Oldskeptic wrote:I almost got into sun-tracking-plants as examples of awareness without consciousness or cognition but left off at the verge of it. Glad you brought it up. My next step would have been those little low profile machines that run around the house hoovering the floor while bumping into things and changing direction just like some ameba do. That idea came to me when Little Idiot asked "What would it mean to produce awareness in a machine and how would you go about doing it?" and I remembered Dawkins in The Ancestor's Tale mentioning a "primitive" worm that has only a "primitive" sense organ at the front end that serves only to turn what serves as a mouth at the front end in the direction of food.

The scientists still have no idea how to design a conscious machine or robot, which is not to say that doing so is impossible in principle.
By the way, the first brains (central nervous systems) developed in flatworms called planarians. My amateurish (and scientifically unconfirmed) conjecture is that elementary consciousness (in the form of primitive tactile sensations) developed soon after the development of brains.

Andrew4Handel wrote:

Teuton wrote:What is especially interesting is that we find (pre-experiential) tactile sensitivity already in plants. Although the merely physiological sensitivity of plants is not to be equated with the psychological sentience of animals, and there's no good reason to believe that plants have consciousness (I reject phytopsychism, the view that plants are subjects of consciousness/experience), that fact confirms that the preconditions of consciousness didn't fall from the sky, and that evolution is a continuous process.

I don't see how responding (mechanically) to stimuli is the same as having an internal sensation or a sensation.

I didn't say it is. Actually, I said it is not.

Andrew4Handel wrote:Two's organism interacting or reacting to each other doesn't imply anything beyond chemical reactions or physical forces.

This is true both of nonconscious organisms and of conscious ones, because the (inter)actions of the latter don't involve any non-physicochemical powers or forces either. There are no "spooky" spiritual powers or forces. Conscious organisms are physical systems just like nonconscious ones, which is of course not to say that consciousness doesn't make any important difference. You're right insofar as mere physiological sensitivity or reactivity doesn't entail psychological sentience.
It is highly astonishing to see what nonconscious organisms such as plants and even microorganisms are capable of doing, and what complex reactive and adaptive behaviour they display (without feeling a thing).

Andrew4Handel wrote:If an interaction occurs between to entities but neither has experience that is not protoconsciousness. If an animal or plants behaviour can be described sufficiently at the biochemical/physics level then there is no reason to attribute mental states to them.

Right. However, the concept of mentality is vague. Does having a mind entail having consciousness? Does it make sense to ascribe mental properties or states to never-conscious things? I don't think so. I think having a mind entails having consciousness, and having consciousness entails having a brain. So I don't think all animals have consciousness, since there are brainless animals such as jellyfish or sponges. My contention is that only animals with brains are properly regarded as bearers of mental properties.

I reject the concept of "protoconsciousness", because there's no logical room between consciousness and nonconsciousness. So protoconsciousness is either consciousness or nonconsciousness. It cannot be something in between.

Andrew4Handel wrote:It easy easy for humans to attribute mental states to various things wrongly. For instance a diagnosis tool for autism is to see whether someone has a theory of mind. Children with an active theory of mind will attribute mental-like states and intentions to simple moving shapes. For instance a small circle leaving a gap in square will be interpreted as someone leaving a room.
This means that we can claim that two chemicals or simple organisms recognise each other but we are anthropomorphising. Mentalistic terms are only appropriate in the presence of real mental states or as metaphors and analogies.

I agree, thinking that real(ly) mental properties or states are present only in animals with brains (central nervous systems).

aw gee Andrew ....you're special...

Teuton wrote:
I agree, thinking that real(ly) mental properties or states are present only in animals with brains (central nervous systems).

Doesn't this mean that it is simply the current state of the nervous system that entails consciousness and nothing to do with past configurations.

If a simpler configuration of the nervous system doesn't entail consciousness then I don't see the value in studying it as a guide to consciousness.

If simple organisms are conscious then that means a more complex nervous system is not the only source of consciousness.

Panpsychics and modern Substance dualists believe that consciousness is a fundamental property which seems to entail we need to explain fundamentals and not emergent properties or functions.

So it seems either we need to explain a fundamental property of a process of emergence.

Panpsychics? Really?

Andrew4Handel wrote:

Teuton wrote:I agree, thinking that real(ly) mental properties or states are present only in animals with brains (central nervous systems).

