I disagree with that. In my view, love is much, more than a feeling.

I want to stay and discuss this, but I need to (want to) go and spend time with my children--who are all on break right now!

I will come back and attempt to answer all of your questions when I can.

Sophie T wrote:

Thommo wrote:

Sophie T wrote:If you continue with this line of argument, aren't you going to have to agree that it is better to kill yourself and be rational (if you want to kill yourself because you find life boring) than it is to be a theist (and be irrational)?

Yes, I see no problem with that conclusion (as presented on those simple terms, where the consequences of killing oneself were largely not considered etc.).

Hmmmm....well I don't know what else to say to that! However, this idea is certainly giving me pause regarding my own beliefs. If, as an atheist, I am required (logically so) to adopt this viewpoint, I might just have to become a theist. Of course, I'll have to make up a God---maybe I'll revert back, at this point, to believing that Skippy exists. Yes, that's what I'm going to do. I am now a Skippyist.

I am actually intrigued by this.

It looks like you actually think that you can argue that for a person who is just unhappy enough to want to kill themselves it's better to be a theist and continue to be unhappy than to kill themselves (which is what they want to do), is that right?

Without introducing more premises (which were excluded from the example) I can't see how that possibly is going to work. I can see it working if you allow for "maybe the person will change their mind later and not be unhappy enough to kill themselves", but then that would work just as well in the first place - i.e. they wouldn't need to convert to be a theist (and indeed it arguably contravenes the premise that they are unhappy enough to kill themselves).

Ragwortshire wrote:

tytalus wrote:Nonsense as well to begin with a set of conclusions and spend one's time refining the assumptions used to reach them, rather than observe reality, hypothesize and test, and see what conclusions the data will support. It is this cart before the horse type of rhetoric that will get called out as nonsense every time, because it is the opposite of reason; as Cito di Pense pointed out, it's just vacuous rationalization.

A rather simplistic way of putting it would be that my beliefs are mostly the hypotheses which are intuitive to me. So: Is it really that nonsensical to take an intuitive hypothesis, and attempt to investigate whether or not it is correct? And one measure (among others!) by which one can do so is to investigate the minimum number of logically independent assumptions involved.

That's not a simplistic way of putting it; that's a completely different way of putting it. And to demonstrate it, once again let's go to the videotape. Let's compare.

Ragwortshire wrote:I concede that my beliefs as they stand do not fare well by this particular measure, but that is not nonsensical. It implies certain questions, such as: Is it possible to come to the same or similar conclusions by means of fewer assumptions? What is the fewest number of assumptions needed?, etc. And it also implies that my beliefs don't live up to my ideals of what a perfect belief system ought to be like. But none of this is in itself nonsensical.

So as we can see here you have gone from a predetermined set of conclusions for which you are refining your assumptions, to a hypothesis you are supposedly investigating to see if it is correct (mimicking the scientific method). So, clearly you've contradicted yourself. I will await evidence that this new method is the one you're following. But that would mean the assumptions of xianity are no longer assumptions at all, not articles of faith, but hypotheses being tested -- and having already failed at the simplest test of parsimony.

As I said to Thommo: The only alternative, from my point of view, seems to be a universal agnosticism (indeed more than that - not even believing anything either way) with regard to any question which cannot be answered using reason and the evidence potentially available to me. However, you of course may know of methods which I do not! In which case, I would be genuinely grateful to hear them

What is wrong with the answer 'I don't know' when you don't know the answer to a question, anyway?

Oh, I forgot. Emotional satisfaction...

Thommo wrote:

Sophie T wrote:

Thommo wrote:

Sophie T wrote:If you continue with this line of argument, aren't you going to have to agree that it is better to kill yourself and be rational (if you want to kill yourself because you find life boring) than it is to be a theist (and be irrational)?

Yes, I see no problem with that conclusion (as presented on those simple terms, where the consequences of killing oneself were largely not considered etc.).

Hmmmm....well I don't know what else to say to that! However, this idea is certainly giving me pause regarding my own beliefs. If, as an atheist, I am required (logically so) to adopt this viewpoint, I might just have to become a theist. Of course, I'll have to make up a God---maybe I'll revert back, at this point, to believing that Skippy exists. Yes, that's what I'm going to do. I am now a Skippyist.

I am actually intrigued by this.

It looks like you actually think that you can argue that for a person who is just unhappy enough to want to kill themselves it's better to be a theist and continue to be unhappy than to kill themselves (which is what they want to do), is that right?

Without introducing more premises (which were excluded from the example) I can't see how that possibly is going to work. I can see it working if you allow for "maybe the person will change their mind later and not be unhappy enough to kill themselves", but then that would work just as well in the first place - i.e. they wouldn't need to convert to be a theist (and indeed it arguably contravenes the premise that they are unhappy enough to kill themselves).

What (I think) I am saying is that the thought of living in a world where love is viewed as nothing more than a feeling (as opposed to being an action), where there is no such thing as unconditional love, where it is logically better to be suicidal and/or a psychpath than it is to be a theist, where there is no hope, whatsoever, of life after this life, where there is no meaning in this life, where it is better to love your children only for as long as doing so makes you happy, where unconditional love for one's children is seen as trivial and/or irrational may, in fact, be a very great source of someone's unhappiness and could even lead someone to rationally choose to become a psychopath or to rationally choose to end his own life, rather than to choose to be a healthy, loving (though sometimes irrational) individual. Again--I think that it can be successfully argued that there are times (as I described above) when it is, in fact, better (for the person in question) to be irrational (in some ways, such as being irrational when it comes to a belief in the existence of God) than it is to be rational. And in fact, I would say that there are times when it may even be rational to be selectively irrational.

