:Have I understood correctly: your claim is that the observer can determine at time t1 that events A, B and C occurred at an earlier time than t1, i.e are in the observer's past at that time?

How can he do this?

He can't determine that they are in his past, but we can reason that they must be.

mangaroosh wrote:

twistor59 wrote:Have I understood correctly: your claim is that the observer can determine at time t1 that events A, B and C occurred at an earlier time than t1, i.e are in the observer's past at that time?

How can he do this?

He can't determine that they are in his past, but we can reason that they must be.

Yes we can, but only because we have a God's eye view of the universe, which, in this case is Minkowski space.

The key point is that you couldn't use a fact like "A is in the past of t1" as an ingredient of any physical law, because it's completely arbitrary.

What I mean is that assigning times to events (events are real physical things like a flash of light, or an atom decaying) by using spatial slices like this:



then event A - a real physical event like a flash of light - lies to the past of time t1.

But if I assign times to events by using spatial slices like this:



then the same physical event A now lies to the future of t1. Note, although the lines are curved, this is still flat Minkowski space, not curved spacetime.

Physical laws can't be expressed in such a way that they depend on assigning time coordinates to remote events like we do in the first diagram, because the first diagram's assignment is entirely arbitrary, the second diagram's assignment is just as good. But then there is no distinction between past and future for these remote events (which lie outside dude's light cones). The only distinction would be for a godlike figure who had visibility of the whole of Minkowski space. And even then the disinction would depend on how he or she decided to set up the time coordinates. These coordinates are not physical.

That's why if you look at Einstein's early work he drones on and on about formulating physical laws in a manner that they behave in a nice controlled way when you change the coordinates.

Teuton wrote:Direct realists about perception do not claim that perception is causally direct but that it is cognitively direct in the sense that when I see an external object, I see the external object itself rather than a mental image of it.
There certainly are physical and neurophysiological intermediaries between the object seen and my seeing it. But this doesn't mean that the primary object of perception is not a mind-independent, nonmental object.

"In holding that external objects or events are immediate or direct objects of perception, Direct Realists deny that perception of these external objects or events must be mediated by a prior awareness of causal intermediaries in the causal series eventuating in perception. Even if, say, the photoisomerisation of rhodopsin photopigment molecules in one’s eyes is a nomically necessary intermediary event in one’s visual perception of external objects or events, it does not follow, on Direct Realism, that one must be aware of that event (or any other intermediary event or object) when one perceives external physical objects or events.
In this light, consider the following two claims:

(i) perception is indirect in the sense that it involves a series of causal intermediaries between the external object (or event) and the percipient;
and
(ii) perception is indirect in the sense of involving a prior awareness of something other than the external object (or event).

Claims (i) and (ii) thus distinguished, Direct Realists can argue that it does not follow from the fact that perception is indirect in the sense of (i) that it is indirect in the sense of (ii). What the Causal Argument establishes is only the causal indirectness of perception in the sense of (i), not the cognitive indirectness in the sense of (ii). Hence, this argument does not refute Direct Realists not committed to denying the indirectness of perception in the sense of (i). Thus, lest they fall prey to this argument, Direct Realists should be careful to distinguish between causal indirectness and cognitive indirectness."

(Le Morvan, Pierre. "Arguments Against Direct Realism and How to Counter Them." American Philosophical Quarterly 41.3 (2004): 221-234: http://www.tcnj.edu/~lemorvan/DR_web.pdf)

"Science does not refute naive [direct] realism. To say that because we can give a causal account of how it comes about that we see the real world, it follows that we do not see the real world, is to commit a famous fallacy. It is called the genetic fallacy. ...
[T]he form of the genetic fallacy in the theory of perception goes as follows. We can show that when you apparently see your hand in front of your face, what is actually happening is that light reflected from the hand is causing you to have a visual experience, which you take to be a visual experience of your hand. Because we can explain why you think you are seeing a hand, we can show that you did not really see a hand in front of your face but only the visual experience, which was the effect of the neurobiological processes.
So stated, I hope it is obvious that this is a fallacy. The causal account of how I come to see my hand in front of my face does not show that I do not really see my hand in front of my face."

(Searle, John. Mind: A Brief Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 270-1)

Apologies Teuton, I'm not sure I fully understand the argument, bcos I haven't given it my full consideration - only bcos it isn't a discussion I'm looking to get too far into at the moment.

I'll take the statement above, which seems to summarise the position: "when I see an external object, I see the external object itself rather than a mental image of it."

Here we have to make the distinction between the light reflected from an object, and the object itself; it's the reflected light that hits our retina and this information is processed by the brain. So, to an extent we don't see the object itself, rather light reflected from the object which is then processed by the brain; the question then becomes whether the sensory output is an accurate reflection of the output, and whether or not the input has been distorted in any way.

Does the fact that there is a vast spectrum of light that we don't see not somewhat invalidate the idea that we see the objects themselves?

twistor59 wrote:Yes we can, but only because we have a God's eye view of the universe, which, in this case is Minkowski space.

The key point is that you couldn't use a fact like "A is in the past of t1" as an ingredient of any physical law, because it's completely arbitrary.

What I mean is that assigning times to events (events are real physical things like a flash of light, or an atom decaying) by using spatial slices like this:

past.jpg

then event A - a real physical event like a flash of light - lies to the past of time t1.

But if I assign times to events by using spatial slices like this:

future.jpg

then the same physical event A now lies to the future of t1. Note, although the lines are curved, this is still flat Minkowski space, not curved spacetime.

