Cito di Pense (#2090edited by CdP) wrote:

zoon wrote:it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion, and why it is so fiercely defended.

Why do you think they 'evolved' to have such an 'illusion'? Is it not absurd to think that 'illusions' have an evolutionary efficacy?

Zoon: Plenty of illusions have evolutionary efficacy, for example, eye spots on the wings of butterflies probably evolved to give predators like birds the illusion that a large and fearsome animal is looking at them.

Robert Trivers, a respected evolutionary scientist, has recently written a book “Deceit and self-deception: fooling yourself the better to fool others” about the possible survival value of self-deception, which would be an example of an evolved cognitive illusion in humans. He first put forward this suggestion about thirty years ago, and many researchers take it seriously.

DavidMcC wrote:Cito, I read zoon's post as implying that FW isn't just an illusion, but your reply assumed that it is, and that zoon thought it was too. Surely a misreading.

As ever, free will has multiple definitions. I would say that the basic definition is metaphysical, that people have some essential freedom, beyond merely social freedom. I was also stretching the term to refer to the social freedom which members of a human group give to each other. I think the social freedom is real (and important for functioning human groups), and that the metaphysical freedom is an illusion but a useful one.

If it is important for the stability of a human group that all the members should be careful to allow each other freedom of action (within limits), then an illusion that all people who count as group members have, by their nature, a core essence of freedom which ought morally to be protected, might well be a useful illusion. Groups whose members were less likely to try taking advantage of each other, or were more likely to be attacked when they did try it, may well have been less liable to internal dissention than other groups.

GrahamH (#2097) wrote:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

sep wrote:“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millennia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. (Clearly, there will also be epistemic conditions on responsibility as well, such as being aware—or failing that, being culpably unaware—of relevant alternatives to one's action and of the alternatives' moral significance.) But the significance of free will is not exhausted by its connection to moral responsibility. Free will also appears to be a condition on desert for one's accomplishments (why sustained effort and creative work are praiseworthy); on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the value we accord to love and friendship.

This suggests strongly that free will is primarily a social concept, based on people’s reactions to each others’ behaviour. If someone has free will then they are morally responsible for their actions, which cashes out in physical, evolutionary, terms as other members of the group ganging up on them if they misbehave (edit: small children or mentally disabled people, who are not accorded free will, are controlled at all times but are less likely to be punished if they misbehave –the controller, e.g. the parent is more likely to be punished if the misbehaviour was serious). The idea may be metaphysical, but the practice is solidly physical, with a clear evolutionary rationale. Likewise, if a person with free will behaves well, e.g. shows sustained effort or produces creative work, then they can expect praise and other rewards from the rest of the group. Again, the idea of praise may be metaphysical, but the rewards are likely to be translated into greater reproductive success.

zoon wrote:...

This suggests strongly that free will is primarily a social concept, based on people’s reactions to each others’ behaviour. If someone has free will then they are morally responsible for their actions, which cashes out in physical, evolutionary, terms as other members of the group ganging up on them if they misbehave (edit: small children or mentally disabled people, who are not accorded free will, are controlled at all times but are less likely to be punished if they misbehave –the controller, e.g. the parent is more likely to be punished if the misbehaviour was serious). The idea may be metaphysical, but the practice is solidly physical, with a clear evolutionary rationale. Likewise, if a person with free will behaves well, e.g. shows sustained effort or produces creative work, then they can expect praise and other rewards from the rest of the group. Again, the idea of praise may be metaphysical, but the rewards are likely to be translated into greater reproductive success.

I agree that free will is a social concept. The idea of will, and being free to exercise it hardly makes sense without others acting conditionally to limit one's freedom of action. Treat certain others in certain ways and you can avoid certain constraints on your actions.

I don't see anyone here disputing that we have free will in a social sense.