Sophie T wrote:
What (I think) I am saying is that the thought of living in a world where love is viewed as nothing more than a feeling (as opposed to being an action), where there is no such thing as unconditional love, where it is logically better to be suicidal and/or a psychpath than it is to be a theist, where there is no hope, whatsoever, of life after this life, where there is no meaning in this life, where it is better to love your children only for as long as doing so makes you happy, where unconditional love for one's children is seen as trivial and/or irrational may, in fact, be a very great source of someone's unhappiness and could even lead someone to rationally choose to become a psychopath or to rationally choose to end his own life, rather than to choose to be a healthy, loving (though sometimes irrational) individual. Again--I think that it can be successfully argued that there are times (as I described above) when it is, in fact, better (for the person in question) to be irrational (in some ways, such as being irrational when it comes to a belief in the existence of God) than it is to be rational. And in fact, I would say that there are times when it may even be rational to be selectively irrational.

Loving somebody who isn't there any more is crazy (euphemistically, irrational).

Aaaauuuuughhhhhh. Teh stoopid. It burns.

Sophie T wrote:What (I think) I am saying is that the thought of living in a world where love is viewed as nothing more than a feeling (as opposed to being an action), where there is no such thing as unconditional love, where it is logically better to be suicidal and/or a psychpath than it is to be a theist, where there is no hope, whatsoever, of life after this life, where there is no meaning in this life, where it is better to love your children only for as long as doing so makes you happy, where unconditional love for one's children is seen as trivial and/or irrational may, in fact, be a very great source of someone's unhappiness and could even lead someone to rationally choose to become a psychopath or to rationally choose to end his own life, rather than to choose to be a healthy, loving (though sometimes irrational) individual.

I think you need to examine what I've said more closely as almost none of these things follow from my argument.

I very much doubt that someone can choose to become a psychopath, I've already explained why the position I've outlined does not support that "where it is logically better to be suicidal and/or a psychopath than it is to be a theist" - perhaps you are unaware of the difference between a partial and total ordering? As you seem to be assuming that this structure is the latter, even though there's no reason to suggest that from what I've said.

The love issue, well that was me attempting to describe love as I see it (it certainly is an emotion) in a simple enough manner for the purpose of this conversation. If you think I've oversimplified it, well fair enough, but that's got nothing to do with a logical consequence of my argument, I'm just describing it as I see it pertains to this conversation - if you think my description is inaccurate please go ahead and explain how.

Sophie T wrote:Again--I think that it can be successfully argued that there are times (as I described above) when it is, in fact, better (for the person in question) to be irrational (in some ways, such as being irrational when it comes to a belief in the existence of God) than it is to be rational. And in fact, I would say that there are times when it may even be rational to be selectively irrational.

Well, feel free to go ahead and make the argument, I'd love to see these examples as I've asked.

I'm not quite sure which "above" examples you're referring to here, because the "better to be a theist than a psychopath" doesn't actually contravene anything I've said, if you don't understand what I mean there, we should go back over this point before we continue with this miscommunication.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Of course if you merely go around believing that in your experience trains often arrive on time so there's no reason to think otherwise of the next train that's due... well, that's a bit different.

That's exactly what I was referring to - how, in principle, is that different? Trains often run on time, and they often don't. Yet for any given train that I intend to take, I believe it is going to be on time. Why is this belief less irrational then my belief in God?

Well, we have evidence that trains exist.
We have evidence that trains run on time.

It is irrational to assume that the next train will be on time if trains don't always run on time, but it's far more likely to be correct than that the next train to come along will be a unicorn.

Surely this kind of reasoning is elementary? It's dramatically more likely that a given train will be on time than that it will spontaneously turn into a flock of seagulls, no?

Please confirm you concur with this last premise question (which isn't necessarily prohibited by the laws of physics I should add, it's just stupendously mind-numbingly unlikely according to our current models).

Certainly I concur with the premise as you have stated it - but, to play the Devil's advocate, does that actually make it less rational to believe that a train will turn into a flock of seagulls, than it is to believe that the train will be on time? Neither is supported by a rational argument based on available evidence. By your line of reasoning, it would seem to me that both are in principle equally irrational (since rationality as you have defined it seems to be a binary property) - and if this is not the case, then my understanding of your position must in some way be flawed.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Fair enough, I call this "making shit up" and I tend to regard people who "make shit up" as being irrational if they treat it as true or existent.

You can call it whatever you like, but I do not see, for myself, a viable alternative.

Not making shit up is the alternative.

Which translates as not believing anything at all, apart from those propositions for which a rational argument based on evidence exists. Again, unless you can demonstrate that reason can answer questions such as "Does God exist?" or "Do we have free will?", this is not, for me, a viable alternative.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:So how do you discriminate between an acceptable unevidenced claim and an unacceptable one? Without such a criteria your position is inconsistent.

I am not quite sure, but I guess the way I would usually do it is: On the basis of "soft" evidence (for example, if A implies B, then B is soft evidence for A), and on the basis of whether or not I am willing to live with the consequences of accepting the claim.

That's fallacious reasoning unfortunately and provides no answer for the question.

How exactly is it fallacious?

By the way, I realise I have again failed to be precise here: I should have defined B as being soft evidence for A if A implies B, and in addition ¬A does not imply B. Obviously propositions which are necessarily true ought not to be included in the definition.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:Note: Quote pyramid omitted for brevity.

Well. In that case, I would say that given the form of the argument, the premise is demonstrably false.

To know some fact implies that one is aware of solid rational reasons for that fact to be true. The statement you gave states "I don't know how I know", implying that the speaker is not aware of any such reasons. Therefore, the speaker cannot know that God does not exist. (By the way, I do not claim to know that God exists.)

So you know that knowledge cannot be imparted from outside? But that falls to the same argument you put up... your argument is self-defeating.

Your argument didn't state that knowledge had been imparted from outside. If one were to say "I know that God exists because the knowledge has been placed in my brain by an external source, therefore God does not exist", then that would be a different argument. In that case, the immediate question would be "What is this external source? How do you know that it is reliable?" etc., etc.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Omnipotence - all powerful (can do anything)
Omniscience - all knowing (knows everything)

Of course these may not be "sensible" by your standards because they lead to logical contradictions. As far as I'm concerned no other definition is "sensible" (because it's merely starting from here then trying to rationalise a belief).

