Mr.Samsa wrote:I'm currently trying to write an article on this topic because I think it's an interesting issue.

I find your arguments pretty interesting and I'd like to read that article when it's finished if it's possible .

Hehe no problem, those others work as well. I too think it is a science, but as one of your links states, yet no theory has more or less united it (one that is both theoretically and methodologically acceptable). If something like Staddon's theoretical behaviorism works to put together cognitive neuropsychology and behaviorism (which I see as the strongest candidates) then things would change. But it seems to be a somewhat far-fetched expectation at the moment and it also requires dealing with old (persisting) issues like: what internal states are to be considered? those with strong neural evidence or every demon plausibly suggested by a cognitive model? and so on.

Mr.Samsa wrote:

Asta666 wrote:

Mr.Samsa wrote:I'm currently trying to write an article on this topic because I think it's an interesting issue.

I find your arguments pretty interesting and I'd like to read that article when it's finished if it's possible .

I got sidetracked on writing it If I ever get it finished, I'll let you know.

Scott O. Lilienfeld may have beaten you to it with his paper "Public Skepticism of Psychology: Why Many People Perceive the Study of Human Behavior as Unscientific". It's a very well written piece, even though as expected, it doesn't highlight many behavioral psych accomplishments.

I find it funny to contrast views like Lilienfeld's and Schlinger's. We see a lot of different forms of criticism depending on where one stands inside the field. I guess that is another consequence of the lack of "paradigm" that Wilson notes in that blog article. Anyway, I thought that in countries like the US where scientific psychology has a longer tradition things would be different. Ironically, in my country, where psychoanalysis is still dominant, I think there is a pretty favorable public view on psychology.

I would say psychology is a lot of philosophy with some science. The problem is that for the most part it is a study of emergent patterns in an extremely complex system. It deals a lot with fuzzy concepts like relationships. Ultimately, I believe through advances in technology, computer models, and a much better understanding of biological neural networks, it will gradually become more scientific and less philosophical.

What I'm reading in this thread, it sounds very much like psychology IS a science. But it doesn't match up with what you see in your typical therapy session. (I'm a nurse and I've done psych rotations) It feels a lot more like people talking out their ass when I would sit in on group therapy sessions in hospital, with things that sound good, but dont really seem to have any firm science behind them.

Is it possible there's a wide gap between the theoretical psychology employed in research and psychological care?

Mr.Samsa wrote:Well I disagree that psychology has no underlying paradigm. It does; behaviorism. All psychological fields are based on behaviorist methodology and the only 'remaining' competing paradigm is psychoanalysis' mentalism - but, as you allude to in your post, it's not a particularly popular or dominant view at all so it presents no real competition. Behavioral psychology, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, personality psychology, social psychology, etc etc, these all use the behaviorist philosophy to conduct their research, perhaps highlighted best by the fact that psychology no longer views introspection or self-reported data as evidence of the thought or belief itself, but rather treats it as a verbal report that is subject to its own contingencies (i.e. people are more likely to report positive aspects of their personality than negative ones because, socially, that is the "right" thing to do).

Schlinger has taken the same approach that Skinner did, by trying to set up cognitivism and behaviorism as if they were competing paradigms by strawmanning the hypothetical constructs used in cognitive psychology. In reality, cognitivism is based on behaviorism, and it simply expands on how cognitions are handled in behaviorism by using the computational theory of mind metaphor.

