Free Will

ughaibu · **#4861** by **ughaibu** » Jan 18, 2017 8:40 pm

tuco wrote:Do you think that a game of pool is unpredictable when played by robots? And if so why?

Sorry, I fucked up the quotes, so you probably replied to something I didn't say.

tuco · **#4862** by **tuco** » Jan 18, 2017 8:42 pm

Well, I am still trying to figure out how to get from one coordinate to another. I am very simple, forgive me.

ughaibu · **#4863** by **ughaibu** » Jan 18, 2017 8:53 pm

tuco wrote:the question is:
how does a system end up as X1, Y1, Z2 and not X2, Y2, Z2. What are the possible mechanisms for this to happen?
How.

How is this question relevant?

tuco · **#4864** by **tuco** » Jan 18, 2017 8:58 pm

I cant fuck off and reply at the same time :) I just hope nobody will report you nor mods will get trigger happy.

Relevant .. relevant to what? Its a question for 11 year old .. how do I get from here to there? Because you decide .. do the balls in a game of pool decide? Does the player, in a game of pool, decide? Does robot, in a game of pool, decide? Its a simple question about coordinates and mechanism how to get from one coordinate to another.

ughaibu · **#4865** by **ughaibu** » Jan 18, 2017 9:03 pm

tuco wrote:Its a question for 11 year old ..

Answer.

DavidMcC · **#4866** by **DavidMcC** » Jan 18, 2017 9:32 pm

archibald wrote:
DavidMcC wrote:
archibald wrote:
DavidMcC wrote:Sorry, but what I was trying to say was that only the conscious mind actually adds anything. All the unconscious can do is remember (= store) for possible further reference by the conscious.

And you think this is what happens because.......?

Because that is how my mind seems to work. Do you have any reason to contradict that?

Lol. The old 'this is how it feels to me' thing. What use is that, at the end of the day, if it's an illusion? Which is, despite your misgivings about certain experiments, what all, without exception as far as I know, the neurological experiments suggest.

You're just making stuff up that has no basis in evidence.
...

Will you please stop this nonsense about free will being an illusion, unless you can show me a neurological experiment that I can't demolish as being just as flawed as Libet's. Ie, one that satisfies my requirement that the participants actually have to think, rather than just stare into space and mark time.

archibald · **#4867** by **archibald** » Jan 18, 2017 11:31 pm

LucidFlight wrote:.... suggesting the laws of nature might act differently than we have modelled and described, to the extent that they can change in order to realise different outcomes. If it is the case that they can change (aside from our descriptions of them), then that very well may be the key to free will.

I should be clear, I'm not talking about the laws as we have written or described them, I'm taking about how they actually are. So, if they can somehow change to produce a different outcome than the original laws the system started off with, that would be an interesting mechanism to study, and perhaps the key free will — that is, if consciousness can somehow have control over the changes in laws (not as we've mapped them, but the laws in themselves, just so that's clear).

I think it's fair to say that the laws of nature can seem quite capricious. Quantum Physics (inasmuch as I half understand it) involves considering weird stuff, such as something (eg you LucidFlight) 'probabilistically existing' simultaneously everywhere in the universe at the same time, but only 'manifesting' in one place and time (or spacetime) because of enormously high probability associated with that time and place. Or something like that. Lots of counter-intuitive stuff in other words. If you can get your head around it, you're doing better than me.

But the way I see it, the laws of physics, or 'what's actually happening' if you like, reality in other words, can be as complicated, chaotic, random and stochastic as it likes, but it doesn't give free will, since that would still imply control over any kind of reality, and control which is free from being caused by it, no matter how it operates.

I think it's ok to say that consciousness may supervise or control, but the question is can anything supervise the supervisor? If not the supervising is automated, albeit in a very complicated, dynamic and interactive way, just like everything else.

