GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:
I think the disagreement is if most people sit around wondering if they could have chosen otherwise or if they just assume/believe they could have. I think it's the latter, and that seems to be what the study that I saw Coyne providing data from in a talk I saw on youtube showed evidence for. Archibald now brings up some other studies - I know not why.

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.
I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

Shouldn't you be posting what YOU think, and not what you think that most people think?

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:
I think the disagreement is if most people sit around wondering if they could have chosen otherwise or if they just assume/believe they could have. I think it's the latter, and that seems to be what the study that I saw Coyne providing data from in a talk I saw on youtube showed evidence for. Archibald now brings up some other studies - I know not why.

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.
I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

Shouldn't you be posting what YOU think, and not what you think that most people think?

\
Well there is data.

GrahamH wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:
You are the one who needs to recognize that any model of free will needs to specify under what circumstances it can occur. I have done so, (as you well know) and that is more than any one else has done, so mine is the only scientifically valid version.

Now that really is bollocks!

Why do you think that? Surely you are the one talking out of the wrong orifice, because you have re-started the circular argument that people only think they have FW, but they're really only puppets, even when they take the time to use rational thought before acting.

John Platko wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:
I think the disagreement is if most people sit around wondering if they could have chosen otherwise or if they just assume/believe they could have. I think it's the latter, and that seems to be what the study that I saw Coyne providing data from in a talk I saw on youtube showed evidence for. Archibald now brings up some other studies - I know not why.

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.
I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

Shouldn't you be posting what YOU think, and not what you think that most people think?

\
Well there is data.

The problem with that paper is that it refers to "determinism" and "indeterminsim", as if there was no such thing as partial determinism. Like FW that has to be all or nothing. Foolish.

DavidMcC wrote:
The problem with that paper is that it refers to "determinism" and "indeterminsim", as if there was no such thing as partial determinism. Like FW that has to be all or nothing. Foolish.

When describing universe B

(Universe B) in which almost everything that happens is completely caused by whatever happened before it. The one exception is human decision making.

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:
I think the disagreement is if most people sit around wondering if they could have chosen otherwise or if they just assume/believe they could have. I think it's the latter, and that seems to be what the study that I saw Coyne providing data from in a talk I saw on youtube showed evidence for. Archibald now brings up some other studies - I know not why.

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.
I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

Graham, John was actually agreeing with romansh, don't you know.

I hesitate to suggest what his point was in that case. It appears to amount to 'people assume they have free will' and he calls it 'the reality that we live in', and feels that it's pointless and unproductive to explore whether it is what it seems to be.

If I'd known that he was going to make such a significant breakthrough, I wouldn't have left the thread for fear of missing the moment.

As it is, I'm leaving it again. I don't honestly know how you and romansh can suffer the idiocy on display from most of the others posting regularly. Pm me if anyone ever puts forward a coherent case for free will. Thanks.

archibald wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:
I think the disagreement is if most people sit around wondering if they could have chosen otherwise or if they just assume/believe they could have. I think it's the latter, and that seems to be what the study that I saw Coyne providing data from in a talk I saw on youtube showed evidence for. Archibald now brings up some other studies - I know not why.

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.
I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

Graham, John was actually agreeing with romansh, don't you know.

I hesitate to suggest what his point was in that case. It appears to amount to 'people assume they have free will' and he calls it 'the reality that we live in', and feels that it's pointless and unproductive to explore whether it is what it seems to be.

I wouldn't go that far. It's just pointless to try to get a meaningful result from a simple thought experiment like: could I have chosen differently if everything was exactly the same. To get a meaningful result requires detailed knowledge of how choices are made and the nuts and bolts details of those choices.

If I'd known that he was going to make such a significant breakthrough, I wouldn't have left the thread for fear of missing the moment.

Perhaps you had no choice.

As it is, I'm leaving it again. I don't honestly know how you and romansh can suffer the idiocy on display from most of the others posting regularly. Pm me if anyone ever puts forward a coherent case for free will. Thanks.