They may be sensible, but they're not definitions. "Anything" and "Everything" haven't been defined. Any what? Every what?

(This isn't a frivolous question; how you define "anything" is pretty much the same question as how you define omnipotence.)

They are definitions. Thing denotes any logical object of the language.

Which language? I assume you mean English - in which case I would point out that English is a rather contradictory language in the first place. (Considering that something like "This statement is false" is generally considered to be a valid sentence in English.) So it is no surprise if a definition based on the English language fails - but that I feel is the fault of the language, not of the concept itself.

If I am mistaken and you mean one of the languages of formal logic, then I take my hat off to you - it's something I've never actually considered before as part of a definition of omnipotence or omniscience. And I think it actually might work rather well. Who knows?

tytalus wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

tytalus wrote:Nonsense as well to begin with a set of conclusions and spend one's time refining the assumptions used to reach them, rather than observe reality, hypothesize and test, and see what conclusions the data will support. It is this cart before the horse type of rhetoric that will get called out as nonsense every time, because it is the opposite of reason; as Cito di Pense pointed out, it's just vacuous rationalization.

A rather simplistic way of putting it would be that my beliefs are mostly the hypotheses which are intuitive to me. So: Is it really that nonsensical to take an intuitive hypothesis, and attempt to investigate whether or not it is correct? And one measure (among others!) by which one can do so is to investigate the minimum number of logically independent assumptions involved.

That's not a simplistic way of putting it; that's a completely different way of putting it. And to demonstrate it, once again let's go to the videotape. Let's compare.

Ragwortshire wrote:I concede that my beliefs as they stand do not fare well by this particular measure, but that is not nonsensical. It implies certain questions, such as: Is it possible to come to the same or similar conclusions by means of fewer assumptions? What is the fewest number of assumptions needed?, etc. And it also implies that my beliefs don't live up to my ideals of what a perfect belief system ought to be like. But none of this is in itself nonsensical.

So as we can see here you have gone from a predetermined set of conclusions for which you are refining your assumptions, to a hypothesis you are supposedly investigating to see if it is correct (mimicking the scientific method). So, clearly you've contradicted yourself. I will await evidence that this new method is the one you're following. But that would mean the assumptions of xianity are no longer assumptions at all, not articles of faith, but hypotheses being tested -- and having already failed at the simplest test of parsimony.

When you consider the fact that I never said that refining my assumptions was my only or even my most important objective here, I think it's quite clear no contradiction between the two exists.

Let me lay things out as clearly as I can: My procedure for defining my beliefs in an ongoing manner goes something like the following:

1. Adopt an intuitive hypothesis (i.e., belief system).

2. Examine whether this hypothesis is logically consistent and concurs with the available evidence. If not, either alter the hypothesis so that it meets these criteria, or if this is impossible find a new hypothesis (again, intuitively). Once a consistent hypothesis is found, then proceed to 3.

3. Compare the hypothesis with alternatives on the basis of: soft evidence (as I defined in my previous post), number of necessary independent assumptions, and willingness to accept the implications (and possibly other things which I am forgetting at the moment) - the first being rather more important and the other two of about equal value.

If an alternative is deemed superior on these grounds, then investigate if a hybrid between the two, combining the best elements of both, is possible - if not, simply adopt the alternative. Either way, return to step 2 and check the new hypothesis for consistency. Leave the original hypothesis aside, to be returned to if the "better" one is discarded later.

If no alternative is deemed superior, then proceed to 4.

4. Be satisfied with the hypothesis/belief system.

Okay so that was rather complicated - but basically I think that's the way I tend to approach these sorts of questions in practice. I don't of course claim that it is anything like the scientific method - I am merely trying to describe my thought processes as best I can. And of course it is not all as simple as this - because I am constantly going back to see whether such-and-such an argument is really valid, whether such-and-such a concept is really coherent, etc.

But in any case: you can see clearly (I hope!) that testing hypotheses is my overall goal, and refining assumptions is a small step along the way (it's part of step 3).

tytalus wrote:

As I said to Thommo: The only alternative, from my point of view, seems to be a universal agnosticism (indeed more than that - not even believing anything either way) with regard to any question which cannot be answered using reason and the evidence potentially available to me. However, you of course may know of methods which I do not! In which case, I would be genuinely grateful to hear them

What is wrong with the answer 'I don't know' when you don't know the answer to a question, anyway?

Let me state it again if it wasn't clear enough already: I do not know whether or not God exists. By the dictionary definitions of both terms, I'm an agnostic Christian theist.

But despite not knowing, I can't just leave the question there and not even ask it, so to speak. If a possible answer is put forward then I want to investigate it on whatever grounds I can - and not on grounds which immediately preclude any answer at all, either. And if a possible answer seems promising, then - well, then very nearly by definition, I believe in it.

And yes, of course, wanting to investigate these sorts of questions in this manner is, in itself, a way in which I seek emotional satisfaction. But to be perfectly honest, I'm actually fine with that. This is the sort of emotion I feel I can live with.

By the way. Rereading the thread, it seems like there is a post of mine which I intended to submit, but which somehow ended up not getting posted (probably I forgot to hit submit or something). I will see what I can do about reposting it at some point.

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Well, we have evidence that trains exist.
We have evidence that trains run on time.

It is irrational to assume that the next train will be on time if trains don't always run on time, but it's far more likely to be correct than that the next train to come along will be a unicorn.

Surely this kind of reasoning is elementary? It's dramatically more likely that a given train will be on time than that it will spontaneously turn into a flock of seagulls, no?

Please confirm you concur with this last premise question (which isn't necessarily prohibited by the laws of physics I should add, it's just stupendously mind-numbingly unlikely according to our current models).

