archibald wrote:

John Platko wrote:The author proves how it is possible in a deterministic physical world to have agents that could have real choices.

Let me just stop you there. I must have missed that bit. Are you sure?

Pretty sure -perhaps you missed that bit.

And what are 'real' choices? Are they freely willed choices? If not, I'm losing interest rapidly.

And agent could choose A or B in world where history only follows one non branching thread- that's what the author demonstrates. The author shows that a deterministic world is insufficient to deny the possibility of choice. Here's how the author put it:

To give a “possibility proof” of how determinism at the physical level can co-exist with freedom at the agential level, I have sketched a toy model of the relationship between the lower and the higher level of a multi-level system and offered a simple semantic analysis of modal statements at both levels.

John Platko wrote:By doing so he has untethered the concept of free will from determinism.

I must have missed this bit too.

Perhaps you should give it another read - or at least explain what you think the author was going on about when he explained how an agent could have a branched decision tree in a deterministic world, i.e. one where the physical states don't seem to branch.

I think not john. I'd rather you explained what you got from the paper, rather than you referring me back to snippets which 'sound like' they amount to anything. Anyone can talk the talk, and use colourful phrases like 'possibility proof'. Compatibilists do it all the time. Has this guy got anything new? Zzzzzz.

For my sins, I've read it again, at least, I've read several pages of it again, starting from the bit you quoted (regarding his 'possibility proof'), and already I'm seeing what appear to be unjustified statements (assumptions?) about multiple realisability and agential choice. It seems to be begging the question a lot.

archibald wrote:I think not john. I'd rather you explained what you got from the paper, rather than you referring me back to snippets which 'sound like' they amount to anything. Anyone can talk the talk, and use colourful phrases like 'possibility proof'. Compatibilists do it all the time. Has this guy got anything new? Zzzzzz.

Anyone can say a paper doesn't say anything, but can they say why it doesn't? Can they point to a flaw in the reasoning? If they can do that then they have something worthwhile to say.

What's wrong with "possibility proof"?

Some say that determinism makes it impossible for people to do otherwise. List's possibility proof proves that doesn't have to be so, i.e. that there are other possibilities that are consistent with known science.

See my previous comments about mulberry bushes.

Either this guy has got hold of something or he hasn't. I suspect the latter.

John Platko wrote:Some say that determinism makes it impossible for people to do otherwise. List's possibility proof proves that doesn't have to be so, i.e. that there are other possibilities that are consistent with known science.

So you say. I'm having trouble staying awake listening to you though. If mere assertions were enough to keep me interested, I'd consider doing theology.

Can you illustrate?

archibald wrote:For my sins, I've read it again, at least, I've read several pages of it again, starting from the bit you quoted (regarding his 'possibility proof'),

Perhaps it would be better if you start again from the beginning instead of the end.

and already I'm seeing what appear to be unjustified statements (assumptions?) about multiple realisability and agential choice. It seems to be begging the question a lot.

You need to do better than "seems" to critique a peer reviewed journal published paper like this. You need to point out what is wrong with the reasoning in the paper. (Hint: I don't think complaining about the impossibility of multiple realisability is going to get the job done. )

archibald wrote:See my previous comments about mulberry bushes.

Either this guy has got hold of something or he hasn't. I suspect the latter.

What you suspect matters not - point to a specific a flaw in his reasoning.

You could start by justifying multiple realisability. We could move on to what appears to be an assumption about agents having choices after that.

If they can't be justified, I'd call them flaws.

Given of state of the world at some point in time there may exist more than one number of alternate prior states that gives rise to that state. AND given the state of the world at some point in time there may exist more than one number of alterernate subsequent states that could arise from that state.

The second half of that statement is indeterminism. The first half may or may not be true.

scott1328 wrote:The second half of that statement is indeterminism.

Pretty much what I was thinking.

Time for my nap.

archibald wrote:

John Platko wrote:Some say that determinism makes it impossible for people to do otherwise. List's possibility proof proves that doesn't have to be so, i.e. that there are other possibilities that are consistent with known science.