John Platko wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:
I think the disagreement is if most people sit around wondering if they could have chosen otherwise or if they just assume/believe they could have. I think it's the latter, and that seems to be what the study that I saw Coyne providing data from in a talk I saw on youtube showed evidence for. Archibald now brings up some other studies - I know not why.

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.
I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

Shouldn't you be posting what YOU think, and not what you think that most people think?

\
Well there is data.

That's data? Well, OK. The back of your breakfast cereal box is covered with data, too. What you're linking is (until you provide some analysis to indicate it's worth anything) the result of a public opinion poll that is guaranteed neither to be unbiased nor thorough. There should be a name for the practice of sticking terms into a search engine and linking one result from the search carrying an academic byline but, absent your sage analysis, guaranteed neither to be unbiased nor thorough. Shitsucking. How's that? But go ahead, let your imagination run wild.

We should take a poll in this thread to determine if free will exists. The data would be about as good as that paper.

Cito di Pense wrote:

John Platko wrote:

DavidMcC wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.
I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

Shouldn't you be posting what YOU think, and not what you think that most people think?

\
Well there is data.

That's data?

Jerry Coyne seems to think so.

Well, OK. The back of your breakfast cereal box is covered with data, too. What you're linking is (until you provide some analysis to indicate it's worth anything) the result of a public opinion poll that is guaranteed neither to be unbiased nor thorough. There should be a name for the practice of sticking terms into a search engine and linking one result from the search carrying an academic byline but, absent your sage analysis, guaranteed neither to be unbiased nor thorough. Shitsucking. How's that? But go ahead, let your imagination run wild.

Ummm, I got turned on to that data by this comment:

romansh wrote:

John Platko wrote:
Not at all. I think most people think of free will as something like: I have free will if I can choose to have my ice cream in a cone or a cup. Most people don't sit around after they finished their cone wondering if they could have chosen the cup.

What you think while that might be interesting is not really evidence. Again I point you at Jerry Coyne's video where he quotes some data. I am happy to consider your data, should you have any.

It's even peer reviewed data by the good folks at Mind your & Language!


Was I shitsucking?


Might as well close the loop:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_k96Vn3MyrA&t=1315s

That's the same paper that was presented about fifty pages ago, or thereabouts. All it suggests is that most people appear to believe in the sort of free will that nobody has ever, in the world, provided a feasible model for.

This is big progress for the thread and I will be alerting Reuters.

felltoearth wrote:We should take a poll in this thread to determine if free will exists. The data would be about as good as that paper.

This result would have a certain je ne sais quois in that there would be a certain bias in the population being surveyed.

The paper notes but does not dwell on the fact that those surveyed were university students. This undoubtedly introduces a bias, but I can't help hoping it introduces a thoughtful bias.

Having said that how should we go about finding out what a general population thinks free will is?

romansh wrote:

Having said that how should we go about finding out what a general population thinks free will is?

As a question on its own, who the fuck cares and why does it really matter?

felltoearth wrote:

romansh wrote:
Having said that how should we go about finding out what a general population thinks free will is?

As a question on its own, who the fuck cares and why does it really matter?

In the sense that anything matters?
But if someone says they did it of their own free will then it might be of interest what they mean, depending on the context.

But you get the point; it be data.

GrahamH wrote:

John Platko wrote:
I think the disagreement is if most people sit around wondering if they could have chosen otherwise or if they just assume/believe they could have. I think it's the latter, and that seems to be what the study that I saw Coyne providing data from in a talk I saw on youtube showed evidence for. Archibald now brings up some other studies - I know not why.

Surely that is not the question. Of course 'most people' don't give it any thought at all, and if asked will probably just assume it. The point is that most people who DO think about it go with that assumption that they could have taken any option in that particular moment and don't have much of a clue just why they chose as they did.

If all they were choosing was the flavour of an ice cream, then maybe you are right, but I bet they DO have a clue when it actually matters.

I doubt you will find many who think they did it because circumstances were just so to cause to the do just that thing. They will think it was their own will deciding, despite the circumstances. That is the common conception of free will.