The disputes here seem to be due to some posters overlooking this bit:

SEP wrote:The majority view, however, is that we can readily conceive willings that are not free. Indeed, much of the debate about free will centers around whether we human beings have it, yet virtually no one doubts that we will to do this and that. The main perceived threats to our freedom of will are various alleged determinisms: physical/causal; psychological; biological; theological. For each variety of determinism, there are philosophers who (i) deny its reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds; (ii) accept its reality but argue for its compatibility with free will; or (iii) accept its reality and deny its compatibility with free will. (See the entries on compatibilism; causal determinism; fatalism; arguments for incompatibilism; and divine foreknowledge and free will.) There are also a few who say the truth of any variety of determinism is irrelevant because free will is simply impossible.If there is such a thing as free will, it has many dimensions...

zoon wrote:

Cito di Pense (#2090edited by CdP) wrote:

zoon wrote:it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion, and why it is so fiercely defended.

Why do you think they 'evolved' to have such an 'illusion'? Is it not absurd to think that 'illusions' have an evolutionary efficacy?

Zoon: Plenty of illusions have evolutionary efficacy, for example, eye spots on the wings of butterflies probably evolved to give predators like birds the illusion that a large and fearsome animal is looking at them.

Robert Trivers, a respected evolutionary scientist, has recently written a book “Deceit and self-deception: fooling yourself the better to fool others” about the possible survival value of self-deception, which would be an example of an evolved cognitive illusion in humans. He first put forward this suggestion about thirty years ago, and many researchers take it seriously.

DavidMcC wrote:Cito, I read zoon's post as implying that FW isn't just an illusion, but your reply assumed that it is, and that zoon thought it was too. Surely a misreading.

As ever, free will has multiple definitions. I would say that the basic definition is metaphysical, that people have some essential freedom, beyond merely social freedom. I was also stretching the term to refer to the social freedom which members of a human group give to each other. I think the social freedom is real (and important for functioning human groups), and that the metaphysical freedom is an illusion but a useful one.

If it is important for the stability of a human group that all the members should be careful to allow each other freedom of action (within limits), then an illusion that all people who count as group members have, by their nature, a core essence of freedom which ought morally to be protected, might well be a useful illusion. Groups whose members were less likely to try taking advantage of each other, or were more likely to be attacked when they did try it, may well have been less liable to internal dissention than other groups.

GrahamH (#2097) wrote:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

sep wrote:“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millennia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. (Clearly, there will also be epistemic conditions on responsibility as well, such as being aware—or failing that, being culpably unaware—of relevant alternatives to one's action and of the alternatives' moral significance.) But the significance of free will is not exhausted by its connection to moral responsibility. Free will also appears to be a condition on desert for one's accomplishments (why sustained effort and creative work are praiseworthy); on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the value we accord to love and friendship.

This suggests strongly that free will is primarily a social concept, based on people’s reactions to each others’ behaviour. If someone has free will then they are morally responsible for their actions, which cashes out in physical, evolutionary, terms as other members of the group ganging up on them if they misbehave (edit: small children or mentally disabled people, who are not accorded free will, are controlled at all times but are less likely to be punished if they misbehave –the controller, e.g. the parent is more likely to be punished if the misbehaviour was serious). The idea may be metaphysical, but the practice is solidly physical, with a clear evolutionary rationale. Likewise, if a person with free will behaves well, e.g. shows sustained effort or produces creative work, then they can expect praise and other rewards from the rest of the group. Again, the idea of praise may be metaphysical, but the rewards are likely to be translated into greater reproductive success.

What gregariousness (or sociality) in a species whose individuals are free-willed (in my sense) does is to make it necessary to impose a uniform moral code on the group. Otherwise, FW would cause everyone to have their own version of the moral code, with inevitable differences between individuals, leading to avoidable conflict within the group. Thus, gregariousness does not create the "illusion of FW", but does make a moral code necessary.

Deleted double post (yet again - the browser is so slow, I end up clicking twice. Sorry.)

SEP wrote:The will has also recently become a target of empirical study in neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Benjamin Libet (2002) conducted experiments designed to determine the timing of conscious willings or decisions to act in relation to brain activity associated with the physical initiation of behavior. Interpretation of the results is highly controversial. Libet himself concludes that the studies provide strong evidence that actions are already underway shortly before the agent wills to do it. As a result, we do not consciously initiate our actions, though he suggests that we might nonetheless retain the ability to veto actions that are initiated by unconscious psychological structures
...

