CharlieM wrote:DavidMcC wrote:CharlieM wrote:According to my perception, the moon was moving across the landscape and keeping up with the bus. By the time I had added the concept of the solar system and planetary motion to my world picture, I did not see the moon in the same way. I stopped seeing it as moving across the landscape at a similar speed to the bus. I had added to my given picture of the world. But what I had added were concepts which were already part of reality in the first place.
Likewise when I see a pencil in a glass of water, I don't see a bent pencil, I see a straight pencil the image of which has been altered by the property of the water. I have added refraction of light to my concepts.
These are not percepts, they are concepts, so you got the right word the second time. What you got wrong on both occasions, however, was to confuse perceptions with cognition.
Well I don't want to get into the nitty gritty of word definitions, but I take your point that "moon" and "landscape" are concepts.
Those weren't the relevant "concepts". The apparent motion of the moon and lanscape were the relevant concepts.
But from this example I would hope that you could see where I was coming from. Now that I already have a concept of "moon" I cannot go back and experience what it was like to have the separate percepts without having the associated concept in my mind, but I can go back as a thought experiment and imagine a time prior to my forming these concepts. What I am trying to get at is that if we want to examine human cognition and knowledge then we should start at the beginning of the process of knowledge. And I would say that it begins by receiving information through the senses before any thinking activity sets about to understand these impressions.Do you argee with that?DavidMcC wrote: The "moving moon" and the "bent pencil" are the result of cognition based on incomplete information about the world/solar system that you perceive.
So you agree that gaining knowledge is a process of moving from a position of having inputs which are totally disconnected towards a unifying of all these unconnected sense inputs?
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I doubt that anyone could disagree with such an anodyne statement, tbh, apart from a possible issue with "totally disconnected".
Where is this going?