Doesn't this mean that it is simply the current state of the nervous system that entails consciousness and nothing to do with past configurations.
If a simpler configuration of the nervous system doesn't entail consciousness then I don't see the value in studying it as a guide to consciousness.
If simple organisms are conscious then that means a more complex nervous system is not the only source of consciousness.
Panpsychics and modern Substance dualists believe that consciousness is a fundamental property which seems to entail we need to explain fundamentals and not emergent properties or functions.
So it seems either we need to explain a fundamental property of a process of emergence.

During the course of the evolution of the nervous system, especially of the central nervous system (brain+spinal cord), different levels and forms of neural organization developed, with the level of consciousness being the latest and highest one. Lower levels such as the one of the autonomic nervous system are perfectly functional but subconscious. Its electrochemical mechanisms don't produce consciousness.

The very big scientific problem is to discover and identify that special level of neural organization in the brain whose electrochemical mechanisms are the direct producers or realizers of consciousness, and where the immediate transformation of objective neural signals into subjective experiences (sensations, emotions) takes place.

I find panpsychism utterly incredible, but I'm aware that (ontological) emergentism isn't unproblematic. I know that consciousness exists now and I do believe that there was a time when the universe was devoid of consciousness; so it must have come into being somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. So there is a sense in which it is properly called an emergent phenomenon. And the most plausible naturalistic and scientific assumption is that consciousness came into being in animal organisms and through the neural activity of their brains, even though we don't know how exactly or when exactly.

The crucial ontological question is whether the evolutionary emergence of conscious events/states involved or required the creation of a novel kind of natural properties which are nonphysical and physically irreducible, namely phenomenal properties aka qualia.
I doubt it did. I doubt that the production of phenomenal consciousness entails a mysterious production of hyper- or superphysical properties. Although the nature of qualia is still a highly contentious issue in the philosophy of mind, I'm strongly inclined to believe that they are not an ontologically novel type of properties—nonphysical appearance properties—but appearing physical properties of a pre-existing kind. Qua appearances, qualia are just apparent properties, and as such they are not real properties in addition to the physical or chemical properties of the brain or any other material object. So the natural emergence of consciousness doesn't entail any "magical", ontologically implausible emergence of nonphysical properties. I think you can have (a physicalistic) emergentism without an ontological property dualism.

Teuton wrote:

Andrew4Handel wrote:

Teuton wrote:I agree, thinking that real(ly) mental properties or states are present only in animals with brains (central nervous systems).

Doesn't this mean that it is simply the current state of the nervous system that entails consciousness and nothing to do with past configurations.
If a simpler configuration of the nervous system doesn't entail consciousness then I don't see the value in studying it as a guide to consciousness.
If simple organisms are conscious then that means a more complex nervous system is not the only source of consciousness.
Panpsychics and modern Substance dualists believe that consciousness is a fundamental property which seems to entail we need to explain fundamentals and not emergent properties or functions.
So it seems either we need to explain a fundamental property of a process of emergence.

During the course of the evolution of the nervous system, especially of the central nervous system (brain+spinal cord), different levels and forms of neural organization developed, with the level of consciousness being the latest and highest one. Lower levels such as the one of the autonomic nervous system are perfectly functional but subconscious. Its electrochemical mechanisms don't produce consciousness.

The very big scientific problem is to discover and identify that special level of neural organization in the brain whose electrochemical mechanisms are the direct producers or realizers of consciousness, and where the immediate transformation of objective neural signals into subjective experiences (sensations, emotions) takes place.

I find panpsychism utterly incredible, but I'm aware that (ontological) emergentism isn't unproblematic. I know that consciousness exists now and I do believe that there was a time when the universe was devoid of consciousness; so it must have come into being somehow, somewhere, and somewhen. So there is a sense in which it is properly called an emergent phenomenon. And the most plausible naturalistic and scientific assumption is that consciousness came into being in animal organisms and through the neural activity of their brains, even though we don't know how exactly or when exactly.