Certainly I concur with the premise as you have stated it - but, to play the Devil's advocate, does that actually make it less rational to believe that a train will turn into a flock of seagulls, than it is to believe that the train will be on time? Neither is supported by a rational argument based on available evidence. By your line of reasoning, it would seem to me that both are in principle equally irrational (since rationality as you have defined it seems to be a binary property) - and if this is not the case, then my understanding of your position must in some way be flawed.

Well, I've kept things simple here to explain the concept, but surely the extension to probabilistic reasoning is easy to understand? I can of course expand if it's not clear enough.

Sure though if we stick to propositional logic it's irrational. In terms of classifying "how irrational" as I say, the frequency with which the reasoning turns up a wrong answer is the relevant measure. And on that it's hard to be worse than predicting that the next train will turn into a flock of seagulls - despite this proposition being just as well evidenced as, say, god - to bring this back closer to the topic.

Please don't lose sight of the hypothetical nature of this - I can't think of any real person who would actually express absolute certainty in a non probabilistic sense of the next train being on time!

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Fair enough, I call this "making shit up" and I tend to regard people who "make shit up" as being irrational if they treat it as true or existent.

You can call it whatever you like, but I do not see, for myself, a viable alternative.

Not making shit up is the alternative.

Which translates as not believing anything at all, apart from those propositions for which a rational argument based on evidence exists. Again, unless you can demonstrate that reason can answer questions such as "Does God exist?" or "Do we have free will?", this is not, for me, a viable alternative.

Why is it not a "viable alternative"? All you've done is said you don't like the consequence of being rational. I've presented an alternative, which you acknowledge exists. Reality doesn't bow to our aesthetic preferences.

If you want to maintain a rational argument, you need to reason this part out.

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:So how do you discriminate between an acceptable unevidenced claim and an unacceptable one? Without such a criteria your position is inconsistent.

I am not quite sure, but I guess the way I would usually do it is: On the basis of "soft" evidence (for example, if A implies B, then B is soft evidence for A), and on the basis of whether or not I am willing to live with the consequences of accepting the claim.

That's fallacious reasoning unfortunately and provides no answer for the question.

How exactly is it fallacious?

By the way, I realise I have again failed to be precise here: I should have defined B as being soft evidence for A if A implies B, and in addition ¬A does not imply B. Obviously propositions which are necessarily true ought not to be included in the definition.

Well it's fallacious in that your willingness to "live with" the consequences of a claim about an object's existence in reality has no bearing on the truth of whether the object actually exists in reality. This is the archetype fallacious reasoning that was mocked in the cartoon parodying the "creationist method" about a page back.

It's also rather suspect to claim that there's "soft evidence" for an unevidenced claim.

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:
So you know that knowledge cannot be imparted from outside? But that falls to the same argument you put up... your argument is self-defeating.

Your argument didn't state that knowledge had been imparted from outside. If one were to say "I know that God exists because the knowledge has been placed in my brain by an external source, therefore God does not exist", then that would be a different argument. In that case, the immediate question would be "What is this external source? How do you know that it is reliable?" etc., etc.

Nor did it state that knowledge wasn't imparted from inside (I am not asserting whether or not it was). Therefore it could have been, therefore you need to know this to assert that I don't know.

But it's interesting that you are now challenging me to prove my claim, when my point was that you wouldn't find this claim acceptable precisely because it was unevidenced...

QED.

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Omnipotence - all powerful (can do anything)
Omniscience - all knowing (knows everything)

Of course these may not be "sensible" by your standards because they lead to logical contradictions. As far as I'm concerned no other definition is "sensible" (because it's merely starting from here then trying to rationalise a belief).

They may be sensible, but they're not definitions. "Anything" and "Everything" haven't been defined. Any what? Every what?

(This isn't a frivolous question; how you define "anything" is pretty much the same question as how you define omnipotence.)

They are definitions. Thing denotes any logical object of the language.

Which language? I assume you mean English - in which case I would point out that English is a rather contradictory language in the first place.

Whatever logical language the theory is supposed to be constructed in.

Ragwortshire wrote:If I am mistaken and you mean one of the languages of formal logic, then I take my hat off to you - it's something I've never actually considered before as part of a definition of omnipotence or omniscience. And I think it actually might work rather well. Who knows?

It's the obvious one, it works fine... Just not from the theist's point of view, because as I said - it leads to contradictions, which was after all the point of the throw away example!

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Well, we have evidence that trains exist.
We have evidence that trains run on time.

It is irrational to assume that the next train will be on time if trains don't always run on time, but it's far more likely to be correct than that the next train to come along will be a unicorn.

Surely this kind of reasoning is elementary? It's dramatically more likely that a given train will be on time than that it will spontaneously turn into a flock of seagulls, no?

Please confirm you concur with this last premise question (which isn't necessarily prohibited by the laws of physics I should add, it's just stupendously mind-numbingly unlikely according to our current models).

Certainly I concur with the premise as you have stated it - but, to play the Devil's advocate, does that actually make it less rational to believe that a train will turn into a flock of seagulls, than it is to believe that the train will be on time? Neither is supported by a rational argument based on available evidence. By your line of reasoning, it would seem to me that both are in principle equally irrational (since rationality as you have defined it seems to be a binary property) - and if this is not the case, then my understanding of your position must in some way be flawed.

Well, I've kept things simple here to explain the concept, but surely the extension to probabilistic reasoning is easy to understand? I can of course expand if it's not clear enough.

I'd be very grateful - not because anything you've said so far is at all unclear, but because once probability enters the equation I can see more than one way (in principle, anyway) of extending the concept.

Thommo wrote:Sure though if we stick to propositional logic it's irrational. In terms of classifying "how irrational" as I say, the frequency with which the reasoning turns up a wrong answer is the relevant measure. And on that it's hard to be worse than predicting that the next train will turn into a flock of seagulls - despite this proposition being just as well evidenced as, say, god - to bring this back closer to the topic.