Graham, FW certainly is "more than just making conscious decisions", as I have already said. However, the above quote seems to show that Libet contradicts himself, because, if we can, indeed, sometimes veto actions that we ourselves unconsciously initiate, then that is a free will (in the form of the "free won't"), not a mere illusion of it. Also, of course, the timing issue does not show what he thought it showed.

EDIT: The most important aspects of FW that is additional to mere conscious choices, are as I''ve often said, the ability to change our minds without external cause, and the imperfect predictability of alternative ideas/thoughts.

zoon wrote:If materialists want to argue that free will is some sort of illusion, it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion..

You raise a good point. I think the illusion of free will is simply the experience of being privy to a decision process along with being fed the emotions that are created as options are weighed up, e.g. 'mmm mars bar taste' when deciding whether to buy a Mars or Snickers. The question is why is our concious self made privy to this? A hard question that would probably require knowing why our 'concious self' is made privy to anything at all. So perhaps we'd first have to answer why ground apes have evolved the illusion of conciousness?

Panderos wrote:

zoon wrote:If materialists want to argue that free will is some sort of illusion, it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion..

You raise a good point. I think the illusion of free will is simply the experience of being privy to a decision process along with being fed the emotions that are created as options are weighed up, e.g. 'mmm mars bar taste' when deciding whether to buy a Mars or Snickers. The question is why is our concious self made privy to this? A hard question that would probably require knowing why our 'concious self' is made privy to anything at all. So perhaps we'd first have to answer why ground apes have evolved the illusion of conciousness?

Why are you so sure that everything is "just an illusion", Panderos? Is it because Sam Harris said so?

DavidMcC wrote:

SEP wrote:The will has also recently become a target of empirical study in neuroscience and cognitive psychology. Benjamin Libet (2002) conducted experiments designed to determine the timing of conscious willings or decisions to act in relation to brain activity associated with the physical initiation of behavior. Interpretation of the results is highly controversial. Libet himself concludes that the studies provide strong evidence that actions are already underway shortly before the agent wills to do it. As a result, we do not consciously initiate our actions, though he suggests that we might nonetheless retain the ability to veto actions that are initiated by unconscious psychological structures
...

Graham, FW certainly is "more than just making conscious decisions", as I have already said. However, the above quote seems to show that Libet contradicts himself, because, if we can, indeed, sometimes veto actions that we ourselves unconsciously initiate, then that is a free will (in the form of the "free won't"), not a mere illusion of it. Also, of course, the timing issue does not show what he thought it showed.

EDIT: The most important aspects of FW that is additional to mere conscious choices, are as I''ve often said, the ability to change our minds without external cause, and the imperfect predictability of alternative ideas/thoughts.

"Changing your mind" is no more or less "free" than "making your mind up". "without external cause" is nothing other than "no identified cause".
"Something extra"? Do you want special sauce on that?

This brings you round again to "will is uncaused cause". The idea that your thoughts of what you intend to do cause your subsequent actions. "Causality is a metaphysical assumption", as ughaibu is keen to proclaim, on another thread.

Panderos wrote:

zoon wrote:If materialists want to argue that free will is some sort of illusion, it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion..

You raise a good point. I think the illusion of free will is simply the experience of being privy to a decision process along with being fed the emotions that are created as options are weighed up, e.g. 'mmm mars bar taste' when deciding whether to buy a Mars or Snickers. The question is why is our concious self made privy to this? A hard question that would probably require knowing why our 'concious self' is made privy to anything at all. So perhaps we'd first have to answer why ground apes have evolved the illusion of conciousness?

It might be useful to register that a choice is being made, just as it could be useful to register that you are currently running from a predator, or earning goodwill credit with a kindness to the group leader. Its a way of connecting the dots to make a picture that can be recognised.

DavidMcC wrote:

Panderos wrote:

zoon wrote:If materialists want to argue that free will is some sort of illusion, it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion..

