Cito di Pense (#2136) wrote:

zoon wrote:What would you say is the evidence that mole rats have a moral code while ants don’t, other than their being mammals?

Some people whose heads are not full of thinking about lions and mole rats tend to think of moral codes as discourses. This puts humanism squarely among the humans.

This looks like an argument in favour of special sauce. Humans are squarely among the animals, evolved to maximise inclusive fitness, they are not all that special. Language is a physical phenomenon.

Cito di Pense (#2137) wrote: Can we modify human DNA to make armies of slave drones, sort of like the orcs in LOTR?

So far, no we can’t, but I take it you are not arguing that humans have some special sauce which would make it necessarily impossible?

Cito di Pense wrote:Well, then you are working on a theory of language, and the field of battle there is littered with corpses of people who defended the idea that words are 'fed in' and the corpses of those who opposed themselves to that idea. It seems almost trivial not to avoid using the language one generates to propose a theory of language. Such theories exemplify the sort of people who like to hear themselves talk and then take the talk one step farther. I'm not saying we don't all like hearing ourselves talk. I just draw the line at untestable theories about non-observables.

If you are saying that I'm guessing, then you are obviously right. That is simply how it feels. If you stop the words flowing through your mind for a second, and try to guess what word will be spoken next, you'll find you can't. And if you do, then you won't be able to say where that word came from. It's like watching a movie.

DavidMcC wrote:

zoon wrote:Naked mole rats are the classic example of mammals which cooperate in the same sort of way as ants, with the queen of the colony being the only reproducing female and to some extent controlling the others. Would you say this was an example of a moral code? Naked mole rats and humans have moral codes, while ants don’t? What would you say is the evidence that mole rats have a moral code while ants don’t, other than their being mammals?

Zoon, I was not talking about naked mole rats, so it is a misrepresentation to pick on a special exception to a general rule like that. As you say, naked mole rats are different from other social mammals in being eusocial. Therefore, I am not arguing that naked mole rats have a moral code. This is not to say that they are exactly like ants - their behaviour is still mammalian, in not being controlled in detail by "command instincts".

I try not to misrepresent people, and please let me know if it happens, but I don’t think I was guilty that time. I was answering your post #2133, which reads:

DavidMcC (#2133) wrote:... In effect, social mammals are suspending their FW for the sake of group cohesion, by adhering to a moral code. The group leader imposes his/her FW on the subordinates, so mammal sociality is possible in spite of FW, in a sense, thanks to moral codes.

In that post, you were clearly speaking about social mammals in general, and the only general rule which you suggested was: “The group leader imposes his/her FW on the subordinates”. Naked mole rats are social mammals, and they are not an exception to that particular rule.

DavidMcC wrote:
EDIT: I fact, I was only talking of social primates as animals that seem to have "moral codes" (even if these are only a reflection of the effects of oxytocin, the exclusion-bonding hormone that assists social mammals to live co-operatively, to an extent).

In what respects would you say that wolves (as an example of non-primate social mammals) do not have a moral code, while chimps (as an example of social primates) do have a moral code? Both species operate in groups, with a clear hierarchy.

Zoon, when I wrote of "mammals in general", I did not mean every single mammal species, just the general trend, which applies to NEARLY all mammals. In fact, the marmosets may be a more interesting exception than mole rats, because the former are eusocial primates, and I had said that I thought mammalian sociality allowed more time for the expression of FW. I now add to that, because it is clear that it is the leader's FW that gets expressed more than the subordinates'.

zoon wrote:Different social mammals have different kinds of societies, and humans are the only mammals which are generally regarded as having moral codes (and we also cooperate in much more detail than any other mammalian species).

That isn't necessarily true, however. There is evidence that chimps have moral codes, too. For example, when the females in a group at Monkey World ganged uo on the new alpha male and beat him up badly (so that he could not remain as leader), some of them later came up and used body language suggesting that they were apologetic about it. This, in turn, suggests feelings of guilt at having broken a moral code.

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:I struggle to see how we could freely choose our preferences.

We don't need to, in order to have and exercise free will.

Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean. In any case, how is this relevant to my post quoted above?

Let me spell it out for you.

You claim free will is possibly irrespective of who or what controls one's preferences. "We don't need to [freely choose our preferences]"

It seems plain that is someone could control your preferences they control what you wanted to do, what you thought was the best option, in any situation, and you would then "freely choose" according to your un-free preference, which would not be "free will".

GrahamH wrote:Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

Schopenhauer makes roughly the same point, or a very similar point, that your question makes, using the idea of motivation.

Arthur Schopenhauer wrote:I can do what I will: I can, if I will, give everything I have to the poor and thus become poor myself—if I will! But I cannot will this, because the opposing motives have much too much power over me for me to be able to. On the other hand, if I had a different character, even to the extent that I were a saint, then I would be able to will it. But then I could not keep from willing it, and hence I would have to do so.

Arthur Schopenhauer wrote:[A]s little as a ball on a billiard table can move before receiving an impact, so little can a man get up from his chair before being drawn or driven by a motive. But then his getting up is as necessary and inevitable as the rolling of a ball after the impact. And to expect that anyone will do something to which absolutely no interest impels them is the same as to expect that a piece of wood shall move toward me without being pulled by a string.

ughaibu wrote:I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean.