Well of course - but there are two different concepts here. One is a given fact being well-evidenced, and the other is that fact being likely to be true. These are, at least on the face of it, different measures of correctness or reasonableness.

Thommo wrote:Please don't lose sight of the hypothetical nature of this - I can't think of any real person who would actually express absolute certainty in a non probabilistic sense of the next train being on time!

Of course not - I think it's worth mentioning that I don't think one can ever have any kind of certainty without evidence. So far as certainty goes, I agree very much with your line of reasoning. But nevertheless, there's no probability involved (or at least I don't perceive there to be) when I say I believe that a certain train will be on time.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:Which translates as not believing anything at all, apart from those propositions for which a rational argument based on evidence exists. Again, unless you can demonstrate that reason can answer questions such as "Does God exist?" or "Do we have free will?", this is not, for me, a viable alternative.

Why is it not a "viable alternative"? All you've done is said you don't like the consequence of being rational. I've presented an alternative, which you acknowledge exists. Reality doesn't bow to our aesthetic preferences.

If you want to maintain a rational argument, you need to reason this part out.

Because to me, these questions cry out to be asked even if they cannot be answered by reason. I admit that this is fundamentally an emotional issue for me, but at least it is not the sort of emotion which immediately implies a bias in what beliefs one eventually arrives at - only a bias in whether to believe anything at all on the subjects in question.

I am not claiming to be privy to absolute truth, and so nor am I demanding that reality bow to my aesthetic preferences. However, my actions in deciding whether to believe something, or nothing, are indeed influenced by aesthetics and by emotions, and in this particular case I don't see any obvious reason for me to avoid this influence.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:So how do you discriminate between an acceptable unevidenced claim and an unacceptable one? Without such a criteria your position is inconsistent.

I am not quite sure, but I guess the way I would usually do it is: On the basis of "soft" evidence (for example, if A implies B, then B is soft evidence for A), and on the basis of whether or not I am willing to live with the consequences of accepting the claim.

That's fallacious reasoning unfortunately and provides no answer for the question.

How exactly is it fallacious?

By the way, I realise I have again failed to be precise here: I should have defined B as being soft evidence for A if A implies B, and in addition ¬A does not imply B. Obviously propositions which are necessarily true ought not to be included in the definition.

Well it's fallacious in that your willingness to "live with" the consequences of a claim about an object's existence in reality has no bearing on the truth of whether the object actually exists in reality. This is the archetype fallacious reasoning that was mocked in the cartoon parodying the "creationist method" about a page back.

Certainly; this one is more of a pragmatic consideration than anything else - if my beliefs are perfectly consistent but imply things I consider terrible, then that is fine for being rational, but not so great for my life as a whole. In any case I would rank it as being rather less important than soft evidence.

By the way, I'm not trying to claim that the criteria I've stated are the most rational ones available; rather, I am trying to identify the criteria I use in practice. I might well modify them over time - particularly if I had alternative ones which I felt able to accept.

Thommo wrote:It's also rather suspect to claim that there's "soft evidence" for an unevidenced claim.

Why? So far we've been defining a "claim supported by evidence" in quite a narrow sense - to me it is quite logical to formulate a broader definition, for the sake of comparison if nothing else.

If you think the definition I have given is fallacious, by all means point out why.

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:
So you know that knowledge cannot be imparted from outside? But that falls to the same argument you put up... your argument is self-defeating.

Your argument didn't state that knowledge had been imparted from outside. If one were to say "I know that God exists because the knowledge has been placed in my brain by an external source, therefore God does not exist", then that would be a different argument. In that case, the immediate question would be "What is this external source? How do you know that it is reliable?" etc., etc.

Nor did it state that knowledge wasn't imparted from inside (I am not asserting whether or not it was). Therefore it could have been, therefore you need to know this to assert that I don't know.

But it's interesting that you are now challenging me to prove my claim, when my point was that you wouldn't find this claim acceptable precisely because it was unevidenced...

Hmm. I wonder, then, if all this talk of knowing things is something of a red herring. Why not just state "God does not exist", and be done with it? Since in that case, my problem with the argument would be that not only that it is unevidenced (of course if it was evidenced I would accept it), but further that I do not know even of any soft evidence for the non-existence of God. I cannot think of anything which is particularly implied by there being no God (though of course, this may just be my lack of imagination!).

Thommo wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

Thommo wrote:Thing denotes any logical object of the language.

Which language? I assume you mean English - in which case I would point out that English is a rather contradictory language in the first place.

Whatever logical language the theory is supposed to be constructed in.

Ok, now I am very interested.

In fact, I am going to think about this one some more and see just what language one would ideally construct a theory of omnipotence or omniscience in. Feel free to suggest one in the meantime, if you know of one.

Ragwortshire wrote:

tytalus wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:
A rather simplistic way of putting it would be that my beliefs are mostly the hypotheses which are intuitive to me. So: Is it really that nonsensical to take an intuitive hypothesis, and attempt to investigate whether or not it is correct? And one measure (among others!) by which one can do so is to investigate the minimum number of logically independent assumptions involved.

That's not a simplistic way of putting it; that's a completely different way of putting it. And to demonstrate it, once again let's go to the videotape. Let's compare.

Ragwortshire wrote:I concede that my beliefs as they stand do not fare well by this particular measure, but that is not nonsensical. It implies certain questions, such as: Is it possible to come to the same or similar conclusions by means of fewer assumptions? What is the fewest number of assumptions needed?, etc. And it also implies that my beliefs don't live up to my ideals of what a perfect belief system ought to be like. But none of this is in itself nonsensical.

So as we can see here you have gone from a predetermined set of conclusions for which you are refining your assumptions, to a hypothesis you are supposedly investigating to see if it is correct (mimicking the scientific method). So, clearly you've contradicted yourself. I will await evidence that this new method is the one you're following. But that would mean the assumptions of xianity are no longer assumptions at all, not articles of faith, but hypotheses being tested -- and having already failed at the simplest test of parsimony.