The crucial ontological question is whether the evolutionary emergence of conscious events/states involved or required the creation of a novel kind of natural properties which are nonphysical and physically irreducible, namely phenomenal properties aka qualia.
I doubt it did. I doubt that the production of phenomenal consciousness entails a mysterious production of hyper- or superphysical properties. Although the nature of qualia is still a highly contentious issue in the philosophy of mind, I'm strongly inclined to believe that they are not an ontologically novel type of properties—nonphysical appearance properties—but appearing physical properties of a pre-existing kind. Qua appearances, qualia are just apparent properties, and as such they are not real properties in addition to the physical or chemical properties of the brain or any other material object. So the natural emergence of consciousness doesn't entail any "magical", ontologically implausible emergence of nonphysical properties. I think you can have (a physicalistic) emergentism without an ontological property dualism.

Question form the cheap seats, wouldn't (a physicalistic) emergentism HAVE to be without an ontological property dualism because physicalism is a monist position?

another one too;
wouldnt the answer to this question;
The crucial ontological question is whether the evolutionary emergence of conscious events/states involved or required the creation of a novel kind of natural properties which are nonphysical and physically irreducible, namely phenomenal properties aka qualia.
be 'yes it must involve qualia'
because 'qualia' referes to 'what its like' and you dont get a 'conscious events/states involved' without it being a 'what its like' - assuming you are working from unconscious central nervous system (the worms or plants etc) to a conscious central nervous system (like us)

Little Idiot wrote:Question form the cheap seats, wouldn't (a physicalistic) emergentism HAVE to be without an ontological property dualism because physicalism is a monist position?

Nonreductive/emergent physicalism combines substance monism with property dualism. Whether this is physicalism enough is debatable. Many think that nonreductive physicalism is pseudophysicalism, because "true" physicalism is either eliminative or reductive, and both substance-monistic and property-monistic.

Little Idiot wrote:another one too; wouldnt the answer to this question;

"The crucial ontological question is whether the evolutionary emergence of conscious events/states involved or required the creation of a novel kind of natural properties which are nonphysical and physically irreducible, namely phenomenal properties aka qualia."

be 'yes it must involve qualia'
because 'qualia' referes to 'what its like' and you dont get a 'conscious events/states involved' without it being a 'what its like' - assuming you are working from unconscious central nervous system (the worms or plants etc) to a conscious central nervous system (like us)

Well, that's the big problem with reductive physicalism, which has been accused by its opponents of not really being different from eliminative physicalism. If conscious states are real and identical with neural states, there is still a real difference between conscious neural states and nonconscious neural states. What makes the difference? Many answer: the former involve real and irreducible qualia and the latter don't. But that's the answer reductive physicalists cannot give!

Teuton wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Question form the cheap seats, wouldn't (a physicalistic) emergentism HAVE to be without an ontological property dualism because physicalism is a monist position?

Nonreductive/emergent physicalism combines substance monism with property dualism. Whether this is physicalism enough is debatable. Many think that nonreductive physicalism is pseudophysicalism, because "true" physicalism is either eliminative or reductive, and both substance-monistic and property-monistic.

Great answer, thats why I like your stuff Teuton. Its a lot like having an AI operated google, kind of 'I think think you'll find that what you are looking for is this...'
If I recall you hold the position of Nonreductive/emergent physicalism, one against which its quite hard to argue (other than attacking it as being a kind of dualism, to which the response is 'yeah, so?').

Remind me briefly if you can, what exactly does property dualism allow you to say about qualia? (struggle with remembering long words, seriously)
Is it (words to the effect) that mental states emerge as a result of physical properties, but are essentially different to those physical properties (i.e. not physical)?

Little Idiot wrote:another one too; wouldnt the answer to this question;

"The crucial ontological question is whether the evolutionary emergence of conscious events/states involved or required the creation of a novel kind of natural properties which are nonphysical and physically irreducible, namely phenomenal properties aka qualia."

be 'yes it must involve qualia'
because 'qualia' referes to 'what its like' and you dont get a 'conscious events/states involved' without it being a 'what its like' - assuming you are working from unconscious central nervous system (the worms or plants etc) to a conscious central nervous system (like us)

Well, that's the big problem with reductive physicalism, which has been accused by its opponents of not really being different from eliminative physicalism. If conscious states are real and identical with neural states, there is still a real difference between conscious neural states and nonconscious neural states. What makes the difference? Many answer: the former involve real and irreducible qualia and the latter don't. But that's the answer reductive physicalists cannot give!

yeah, they (reductive & eliminative physicalists) would seem stuck there. I guess the'd be forced to say there is no such thing as a non-conscious neural state. I'm not a physicalist, so tolerate me and point it out if I'm building strawmen
Can you supply a clear example of a 'non-conscious neural state'?

