Got me thinking about whether or not there were ANY ideas in Rodney's head. We always assumed so but where was the evidence? He would stagger into a pit party from the woods and seize upon some innocent fourteen year-old and then proceed in a straight line, knocking aside his 'friends' as he ravenously pursued her. Vacant eyes, evil skull-like grin, lack of coordination. Hunger!

...Fuck

R-zombie

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:
Right. Berkeley doesn't deny what everyone knows exists. But then he goes on from there and tries to say something further about how these things are caused or just 'how they are'.

Right. Berkeleyan idealists and physical realists don't disagree on the existence of trees but on their ontic nature.

And then there is I, who disagree that ontic nature or true nature has any fixed meaning at all.

Asking after ontic nature is like asking about the attitude of the weather.

Think over post 199 Teuton. I think it's important.

SpeedOfSound wrote:or maybe not
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/

Berkeley presents here the following argument (see Winkler 1989, 138):

(1) We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.).

(2) We perceive only ideas.

Therefore,

(3) Ordinary objects are ideas.

LI, this sounds exactly like your argument the last time I talked to you. Wasn't a number 2 that we never agree upon?

What's missing here is the distinction between mediate and immediate objects of perception. Even if mental ideas are our immediate objects of perception it doesn't follow that external, material objects as mediate objects of perception are themselves (collections of) ideas.

A representative theory of perception is compatible with physical realism:

"In this book I argue that the correct philosophical theory of perception is a representative one. By such a theory, I mean one which holds

(i) that the immediate objects of (visual) perception are always mental;
(ii) that there are objects, variously called external, material or physical, which are independent of the existence of sentient creatures;
(iii) that these objects have only the primary qualities;
and
(iv) to (visually) perceive a material object is to be in a certain kind of perceptual state as a causal result of the action of that object.

(The restriction to visual perception - seeing - is to be understood throughout.)
With the exception of clause (ii), these clauses are defended in the chapters that follow. Clause (ii) is, however, an assumption. I assume, that is, that Idealism (Phenomenalism) is false. I take it that we are a very small part of a universe that existed millions of years before we did and will exist millions of years after we have gone."

(Jackson, Frank. Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. p. 1)

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:or maybe not
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/

Berkeley presents here the following argument (see Winkler 1989, 138):

(1) We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.).

(2) We perceive only ideas.

Therefore,

(3) Ordinary objects are ideas.

LI, this sounds exactly like your argument the last time I talked to you. Wasn't a number 2 that we never agree upon?

What's missing here is the distinction between mediate and immediate objects of perception. Even if mental ideas are our immediate objects of perception it doesn't follow that external, material objects as mediate objects of perception are themselves (collections of) ideas.

A representative theory of perception is compatible with physical realism:

"In this book I argue that the correct philosophical theory of perception is a representative one. By such a theory, I mean one which holds

(i) that the immediate objects of (visual) perception are always mental;
(ii) that there are objects, variously called external, material or physical, which are independent of the existence of sentient creatures;
(iii) that these objects have only the primary qualities;
and
(iv) to (visually) perceive a material object is to be in a certain kind of perceptual state as a causal result of the action of that object.

(The restriction to visual perception - seeing - is to be understood throughout.)
With the exception of clause (ii), these clauses are defended in the chapters that follow. Clause (ii) is, however, an assumption. I assume, that is, that Idealism (Phenomenalism) is false. I take it that we are a very small part of a universe that existed millions of years before we did and will exist millions of years after we have gone."

(Jackson, Frank. Perception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. p. 1)

I think this line of countering introduces new problems. I need to think it through again before commenting further.

I take a different attack on premise 2 and claim that to say 'we perceive ideas or thoughts' is an automatic introduction of dualismwhere it's ugly little head is not required. It makes no sense to say we perceive ideas.

We perceive.

This in itself is a glob of concepts and constructs but it says simply that I am a critter who perceives. Without trying to say I am in addition a mind that perceives some mediate thing.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
"Are there fictional superheroes without supernatural powers?" – "Yes, Batman, for example."

If you instead said "fictional superheroes without supernatural powers exist" you can see that things have taken a very slight turn.

Is there an intelligible semantic difference between being there and existing? I don't think so.

"If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. Existence is not some special distinction that befalls some of the things there are. Existence just means being one of the things there are, nothing else."

(Lewis, David. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. pp. 80-1)

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
"Are there fictional superheroes without supernatural powers?" – "Yes, Batman, for example."