DESPITE the circumstances?? Don't you mean, "IN LIGHT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES"?

I had a rather enjoyable hedge trimming session today while listening to this lecture by Professor Christian List.

For those who prefer papers, I think this captures his ideas in that lecture.

John Platko wrote:I had a rather enjoyable hedge trimming session today while listening to this lecture by Professor Christian List.

For those who prefer papers, I think this captures his ideas in that lecture.

Kudos to you for posting something with some meat on it.

Unfortunately, having chewed on the article (I haven't listened to the audio) I find myself thinking that he has, in his concluding remarks, pretty much summed up my objections (in blue), and offered me a not very convincing reply (in red):

"Not everyone will agree with my argument, and some readers (eg archibald) will find it misguided.
They will say: “you may have identified a technical sense in which, relative to the
epistemic limitations of the special sciences, free will can be ‘defined into existence’, but
this hardly shows that free will is truly real”. My response (to archibald) is that the special-science
perspective is the only perspective from which we are likely to be able to defend free
will, and that it is also a perspective from which we can actually be said to have free will."

In which I hear, 'free will needs to be defended and this is the best fudge can be managed'.

Which is, in a way, (a) my perennial problem with compatibilism in general and (b) my frequent definition of it.

In particular, it seems to me that the analysis relies too heavily on something the author calls 'our best scientific theories of agency', which upon reading I found a bit wooly, and involving the arguably wishful thinking that agency can provide free will, without providing an explanation as to how it possibly could. This lack of convincing explanation is what I might call the 'ever-present absence' of an explanation on this issue, or the 'missing link' (DavidMcC's valiant efforts notwithstanding).

And before you ask, the answer is no, John, Constuctor Theory doesn't even get close to providing it either, imo.

The other point at which I raised my eyebrows was just before halfway through, at ....

"Multiple realizability: There is typically more than one physical state that gives rise to the same agential state; not every variation in the physical state needs to bring about a variation in the agential state."

I don't recall seeing this assertion justified, and yet it forms an important component (almost used as an assumption) thereafter.

All in all, I applaud the writer's honest effort and his diligence and rigour, but unless I missed something, it seems to me to be nothing more than an intelligent piece of free will apologetics written by yet another person who wants us to have free will by hook or by crook rather that accepting the much more likely (it seems) suggestion that we don't, and squaring up to the tricky problem of what that implies for us.

In short, I see a dodge. A fudge-dodge.

I don't say that with any great sense of pleasure. Like a lot of people, it disturbs me to think that I (and my fellow humans) don't have free will, just as it disturbs me to think that there's no loving god to watch over us. Sometimes though, it seems better, at least on a personal level, despite it also feeling counterintuitive, to allow oneself to swallow what appears to be the bitter pill rather than the sugary one.

Either that, or I'm wrong, and somehow, as yet unexplained or understood, we do likely have free will.

archibald wrote:

John Platko wrote:I had a rather enjoyable hedge trimming session today while listening to this lecture by Professor Christian List.

For those who prefer papers, I think this captures his ideas in that lecture.

Kudos to you for posting something with some meat on it.

I'm glad you enjoyed it.

Unfortunately, having chewed on the article (I haven't listened to the audio) I find myself thinking that he has, in his concluding remarks, pretty much summed up my objections (in blue), and offered me a not very convincing reply (in red):

"Not everyone will agree with my argument, and some readers (eg archibald) will find it misguided.
They will say: “you may have identified a technical sense in which, relative to the
epistemic limitations of the special sciences, free will can be ‘defined into existence’, but
this hardly shows that free will is truly real”. My response (to archibald) is that the special-science
perspective is the only perspective from which we are likely to be able to defend free
will, and that it is also a perspective from which we can actually be said to have free will."

In which I hear, 'free will needs to be defended and this is the best fudge can be managed'.

Which is, in a way, (a) my perennial problem with compatibilism in general and (b) my frequent definition of it.

It's a complicated paper, let's take our analysis a bit slower and a bit more meaty.

