GrahamH wrote:

romansh wrote:

John Platko wrote:
And the obvious next question is: what can we do to improve our unconscious decision making.

It would be if we can do otherwise.

Obviously that must be up to the unconscious to decide! Can unconscious processes 'decide' to raise it as a conscious thought to act in a particular way? Perhaps.

But in either case it can be seen as diffusion of ions across synapses (or whatever synapses do) that is "part" of what our brains do.

I don't quite understand Chomsky's argument, he obviously is arguing for free will. He does not think determinacy or randomness gives it to us. I don't get a sense that it is the mixture either. So is he arguing for something else and is this something else not subject to determinacy, randomness and mixtures thereof.

I suppose it does not matter so long as John considers Chomsky on his side.

GrahamH wrote:

romansh wrote:

John Platko wrote:
And the obvious next question is: what can we do to improve our unconscious decision making.

It would be if we can do otherwise.

Obviously that must be up to the unconscious to decide! Can unconscious processes 'decide' to raise it as a conscious thought to act in a particular way? Perhaps.

My conscious thoughts can raise the question to your consciousness. Well at least in theory that's supposed to work.

And with various spiritual practices, one can learn to commune with their unconscious self. And if nothing else, this thread makes clear why one should be interested in such communion. Otherwise you're just conceding your reins to a mysterious committee of forces that control you. One needs to work on their sub constructors so their knowledge can create more choices.

And speaking of more choices and creating new knowledge. This explains it all rather well. (I know there's another go thread but this is relevant to this thread.)



New knowledge can break us free from a local minimum that we may be stuck in - then we have more choices, and that all means more free will.

romansh wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

romansh wrote:

John Platko wrote:
And the obvious next question is: what can we do to improve our unconscious decision making.

It would be if we can do otherwise.

Obviously that must be up to the unconscious to decide! Can unconscious processes 'decide' to raise it as a conscious thought to act in a particular way? Perhaps.

But in either case it can be seen as diffusion of ions across synapses (or whatever synapses do) that is "part" of what our brains do.

I don't quite understand Chomsky's argument, he obviously is arguing for free will. He does not think determinacy or randomness gives it to us. I don't get a sense that it is the mixture either. So is he arguing for something else and is this something else not subject to determinacy, randomness and mixtures thereof.

I suppose it does not matter so long as John considers Chomsky on his side.

Chomsky doesn't concede that our neurons are in charge he says we don't know. Don't know is don't know. Then he deals with the reality he experiences - making sure we understand that we should have more confidence in that than in our theories. An idea he got from Bertrand Russell. That's were I think some folks here have made a wrong turn. Too much confidence in theories not enough in their own experiences.

So it boils down to Chomsky does not know whether he has free will or not, but he feels he has it.

romansh wrote:So it boils down to Chomsky does not know whether he has free will or not, but he feels he has it.

I think that's fair. And he thinks we should place our highest confidence in our experience, and our second highest confidence in the experience of others who are like us, and 0 confidence in theories that we have insufficient knowledge to develop.

It all seems rather rational to me.

John Platko wrote:I'm having even more trouble trying to sus out the ramifications for the folks who concede they have no free will and that their choices are made by some currently mysterious mechanisms in their brain which control them.

This is at the heart of your misconception John. The current decisions are the same mechanisms (mysterious if you insist) that Dennett, Deutsch, England, Lubos and Platko (and no doubt others) argue for. They can be classical or quantum phenomena, they can be expressed in terms of soul snippets or Deutschian information and knowledge ... it does not matter. Are they a result of cause and effect? If so then it is difficult to see how I could have done otherwise. If it is a result of some random process then surely this is not free in any meaningful sense of the phrase. Mixtures thereof? Nah not really.

The problem is if there is a mechanism for our wills I don't think we can call it free. Complicated definitely, but not free.

Complicated will anyone?

I think that's fair. And he thinks we should place our highest confidence in our experience, and our second highest confidence in the experience of others who are like us, and 0 confidence in theories that we have insufficient knowledge to develop.

It all seems rather rational to me.

Seems naïve to me.

romansh wrote:

John Platko wrote:I'm having even more trouble trying to sus out the ramifications for the folks who concede they have no free will and that their choices are made by some currently mysterious mechanisms in their brain which control them.

This is at the heart of your misconception John. The current decisions are the same mechanisms (mysterious if you insist) that Dennett, Deutsch, England, Lubos and Platko (and no doubt others) argue for. They can be classical or quantum phenomena, they can be expressed in terms of soul snippets or Deutschian information and knowledge ... it does not matter. Are they a result of cause and effect? If so then it is difficult to see how I could have done otherwise. If it is a result of some random process then surely this is not free in any meaningful sense of the phrase. Mixtures thereof? Nah not really.

The problem is if there is a mechanism for our wills I don't think we can call it free. Complicated definitely, but not free.

Complicated will anyone?

I think that's fair. And he thinks we should place our highest confidence in our experience, and our second highest confidence in the experience of others who are like us, and 0 confidence in theories that we have insufficient knowledge to develop.