If you instead said "fictional superheroes without supernatural powers exist" you can see that things have taken a very slight turn.

Is there an intelligible semantic difference between being there and existing? I don't think so.

"If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. Existence is not some special distinction that befalls some of the things there are. Existence just means being one of the things there are, nothing else."

(Lewis, David. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. pp. 80-1)

That is what I am trying to say in the exist discussion to be sure. I like this.

However, there IS a semantic difference between being there and existing and it is not in the language itself, lifted out of the situation, it's in the situation.

When you prepend the word 'fictional' you cause a mode that significantly alters anything you say next.

But that doesn't exactly address what you said on my second reading of this. See next.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
Right. Berkeleyan idealists and physical realists don't disagree on the existence of trees but on their ontic nature.

And then there is I, who disagree that ontic nature or true nature has any fixed meaning at all.

Are trees physically irreducible or mentally reducible entities? This is not a meaningless question, is it?

I think the word exist being substituted for 'being there' has a subtle influence, a nudge, in the direction of the more general.

Could be that I am paranoid about arguments slipping one in there by talking about 'fictional existence'.

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
Right. Berkeleyan idealists and physical realists don't disagree on the existence of trees but on their ontic nature.

And then there is I, who disagree that ontic nature or true nature has any fixed meaning at all.

Are trees physically irreducible or mentally reducible entities? This is not a meaningless question, is it?

I think it is the very heart of meaningless.

To show how meaningless this is it might be good to merge the discussion about strange ideas existing in Rodney's head with ideas about representation and perceiving ideas.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
Is there an intelligible semantic difference between being there and existing? I don't think so.

"If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. Existence is not some special distinction that befalls some of the things there are. Existence just means being one of the things there are, nothing else."
(Lewis, David. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. pp. 80-1)

That is what I am trying to say in the exist discussion to be sure. I like this.

However, there IS a semantic difference between being there and existing and it is not in the language itself, lifted out of the situation, it's in the situation.

When you prepend the word 'fictional' you cause a mode that significantly alters anything you say next.

Right. But to use "to exist" or "to be there" in a fictional context is not to change its meaning but to implicitly or tacitly add "not really, you know", i.e. to pragmatically presuppose a socially shared context-dependent understanding that is not ontologically committing in the philosophical sense.

"There are prefixes or prefaces (explicit or implicit) that rob all that comes after of assertoric force. They disown or cancel what follows, no matter what that may be. Once the assertoric force is cancelled, no amount of tub-thumping will regain it. If you’ve disowned what follows, it doesn’t matter whether you then say just that eating people is wrong, or whether you say it’s true in the most robustly realist sense imaginable that eating people is wrong,
or whether you say the wrongness of eating people is built into the very fabric of mind-independent reality—whichever you say, it comes pre-cancelled.
Here are some examples of disowning prefixes and prefaces.

(1) According to the pack of lies my opponent has told you. . . .
(2) I shall say much that I do not believe, starting now.
(3) According to the Sherlock Holmes stories. . . .
(4) What follows is true according to the Holmes stories.
(5) Let’s make believe the Holmes stories are true, though they aren’t.

I classify (1), (3), and (4) as prefixes, (2) and (5) as prefaces. (So in view of (4), the distinction I’m drawing is not between complete sentences and mere phrases.) When the assertoric force of what follows is cancelled by a prefix, straightway some other assertion takes its place: an assertion, as it might be, about what my opponent’s lies or the Holmes stories say or imply. Not so for prefaces. In the case of (5), a replacement is at least suggested, but it is not yet asserted. In the case of (2), no replacement assertion is even suggested."

(Lewis, David. "Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism." In Fictionalism in Metaphysics, edited by Mark Eli Kalderon, 314-321. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 315)

SpeedOfSound wrote:I think the word exist being substituted for 'being there' has a subtle influence, a nudge, in the direction of the more general.

We do have and use an absolute concept of existence: to exist simpliciter (i.e. considered absolutely or without qualification). To exist simpliciter is to be part of reality.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Could be that I am paranoid about arguments slipping one in there by talking about 'fictional existence'.

Fictional existence is like fool's gold or bogus money.

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
Is there an intelligible semantic difference between being there and existing? I don't think so.