That depends on how we define "paradigm". In my opinion, methodology is only a mean to an end: explanation. Scientific psychology has somewhat similar methodologies but plenty of different explanations or theories.
I think that Schlinger might be doing what you say he is doing, but he also has a point. Computational theory of mind is pretty controversial (I think there are some interesting arguments on that issue in this paper by Chalmers http://consc.net/papers/computation.html) and yet does not explain all the hypothesis that are included in "cognitive psychology". The term "cognitive" initially seemed to be restricted to pretty defined concepts and methodologies (take Marr's model of vision for instance) but now there are a lot of theories that claim to be "cognitive" and are pretty far off from those standards.
I wish it were like you describe it, but it sounds too optimistic to me. I still see a lot of different hypothesis competing to explain the same behaviors, postulating different mechanisms, and a lot of difficulties in choosing one over the others. Neurological evidence helps a lot on this matter, activation in the brain might no be the cause of the cognitive process, but if it's precise at least shows that something real is going on. Same with brain lesion studies (like memory ones). But again there is nowhere near enough evidence like this to help choosing between hypothesis in all of the theories labeled as "cognitive".
The most common methodology I see is null hypothesis test, and that doesn't help anywhere near as much as neurological evidence or controlled experimental data.

PS: I'm not saying that Schlinger is entirely right either. Traditional behaviorism cannot explain behavior in any successful way while ignoring internal states. Sure, environmental stimulus play a role and can provide some good predictions, but saying that equals the explanation of behavior is like saying that because there is a high direct correlation between I introducing and turning a key inside a car and the engine starting I have explained how cars work. As Chomsky notes:
"Suppose that an engineer is presented with a device whose functioning he does not understand, and suppose that through experiment he can obtain information about input-output relations of this device. He would not hesitate, if rational, to construct a theory of the internal states of the device and to test it against further evidence. He might also go on to try to determine the mechanisms that function in the ways described by his theory of internal states, and the physical principles at work -- leaving open the possibility that new and unknown physical principles might be involved, a particularly important matter in the study of behavior of organisms. His theory of internal states might well be the only useful guide to further research. By objecting, a priori, to this research strategy, Skinner merely condemns his strange variety of "behavioral science" to continued ineptitude."
So basically what I'm saying is that cognitive psychology is a necessity if we want explanations, but that brings again the problem of distinguishing between proposed internal mechanisms, and that problem is by no means solved. Neuroscience helps, but not THAT much, at least for now.

PS: I'm not saying that Schlinger is entirely right either. Traditional behaviorism cannot explain behavior in any successful way while ignoring internal states. Sure, environmental stimulus play a role and can provide some good predictions, but saying that equals the explanation of behavior is like saying that because there is a high direct correlation between I introducing and turning a key inside a car and the engine starting I have explained how cars work. As Chomsky notes:
"Suppose that an engineer is presented with a device whose functioning he does not understand, and suppose that through experiment he can obtain information about input-output relations of this device. He would not hesitate, if rational, to construct a theory of the internal states of the device and to test it against further evidence. He might also go on to try to determine the mechanisms that function in the ways described by his theory of internal states, and the physical principles at work -- leaving open the possibility that new and unknown physical principles might be involved, a particularly important matter in the study of behavior of organisms. His theory of internal states might well be the only useful guide to further research. By objecting, a priori, to this research strategy, Skinner merely condemns his strange variety of "behavioral science" to continued ineptitude."
So basically what I'm saying is that cognitive psychology is a necessity if we want explanations, but that brings again the problem of distinguishing between proposed internal mechanisms, and that problem is by no means solved. Neuroscience helps, but not THAT much, at least for now.

I think there are several good criticisms of Skinner's conception of behaviorism but I don't think the one that your mentioning here is one of them. Chomsky had a fundamental misunderstanding of what Skinner's ideas were and Skinner was not endorsing the view that "internal states" should be ignored. He actually had openly spoken against such a view and was one of his main reasons for creating radical behaviorism to move away from Watson's conception and ideas. Cognitive psychology like Samsa said is pretty much the same as behavioral psychology, there are slight differences but most perceived differences come from lack of understand of each other's research from both sides.

Imza wrote:I think there are several good criticisms of Skinner's conception of behaviorism but I don't think the one that your mentioning here is one of them. Chomsky had a fundamental misunderstanding of what Skinner's ideas were and Skinner was not endorsing the view that "internal states" should be ignored. He actually had openly spoken against such a view and was one of his main reasons for creating radical behaviorism to move away from Watson's conception and ideas. Cognitive psychology like Samsa said is pretty much the same as behavioral psychology, there are slight differences but most perceived differences come from lack of understand of each other's research from both sides.