You raise a good point. I think the illusion of free will is simply the experience of being privy to a decision process along with being fed the emotions that are created as options are weighed up, e.g. 'mmm mars bar taste' when deciding whether to buy a Mars or Snickers. The question is why is our concious self made privy to this? A hard question that would probably require knowing why our 'concious self' is made privy to anything at all. So perhaps we'd first have to answer why ground apes have evolved the illusion of conciousness?

Why are you so sure that everything is "just an illusion", Panderos? Is it because Sam Harris said so?

Your trying to paint me as a Sam Harris drone is starting to grate. I have read as many of his books as you have William Lane Craig (I'm assuming that is zero).

GrahamH wrote:"Changing your mind" is no more or less "free" than "making your mind up". "without external cause" is nothing other than "no identified cause".

No, it isn't, because it doesn't necessarily happen. You still have an inadequate model of the brain, it seems, causing you to misinterpret hypotheses of FW. (And, no, this thread is not about WLC's particular version of wibbling something into its opposite.)

"Something extra"? Do you want special sauce on that?

Just another Cito-ism, devoid of meaning.

Panderos wrote:Your trying to paint me as a Sam Harris drone is starting to grate. I have read as many of his books as you have William Lane Craig (I'm assuming that is zero).

So, you think I'm WLC!!??
That's hilarious!

GrahamH wrote:

Panderos wrote:

zoon wrote:If materialists want to argue that free will is some sort of illusion, it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion..

You raise a good point. I think the illusion of free will is simply the experience of being privy to a decision process along with being fed the emotions that are created as options are weighed up, e.g. 'mmm mars bar taste' when deciding whether to buy a Mars or Snickers. The question is why is our concious self made privy to this? A hard question that would probably require knowing why our 'concious self' is made privy to anything at all. So perhaps we'd first have to answer why ground apes have evolved the illusion of conciousness?

It might be useful to register that a choice is being made, just as it could be useful to register that you are currently running from a predator, or earning goodwill credit with a kindness to the group leader. Its a way of connecting the dots to make a picture that can be recognised.

Indeed. I can certainly see that if some stuff is being 'registered', that some decision processes qualify as important enough to be 'registered'. But like I say that forces the question of why 'we' are made privy to anything at all. Not a question I particularly want to get into; I've seen those threads

DavidMcC wrote:

Panderos wrote:Your trying to paint me as a Sam Harris drone is starting to grate. I have read as many of his books as you have William Lane Craig (I'm assuming that is zero).

So, you think I'm WLC!!??
That's hilarious!

Lol. I should have said "William Lane Craig's".

What WLC does is to admit that his religious nonsense is only compatible with "no free will", then wibble his way round that contradiction.

DavidMcC wrote: You still have an inadequate model of the brain, it seems, causing you to misinterpret hypotheses of FW.

"Hypotheses of FW"? FFS

Random neuron firing ("uncaused cause"!) sets your will free! Hurrah!

Free will found in a race condition.

"Initial willing is a data spike. Final willing declared free and fair."

DavidMcC wrote:the above quote seems to show that Libet contradicts himself, because, if we can, indeed, sometimes veto actions that we ourselves unconsciously initiate, then that is a free will (in the form of the "free won't"), not a mere illusion of it.

Libet wasn't a free will denier, either before or after his famous experiment.

DavidMcC (#2103) wrote:What gregariousness (or sociality) in a species whose individuals are free-willed (in my sense) does is to make it necessary to impose a uniform moral code on the group. Otherwise, FW would cause everyone to have their own version of the moral code, with inevitable differences between individuals, leading to avoidable conflict within the group. Thus, gregariousness does not create the "illusion of FW", but does make a moral code necessary.

Unlike you, I would say that individuals have differing genetic interests, and that it is these, not free will, which make it necessary to impose a moral code on the group. I would argue that actively allowing each other freedom of action within limits is a part of the moral code for successfully functioning human groups, and that this is where free will appears. (Actively allowing freedom of action involves collective action against anyone who is attempting to to control others too much).

GrahamH (#2102) wrote:

zoon wrote:...