The author proves how it is possible in a deterministic physical world to have agents that could have real choices. By doing so he has untethered the concept of free will from determinism. The fact that this does not actually prove that we actually have free will is another matter - one that can not be solved until we understand much more about the actual workings of the human mind and the actual mechanisms involved in what we experience as choice. But this paper should end, at least until better understanding of the actual mechanisms of human choice are known, the notion that free will is incompatible with determinism. That is the salient take away point of the paper - and the part of the paper you need to show is in error.

In particular, it seems to me that the analysis relies too heavily on something the author calls 'our best scientific theories of agency', which upon reading I found a bit wooly, and involving the arguably wishful thinking that agency can provide free will, without providing an explanation as to how it possibly could. This lack of convincing explanation is what I might call the 'ever-present absence' of an explanation on this issue, or the 'missing link' (DavidMcC's valiant efforts notwithstanding).

It's true that the author did not pin down how the human mind functions and how choices are made. We're not surprised by that - are we? What the author does do is show that it is possible to create a model that is consistent with known science, where the world is deterministic, and an agent could be part of that world and interact with that world in a way where the agent has free choice even though the world behaves in a deterministic manner. And that should end, at least for now, people saying that because the world is deterministic we can't have free will. The author clearly demonstrates how higher level emergent functions that have real choices are consistent with a deterministic world.

And before you ask, the answer is no, John, Constuctor Theory doesn't even get close to providing it either, imo.

I see Constructor Theory more as a tool for modeling the kind of behavior described in the paper.

The other point at which I raised my eyebrows was just before halfway through, at ....

"Multiple realizability: There is typically more than one physical state that gives rise to the same agential state; not every variation in the physical state needs to bring about a variation in the agential state."

I don't recall seeing this assertion justified, and yet it forms an important component (almost used as an assumption) thereafter.

I would think that assertion obvious.
I wood think that assertion obvious.
I would think that asertion obvious.
I would thinky that assertion obvious.

All in all, I applaud the writer's honest effort and his diligence and rigour, but unless I missed something, it seems to me to be nothing more than an intelligent piece of free will apologetics written by yet another person who wants us to have free will by hook or by crook rather that accepting the much more likely (it seems) suggestion that we don't, and squaring up to the tricky problem of what that implies for us.

In short, I see a dodge. A fudge-dodge.

I think such meaty paper deserves a more meaty critique. It seems to me that the author proves how even in a deterministic world it is possible for agents to be modeled, consistent with the best science of today, that have the ability to do otherwise. How do you refute this?

John Platko wrote:The author proves how it is possible in a deterministic physical world to have agents that could have real choices.

Let me just stop you there. I must have missed that bit. Are you sure? Where? Proof you say? Pardon me for being a tad sceptical about that at this point.

And if it's (allegedly) a 'proof of a possibility' then I'm not necessarily likely to fall off my chair. I already allow that an afterlife is possible, for example, but you won't easily get me to believe in it.

And what are 'real' choices? Are they freely-willed choices? If not, I'm losing interest rapidly.

John Platko wrote:By doing so he has untethered the concept of free will from determinism.

I must have missed this bit too. You may need to point it out to me, or explain it. I mean, it's the sort of thing compatibilists generally are always claiming to have done. Why should I perk up this time? Aren't I just going to be let down (again)?

John Platko wrote:

archibald wrote:"Multiple realizability: There is typically more than one physical state that gives rise to the same agential state; not every variation in the physical state needs to bring about a variation in the agential state."

I don't recall seeing this assertion justified, and yet it forms an important component (almost used as an assumption) thereafter.

I would think that assertion obvious.

In what way? Personally, I'm not even sure what an 'agential state' is. Is it 'the state of an agent'? How is this different from 'an agent's physical state'?

I'm sincerely hoping you've got something here John, because I've been around the Mulberry Bush several times already with you and I'm not necessarily up for doing it again for any prolonged period unless you've got something. And by 'something' I mean something which directly pertains to or affects the big question here.