I understand that radical behaviorism saw internal states as any other form of behavior and claimed that they could also be explained by focusing on environmental variables, but not by physiological or mental mechanisms. If that's right, even if Skinner accepts internal states as behavior, his way of explaining them to me seems to differ from the postulates of cognitive psychology and neuroscience and Chomsky's critique is accurate (from his point of view, where mental mechanisms that are a function of the brain play a causal role).

Mr.Samsa wrote:Yeah, I was usually "methodology" in a broader sense - not only in how to collect the data, but what the data is, the unit of measurement, the philosophical underpinnings, etc. Cognitivism and behaviorism simply can't be different paradigms because they're not incommensurable. Not only can we directly compare data, but we can explain it using our own terminology, and assist each other in our investigations. The cognitivists may make extra assumptions, or extra claims, which aren't relevant to behaviorist researchers, but I don't see how that would make it distinct enough to be considered its own paradigm.

I think this argument is incorrect, because Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability doesn't imply an incomparability between the theories, nor a lack of common terminology (see Kuhn 1983, p. 670; Lorenzano 2008, p. 245-247). Anyway, I prefer the terminology proposed by the structuralist theory of science (in this case, they might be considered different "theory-nets").
Here's an interesting article that analizes one aspect of the debate between cognitive psychology and behavior analysis:
Burgos. (2007). The theory debate in psychology. Behavior and Philosophy, 35, 149-183.
http://www.behavior.org/resources/198.pdf

References:
Kuhn, T. S. (1983), “Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability”, in Asquith, P. D. y Nickles, T. (eds.), PSA 1982, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1983, 2, pp. 669-688.
Lorenzano, P. (2008). Inconmensurabilidad teórica y comparabilidad empírica: el caso de la genética clásica. Anal. filos., vol.28, n.2, pp. 239-279.

Mr.Samsa wrote:Yeah, I was usually "methodology" in a broader sense - not only in how to collect the data, but what the data is, the unit of measurement, the philosophical underpinnings, etc. Cognitivism and behaviorism simply can't be different paradigms because they're not incommensurable. Not only can we directly compare data, but we can explain it using our own terminology, and assist each other in our investigations. The cognitivists may make extra assumptions, or extra claims, which aren't relevant to behaviorist researchers, but I don't see how that would make it distinct enough to be considered its own paradigm.

I just meant that to me they seem to be different types of theories, even if the are commensurable and share a common methodology. I don't care too much about the definition of "paradigm", I just used the term as "majorly accepted theory in the field".

Mr.Samsa wrote:The idea that Skinner ignored physiological or mental causes is simply wrong. Skinner was obviously one of the first scientists in the nature-nurture debate to claim that it's both, and explained numerous times how you cannot study or understand behavior without understanding the biological and environmental causes behind it.The confusion over Skinner's stance on physiology stems from his early comments on the topic, which were interpreted to be dismissive in an absolute sense. He did argue against using physiological concepts to explain behavior, but only because he was writing at a time where we knew practically nothing about the brain. Positing neurological causes for behavior was simply, at best, guesswork, and at worst an explanatory fiction. As the decades rolled on, and technology advanced, Skinner argued that we are now able to make claims of neurological causes, as the only thing that was holding him back was empirical data of the thing that was said to be causing the behavior.