This suggests strongly that free will is primarily a social concept, based on people’s reactions to each others’ behaviour. If someone has free will then they are morally responsible for their actions, which cashes out in physical, evolutionary, terms as other members of the group ganging up on them if they misbehave (edit: small children or mentally disabled people, who are not accorded free will, are controlled at all times but are less likely to be punished if they misbehave –the controller, e.g. the parent is more likely to be punished if the misbehaviour was serious). The idea may be metaphysical, but the practice is solidly physical, with a clear evolutionary rationale. Likewise, if a person with free will behaves well, e.g. shows sustained effort or produces creative work, then they can expect praise and other rewards from the rest of the group. Again, the idea of praise may be metaphysical, but the rewards are likely to be translated into greater reproductive success.

I agree that free will is a social concept. The idea of will, and being free to exercise it hardly makes sense without others acting conditionally to limit one's freedom of action. Treat certain others in certain ways and you can avoid certain constraints on your actions.

I don't see anyone here disputing that we have free will in a social sense.

The disputes here seem to be due to some posters overlooking this bit:

SEP wrote:The majority view, however, is that we can readily conceive willings that are not free. Indeed, much of the debate about free will centers around whether we human beings have it, yet virtually no one doubts that we will to do this and that. The main perceived threats to our freedom of will are various alleged determinisms: physical/causal; psychological; biological; theological. For each variety of determinism, there are philosophers who (i) deny its reality, either because of the existence of free will or on independent grounds; (ii) accept its reality but argue for its compatibility with free will; or (iii) accept its reality and deny its compatibility with free will. (See the entries on compatibilism; causal determinism; fatalism; arguments for incompatibilism; and divine foreknowledge and free will.) There are also a few who say the truth of any variety of determinism is irrelevant because free will is simply impossible.If there is such a thing as free will, it has many dimensions...

Assuming we have free will in the social sense – that we actively maintain each other’s freedom of action within the group – I think it’s noticeable that determinism could in fact be a serious threat to that kind of free will. If materialism’s correct, then we might eventually be able to control people by direct observation or manipulation of brains. It’s a long way off, but the possibility is there.

This would be a threat to social free will because it would be a new way for people to control each other, and social free will is about actively preventing too much control. Anyone who was at risk of being controlled so thoroughly would be likely to fight fiercely or leave the group – it could have a thoroughly disruptive effect.

I suspect that if mindreading and mind control became technically possible, they would need to be made illegal, like murder or physical attack, for society to survive. ?

Panderos (#2106) wrote:

zoon wrote:If materialists want to argue that free will is some sort of illusion, it’s useful to have some plausible reason why ground apes should have evolved to have such a persistent and odd illusion..

You raise a good point. I think the illusion of free will is simply the experience of being privy to a decision process along with being fed the emotions that are created as options are weighed up, e.g. 'mmm mars bar taste' when deciding whether to buy a Mars or Snickers. The question is why is our concious self made privy to this? A hard question that would probably require knowing why our 'concious self' is made privy to anything at all. So perhaps we'd first have to answer why ground apes have evolved the illusion of conciousness?

? Perhaps our conscious self is privy to its own deliberations because, so far, the insides of our skulls are private. We can’t mindread or control each other by detailed direct action on brain mechanisms. But this could change if materialism is correct and technology advances. If our thoughts were no longer private, and we were influencing each other’s brains directly, would we still make a distinction between thoughts and the external world?

zoon wrote:Assuming we have free will in the social sense – that we actively maintain each other’s freedom of action within the group – I think it’s noticeable that determinism could in fact be a serious threat to that kind of free will. If materialism’s correct, then we might eventually be able to control people by direct observation or manipulation of brains. It’s a long way off, but the possibility is there.

This would be a threat to social free will because it would be a new way for people to control each other, and social free will is about actively preventing too much control. Anyone who was at risk of being controlled so thoroughly would be likely to fight fiercely or leave the group – it could have a thoroughly disruptive effect.

I suspect that if mindreading and mind control became technically possible, they would need to be made illegal, like murder or physical attack, for society to survive. ?

There are already numerous forms of social mind control in play, although not "by direct observation or manipulation of brains".