ETA: Imo, determinism is very hard to defend. It's almost to be ruled out. 'Determinism-plus' is a much better option (plus random, plus probabilistic, etc). None get to 'free from cause', that I can see.

archibald · **#4868** by **archibald** » Jan 18, 2017 11:36 pm

DavidMcC wrote:Will you please stop this nonsense about free will being an illusion, unless you can show me a neurological experiment that I can't demolish as being just as flawed as Libet's. Ie, one that satisfies my requirement that the participants actually have to think, rather than just stare into space and mark time.

David, how would it matter? Even if consciousness does play a role in more deliberated decisions (involving the appraisal of various predicted/simulated options) which I don't think is a daft idea at all (in fact I might easily agree that it likely does happen this way, and maybe not just by veto, but by options being selected from a menu of deliberated calculated options) your problem, or our problem if we are to find meaningful free will, just moves up a level to ask, what causes the simulations, the appraisal of them and most crucially of all, what has control over that process? What supervises the supervisor?

So, you can call a process like that 'conscious control' (possibly even biological will if you must) but it's not freely decided conscious control, it's automated conscious control. The brain activity may be sustained and widespread enough to have crossed a threshold, into consciousness, and conscious processes may in turn affect matters thereafter, via all manner of inter-connected and reciprocating dynamic loops and waves of neuronal activity, but at the end of the day....it's still all caused activity. It doesn't seem to allow for 'could have done differently' or any of the other definitional requirements for what we all experience as free will.

By the way, I did already link to experiments where the participants had both time to think and complex tasks. Eg. the i-spy (swan) experiment, and others. There are literally hundreds of different experiments of a wide variety, and none of them suggest we have free will, nor is there any detailed hypothetical description of how we could have free will, which is at least as big an obstacle to those who believe we have it. They can't even explain the concept in detail, never mind carry out an experiment. That's paucity of anything to go on, surely.

You endlessly complaining about (and misrepresenting) Libet's experiments (or Libet-type experiments) is not getting you anywhere nearer to free will, no matter how limited the reasonable conclusions we can draw from them. They still point away from free will, not towards it. They say to us, 'wherever free will is to be found, it's not here, in these particular laboratory scenarios' (and worryingly for free-willers, the researchers are beginning to tell what the decisions are before the participant makes them, and in other experiments the participants are claiming to have made decisions made by the researchers). So, where is it David? Why should we favour it existing as an option? Because it feels like it? That's no good, considering how unreliable our mental perceptions are and how prone they are to (useful) illusions, as has been demonstrated over and over in psychological experiments.

ughaibu · **#4869** by **ughaibu** » Jan 19, 2017 4:48 am

archibald wrote:I think it's fair to say that the laws of nature can seem quite capricious. Quantum Physics

Physics is a science, laws of nature are not laws of science so laws of nature are not laws of physics.

archibald wrote:the laws of physics, or 'what's actually happening' if you like, reality in other words

Laws of physics are laws of science, they are statements created by physicists. Science is not metaphysics and the only statements made by scientists, that are candidates for metaphysical facts, are observational, not created. So, laws of physics are not, or are only coincidentally, statements of reality.

archibald wrote:determinism is very hard to defend. It's almost to be ruled out. 'Determinism-plus' is a much better option (plus random, plus probabilistic, etc). None get to 'free from cause', that I can see.

Determinism is a global thesis, all or nothing. There is no determinism plus random unless by "determinism" a person means some species of epistemic program, and of course, we still have been given no reason to think that how the world is, is arbitrated by human epistemology.

archibald wrote:None get to 'free from cause', that I can see.

Determinism has nothing to do with "cause" and free will does not require that there be no cause. In fact, the most popular theories of free will, amongst those who hold the libertarian position, are causal theories.

So, never mind Libet, this guy is still completely off the pace about pretty much everything relevant to the discussion. This kind of incorrigibility is typical of denialism, and constitutes another reason that excludes denialists from any rational discussion.

archibald · **#4870** by **archibald** » Jan 19, 2017 10:37 am

ughaibu wrote:So, never mind Libet, this guy is still completely off the pace about pretty much everything relevant to the discussion.

It's hardly surprising he's off the pace. He was born a hundred years ago and is now dead. That tends to slow you down quite a bit.