As for mental causes, he accepted these too. He viewed external and internal behaviors as simply being "chains of behavior", links which are both an effect of the preceding link and a cause of the following link. It didn't matter if the link was an external behavior, an internal one, or a biological cause, it all had the same effect. He laid out the groundwork for the cognitivists to study internal states by developing the methodology which makes it possible to scientifically investigate unobservable states, however, he did warn us to be cautious when explaining an unobservable behavior with another unobservable behavior, as we can derive the existence of the first through indirect methods and effects from observable behaviors, but to derive the existence of the second unobservable behavior we only have the first unobservable behavior as our guide. He personally didn't think this was a fruitful avenue of research as he felt it was fraught with possible errors, but he certainly didn't rule it out. His behaviorist method is, without modification or additions, CBT which works on not only changing thoughts to change behavior, but also changing thoughts to change other thoughts, so it's certainly not the case that behaviorism rejects the idea that internal states cannot be causes of behaviors.

Yes, he accepts mental causes and internal states, but only in terms of behaviors, or like you said "chains of behavior", while cognitivists see mental causes not in terms of behavior, but in terms of mental mechanisms that would be an emerging function of the brain (and maybe other physical systems too).
As that article from Burgos that seeker shared puts it: "the radical behaviorists’ account of the nature of theories restricts theoretical terms in psychology to behavioral terms, which radical behaviorists take as observational. [...]
There are many terms in psychology that are theoretical but are not meant as behavioral, such as those provided by MacCorquodale and Meehl (1948) as examples of terms that designate hypothetical constructs:
Guthrie’s movement-produced stimuli, Hull’s rg’s, Sd’s, and afferent neural interaction, Allport’s biophysical traits, Murray’s regnancies, the notion of ‘anxiety’ as used by Mowrer, Miller, and Dollard and others of the Yale-derived
group, and most theoretical constructs in psychoanalytic theory.
Cognitivistic terms (as used by cognitivists; see note 3) such as “memory,” “representation,” “attention,” “reasoning,” “thought,” and “intelligence,” among many others, would not qualify as theoretical either. "
So I think we are talking about two different theories here (even if one can make some translations to the other one's terms): one regarding behavior, the other regarding mental mechanisms. That's what I haven't seen integrated in a psychological theory yet.
Another problem I see is that cognitive psychology can only actually be a theory within psychology if functionalism and computational theory of mind prove to be true (and even if they do, then we'll have to ask ourselves if we are talking about psychology or computer science), if not it would just be the study of brain functions (and hence a part of neurology). But this issue doesn't seem to be sufficiently clear at present.

Mr.Samsa wrote:My argument wasn't that we could compare ideas and have a common terminology, therefore they aren't incommensurable, but rather that we have the same underlying ideas about the subject matter, the same approach, methodologies, units of measure, and that all data can be directly transferred from one to the other, etc. which makes them commensurable. I haven't read the articles you've linked to yet, but are you arguing that behaviorism and cognitivism are incommensurable, or that paradigms don't need to be incommensurable? Or just that my simplified argument about how they are commensurable is incorrect?

Kuhn modified and clarified his views about incommensurability through time, and in his later perspective, incommensurability doesn't imply incomparability (this solved several problems of his previous perspective). So yes, I'm arguing that behaviorism and cognitivism are incommensurate (but comparable) if we adopt Kuhn's later perspective. Anyway (as Kuhn himself has acknowledged) some of these issues were expressed more clearly by the structuralist theory.

Asta666 wrote:I just meant that to me they seem to be different types of theories, even if the are commensurable and share a common methodology. I don't care too much about the definition of "paradigm", I just used the term as "majorly accepted theory in the field".

I think they're different theories, and different research programs. Anyway, there's nothing wrong with that.

Asta666 wrote:Yes, he accepts mental causes and internal states, but only in terms of behaviors, or like you said "chains of behavior", while cognitivists see mental causes not in terms of behavior, but in terms of mental mechanisms that would be an emerging function of the brain (and maybe other physical systems too).

Not all of them. I mean, there're many proposals, both within cognitive psychology and within behavior analysis, and it would be misleading to neglect such plurality of perspectives. For example, within cognitive psychology you'll find functionalism and computational theory of mind, but you'll also find connectionism, situated cognition, dynamic systems, emergentism, dispositionalism, property dualism, eliminativism, instrumentalism, etc. And within behavior analysis, you´ll find Skinner's classical account of private events, but you'll also find Rachlin's molar behaviorism, and Kantor's interbehaviorism, and Tonneau's direct realism, and Staddon's theoretical behaviorism.

