THWOTH wrote:

Made of Stars wrote:Re. Mike Adams' claims cited above: Any argument that starts with 'Everyone knows...' has already lost.

And everybody knows you can take that to the bank.

There are no absolutes!

Thommo wrote:

home_ wrote:

MarkS wrote:I'm sure this has been raised before - and correct me if I'm wrong, but surely any "upload" would simply be a copy - I would still have to die.

Maybe you could just redirect electricity from brain onto silicon chips, and the activity of the brain would just cease.

Redirect electricity?

If you "are" electric activity in your brain (and assuredly this isn't the case anyway, with chemical interactions forming a large part of the picture in addition), then redirecting electric activity from the brain (so that there is no longer electric activity in your brain) is still death, it's still the end of "you". The particular electrons are not the key element here.

It's not wetware that makes you "you", but software. If you move electricity from brain to silicon, it's still "you". Brain dies, but software lives.

home_ wrote:

Thommo wrote:

home_ wrote:

MarkS wrote:I'm sure this has been raised before - and correct me if I'm wrong, but surely any "upload" would simply be a copy - I would still have to die.

Maybe you could just redirect electricity from brain onto silicon chips, and the activity of the brain would just cease.

Redirect electricity?

If you "are" electric activity in your brain (and assuredly this isn't the case anyway, with chemical interactions forming a large part of the picture in addition), then redirecting electric activity from the brain (so that there is no longer electric activity in your brain) is still death, it's still the end of "you". The particular electrons are not the key element here.

It's not wetware that makes you "you", but software. If you move electricity from brain to silicon, it's still "you". Brain dies, but software lives.

Ehh, no. Your brain activity is electricity (and the particular electrons involved change over time, just like all the other particles in your body and brain) and chemical interactions. If you redirect a few electrons "you" is not moved.

I can redirect the electrons in a brain by pureeing it in a food blender and then hooking up each end of the resultant mush to a potential difference. This does not mean the unfortunate donor would live on as a food blender.

I think you guys are talking past each other and actually meaning the same thing. 'Moving' the pattern of electrical AND chemical activity (static and active) to a computer simulation would upload/transfer the stuff that makes up the mind.

home_ wrote:

Thommo wrote:

home_ wrote:

MarkS wrote:I'm sure this has been raised before - and correct me if I'm wrong, but surely any "upload" would simply be a copy - I would still have to die.

Maybe you could just redirect electricity from brain onto silicon chips, and the activity of the brain would just cease.

Redirect electricity?

If you "are" electric activity in your brain (and assuredly this isn't the case anyway, with chemical interactions forming a large part of the picture in addition), then redirecting electric activity from the brain (so that there is no longer electric activity in your brain) is still death, it's still the end of "you". The particular electrons are not the key element here.

It's not wetware that makes you "you", but software. If you move electricity from brain to silicon, it's still "you". Brain dies, but software lives.

It may "live" in a manner of speaking, but it would not be able to learn in the way that the "wet" original could,because learning involves forming new synaptic connections. It is not clear whether a silicon brain would be able to emulate that, as it is a function of biology.

kennyc wrote:I think you guys are talking past each other and actually meaning the same thing. 'Moving' the pattern of electrical AND chemical activity (static and active) to a computer simulation would upload/transfer the stuff that makes up the mind.

No, that wouldn't either. Although it's a bit more subtle.

Let's assume that "you" are your brain activity - that is to say a particular pattern of continuously occurring electrical and chemical activity within your skull. Now one thing we can say about the identity "you" is that it is always a continuation of this brain activity - the pattern may move in space, in a continuous fashion, as your head moves in space, which is to say that if you go from London to Paris your thoughts go with you via a continuous path connecting the two points in space (and time).

If you "move" your brain activity by some digital-like mechanism such as a 3d scanner and printer, or neural mapping then running a simulation, you break the essential continuity - there is no longer a persistent "you" at all points between the earlier activity in a brain (which is you) and the later activity in a computer (which some transhumanists want to call "you"). Breaking the continuity breaks the only claim with which we identify some atoms with some other atoms. It's not you.

It really doesn't help that some of these guys are distinguishing between the software and hardware of a programmable computer which humans don't have. We are more like a Babbage engine or analog computer - the program is the hardware.

Moving some of the brain's activity, e.g. Matrix style running humans as biological batteries does not mean that some "essence" of you goes off to inhabit some other physical object. Electrical current is just current, the charges in you are no different than the charges anywhere else.

Thommo wrote:

kennyc wrote:I think you guys are talking past each other and actually meaning the same thing. 'Moving' the pattern of electrical AND chemical activity (static and active) to a computer simulation would upload/transfer the stuff that makes up the mind.

No, that wouldn't either.

....