Nice video Mike_L.

Would I be correct to think you are showing for example 'driving without attention on the task' as an example of a non-conscious neural state?

Little Idiot wrote:Nice video Mike_L.

Would I be correct to think you are showing for example 'driving without attention on the task' as an example of a non-conscious neural state?

Yes, I think that fits the bill.

Related...

Alan Baddeley on Working Memory and Consciousness





But this is also of interest...

Working memory without consciousness

Excellent work, thank you.

from the last one,

Our findings challenge the currently held view that working memory processes are contingent on conscious awareness.

does this mean current views are; if we know it, then we know that we know it
their findings suggest; we can know it, but not know that we know it

Perhaps. But it might simply be along the lines of...

Consciousness is a product of working memory (Baddeley)...

At the heart of a consciousness mechanism lies a capacity for the temporary storage and manipulation of information, which is the hallmark of working memory. (Link)

...but not all working memory involves conscious awareness (Soto et al).

I'm not sure, though, that the latter necessarily contradicts the former.

Is consciousness more than just a product of working memory?
As one who holds the view that consciousness arises in the brain, I'm inclined to say no... or... If it involves more than just working memory, then the "more" can nevertheless also be explained in terms of neurology.

Its great to see that the neuroscience models are coming along so well.
Thanks for pulling the pieces together with the links and clips too.

How 'mainstream' is the Matt Faw video? is that 'far out on a limb' or nothing too radical?

As one who doesn't believe consciousness arises in the brain, I'm going to ask is that about the end of the neuroscience model? is it complete yet. The first video shows how the brain projects (in my idealism I say it externalizes) its internal content and then experiences it as-if its a physical external environment (the holodeck idea). This is exactly what I suggest happens.

Confusing your perception of what the brain is doing =/= conciousness happening outside of the brain.

From Matt Faw on Vimeo...

Matt Faw is a filmmaker who is fascinated by science topics like consciousness, the body, evolution and cosmology. He is currently producing an independent documentary on the emerging science of consciousness.

Making extensive use of analogy (e.g. likening the hippocampus to a holodeck), he's basically putting into layman's terms what scientific investigation of consciousness has thusfar revealed.

Little Idiot wrote:As one who doesn't believe consciousness arises in the brain, I'm going to ask is that about the end of the neuroscience model? is it complete yet.

It's a matter of conjecture as to whether or not the neuroscience model will ever be complete. For that matter, one can debate what exactly constitutes a "complete" model.
Similar ideas have been / are being explored on this page of the "Justified True Belief" thread. Logical_bob (post #94) and Calilasseia (post #96) address the topic very well.
As it pertains to the neuroscience model of consciousness, I would say that the model, notwithstanding current limitations, is sufficiently compelling to stand on its own. In short: consciousness is a product of brain function.

Little Idiot wrote:The first video shows how the brain projects (in my idealism I say it externalizes) its internal content and then experiences it as-if its a physical external environment (the holodeck idea). This is exactly what I suggest happens.

I think that works as an analogy to explain the role of working memory in consciousness. However, I don't think that it undermines the basic thesis that consciousness is a product of brain function.

Sendraks wrote:Confusing your perception of what the brain is doing =/= conciousness happening outside of the brain.

Says it more elegantly than I ever could!

Sendraks wrote:Confusing your perception of what the brain is doing =/= conciousness happening outside of the brain.

Fair enough.

As your belief, or ones belief that consciousness originates in the brain =/= scientific evidence that consciousness originates in the brain

IMO this 'does consciouness originate in the brain' is actually an oversimplification of the issue. Its based on not defining terms, just like say 'does a tree falling unobserved in the forest make a sound' is a problem of definitions more than trees and sound.

What I actually will never agree to is that awareness is a product of the brain.

If consciousness is self-aware-ness then I have no issue in that originating in the brain. I think thats as near as science can get. When Neuroscience can explain that, IMO thats as far as it can go - leaving the issue of awareness as not in the brain.

But I'm just a crazy idealist, what do I know about the limits of neuroscience