Thommo wrote:One of the fundamental problems with approaching this from science though is that even if we could prove consciousness (or qualia, or subjectivity or any of the other related concepts) is not a physical thing (and I don't think science claims that at this point in time) that doesn't mean it proves that consciousness is a non-physical thing.
The "thing" part is an assumption - it might be that we are predisposed to reify certain models or mental functions and it might be that this has evolutionary benefit. That isn't the same as establishing the ontological status of those models or functions.
As an example, suppose I could prove a shadow is not a physical thing (for example by having it move faster than the speed of light and "break" the laws of physics), what now? It's still fully explained by physics and physical phenomena. Or in the parlance of certain philosophical views supervenient on them. The problem arises purely through our erroneous description of the phenomenon at play and the shortcuts we take in describing it.
I certainly agree with you that there is at present no credible evidence for immaterial consciousness. I would also agree that even if, for example, something were shown to move faster than the speed of light, this would still not be evidence for immaterial consciousness, only that the current laws of physics needed revision.
Evidence in favour of non-physical mental powers would need to be more specific, for example, if Uri Geller’s spoon-bending claims had survived rigorous investigation instead of being quickly shown to be fraudulent. While the possibility of such new evidence can never be entirely ruled out, it doesn’t seem any more likely than evidence for gods or flying spaghetti monsters.
Richard Dawkins argues in his book “The Blind Watchmaker” that before Darwin and Wallace came up with the theory of evolution by natural selection, the strong appearance of teleology in living things did constitute good rational evidence for some kind of creator which could plan ahead, like human minds. Since the laws of physics as developed by scientists such as Newton were essentially non-teleological, the creative power behind living things would need to have at least some non-physical aspect? The theory of evolution by natural selection does manage to resolve this apparent difficulty for physicalism, but as Dawkins points out it’s the only theory which anyone has yet thought of which would resolve it. If the theory of evolution by natural selection were to be shown not to hold, there’s no alternative physicalist hypothesis waiting in the wings to save physicalism from the apparent purposefulness of living things. I presume this is why people such as Jayjay4547 and jamest who are arguing for gods or idealism attempt to attack the evidence for evolution by natural selection: if they were successful, they would indeed have powerful evidence that the apparent purposefulness or rationality of living things is essentially outside the laws of physics, non-physical. They have not come close to succeeding.
(I do agree that our tendency to reify forward planning as consciousness is a mental quirk which probably evolved because it promotes the survival of the individual’s genes, but that argument starts with the evidence-based assumptions that we evolved and that physicalism is correct.)
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