SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Ok, then if I may pass on the side, skip the starter and head straight into the main - isnt it simply a case of the word existence being context specific?

If I say 'Peter Pan can fly, but Captain Hook cant' I mean they exist with constant characteristics in the context of the story.
So, then in the context of that story, a child would be quite correct (and only in that context) if I started talking about Captain Hook flying. At least I'd have to justify how and why he could do so - where as no need to justify myself if it was Peter Pan flying.

If I say the integer '3' exists, then this is different to saying the integer 3.1 exists, as 3.1 is obviously not an integer.
I dont mean I can get a sack of 3 and bring it home.
Context specific.

If I say trees exist, the context is general, if I say the mango tree in my back garden, I am being specific about an instance of a tree - context specific.

I might say that Peter Pan does not exist and pretty much get agreement from everybody. For the same reasons that pretty much everyone agrees that birds exist.

You can say Peter Pan doesnt exist, and I'd agree - we'd be talking about physically existing in the way birds and trees do exist.

But when I say PP does exist in the story, do you agree or not?

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Based on this, you cant give a definition of the word exist without relating a context for the word. Changing the context changes the 'definition' of the word because its a context specific word, like many others.
But that doesn't mean we cant use it - in general or philosophy - just gotta be careful and clear about our context.

I would it call it the situation or usage rather than context. Context doesn't quite cover it. It has some affect on the truth value of the statement.

As for a definition of course we can do that without all the context or the individual situation. That's how words work. We can't do away with how words work.

Not sure what you just said - did you say we can get a definition of exist which doesnt depend on situation/usage/context?

If so, go on - give me it.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Does the world exist?
Yes.
But this does not mean I am a physicalist or that the world is observer-independent material object 'out there' in space.

To me, the world exists within the context of my experience of it, as I assume it exists in your experience. This 'experienced world' which is forced upon me in the format I know as experience is a construction from many sources, including but not limited to my senses. Because the construction is a 'mental construction' I describe the world as mental.
One does not have to ascribe an observer independence upon the world to allow it to exist - and idealism does not need to declare 'the world does not exist' - we just provide the context (mental experience) in which the world is said to exist.

You believe in some kind of True Nature that's all hooked up with magic and theism. I might get on just fine with you if we are talking about some species existing or some class of numbers but why should I listen to you talk about the world existing? I would sooner take my lead from Peter Pan.

You believe that I believe in ....
I believe in trees, I cant bend spoons, I believe in the same world as you.
If you were to believe in some material world, I'd just say 'that material world is simply a form of a mind-made experience'
If you think naive realism is correct, then you should be able to demonstrate this in some way, other wise your just as much believing in fairies as you believe I am.

A statement about existence being true or not is context dependent.

Little Idiot wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Based on this, you cant give a definition of the word exist without relating a context for the word. Changing the context changes the 'definition' of the word because its a context specific word, like many others.
But that doesn't mean we cant use it - in general or philosophy - just gotta be careful and clear about our context.

I would it call it the situation or usage rather than context. Context doesn't quite cover it. It has some affect on the truth value of the statement.

As for a definition of course we can do that without all the context or the individual situation. That's how words work. We can't do away with how words work.

Not sure what you just said - did you say we can get a definition of exist which doesnt depend on situation/usage/context?

If so, go on - give me it.

I like this one.
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/exist

b : to have being in a specified place or with respect to understood limitations or conditions <strange ideas existed in his mind>

It covers situation and context. The word has other usage though. As words do.

Little Idiot wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Ok, then if I may pass on the side, skip the starter and head straight into the main - isnt it simply a case of the word existence being context specific?

If I say 'Peter Pan can fly, but Captain Hook cant' I mean they exist with constant characteristics in the context of the story.
So, then in the context of that story, a child would be quite correct (and only in that context) if I started talking about Captain Hook flying. At least I'd have to justify how and why he could do so - where as no need to justify myself if it was Peter Pan flying.

If I say the integer '3' exists, then this is different to saying the integer 3.1 exists, as 3.1 is obviously not an integer.
I dont mean I can get a sack of 3 and bring it home.
Context specific.

If I say trees exist, the context is general, if I say the mango tree in my back garden, I am being specific about an instance of a tree - context specific.

I might say that Peter Pan does not exist and pretty much get agreement from everybody. For the same reasons that pretty much everyone agrees that birds exist.

You can say Peter Pan doesnt exist, and I'd agree - we'd be talking about physically existing in the way birds and trees do exist.