Physical laws can't be expressed in such a way that they depend on assigning time coordinates to remote events like we do in the first diagram, because the first diagram's assignment is entirely arbitrary, the second diagram's assignment is just as good. But then there is no distinction between past and future for these remote events (which lie outside dude's light cones). The only distinction would be for a godlike figure who had visibility of the whole of Minkowski space. And even then the disinction would depend on how he or she decided to set up the time coordinates. These coordinates are not physical.

That's why if you look at Einstein's early work he drones on and on about formulating physical laws in a manner that they behave in a nice controlled way when you change the coordinates.

There is a fundamental issue when we talk about assigning time co-ordinates to events, because in doing so it forces us to take a philosophical position on the nature of time; that is, for those co-ordinates to be meaningful, we must take a certain position on the nature of time.

We can avoid that potential minefield, howerver, by not talking about time co-ordinates at all. Firstly, we can start off with the idea that all that exists in the universe is us; that is, for me, the universe consists only of me, or for you, the universe consists only of you. That might be a solipsist position, but it isn't one that we have to stick to. So, if the universe consists only of me - meaning that what I see as distant planets, galaxies etc. is just a figment of my imaginations - if I am the universe (for you, you are the universe and I don't exist) and I say "now", then, to all intents and purposes we don't have any problems with the idea of simultaneity of distant events. The present moment is all there is for us, and therefore all there is, so "now" is all that exists.

However, if we allow that the universe consists of more than just us, which I think is somewhat reasonable, then we are commited to the idea that there are parts of the universe which are spatially separated from us. If we allow that, in these spatially separated parts of the universe, events occur, then we can reasonably deduce that when we say "now" there are events which are simutlaneous with that in distant parts of the universe - the only other option is if there are no events spatially separated from us, or that no part of the universe exists which is spatially separated from us.

When we establish this fact, that there are spatially separated events which are simultaneous with our "now", we can proceed using the idea that light propagates at a finite speed. If there are events in the universe, which are spatially separated from us and which are simultaneous with our "now", and light propagates at a finite speed from those events, then we reason that when light from those events reach us, in what we would term "a now after the original", those events that were simultaneous with the original "now" must, by necessity, be in our past.

Causality
I think what you are successfully demonstrating is that an event cannot have a causal influence on our present, until light from that event reaches us, in our present; but the event that was the emission of the light, is a different, but connected, event from the event of the light reaching us. This is where the past light cone comes in, I think. But, events can be in our past even if they haven't had a causal influence on us yet; it just means they won't make up part of the sensory experience that we call the past.


The issue arises, I think, when we start trying to determine which events are simultaneous with our "now"; but we can reason that, by the time light from spatially separated events reaches us, the events from which they traveled must, by necessity be in our past; even if they hadn't had a causal influence yet.


That is one of the benefits of abstract reasoning, as you maybe allude to, that we can take a "gods eye view" of the universe.

twistor59 wrote:
But if I assign times to events by using spatial slices like this:

If,...
The point is that in this thread we discuss Einstein/Minkowski spacetime.So let's stick to that.
But I do not understand the point you try to make.
What would your slicessystem change to the meaning of Relativity of simultaneity and or Block universe?
You take a coordinate system and stick to it. For one observer (blue) the two events are simultaneous. For the other observer (green) those two events do not occur simultaneous. With your curved reference system there is still Block Universe. Like this:

VDam wrote:

twistor59 wrote:
But if I assign times to events by using spatial slices like this:

If,...
The point is that in this thread we discuss Einstein/Minkowski spacetime.So let's stick to that.

We are sticking to it. Minkowski space with a non rectilinear coordinate system is still Minkowski space. The metric is a geometric object that doesn't give a flying fuck for what coordinates we choose to represent it in.

VDam wrote:
But I do not understand the point you try to make.
What would your slicessystem change to the meaning of Relativity of simultaneity and or Block universe?
You take a coordinate system and stick to it. For one observer (blue) the two events are simultaneous. For the other observer (green) those two events do not occur simultaneous. With your curved reference system there is still Block Universe. Like this:

The point I'm trying to make is that the past/future distinction for events which are spacelike separated from an observer is not a physical one. It is an arbitrary one. This is beyond dispute.

mangaroosh wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:Again, you do not have any conflicting memories, because the only conflicts are between you as an observer and observers of your observing.

Then that implies that the event, as represented by the reference frame S', is less valid than the same event represented in S.

Again, it isn't individual events that are less valid in the other observer's frame, it's the CHAIN of events that can come out in a different way to the observer of the observer.
I won't say this again.

twistor59 wrote:

VDam wrote:

twistor59 wrote:
But if I assign times to events by using spatial slices like this:

If,...
The point is that in this thread we discuss Einstein/Minkowski spacetime.So let's stick to that.

We are sticking to it. Minkowski space with a non rectilinear coordinate system is still Minkowski space. The metric is a geometric object that doesn't give a flying fuck for what coordinates we choose to represent it in.

I'm new here, but I wonder whether this 'f**k' kind of language is appropriate on this forum. Please stay polite. Thanks.

VDam wrote:
But I do not understand the point you try to make.
What would your slicessystem change to the meaning of Relativity of simultaneity and or Block universe?
You take a coordinate system and stick to it. For one observer (blue) the two events are simultaneous. For the other observer (green) those two events do not occur simultaneous. With your curved reference system there is still Block Universe. Like this:

The point I'm trying to make is that the past/future distinction for events which are spacelike separated from an observer is not a physical one. It is an arbitrary one. This is beyond dispute.

The fact that a spacelike event is in your future or not (depending on the coordinate system you use) is irrelevant for refuting block universe (I thought this thread is about Block universe). Because If you choose one system, even your curved slices system, then the relativity of simultaneity tells you that block universe must exist. That's what i showed in my diagram.
So where is the problem?