Cito di Pense · **#4871** by **Cito di Pense** » Jan 19, 2017 10:45 am

archibald wrote:
ughaibu wrote:So, never mind Libet, this guy is still completely off the pace about pretty much everything relevant to the discussion.

It's hardly surprising he's off the pace. He was born a hundred years ago and is now dead. That tends to slow you down quite a bit.

Good one.

What a ridiculous conversation, though. The determinists are using representationalism and the free will advocates are using solipsism. It's like there's no middle ground, which makes for fine dichotomies, both of which are absurd.

The nervous system is self-sustaining, AND it specifies what inputs from the environment will affect it, without the 'decider deciding' (unless you assume otherwise, but don't make your assumption your conclusion). To say that it doesn't so specify completely is to advocate free will, but you have to come up with something that makes this possible. We observe the organism responding to inputs, and sometimes it looks like choices are being made, but that's our conniption as observers. From Maturana and Varela:

GrahamH · **#4872** by **GrahamH** » Jan 19, 2017 10:46 am

archibald wrote:
DavidMcC wrote:Will you please stop this nonsense about free will being an illusion, unless you can show me a neurological experiment that I can't demolish as being just as flawed as Libet's. Ie, one that satisfies my requirement that the participants actually have to think, rather than just stare into space and mark time.

David, how would it matter? Even if consciousness does play a role in more deliberated decisions (involving the appraisal of various predicted/simulated options) which I don't think is a daft idea at all (in fact I might easily agree that it likely does happen this way, and maybe not just by veto, but by options being selected from a menu of deliberated calculated options) your problem, or our problem if we are to find meaningful free will, just moves up a level to ask, what causes the simulations, the appraisal of them and most crucially of all, what has control over that process? What supervises the supervisor?

It seems pretty obvious to me that deliberation, weighing of pros and cons and working out possible consequences, cannot possibly generate any free will. It's an exercise in greater constraint, more strings. It can add complexity to the choice, but every cost or benefit you identify is another stick or carrot guiding your selection.

If a flash of inspiration, a spontaneous thought to act, is not free will then surely nothing is.

Deliberating time could be relevant to moral responsibility because people have to see possible consequences to avoid them.

Cito di Pense · **#4873** by **Cito di Pense** » Jan 19, 2017 10:50 am

GrahamH wrote:Deliberating time could be relevant to moral responsibility because people have to see possible consequences to avoid them.

Just don't assume your conclusion. The nervous system specifies organically how it will respond to the environment, unless you assume otherwise. It's not a one-or-the-other scenario.

People's histories are conjured up as significant, but they're just histories of interacting with the environment. What the organism learns is determined by how the nervous system responds over that history. It's not a one-or-the-other scenario.

GrahamH · **#4874** by **GrahamH** » Jan 19, 2017 10:52 am

Cito di Pense wrote:
archibald wrote:The nervous system is self-sustaining, AND it specifies what inputs from the environment will affect it, without the 'decider deciding' (unless you assume otherwise, but don't make your assumption your conclusion). To say that it doesn't so specify completely is to advocate free will, but you have to come up with something that makes this possible.

Interesting. How does that work? Some unselected ignoring of some inputs has something to do with free will? :scratch:

Cito di Pense · **#4875** by **Cito di Pense** » Jan 19, 2017 10:55 am

GrahamH wrote:
Cito di Pense wrote:The nervous system is self-sustaining, AND it specifies what inputs from the environment will affect it, without the 'decider deciding' (unless you assume otherwise, but don't make your assumption your conclusion). To say that it doesn't so specify completely is to advocate free will, but you have to come up with something that makes this possible.

Interesting. How does that work? Some unselected ignoring of some inputs has something to do with free will?

The language of 'ignoring' implies an act of will. In practice, one response happens in relation to inputs. The nervous system specifies organically how it will respond. Some of that is learning, so it's a bit ambiguous to refer to 'ignoring'.

We talk about 'ignoring' only due to our conniptions as observers trying to make sense of what is going on. Don't assume too much.