But when I say PP does exist in the story, do you agree or not?

I see no need for the word physical to be added in. The context makes that clear.

I'm not certain why you would want to talk about existence in a piece of fiction. You would have to give me a scenario where such a thing would come up.

Little Idiot wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Does the world exist?
Yes.
But this does not mean I am a physicalist or that the world is observer-independent material object 'out there' in space.

To me, the world exists within the context of my experience of it, as I assume it exists in your experience. This 'experienced world' which is forced upon me in the format I know as experience is a construction from many sources, including but not limited to my senses. Because the construction is a 'mental construction' I describe the world as mental.
One does not have to ascribe an observer independence upon the world to allow it to exist - and idealism does not need to declare 'the world does not exist' - we just provide the context (mental experience) in which the world is said to exist.

You believe in some kind of True Nature that's all hooked up with magic and theism. I might get on just fine with you if we are talking about some species existing or some class of numbers but why should I listen to you talk about the world existing? I would sooner take my lead from Peter Pan.

You believe that I believe in ....
I believe in trees, I cant bend spoons, I believe in the same world as you.
If you were to believe in some material world, I'd just say 'that material world is simply a form of a mind-made experience'
If you think naive realism is correct, then you should be able to demonstrate this in some way, other wise your just as much believing in fairies as you believe I am.

I think naive realism is adequate to most purpose Just like Newton. It covers the usage of the word exist as I have put it. Material world is another case of adding necessary adjectives and I am not sure why you would do that unless it is to build some sort of straw thingy.

I'd just say 'that material world is simply a form of a mind-made experience'

Then I would say you have said far too much and you have some serious proofs to produce. After some serious definition of the mind and the kind of mind that can make material worlds. Are you sure that you are still not talking about Peter Pan flying here?

Little Idiot wrote:

Destroyer wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Does the world exist?
Yes.
But this does not mean I am a physicalist or that the world is observer-independent material object 'out there' in space.

To me, the world exists within the context of my experience of it, as I assume it exists in your experience. This 'experienced world' which is forced upon me in the format I know as experience is a construction from many sources, including but not limited to my senses. Because the construction is a 'mental construction' I describe the world as mental.
One does not have to ascribe an observer independence upon the world to allow it to exist - and idealism does not need to declare 'the world does not exist' - we just provide the context (mental experience) in which the world is said to exist.

My bold.

But, if the context in which the world is said to exist is ‘mental’, then how does this differ from the context in which the world is said to be physical? If the context ‘mental’ implies that the observer is in some fundamental way distinct in nature from the observed material phenomenon, then how is that possible? How can that which is assumed to be distinct in nature from the system have any possible affiliation or means of contact with the system?

The physical is a form of the mental, it is fundamentally no different to the physical, because what we call the physical world is just how we experience the mental world. You cant show me a piece of something physical in any way other than as part of my (mentally constructed) experience.
The physical is a subset of the mental.

If the physical is just another form of the mental and is fundamentally no different to the mental, then it makes absolutely no sense whatsoever (as in idealism) to believe that the physical is just an illusion that is being generated by a real Mind. In this case, if the physical is just an illusion, then so is the mental which you say is fundamentally no different.

Little Idiot wrote:

Destroyer wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Does the world exist?
Yes.
But this does not mean I am a physicalist or that the world is observer-independent material object 'out there' in space.

To me, the world exists within the context of my experience of it, as I assume it exists in your experience. This 'experienced world' which is forced upon me in the format I know as experience is a construction from many sources, including but not limited to my senses. Because the construction is a 'mental construction' I describe the world as mental.
One does not have to ascribe an observer independence upon the world to allow it to exist - and idealism does not need to declare 'the world does not exist' - we just provide the context (mental experience) in which the world is said to exist.

My bold.

But, if the context in which the world is said to exist is ‘mental’, then how does this differ from the context in which the world is said to be physical? If the context ‘mental’ implies that the observer is in some fundamental way distinct in nature from the observed material phenomenon, then how is that possible? How can that which is assumed to be distinct in nature from the system have any possible affiliation or means of contact with the system?

The physical is a form of the mental, it is fundamentally no different to the physical, because what we call the physical world is just how we experience the mental world. You cant show me a piece of something physical in any way other than as part of my (mentally constructed) experience.
The physical is a subset of the mental.

This boils down to: If you show me a movie I have to see it too. Nothing more.

SpeedOfSound wrote:A statement about existence being true or not is context dependent.