So you say. I'm having trouble staying awake listening to you though. If mere assertions were enough to keep me interested, I'd consider doing theology.

Can you illustrate?

I could but wouldn't it make more sense to stick to the details in List's paper? It's all there in black and white. Your job now is to show where his reasoning if flawed. Perhaps you should "phone a friend". Maybe Cito will lend hand.

archibald wrote:Time for my nap.

Yes, it would indeed be good for you to sleep on this.

archibald wrote:You could start by justifying multiple realisability. We could move on to what appears to be an assumption about agents having choices after that.

If they can't be justified, I'd call them flaws.

I thought I already covered:

Multiple realizability: There is typically more than one physical state that gives rise to the same agential state; not every variation in the physical state needs to bring about a variation in the agential state.

Didn't this clearly demonstrate how that works:

I would think that assertion obvious.
I wood think that assertion obvious.
I would think that asertion obvious.
I would thinky that assertion obvious

Or I could map the states of a binary counter onto TTL or CMOS circuits - different physical states - same agential state.

All of this of course ties into how Knowledge - a certain type of information can be instantiated on different physical substrates - but we need not get that detailed to understand the basics of Multiple realizability.

We could move on to what appears to be an assumption about agents having choices after that.

We could move on but perhaps it would be timely for me to remind you that List is not providing a proof of free will, , he's providing a proof that determinism is not incompatible (according to known facts of science) with the notion that when we make a choice we could have chosen otherwise.

scott1328 wrote:Given of state of the world at some point in time there may exist more than one number of alternate prior states that gives rise to that state. AND given the state of the world at some point in time there may exist more than one number of alterernate subsequent states that could arise from that state.

The second half of that statement is indeterminism. The first half may or may not be true.

Well done!

I would put it slightly differently.

Given of a physical state of the world at some point in time there may exist more than one number of alternate history with the same prior physical states that gives rise to that physical state. Therefore, given the physical state of the world at some point in time there may exist more than one number of alterernate subsequent physical states (future histories) that could arise from that physical state.

The second half of that statement is indeterminism. The first half may or may not be true. Therefore, the ability to do otherwise is not ruled out by our current scientific knowledge, even if every possible history is physiclly deterministic.

Could I add to that that buses don't have to be red. They can be lots of different colours.

Now we've both cited something that makes no difference to free will.

John Platko wrote:Didn't this clearly demonstrate how that works:

I would think that assertion obvious.
I wood think that assertion obvious.
I would think that asertion obvious.
I would thinky that assertion obvious

Nope.

Which part is the physical state and which is the agential state?

archibald wrote:

John Platko wrote:Didn't this clearly demonstrate how that works:

I would think that assertion obvious.
I wood think that assertion obvious.
I would think that asertion obvious.
I would thinky that assertion obvious

Nope.

Which part is the physical state and which is the agential state?

a) I would think that assertion obvious.
b) I wood think that assertion obvious.
c) I would think that asertion obvious.
d) I would thinky that assertion obvious

a, b, c, and d are different potential physical states (letters on a screen) that map to same agential state in my mind.

And there's my binary counter implemented in TTL or CMOS example.

Our computers are displaying the same comments yet the physical state involved in implementing those comments is very different.

John Platko wrote:

archibald wrote:

John Platko wrote:Didn't this clearly demonstrate how that works:

I would think that assertion obvious.
I wood think that assertion obvious.
I would think that asertion obvious.
I would thinky that assertion obvious

Nope.

Which part is the physical state and which is the agential state?

a) I would think that assertion obvious.
b) I wood think that assertion obvious.
c) I would think that asertion obvious.
d) I would thinky that assertion obvious

a, b, c, and d are different potential physical states (letters on a screen) that map to same agential state in my mind.

And there's my binary counter implemented in TTL or CMOS example.

Our computers are displaying the same comments yet the physical state involved in implementing those comments is very different.

So we parse physical states to create and understand meaning with our brains. This is a physical process. It's called thinking.