When you consider the fact that I never said that refining my assumptions was my only or even my most important objective here, I think it's quite clear no contradiction between the two exists.

We'll have to agree to disagree on this one, Ragwortshire; I think there is a vast difference between the terms you're falsely equating here, that is, 'correct' vs. 'consistent', i.e. not explicitly debunked by reality. So far, from your three explanations I have 2 points for consistent vs. one for correct.

Let me lay things out as clearly as I can: My procedure for defining my beliefs in an ongoing manner goes something like the following:

1. Adopt an intuitive hypothesis (i.e., belief system).

2. Examine whether this hypothesis is logically consistent and concurs with the available evidence. If not, either alter the hypothesis so that it meets these criteria, or if this is impossible find a new hypothesis (again, intuitively). Once a consistent hypothesis is found, then proceed to 3.

No evidence so far that your belief system has been altered; though we have plenty of evidence of tortured and abandoned apologetics. I know of no credible evidence for, say, immortal souls. No alteration of hypotheses here. But that's fine, they're just your rules after all. Nothing riding on whether or not your arguments live up to them.

3. Compare the hypothesis with alternatives on the basis of: soft evidence (as I defined in my previous post), number of necessary independent assumptions, and willingness to accept the implications (and possibly other things which I am forgetting at the moment) - the first being rather more important and the other two of about equal value.

Thommo seems to have dealt with this adequately; your standard of evidence here is simply poor and not rigorous, and so I rightly dismiss it. It is interesting, though, how this sort of intuitive approach is so selectively applied by the believer as demonstrated by Occam's Laser's old favorite, 'you owe me $10,000.'

If an alternative is deemed superior on these grounds, then investigate if a hybrid between the two, combining the best elements of both, is possible - if not, simply adopt the alternative. Either way, return to step 2 and check the new hypothesis for consistency. Leave the original hypothesis aside, to be returned to if the "better" one is discarded later.

If no alternative is deemed superior, then proceed to 4.

4. Be satisfied with the hypothesis/belief system.

Again, no evidence for change; plenty of evidence for stasis, and of course emotional satisfaction.

Okay so that was rather complicated - but basically I think that's the way I tend to approach these sorts of questions in practice. I don't of course claim that it is anything like the scientific method - I am merely trying to describe my thought processes as best I can. And of course it is not all as simple as this - because I am constantly going back to see whether such-and-such an argument is really valid, whether such-and-such a concept is really coherent, etc.

Does this mean I can safely rule out this claim of yours and give the game to 'consistent' over 'correct'?

Ragwortshire wrote:Is it really that nonsensical to take an intuitive hypothesis, and attempt to investigate whether or not it is correct?

Because science and reason do better than consistent; they do correct. Or they test to failure, and refine.

But in any case: you can see clearly (I hope!) that testing hypotheses is my overall goal, and refining assumptions is a small step along the way (it's part of step 3).

Again, your efforts to diminish this are admirable, but it's the contradiction of 'correct' vs. 'consistent' I was interested in here. I suspect but do not assume that 'consistent' will win out; you may of course redefine and present some more obfuscatory or contradictory rhetoric to confuse the issue further.

tytalus wrote:

As I said to Thommo: The only alternative, from my point of view, seems to be a universal agnosticism (indeed more than that - not even believing anything either way) with regard to any question which cannot be answered using reason and the evidence potentially available to me. However, you of course may know of methods which I do not! In which case, I would be genuinely grateful to hear them

What is wrong with the answer 'I don't know' when you don't know the answer to a question, anyway?

Let me state it again if it wasn't clear enough already: I do not know whether or not God exists. By the dictionary definitions of both terms, I'm an agnostic Christian theist.

But despite not knowing, I can't just leave the question there and not even ask it, so to speak. If a possible answer is put forward then I want to investigate it on whatever grounds I can - and not on grounds which immediately preclude any answer at all, either. And if a possible answer seems promising, then - well, then very nearly by definition, I believe in it.

Please explain how asking the question 'does god exist?' and answering it with 'I don't know' is not even asking it. I mean, 'agnostic xian' is lol-worthy enough -- god is unknowable and yet you believe thus and so about it -- but the language just fails you here. 'I don't know' is an answer. It may be an answer you don't care for, but it is still an answer and the question was asked. I have asked and answered it: dispute the claim if you wish.

And yes, of course, wanting to investigate these sorts of questions in this manner is, in itself, a way in which I seek emotional satisfaction. But to be perfectly honest, I'm actually fine with that. This is the sort of emotion I feel I can live with.

Well, I'm certainly pleased that such rank nonsense achieves emotional satisfaction for you. It certainly does naught else of import.

Ragwortshire wrote:Hmm. I wonder, then, if all this talk of knowing things is something of a red herring. Why not just state "God does not exist", and be done with it? Since in that case, my problem with the argument would be that not only that it is unevidenced (of course if it was evidenced I would accept it), but further that I do not know even of any soft evidence for the non-existence of God. I cannot think of anything which is particularly implied by there being no God (though of course, this may just be my lack of imagination!).

I'll just answer this one and come back to the rest later.

Of course there's soft evidence for the non-existence of God!

It's claimed in the bible that whatever one sincerely wishes for in prayer (sorry I can't quote, if it REALLY matters I'll look it up) then one receives. This claim is false.

God (as defined in the bible) -> Prayer works

Prayer doesn't work. (Actually, that's hard evidence, but it's also soft evidence).

There are fuckloads of these soft evidences - if god does not exist, resurrection is impossible, resurrection is impossible -- if god does not exist, then the universe obeys natural laws, the universe obeys natural laws.

The problem here is the equivocation of duplicitous apologists (not to say that you're amongst them) that dodge such arguments by flitting back to a deist vague god with no specified attributes against these claims only to mask their actual belief that Jesus rose from the dead.