Good to see we are in agreement on something important.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Ok, then if I may pass on the side, skip the starter and head straight into the main - isnt it simply a case of the word existence being context specific?

If I say 'Peter Pan can fly, but Captain Hook cant' I mean they exist with constant characteristics in the context of the story.
So, then in the context of that story, a child would be quite correct (and only in that context) if I started talking about Captain Hook flying. At least I'd have to justify how and why he could do so - where as no need to justify myself if it was Peter Pan flying.

If I say the integer '3' exists, then this is different to saying the integer 3.1 exists, as 3.1 is obviously not an integer.
I dont mean I can get a sack of 3 and bring it home.
Context specific.

If I say trees exist, the context is general, if I say the mango tree in my back garden, I am being specific about an instance of a tree - context specific.

I might say that Peter Pan does not exist and pretty much get agreement from everybody. For the same reasons that pretty much everyone agrees that birds exist.

You can say Peter Pan doesnt exist, and I'd agree - we'd be talking about physically existing in the way birds and trees do exist.

But when I say PP does exist in the story, do you agree or not?

I see no need for the word physical to be added in. The context makes that clear.

Agreed.
I dont say we'd need the word physical, I am saying that (without adding the word physical) we are clearly talking about a context (in the story) which is a different context to a trees existence (physical).

I'm not certain why you would want to talk about existence in a piece of fiction. You would have to give me a scenario where such a thing would come up.

scenario; two people discussing the meaning of 'existence'. having discussed the need for context to the word, considering an example of a well known fictional character.
Now, answer the question; do you agree that Peter Pan exists within the story?

Another would be the example 'strange ideas existed in his mind' - you cant avoid that example, as you used it for your own example in the offered definition of the word.
So I can skip waiting for you to delay answering the question 'do you agree the thoughts/ideas exist in my mind when I think of something?' because you already agreed to that (as above).

This serves the same purpose as the Peter Pan question - clearly exist does not only mean physical existence.
Therefore; if I say 'the tree exists' there is no need for this to mean I am agreeing with realism.

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:Does the world exist?
Yes.
But this does not mean I am a physicalist or that the world is observer-independent material object 'out there' in space.

To me, the world exists within the context of my experience of it, as I assume it exists in your experience. This 'experienced world' which is forced upon me in the format I know as experience is a construction from many sources, including but not limited to my senses. Because the construction is a 'mental construction' I describe the world as mental.
One does not have to ascribe an observer independence upon the world to allow it to exist - and idealism does not need to declare 'the world does not exist' - we just provide the context (mental experience) in which the world is said to exist.

You believe in some kind of True Nature that's all hooked up with magic and theism. I might get on just fine with you if we are talking about some species existing or some class of numbers but why should I listen to you talk about the world existing? I would sooner take my lead from Peter Pan.

You believe that I believe in ....
I believe in trees, I cant bend spoons, I believe in the same world as you.
If you were to believe in some material world, I'd just say 'that material world is simply a form of a mind-made experience'
If you think naive realism is correct, then you should be able to demonstrate this in some way, other wise your just as much believing in fairies as you believe I am.

I think naive realism is adequate to most purpose Just like Newton. It covers the usage of the word exist as I have put it. Material world is another case of adding necessary adjectives and I am not sure why you would do that unless it is to build some sort of straw thingy.

I'd just say 'that material world is simply a form of a mind-made experience'

Then I would say you have said far too much and you have some serious proofs to produce. After some serious definition of the mind and the kind of mind that can make material worlds. Are you sure that you are still not talking about Peter Pan flying here?

I said 'material world' to illustrate a possible thought about the experienced world.
I dont believe in a material world, as I said - I can talk of blue bunny unicorns as a hypothetical example in the exact same way.

I did this as a half way house to the realist-world, the realist has no more justification to believe in his world than the materialist has.

Little Idiot wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:
I'm not certain why you would want to talk about existence in a piece of fiction. You would have to give me a scenario where such a thing would come up.

scenario; two people discussing the meaning of 'existence'. having discussed the need for context to the word, considering an example of a well known fictional character.
Now, answer the question; do you agree that Peter Pan exists within the story?
...

I'm neutral on that but I CAN tell you that you are talking nonsense in this scenario.

Little Idiot wrote:...

Another would be the example 'strange ideas existed in his mind' - you cant avoid that example, as you used it for your own example in the offered definition of the word.
So I can skip waiting for you to delay answering the question 'do you agree the thoughts/ideas exist in my mind when I think of something?' because you already agreed to that (as above).