"If you say there is something that exists to a diminished degree, once you've said 'there is' your game is up. Existence is not some special distinction that befalls some of the things there are. Existence just means being one of the things there are, nothing else."
(Lewis, David. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. pp. 80-1)

That is what I am trying to say in the exist discussion to be sure. I like this.

However, there IS a semantic difference between being there and existing and it is not in the language itself, lifted out of the situation, it's in the situation.

When you prepend the word 'fictional' you cause a mode that significantly alters anything you say next.

Right. But to use "to exist" or "to be there" in a fictional context is not to change its meaning but to implicitly or tacitly add "not really, you know", i.e. to pragmatically presuppose a socially shared context-dependent understanding that is not ontologically committing in the philosophical sense.

"There are prefixes or prefaces (explicit or implicit) that rob all that comes after of assertoric force. They disown or cancel what follows, no matter what that may be. Once the assertoric force is cancelled, no amount of tub-thumping will regain it. If you’ve disowned what follows, it doesn’t matter whether you then say just that eating people is wrong, or whether you say it’s true in the most robustly realist sense imaginable that eating people is wrong,
or whether you say the wrongness of eating people is built into the very fabric of mind-independent reality—whichever you say, it comes pre-cancelled.
Here are some examples of disowning prefixes and prefaces.

(1) According to the pack of lies my opponent has told you. . . .
(2) I shall say much that I do not believe, starting now.
(3) According to the Sherlock Holmes stories. . . .
(4) What follows is true according to the Holmes stories.
(5) Let’s make believe the Holmes stories are true, though they aren’t.

I classify (1), (3), and (4) as prefixes, (2) and (5) as prefaces. (So in view of (4), the distinction I’m drawing is not between complete sentences and mere phrases.) When the assertoric force of what follows is cancelled by a prefix, straightway some other assertion takes its place: an assertion, as it might be, about what my opponent’s lies or the Holmes stories say or imply. Not so for prefaces. In the case of (5), a replacement is at least suggested, but it is not yet asserted. In the case of (2), no replacement assertion is even suggested."

(Lewis, David. "Quasi-Realism is Fictionalism." In Fictionalism in Metaphysics, edited by Mark Eli Kalderon, 314-321. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 315)

Very nice. Hence, to offer such a discussion and then chop out the word exist and try to apply it to our standing together and seeing a tree, also is cancelled by the prefix.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
Are trees physically irreducible or mentally reducible entities? This is not a meaningless question, is it?

I think it is the very heart of meaningless.

Is the mental-physical distinction meaningless to you?

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:I think the word exist being substituted for 'being there' has a subtle influence, a nudge, in the direction of the more general.

We do have and use an absolute concept of existence: to exist simpliciter (i.e. considered absolutely or without qualification). To exist simpliciter is to be part of reality.

SpeedOfSound wrote:Could be that I am paranoid about arguments slipping one in there by talking about 'fictional existence'.

Fictional existence is like fool's gold or bogus money.

What agreed with in your first Lewis quote is precisely that we do not and probably cannot use an absolute concept of existence: to exist simpliciter.

We must always qualify it before chopping it out as a property.

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Teuton wrote:
Are trees physically irreducible or mentally reducible entities? This is not a meaningless question, is it?

I think it is the very heart of meaningless.

Is the mental-physical distinction meaningless to you?

Yes. Completely. Vehemently.

"On Carnap’s view, questions about existence always involve linguistic frameworks: for example, the framework of mathematics, the framework of propositions, or the framework of commonsense objects. There are then two sorts of existence questions.

Internal questions are those posed within a framework, concerning the existence of certain specific entities within the framework. Examples include ‘Are there any odd perfect numbers?’ asked by a mathematician, and ‘Is there an apple on the table?’ asked by a child. Internal claims are answers to internal questions. On Carnap’s view, internal claims are typically true or false. In some cases, such as mathematics, they will be analytically true or false, with their truth-value determined wholly by the rules of the framework. In other cases, such as claims concerning ordinary objects, they will be empirically true or false, with their truth or falsity determined by the rules of the framework in conjunction with experience and perhaps with other aspects of the world.

External questions are those posed outside a given framework, concern the existence of the framework’s system of entities as a whole. Examples include ‘Do numbers exist?’ or ‘Do ordinary physical objects exist?’ asked from a purported neutral perspective. External claims are answers to external questions. On Carnap’s view, external claims are neither true nor false. For Carnap, the choice between frameworks is practical rather than factual. Any purported factual question about which framework is the ‘correct’ one is held to be a pseudoquestion, without cognitive content.