GrahamH · **#4876** by **GrahamH** » Jan 19, 2017 10:56 am

Cito di Pense wrote:
GrahamH wrote:Deliberating time could be relevant to moral responsibility because people have to see possible consequences to avoid them.

Just don't assume your conclusion. The nervous system specifies organically how it will respond to the environment, unless you assume otherwise. It's not a one-or-the-other scenario.

People's histories are conjured up as significant, but they're just histories of interacting with the environment. What the organism learns is determined by how the nervous system responds over that history. It's not a one-or-the-other scenario.

Fair enough. Put another way, the organic system might settle on a better solution if has more time.
MR is off topic, I think.

archibald · **#4877** by **archibald** » Jan 19, 2017 10:57 am

Cito di Pense wrote:From Maturana and Varela:

From The Beano:

Cito di Pense · **#4878** by **Cito di Pense** » Jan 19, 2017 10:58 am

GrahamH wrote:
Cito di Pense wrote:
GrahamH wrote:Deliberating time could be relevant to moral responsibility because people have to see possible consequences to avoid them.

Just don't assume your conclusion. The nervous system specifies organically how it will respond to the environment, unless you assume otherwise. It's not a one-or-the-other scenario.

People's histories are conjured up as significant, but they're just histories of interacting with the environment. What the organism learns is determined by how the nervous system responds over that history. It's not a one-or-the-other scenario.

Fair enough. Put another way, the organic system might settle on a better solution if has more time.
MR is off topic, I think.

Yes, but "better" is only specified by the observer of the organism doing the responding. Do we really want to inject that? IF the organism comes up with 'better' or 'worse' later on, it's far too late, except that you can refer to learning, now.

GrahamH · **#4879** by **GrahamH** » Jan 19, 2017 11:01 am

Cito di Pense wrote:
GrahamH wrote:
Cito di Pense wrote:The nervous system is self-sustaining, AND it specifies what inputs from the environment will affect it, without the 'decider deciding' (unless you assume otherwise, but don't make your assumption your conclusion). To say that it doesn't so specify completely is to advocate free will, but you have to come up with something that makes this possible.

Interesting. How does that work? Some unselected ignoring of some inputs has something to do with free will?

The language of 'ignoring' implies an act of will. In practice, one response happens in relation to inputs. The nervous system specifies organically how it will respond. Some of that is learning, so it's a bit ambiguous to refer to 'ignoring'.

We talk about 'ignoring' only due to our conniptions as observers trying to make sense of what is going on. Don't assume too much.

Ah, well 'ignoring' is merely the counterpart to 'selecting'. Either can be seen as filtering or selectivity that has nothing to do with consciousness.

I was querying how you get from incomplete organically specified input to free will.

archibald · **#4880** by **archibald** » Jan 19, 2017 11:04 am

GrahamH wrote:It seems pretty obvious to me that deliberation, weighing of pros and cons and working out possible consequences, cannot possibly generate any free will. It's an exercise in greater constraint, more strings. It can add complexity to the choice, but every cost or benefit you identify is another stick or carrot guiding your selection.

Deliberation on its own is not such an issue. The participants in Libet's (spits) experiments had plenty of time to deliberate. The difference seems to be complexity, sustained input and novelty (as in something not having been already encoded in non-conscious processes because the scenario is routine enough). So, to try to think of an example, driving in a foreign country for the first time with the car on the 'wrong' (unusual) side of the road and the steering wheel on the 'wrong' side of the car. Or perhaps multiplying 2589 x 36578.

These are the sorts of things which seem to precede something entering consciousness.

GrahamH wrote:If a flash of inspiration, a spontaneous thought to act, is not free will then surely nothing is.

Funny, I would have thought the opposite. A flash of inspiration is about as unfree as one can get, surely?

GrahamH wrote:Deliberating time could be relevant to moral responsibility because people have to see possible consequences to avoid them.

Only if we allow that people can be responsible.

Or to put it another say, it's the same issue, even if one is just planning a holiday, or some activity without moral consequences. 'I want to avoid creepy-crawlies' for example.

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