This serves the same purpose as the Peter Pan question - clearly exist does not only mean physical existence.
Therefore; if I say 'the tree exists' there is no need for this to mean I am agreeing with realism.

NOW we can talk! Not sure what kind of scene would leave us talking about the existence of Peter Pan inside a story about Peter Pan unless it was to talk you down off one of your weed binges.

Have to fill in the scene a little further. You and I are having idle conversation and I tell you about my infamous dead friend Rodney. I say "some strange ideas existed in that guy's mind" and then you ask "like what?". I say "he had some strange ideas about fidelity and an even stranger idea for his M&M bait shop".

Then we talk about those two things for awhile.

But you being who you are you would probably want to have a further discussion about the reification of the word 'exists' outside of any situation. Then I would say nonsense. Especially if you were taking this specific and trying to meta-physcalize t to fuck-death.

Another different scenario is for us to talk about two people having the above conversation and maybe find out a little bit of the meaning and intent for words like EXIST and HAD. I like that one.

Little Idiot wrote:scenario; two people discussing the meaning of 'existence'. having discussed the need for context to the word, considering an example of a well known fictional character.
Now, answer the question; do you agree that Peter Pan exists within the story?

"According to the story, Peter Pan exists" doesn't imply "Peter Pan exists". Fictional existence is not a kind of existence. Actually, to ascribe fictionality to something/somebody is to deny its/her/his existence.

Little Idiot wrote:This serves the same purpose as the Peter Pan question - clearly exist does not only mean physical existence.

Right.

Little Idiot wrote:Therefore; if I say 'the tree exists' there is no need for this to mean I am agreeing with realism.

Right. "Trees exist" can be true even if trees are ontologically reducible to collections of ideas, as claimed by Berkeley.

"Berkeley does not deny the existence of ordinary objects such as stones, trees, books, and apples. On the contrary...he holds that only an immaterialist account of such objects can avoid skepticism about their existence and nature."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/

Teuton wrote:

Little Idiot wrote:scenario; two people discussing the meaning of 'existence'. having discussed the need for context to the word, considering an example of a well known fictional character.
Now, answer the question; do you agree that Peter Pan exists within the story?

"According to the story, Peter Pan exists" doesn't imply "Peter Pan exists". Fictional existence is not a kind of existence. Actually, to ascribe fictionality to something/somebody is to deny its/her/his existence.

Little Idiot wrote:This serves the same purpose as the Peter Pan question - clearly exist does not only mean physical existence.

Right.

Little Idiot wrote:Therefore; if I say 'the tree exists' there is no need for this to mean I am agreeing with realism.

Right. "Trees exist" can be true even if trees are ontologically reducible to collections of ideas, as claimed by Berkeley.

"Berkeley does not deny the existence of ordinary objects such as stones, trees, books, and apples. On the contrary...he holds that only an immaterialist account of such objects can avoid skepticism about their existence and nature."

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/

Right. Berkeley doesn't deny what everyone knows exists. But then he goes on from there and tries to say something further about how these things are caused or just 'how they are'.

He adds a new theory about existence and I presume he argues for it in a fashion similar to our two token idealists on the forum.
I have an idea though, that Berkeley might do a better job than what we are used to around here.

or maybe not
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/

Berkeley presents here the following argument (see Winkler 1989, 138):

(1) We perceive ordinary objects (houses, mountains, etc.).

(2) We perceive only ideas.

Therefore,

(3) Ordinary objects are ideas.

LI, this sounds exactly like your argument the last time I talked to you. Wasn't a number 2 that we never agree upon?

SpeedOfSound wrote:
I'm not certain why you would want to talk about existence in a piece of fiction. You would have to give me a scenario where such a thing would come up.

"Are there fictional superheroes without supernatural powers?" – "Yes, Batman, for example."

Teuton wrote:

SpeedOfSound wrote:
I'm not certain why you would want to talk about existence in a piece of fiction. You would have to give me a scenario where such a thing would come up.

"Are there fictional superheroes without supernatural powers?" – "Yes, Batman, for example."

If you instead said "fictional superheroes without supernatural powers exist" you can see that things have taken a very slight turn.

"superheroes without supernatural powers exist"

"superheroes with supernatural powers exist"

Turning and tossing.

SpeedOfSound wrote:
Right. Berkeley doesn't deny what everyone knows exists. But then he goes on from there and tries to say something further about how these things are caused or just 'how they are'.

Right. Berkeleyan idealists and physical realists don't disagree on the existence of trees but on their ontic nature.