Even if one does not accept Carnap’s claims about the properties of internal and external questions, there is something natural about the distinction itself. The distinction between internal and external questions seems to reflect a distinction in our practice of raising questions about existence, if nothing else. At the same time, Carnap’s terminology is suboptimal. For a start, the terminology of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ is too closely tied to Carnap’s theoretical apparatus involving frameworks to serve as a neutral starting point. If one rejects the idea of a framework, or of a question being internal to a framework, one will reject this version of the distinction. If possible, it is desirable to draw a relatively pretheoretical version of the distinction that almost anyone can accept, regardless of their theoretical inclinations.

In addition, ‘internal question’ and ‘external question’ may suggest two different sorts of sentence, whereas I think the most important distinction is between different uses of sentence (or perhaps, between different evaluations of sentences). For example, a sentence such as ‘Do prime numbers exist?’ might be used to pose an internal question (by a mathematician, say) or to pose an external question (by a metaphysician, say). The same goes in principle for sentences such as ‘Numbers exist’ and ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten.’

Instead, I will distinguish between two different sorts of existence assertions: ordinary and ontological existence assertions. Here an assertion is an utterance of an assertive sentence. An existence assertion is an utterance of a sentence that appears to assert or deny the existence of certain entities: for example, ‘Xs exist,’ ‘There are Ys,’ ‘There are no Zs.’ One can also straightforwardly extend the distinction to sentences that appear to involve universal quantification, and to sentences in which apparently quantified claims are embedded. For the purposes of this definition, sentences are individuated by surface structure. So it is compatible with the definition that ontological and ordinary assertions of the same sentence may have the same surface structure while differing in deep structure (perhaps involving a difference in covert variables, operators, and the like).

An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table.’

An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount. For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object that is their mereological sum.’

We can think of ontological existence assertions as those made inside the ‘ontology room’, and ordinary existence assertion as those made outside the ontology room. At the very least, there is a clear pragmatic difference between these two sorts of assertion. For example, given an ontological assertion of ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers,’ it is appropriate to respond ‘No, there aren’t, because if numbers exist, they are abstract objects, and there are no abstract objects.’ But given an ordinary assertion of ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers,’ it is not appropriate to respond in this way.

Correspondingly, it is natural to hold that ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness. The correctness of ontological existence assertions is sensitive to ontological matters, and indeed is obviously sensitive in this way. The correctness of ordinary existence assertions is insensitive to ontological matters, or at least is not obviously so sensitive. For example, the correctness of an ordinary assertion of ‘There are prime numbers’ is insensitive to whether Platonism or nominalism is true. Even if nominalism is true, so that strictly speaking there are no numbers, an ordinary mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are infinitely many prime numbers’ is correct. (Note that correctness need not be the same thing as truth.) Likewise, the correctness of an ordinary assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’ is insensitive to the truth or falsity of nihilism. Even if nihilism is true, so that strictly speaking there are no macroscopic objects, an ordinary drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’ may be correct.

By contrast, the correctness of an ontological assertion of ‘There are prime numbers’ is sensitive to whether Platonism or nominalism is true. If nominalism is true, a metaphysician’s utterance of this sentence is incorrect. Likewise, the correctness of an ontological assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’ is sensitive to whether nihilism is true or false. If nihilism is true, then a metaphysician’s assertion of this sentence is incorrect."

(Chalmers, David J. "Ontological Anti-Realism." In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 77-129. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pp. 80-2)

Mental is a construct that we use in everyday human discourse to make sense of, abbreviate in fact, discussions about things like 'strange ideas in Rodney's mind" back when he was alive. If we take this idea any further gibberish is the result.

Now I remember a person who behaved in certain ways, said certain things. I project a mind, as I imagine mine, onto him, back then, and I explain his behavior with the HUGE assumption that some idea was in his 'head'.

This is human ape 1.0. We cannot take that version 1.0 theory of mind and try to reify it in any other way. Such as with representation. Deify, that would be.

Teuton wrote:
(Chalmers, David J. "Ontological Anti-Realism." In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 77-129. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. pp. 80-2)

I'll print that and take it to my desk. A little time. I am reading Barwise and Etchemendy now, Obvious from my use of the word situation. I often take on like a chameleon what I am reading. They make much reference to Carnap, which of course is dusting on my bookshelf.