It all seems rather rational to me.

Seems naïve to me.

Seems like the only sensible way to proceed to me. Here's how Motl put it:
from

All the evidence about the world – about anything – that I may really trust fundamentally boils down to my perceptions. Similarly, all the evidence that you should trust comes through your perception. You are observing the world but the information gets to your knowledge through your nerves and brain cells.

I kind of like the way he put that. "gets to your knowledge through your nerves and brain cells".

Motl wrote:
All the evidence about the world – about anything – that I may really trust fundamentally boils down to my perceptions. Similarly, all the evidence that you should trust comes through your perception. You are observing the world but the information gets to your knowledge through your nerves and brain cells.

My perception of this is that it is incredibly naïve.

edit
I got this bit of knowledge through my nerves and brain cells, especially after I read it back to myself.

John Platko wrote:

romansh wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

romansh wrote:
It would be if we can do otherwise.

Obviously that must be up to the unconscious to decide! Can unconscious processes 'decide' to raise it as a conscious thought to act in a particular way? Perhaps.

But in either case it can be seen as diffusion of ions across synapses (or whatever synapses do) that is "part" of what our brains do.

I don't quite understand Chomsky's argument, he obviously is arguing for free will. He does not think determinacy or randomness gives it to us. I don't get a sense that it is the mixture either. So is he arguing for something else and is this something else not subject to determinacy, randomness and mixtures thereof.

I suppose it does not matter so long as John considers Chomsky on his side.

Chomsky doesn't concede that our neurons are in charge he says we don't know. Don't know is don't know. Then he deals with the reality he experiences - making sure we understand that we should have more confidence in that than in our theories. An idea he got from Bertrand Russell. That's were I think some folks here have made a wrong turn. Too much confidence in theories not enough in their own experiences.

Don't know is don't know unless you are a free will believer, in which case we definitely have free will and Chomsky agrees with you. Nobody said this game was fair or rational, did they?

romansh wrote:

Motl wrote:
All the evidence about the world – about anything – that I may really trust fundamentally boils down to my perceptions. Similarly, all the evidence that you should trust comes through your perception. You are observing the world but the information gets to your knowledge through your nerves and brain cells.

My perception of this is that it is incredibly naïve.

edit
I got this bit of knowledge through my nerves and brain cells, especially after I read it back to myself.

I agree, it does seem naïve. Even JP is acknowledging a strong role for "the unconscious", which is not perception, is it? It seems inescapable that reality defines most, if not all, of what we are, and even our perceptions are shaped by things not perceived. The idea that all we "know" "comes through perception" can't be right.

GrahamH wrote:
I agree, it does seem naïve. Even JP is acknowledging a strong role for "the unconscious", which is not perception, is it? It seems inescapable that reality defines most, if not all, of what we are, and even our perceptions are shaped by things not perceived. The idea that all we "know" "comes through perception" can't be right.

Being a card carrying agnostic knowing or not knowing does not carry much weight for me.

I can't know almost by definition ... everything is perception. Some are more reproducible than others.

Plainly we can perceive (have perceptions) at a subliminal level ie we are not conscious of (directly).

What we are debating is the validity of various sources of perception ... I think (perceive).

John Platko wrote:I'm having even more trouble trying to sus out the ramifications for the folks who concede they have no free will and that their choices are made by some currently mysterious mechanisms in their brain which control them. These mysterious mechanisms are so powerful that they can give people the illusion that they are free. So what other illusions might they create? It seems to me that once we concede that our thoughts are not the product of conscious activity but rather mysterious mechanisms that can delude us about a basic experience like choice then perhaps we're also deluded about other conscious activity that we might take for granted.

Your reasoning seems sound. Yes, perhaps that is the case. But there is no need to speak of "mysterious mechanisms". We know what the mechanisms are in some detail. All we have to do is understand them.

John Platko wrote:The underlying mysterious mechanisms that make our choices for us are perhaps neither rational or skeptical - how could we know? We are under their power - which as we've seen, is indeed great. Oh the plot thickens.

Surely you have it backwards. The mechanisms are our power. We are not apart from the "substrate" that makes it all happen. We are not separate entities imposed on by our brains, our selves, our wills are what our brains construct. What were you saying about model of self?

In Blade Runner, did Rachael know she could play the piano? She had the memory from Tyrell's niece, but Rachael herself says she didn't know if she could play — yet, she remembered lessons. Is knowledge simply having the memory, or is it the perception of knowing recalling and that you have using that memory (i.e., playing the piano)? Is knowledge simply the possession of information or is it the ability to recall and perceive one's own possession of said information?



Edited: see strike-out bits.

ETA

Rachael perceives herself playing the piano; therefore, she confirms she has that knowledge, through perceiving that she has it.

John Platko wrote:I'm not questioning that. I'm saying if the demonstrated reality is that people are not consciously making their choices, if they are being deluded by some mysterious mechanism that is ultimately in control of them, then how can they know that what they believe to be rational actually is rational. Maybe the mysterious mechanism is deluding them into believing that their irrational ideas are rational.