Of course it would. That's the whole point or what is being discussed.

kennyc wrote:

Thommo wrote:

kennyc wrote:I think you guys are talking past each other and actually meaning the same thing. 'Moving' the pattern of electrical AND chemical activity (static and active) to a computer simulation would upload/transfer the stuff that makes up the mind.

No, that wouldn't either.

....

Of course it would. That's the whole point or what is being discussed.

Yes, by religious fantasists.

Describing a human as "software" is wrong, we aren't software. Describing a copy as "a move" is wrong, they are different physical processes, with important conditions varying between them. Describing brain activity as "electricity" is wrong, only a small part of the system is electrical.

There might be ways in which a human brain could be replaced with technology, but "downloading" isn't one of them, copying isn't one of them and "moving electricity" isn't one of them. It's also clear that Kurzweil's programme for the next 30 years is patently ridiculous, relying on advances in computer hardware which have already failed to materialise. He could easily end up being wrong about computing power in 2045 by 15-20 orders of magnitude.

Tangentially related, blog post on

"THE INTRIGUING WEAKNESSES OF DEEP LEARNING AND DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS"

http://enfascination.com/weblog/archives/1172

Thommo wrote: Breaking the continuity breaks the only claim with which we identify some atoms with some other atoms. It's not you.

Ok, point taken. So we have to figure out how to transfer Babbage engine part by part onto silicon chips while its operating.

home_ wrote:

Thommo wrote: Breaking the continuity breaks the only claim with which we identify some atoms with some other atoms. It's not you.

Ok, point taken. So we have to figure out how to transfer Babbage engine part by part onto silicon chips while its operating.

Yeah, if you do that, you've got a much more interesting claim on your hands. You need to imagine a Theseus ship style 1 at a time replacement of neurons with C-neurons (some kind of digital replacement that serves the same function as the part you remove*), to justify the relevant continuity.

I suspect Kurzweil's estimate of 30 years before this can happen is very far from being correct. It may not ever be possible, I doubt I'll live long enough to find out, being over 30 already.

*Pretty sure Data did this to Geordie in a star trek TNG episode.

If "you" can be copied, moved, or otherwise separated from your meat suit then the dualists are correct. Souls all the way down?

laklak wrote:If "you" can be copied, moved, or otherwise separated from your meat suit then the dualists are correct. Souls all the way down?

I disagree. I can clone myself, but the 'me,' the consciousness, the sentient self that is the clone is not 'me' but a separate individual consciousness. Same with copying 'myself' into a digital form. If both the old and the new exist (i.e. the old one is not destroyed) then two separate entities exist with shared history/memories. Not unlike the genes I carry forward that came from countless ancestors. The self, the you, the consciousness (at least for me and dare I say most cognitive scientists) is not equivalent to the soul as defined by religion - a you that continues to exist beyond the physical after(before?) death.

Being able to identify, designate, even copy or move the brain patterns and processes that make up a mind does not provide evidence of dualism as defined by philosophers.

I think that's why he wrote "you".

Thommo wrote:I think that's why he wrote "you".

That still has nothing to do with souls or dualism.

The 'you' that exists at this instant is not the same 'you' that existed 5 minutes ago.

It would appear to denote subjective identity. If your subjective identity is entirely separate from your "meat suit", in that it can be moved, copied or otherwise separated, then yes, you would appear to affirm a form of substance dualism.

Thommo wrote:It would appear to denote subjective identity. If your subjective identity is entirely separate from your "meat suit", in that it can be moved, copied or otherwise separated, then yes, you would appear to affirm a form of substance dualism.

Wrong. There is no dualism, substance or otherwise.
That 'substance' shit is just more philosophical claptrap.

kennyc wrote:

Thommo wrote:It would appear to denote subjective identity. If your subjective identity is entirely separate from your "meat suit", in that it can be moved, copied or otherwise separated, then yes, you would appear to affirm a form of substance dualism.

Wrong. There is no dualism, substance or otherwise.
That 'substance' shit is just more philosophical claptrap.

Reason it out Kenny, the (alleged) fact that there is no dualism does not refute what Laklak said, in fact, I'm pretty sure he (and I) agrees. The important word in the quoted sentence is "if".

All of this speculation about transhumanism is philosophical claptrap.

Thommo wrote:

kennyc wrote:

Thommo wrote:It would appear to denote subjective identity. If your subjective identity is entirely separate from your "meat suit", in that it can be moved, copied or otherwise separated, then yes, you would appear to affirm a form of substance dualism.

Wrong. There is no dualism, substance or otherwise.
That 'substance' shit is just more philosophical claptrap.

Reason it out Kenny, the (alleged) fact that there is no dualism does not refute what Laklak said, in fact, I'm pretty sure he (and I) agrees. The important word in the quoted sentence is "if".

All of this speculation about transhumanism is philosophical claptrap.

I have. You though seem to have a misunderstanding of what mind and particularly consciousness is.