Asta666 wrote:Another problem I see is that cognitive psychology can only actually be a theory within psychology if functionalism and computational theory of mind prove to be true (and even if they do, then we'll have to ask ourselves if we are talking about psychology or computer science), if not it would just be the study of brain functions (and hence a part of neurology). But this issue doesn't seem to be sufficiently clear at present.

I disagree. There're many options for cognitive psychology besides functionalism and computational theory of mind (as I've mentioned, you'll also find find connectionism, situated cognition, dynamic systems, emergentism, dispositionalism, property dualism, eliminativism, instrumentalism, etc). Many of these proposals might argue that cognitive psychology is a theory within psychology, without adopting functionalism and computational theory of mind.

seeker wrote:I think they're different theories, and different research programs. Anyway, there's nothing wrong with that.

I'm not saying there is anything wrong with that. I'm just wondering if they are different theories about the same thing, or different theories about different things, and whether they can be theoretically integrated or not.

seeker wrote:Not all of them. I mean, there're many proposals, both within cognitive psychology and within behavior analysis, and it would be misleading to neglect such plurality of perspectives. For example, within cognitive psychology you'll find functionalism and computational theory of mind, but you'll also find connectionism, situated cognition, dynamic systems, emergentism, dispositionalism, property dualism, eliminativism, instrumentalism, etc. And within behavior analysis, you´ll find Skinner's classical account of private events, but you'll also find Rachlin's molar behaviorism, and Kantor's interbehaviorism, and Tonneau's direct realism, and Staddon's theoretical behaviorism.

Yes I know, but just to start from somewhere I began with CTM and functionalism because I see those approaches as being somewhat more generalized, but maybe I'm wrong. Regarding radical behaviorism, I was replying to Samsa, who I think was arguing from that theory.

seeker wrote:I disagree. There're many options for cognitive psychology besides functionalism and computational theory of mind (as I've mentioned, you'll also find find connectionism, situated cognition, dynamic systems, emergentism, dispositionalism, property dualism, eliminativism, instrumentalism, etc). Many of these proposals might argue that cognitive psychology is a theory within psychology, without adopting functionalism and computational theory of mind.

¿How could it be emergent without being computational or neurological functions? Some of the other branches you mention I'm not aware of. I'd be glad if you could give me any links to read about them.

Asta666 wrote:I'm not saying there is anything wrong with that. I'm just wondering if they are different theories about the same thing, or different theories about different things, and whether they can be theoretically integrated or not.

I'd say they're not "two theories" (e.g., "cognitive psychology" and "behavior analysis"), but a huge number of theories, with diferent degrees of similarity in their theoretical terms and their areas of research, that are usually distinguished using a complex set of prototypical features.

Asta666 wrote:Yes I know, but just to start from somewhere I began with CTM and functionalism because I see those approaches as being somewhat more generalized, but maybe I'm wrong.

I'm not sure they're the more generalized views nowadays. There's been a lot of controversy between CTM and connectionism, and between CTM and situated cognition. Functionalism is only one of many options within philosophy of mind, and there're a lot of controversy there too.

Asta666 wrote:¿How could it be emergent without being computational or neurological functions? Some of the other branches you mention I'm not aware of. I'd be glad if you could give me any links to read about them.

You can explore SEP about the philosophy of mind:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/
Connectionism has redefined "computation" in a more biologically plausible way than traditional CTM. Anyway, probably the situated cognition perspective (e.g. Chemero, 2009; Noë, 2009) has been the more radical departure from traditional CTM. Interestingly, the situated cognition perspective has many similarities with behavior analysis (Morris, 2009; Tonneau, 2011).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Situated_cognition
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Connectionism