archibald wrote:No offense zoon, but I can hardly imagine a worse fudge.
First, I don't think the two definitions are as separate as you think. Both use 'external' influence as the deciding criteria, and external is not the only source of cause.
Second, did you notice that you blended them when you said that that the second was 'compatible with determinism', which is the basis of the first one. It might have been better if you had just said that the second exists (or better still is taken to exist) for practical purposes and left it at that.
I can see why you would want to do that, but I don't think it clarifies all that much. In how many legal cases does the issue boil down to coercion by another person? I can't think of too many off the top of my head, and in cases of outright coercion I'm guessing there is already some room to manoeuvre.
I’m agreeing clearly enough with your main point, that free will in the sense of freedom from any physical causation is highly unlikely to exist.
In post #6150, you said that morality, holding people responsible for their actions, need not be very different in practice if free will is taken not to exist, though it would be based on different foundations:
archibald wrote:……. if we have a morality based on a belief in free will, we are basing it on something (an inner authority) which probably doesn't actually exist.
The way either or any alternative morality plays out or is legislated for may or may not be radically different (though they will be somewhat different) but the underlying principles and
justifications (philosophical, empirical, rational, scientific, etc) would arguably differ a lot.
Again, I’m agreeing with you, the practice of holding people responsible and punishing them for infractions of the local rules would probably not change much, while the justification would change, perhaps it would be that it’s necessary for social cohesion, rather than that the person is ultimately guilty and deserving of punishment.
The practice of punishment does involve the question of whether the person being held responsible intended to carry out the action, and whether the intention was coerced. I gather from your post that you would agree with that? – coercion may not be all that common a defence, but it does exist, according to
Wikipedia:
Duress in English law is a complete common law defence, operating in favour of those who commit crimes because they are forced or compelled to do so by the circumstances, or the threats of another……………………………
This is an exception to the general principle of criminal law that those who choose to break the law are held responsible for the crimes that they commit. The rationale of the exception is that the choice is not wholly voluntary..
Would you change that part of the law as it is practiced, given that you don’t accept free will? My view is that it should stand, and that “not wholly voluntary” can be a reasonable defence, there is a practical distinction to be made between voluntary and coerced actions, even though there’s no ultimate free will. Am I here going beyond what you suggested above:
“It might have been better if you had just said that the second exists (or better still is taken to exist) for practical purposes and left it at that”?
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