I don't find this "soft evidence" at all compelling I have to say - which is because I don't accept it for either side of the argument, which is where you and I differ.

Thommo wrote:

Sophie T wrote:

Thommo wrote:

Sophie T wrote:If you continue with this line of argument, aren't you going to have to agree that it is better to kill yourself and be rational (if you want to kill yourself because you find life boring) than it is to be a theist (and be irrational)?

Yes, I see no problem with that conclusion (as presented on those simple terms, where the consequences of killing oneself were largely not considered etc.).

Hmmmm....well I don't know what else to say to that! However, this idea is certainly giving me pause regarding my own beliefs. If, as an atheist, I am required (logically so) to adopt this viewpoint, I might just have to become a theist. Of course, I'll have to make up a God---maybe I'll revert back, at this point, to believing that Skippy exists. Yes, that's what I'm going to do. I am now a Skippyist.

I am actually intrigued by this.

It looks like you actually think that you can argue that for a person who is just unhappy enough to want to kill themselves it's better to be a theist and continue to be unhappy than to kill themselves (which is what they want to do), is that right?

Without introducing more premises (which were excluded from the example) I can't see how that possibly is going to work. I can see it working if you allow for "maybe the person will change their mind later and not be unhappy enough to kill themselves", but then that would work just as well in the first place - i.e. they wouldn't need to convert to be a theist (and indeed it arguably contravenes the premise that they are unhappy enough to kill themselves).

Well, I've been thinking about this on and off all day, and I don't know that I can provide any rational answers to these questions. I'm feeling a little vulnerable right now because my newfound faith is so new and well . . . fragile. To be perfectly honest, I'm actually afraid to subject it to any sort of rigorous questioning. I realize that's irrational, but then . . . if I believe (and I do) that it is rational to sometimes be irrational--then I'm kind of stuck. At the same time, I do want to be intellectually honest, so maybe if I could just start out with one small question at a time. I don't remember what the original question was, but if you would be willing to ask just one small (non-threatening) question, maybe I would feel brave enough to start with that. Thank you in advance for your patience.

What colour is skippy?

Thommo wrote:What colour is skippy?

Skippy is invisible.

Thommo wrote:It's claimed in the bible that whatever one sincerely wishes for in prayer (sorry I can't quote, if it REALLY matters I'll look it up) then one receives. This claim is false.

God (as defined in the bible) -> Prayer works

Prayer doesn't work. (Actually, that's hard evidence, but it's also soft evidence).

As you say, this is hard evidence - which is why my conception of God does not involve him answering prayers in this sort of way.

Thommo wrote:There are fuckloads of these soft evidences - if god does not exist, resurrection is impossible, resurrection is impossible -- if god does not exist, then the universe obeys natural laws, the universe obeys natural laws.

What reason is there at all for either of these things to be correct? If God does not exist, it does not follow that the universe must obey natural laws. Similarly for resurrections - just stating that God doesn't exist doesn't mean there can't be some other being which occasionally raises people from the dead, or even some sort of method accessible by humans for raising people from the dead. (I don't personally believe either of these, but while we're on the level of whether or not the universe obeys natural laws at all, then they are possible at least in principle.)

Incidentally, how does one prove that resurrections are impossible? That would be of course be hard evidence against my beliefs, if it were shown by rational argument to be the case.

By the way - this is one of the things that I should have posted earlier - I do concede that the alleged resurrection of Jesus is at least in principle tractable by reason. So it does turn out that in addition to questions reason can never answer, I also tend to use other methods regarding questions reason on the evidence potentially available to me (now or in the future) cannot answer.

Thommo wrote:The problem here is the equivocation of duplicitous apologists (not to say that you're amongst them) that dodge such arguments by flitting back to a deist vague god with no specified attributes against these claims only to mask their actual belief that Jesus rose from the dead.

I agree, this is a serious fallacy which I was at the very least guilty of at some point in the past. Belief in the Resurrection (or any other miraculous event, for that matter) does need to be examined separately even if one believes in a God of some sort.

Thommo wrote:I don't find this "soft evidence" at all compelling I have to say - which is because I don't accept it for either side of the argument, which is where you and I differ.

Very well put. I also think this is one point where the difference is rather fundamental. Though I do accept that if I accept this sort of soft evidence as a factor in belief, then it ought to be for both sides equally.

tytalus wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:

tytalus wrote:So as we can see here you have gone from a predetermined set of conclusions for which you are refining your assumptions, to a hypothesis you are supposedly investigating to see if it is correct (mimicking the scientific method). So, clearly you've contradicted yourself. I will await evidence that this new method is the one you're following. But that would mean the assumptions of xianity are no longer assumptions at all, not articles of faith, but hypotheses being tested -- and having already failed at the simplest test of parsimony.

When you consider the fact that I never said that refining my assumptions was my only or even my most important objective here, I think it's quite clear no contradiction between the two exists.

We'll have to agree to disagree on this one, Ragwortshire; I think there is a vast difference between the terms you're falsely equating here, that is, 'correct' vs. 'consistent', i.e. not explicitly debunked by reality. So far, from your three explanations I have 2 points for consistent vs. one for correct.

Apologies - the equivocation was actually unintentional, and I ought not to have used the word "correct". Of course there is nothing to say that a belief which is consistent, for which there is soft evidence, which I can live with and which rests on few assumptions must necessarily be correct. It just makes the belief, well, believable (for me at least). And so a belief which is consistent and meets the other three conditions (in order) better than any other belief, is simply, to me, the most believable belief.

tytalus wrote:No evidence so far that your belief system has been altered; though we have plenty of evidence of tortured and abandoned apologetics. I know of no credible evidence for, say, immortal souls. No alteration of hypotheses here. But that's fine, they're just your rules after all. Nothing riding on whether or not your arguments live up to them.