Advertising, politics, religion and peer pressure are few easy examples. The most effective mind control is that which is thought of as "free will". Influence what people want to do and let them do it and they won't be fighting back. Seed an idea that someone thinks is their own and they will enthusiastically pursue it. Tell them what to do and they are much more likely to reject the idea.

Nobody is going to accept a brain implant that exists to control them, but they might accept one that connects them some future telecoms / FaceBook / Google world of information. How influenced are you now by what your friends do, say and buy? If that is constantly in your head what effect might it have on what you want to do, say or buy? And if it's what you want are you freely choosing it?

GrahamH wrote:

zoon wrote:Assuming we have free will in the social sense – that we actively maintain each other’s freedom of action within the group – I think it’s noticeable that determinism could in fact be a serious threat to that kind of free will. If materialism’s correct, then we might eventually be able to control people by direct observation or manipulation of brains. It’s a long way off, but the possibility is there.

This would be a threat to social free will because it would be a new way for people to control each other, and social free will is about actively preventing too much control. Anyone who was at risk of being controlled so thoroughly would be likely to fight fiercely or leave the group – it could have a thoroughly disruptive effect.

I suspect that if mindreading and mind control became technically possible, they would need to be made illegal, like murder or physical attack, for society to survive. ?

There are already numerous forms of social mind control in play, although not "by direct observation or manipulation of brains".

Advertising, politics, religion and peer pressure are few easy examples. The most effective mind control is that which is thought of as "free will". Influence what people want to do and let them do it and they won't be fighting back. Seed an idea that someone thinks is their own and they will enthusiastically pursue it. Tell them what to do and they are much more likely to reject the idea.

Nobody is going to accept a brain implant that exists to control them, but they might accept one that connects them some future telecoms / FaceBook / Google world of information. How influenced are you now by what your friends do, say and buy? If that is constantly in your head what effect might it have on what you want to do, say or buy? And if it's what you want are you freely choosing it?

All the examples of currently usable mind control which you gave above are legal, and it’s noticeable that none of them work with any degree of certainty, which I think is why they are legal. If people are not being coerced, then they still have their social free will, they are being allowed to do what they want without undue interference from other people. For example, advertisers are allowed to say nice things about their products, but they are not allowed to tell flat lies – lies come too close to coercion. You say: “Seed an idea that someone thinks is their own and they will enthusiastically pursue it.” Yes, indeed, if you succeed in doing this, it’s very effective; but while this is fairly easy with three-year-olds (up to a point), it becomes progressively more difficult as children grow older and cannier. It’s only likely to work on adults if the other person already trusts you, so if it’s used to influence them against their interests, and they find out later, even much later, it’s likely to wreck the trust irreparably. Also, they are likely to tell everyone else what happened, so the perpetrator is less likely to be trusted by others. Normal adults put a lot of effort into deciding how much and in what areas they trust other individuals.

Any more certain forms of control between adults, such as locking people up or attacking them physically so as to cause serious damage, are disallowed except under special circumstances in every functioning human society. (I am claiming that this is the physical basis for our sense that we have free will.) Because our brains are heavily protected, by being inside skulls and by our constant social wariness, anything that could be called actual control of minds is effectively impossible between normal adults unless it’s accompanied by strong physical coercion, which is already illegal.

If technology is developed which enables detailed mindreading or mind control through altering brain mechanisms, then I think it would need to be strictly controlled by law, and made generally illegal in the same way as kidnapping or murder. As you say: “Nobody is going to accept a brain implant that exists to control them”, and under current laws it can be assumed that anyone who puts a brain implant into someone else against their wishes would be acting illegally except perhaps under special and publicly controlled circumstances. I think the same approach would need to be taken if it were possible to read or control someone’s brain at a distance, without damage or surgery: it would be unsafe to treat it as mind control of the same kind as you were describing above; it would be far more potentially disruptive.

Not that remote mind control is about to happen, but I think part of the visceral dislike of materialism is that it opens the possibility that it might happen, and I think materialism would perhaps become more acceptable if it were made clear that direct mindreading or mind control would need to be socially and legally controlled as strictly as any other form of physical coercion.