That's what science is for, to apply reality tests to reason, to try applying knowledge to see if actually means what we think it means, to see if the thing you think you understand is actually just nonsense. As Cito is very fond of saying - "bend a spoon".

LucidFlight wrote:In Blade Runner, did Rachael know she could play the piano? She had the memory from Tyrell's niece, but Rachael herself says she didn't know if she could play — yet, she remembered lessons. Is knowledge simply having the memory, or is it the perception of knowing that you have that memory? Is knowledge simply the possession of information or is it the ability to recall and perceive one's own possession of said information?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlK5b033xOY

Can I suggest that knowledge is being able to play the piano? Whether or not you think you can play the piano is not knowledge of how to play it.

romansh wrote:

Motl wrote:
All the evidence about the world – about anything – that I may really trust fundamentally boils down to my perceptions. Similarly, all the evidence that you should trust comes through your perception. You are observing the world but the information gets to your knowledge through your nerves and brain cells.

My perception of this is that it is incredibly naïve.

edit
I got this bit of knowledge through my nerves and brain cells, especially after I read it back to myself.

So we got Motl and Chomsky and I guess Platko who are incredibly naïve. Anyone else? Dennett? Deutsch?

I can't imagine what it must be like to not be able to trust your own experiences. I'm not saying it's not good to check your own experiences against the experiences of others but that only gets you so far. Sure, we can delude ourselves into thinking all kinds of crazy stuff, but we can do that with scientific theories too.

It doesn't seem like people yet understand quantum mechanics enough to say one way or the other if the world is deterministic - although I gather Sean Carroll is convinced it is. For me it doesn't really matter. I don't find it to be that interesting a question. The far more interesting question is how much can I influence these mysterious inner mechanisms. Some days, it seems more than others. Maybe you've pounded this problem enough for now and it would be worthwhile to pound that (what can I do about it) problem a bit.

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:

romansh wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Obviously that must be up to the unconscious to decide! Can unconscious processes 'decide' to raise it as a conscious thought to act in a particular way? Perhaps.

But in either case it can be seen as diffusion of ions across synapses (or whatever synapses do) that is "part" of what our brains do.

I don't quite understand Chomsky's argument, he obviously is arguing for free will. He does not think determinacy or randomness gives it to us. I don't get a sense that it is the mixture either. So is he arguing for something else and is this something else not subject to determinacy, randomness and mixtures thereof.

I suppose it does not matter so long as John considers Chomsky on his side.

Chomsky doesn't concede that our neurons are in charge he says we don't know. Don't know is don't know. Then he deals with the reality he experiences - making sure we understand that we should have more confidence in that than in our theories. An idea he got from Bertrand Russell. That's were I think some folks here have made a wrong turn. Too much confidence in theories not enough in their own experiences.

Don't know is don't know unless you are a free will believer, in which case we definitely have free will and Chomsky agrees with you. Nobody said this game was fair or rational, did they?

Chomsky only believes in the Carroll, Dennett kind of free will - he doesn't make any claims about the non free free will. Chomsky didn't go full Motl.

GrahamH wrote:

LucidFlight wrote:In Blade Runner, did Rachael know she could play the piano? She had the memory from Tyrell's niece, but Rachael herself says she didn't know if she could play — yet, she remembered lessons. Is knowledge simply having the memory, or is it the perception of knowing that you have that memory? Is knowledge simply the possession of information or is it the ability to recall and perceive one's own possession of said information?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dlK5b033xOY

Can I suggest that knowledge is being able to play the piano? Whether or not you think you can play the piano is not knowledge of how to play it.

You may indeed suggest that the very presence of knowledge is sufficient for the purposes of having said knowledge. Whether or not is it known, is perhaps secondary. There is a certain Rumsfeldian aspect to not knowing that what we know.

Ooh, and how about Jason Bourne. He knew a lot, too.

John Platko wrote:
Chomsky only believes in the Carroll, Dennett kind of free will - he doesn't make any claims about the non free free will. Chomsky didn't go full Motl.

Are you suggesting free free will now? How about free free free will?

Isn't Dennett's free will the non free free will kind?

GrahamH wrote:

romansh wrote:

Motl wrote:
All the evidence about the world – about anything – that I may really trust fundamentally boils down to my perceptions. Similarly, all the evidence that you should trust comes through your perception. You are observing the world but the information gets to your knowledge through your nerves and brain cells.

My perception of this is that it is incredibly naïve.

edit
I got this bit of knowledge through my nerves and brain cells, especially after I read it back to myself.

I agree, it does seem naïve. Even JP is acknowledging a strong role for "the unconscious", which is not perception, is it? It seems inescapable that reality defines most, if not all, of what we are, and even our perceptions are shaped by things not perceived. The idea that all we "know" "comes through perception" can't be right.

How do you know that perception (mental impression) is right. Maybe "the committee" just wants you to think it's right. Who knows what "the committee" is hiding from you, or what you would think if they weren't hiding it.