I must admit I am rather disappointed by this response. I thought you might give some description of what was actually wrong with the method I laid out, or how it could be improved. Alternatively, if you think I have some approximation to the right method, but am failing to actually follow it, then I thought you might point to a specific example where I have failed.

I have, in fact, altered my beliefs many times over the years for a wide variety of reasons, but I do not see what evidence I could possibly provide, on this forum, for this fact. If you can suggest evidence which I could provide but have not actually provided, then by all means, go for it!

tytalus wrote:

3. Compare the hypothesis with alternatives on the basis of: soft evidence (as I defined in my previous post), number of necessary independent assumptions, and willingness to accept the implications (and possibly other things which I am forgetting at the moment) - the first being rather more important and the other two of about equal value.

Thommo seems to have dealt with this adequately; your standard of evidence here is simply poor and not rigorous, and so I rightly dismiss it. It is interesting, though, how this sort of intuitive approach is so selectively applied by the believer as demonstrated by Occam's Laser's old favorite, 'you owe me $10,000.'

I'm pretty sure 'you owe me $10,000' is inconsistent with reality. If I owed someone money, there would be a reason for it (that is, after all, what it means to owe someone money), and if there was a reason for owing such a large sum then I would doubtless remember it. But I do not remember any such reason. Therefore I do not owe you $10,000.

On the other hand, I cannot possibly fault the method here. Present me with a statement which satisfies all of the conditions I have listed, but which I would find absurd (on the scale of 'you owe me $10,000'), and I will happily concede that the method I have outlined is irrevocably flawed.

tytalus wrote:

Okay so that was rather complicated - but basically I think that's the way I tend to approach these sorts of questions in practice. I don't of course claim that it is anything like the scientific method - I am merely trying to describe my thought processes as best I can. And of course it is not all as simple as this - because I am constantly going back to see whether such-and-such an argument is really valid, whether such-and-such a concept is really coherent, etc.

Does this mean I can safely rule out this claim of yours and give the game to 'consistent' over 'correct'?

Of course - and I apologise for ever making such a claim in the first place. Although you can easily see that it is not just consistency I am referring to here - I cannot think of any word apart from "believable" to describe the concept I am trying to get at.

tytalus wrote:Please explain how asking the question 'does god exist?' and answering it with 'I don't know' is not even asking it. I mean, 'agnostic xian' is lol-worthy enough -- god is unknowable and yet you believe thus and so about it -- but the language just fails you here. 'I don't know' is an answer. It may be an answer you don't care for, but it is still an answer and the question was asked. I have asked and answered it: dispute the claim if you wish.

Technically, "I don't know" is merely a statement about your relation to the question. It's short for "I do not know what the answer to this question is." That clearly cannot itself be an answer to the question! If it were, you would know the answer - after all you presumably know that you don't know.

Also what is wrong with being an agnostic theist? It merely highlights the distinction between knowledge and belief. Surely if someone described themselves as an agnostic positive atheist (not knowing whether or not God exists, but believing that God does not exist), that would not be a major problem, right?

tytalus wrote:

And yes, of course, wanting to investigate these sorts of questions in this manner is, in itself, a way in which I seek emotional satisfaction. But to be perfectly honest, I'm actually fine with that. This is the sort of emotion I feel I can live with.

Well, I'm certainly pleased that such rank nonsense achieves emotional satisfaction for you. It certainly does naught else of import.

At this point this is just name-calling. I've given you lots of scope, by outlining my method for deciding what to believe, to criticise that method quite freely. If it's nonsense, you should be able to tell me why it's nonsense - preferably establishing this firmly beforehand.

Ragwortshire wrote:Incidentally, how does one prove that resurrections are impossible?

You want to believe something purely because no one has shown it to be impossible? I'm not saying you believe in resurrections, but clearly you believe in some sort of mumbo-jumbo, largely on the strength of its "not having been shown to be impossible".

The people with whom you are wibbling are simply suggesting that you not believe something simply because it feels good to you to believe it and no one has shown it to be impossible. What happens when you do that is that some people will make fun of you for having done so, and your complaints that people are being impolite to you are the result.

In sum, your beliefs are the foundation of your asking people to be polite to you for no reason at all when you spew bollocks, because you're such a nice guy. If you were a nice guy, you wouldn't come to a forum where you can expect people to make fun of you for spewing bollocks and demand that they not make fun of you for it.

It's human nature for people to make fun of each other's foibles. It's your religion that says we must all "kumbaiyah".

I would not tell you not to "believe". Obviously, it is not enough simply to "believe". In addition, one must "profess".

Cito di Pense wrote:

Ragwortshire wrote:Incidentally, how does one prove that resurrections are impossible?

You want to believe something purely because no one has shown it to be impossible? I'm not saying you believe in resurrections, but clearly you believe in some sort of mumbo-jumbo, largely on the strength of its "not having been shown to be impossible".

Obviously there is a massive gap between "we do not know that resurrections are impossible" and "I believe that Jesus was raised from the dead". Nobody is suggesting that the two statements are in any way equivalent.

However, if Thommo wishes to use the statement that resurrections are impossible as a premise in an argument, then naturally I want to know how this premise is to be justified!

Resurrections are possible, and happen many times a day on operating tables or otherwise in the company of crash-carts & people delivering CPR (though less successful than some might think). From the evidence concerning such resurrections (the process of which is quite well known to medical science), we can conclude in certain circumstances a body can be 'dead' for some time & still be successfully reanimated, albeit with varying degrees of brain damage, from apparently none at all, to quite a considerable amount, rendering the patient permanently bereft of higher brain function.

It is important to note that it is possible to provide data demonstrating that death has occurred, and a former corpse as proof of the resurrection. In the matter of the alleged Jesus of Nazereth, with have some accounts of his death (unevidenced) & his resurrection (unevidenced). I'd happily accept the possibility of his resurrection, but a little critical thinking suggests a number of qually possible alternative explanations for the accounts. No miracles needed.