I think that it was pretty clear what Graham was asking, given the context. Do you genuinely need these "spelling-it-out" sessions, or are you putting off having to answer awkward questions?

DavidMcC (#2144) wrote:Zoon, when I wrote of "mammals in general", I did not mean every single mammal species, just the general trend, which applies to NEARLY all mammals. In fact, the marmosets may be a more interesting exception than mole rats, because the former are eusocial primates, and I had said that I thought mammalian sociality allowed more time for the expression of FW. I now add to that, because it is clear that it is the leader's FW that gets expressed more than the subordinates'.

I don’t think we are about to agree on the subject of free will, because it seems to me when you say the leader’s FW gets expressed more than the subordinates, that the leader is imposing their genetic interests rather than their FW. Mammals tend to have larger brains and more complex behaviour than reptiles, but I would see it as a continuum rather than a sudden accession of free will. ?

DavidMcC (#2145) wrote:

zoon wrote:Different social mammals have different kinds of societies, and humans are the only mammals which are generally regarded as having moral codes (and we also cooperate in much more detail than any other mammalian species).

That isn't necessarily true, however. There is evidence that chimps have moral codes, too. For example, when the females in a group at Monkey World ganged uo on the new alpha male and beat him up badly (so that he could not remain as leader), some of them later came up and used body language suggesting that they were apologetic about it. This, in turn, suggests feelings of guilt at having broken a moral code.

I would certainly agree with you that chimps often show behaviour, such as your example, which is related to human moral behaviour. I’m not entirely clear that your example is one which shows chimps are closer to human morality than wolves, because I think wolves (assuming they are like dogs) also show clear signs of what we interpret as guilt when they’ve misbehaved towards the pack leader. But I would not argue with the claim that in many ways chimps come closer than other animals to human social behaviour.

As a matter of semantics, I would say the phrase “moral code” refers to behaviour which is specifically human, as described in Wikipedia here: it’s far more organised, detailed and culturally specific than anything chimps achieve.

GrahamH(#2146) wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:We don't need to, in order to have and exercise free will.

Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean. In any case, how is this relevant to my post quoted above?

Let me spell it out for you.

You claim free will is possibly irrespective of who or what controls one's preferences. "We don't need to [freely choose our preferences]"

It seems plain that is someone could control your preferences they control what you wanted to do, what you thought was the best option, in any situation, and you would then "freely choose" according to your un-free preference, which would not be "free will".

There’s an interesting difference (as I see it) between a case where someone is not freely choosing their preferences only because their material brain is determinate, and the case where they are not freely choosing their preferences because someone else is clearly (to an outside observer) deciding their preferences for them. In the first case we might be inclined to say that the person is still exercising all the free will they need as humans, but in the second case we would be inclined to say that they are not successfully exercising the kind of free will we want to have, even if they were happily unaware of being under another person’s control.

zoon wrote:

GrahamH(#2146) wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean. In any case, how is this relevant to my post quoted above?

Let me spell it out for you.

You claim free will is possibly irrespective of who or what controls one's preferences. "We don't need to [freely choose our preferences]"

It seems plain that is someone could control your preferences they control what you wanted to do, what you thought was the best option, in any situation, and you would then "freely choose" according to your un-free preference, which would not be "free will".

There’s an interesting difference (as I see it) between a case where someone is not freely choosing their preferences only because their material brain is determinate, and the case where they are not freely choosing their preferences because someone else is clearly (to an outside observer) deciding their preferences for them. In the first case we might be inclined to say that the person is still exercising all the free will they need as humans, but in the second case we would be inclined to say that they are not successfully exercising the kind of free will we want to have, even if they were happily unaware of being under another person’s control.

We have no way to tell if our preferences are due someone else's will, some other determinism, pure chance or whatever.

How could we be any more or less free in ourselves, whichever case applied?

"all the free will they need as humans".
"the kind of free will we want to have".

Do we need "free will"?
Is there any reason to think that it would have to be "The sort we want to have"?

Some people like the idea that they are above nature, some pure creative force. So what?

GrahamH wrote:You claim free will is possibly irrespective of who or what controls one's preferences.

Is that so. Go on then, quote the post.

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:You claim free will is possibly irrespective of who or what controls one's preferences.

Is that so. Go on then, quote the post.

It seems plain from this exhange :

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:I struggle to see how we could freely choose our preferences.

We don't need to, in order to have and exercise free will.

Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean. In any case, how is this relevant to my post quoted above?

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:You claim free will is possibly irrespective of who or what controls one's preferences.

Is that so. Go on then, quote the post.

It seems plain from this exhange :

ughaibu wrote:

GrahamH wrote:

ughaibu wrote:We don't need to, in order to have and exercise free will.

Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean. In any case, how is this relevant to my post quoted above?

Spell it out.

GrahamH(#2150) wrote:

zoon wrote:There’s an interesting difference (as I see it) between a case where someone is not freely choosing their preferences only because their material brain is determinate, and the case where they are not freely choosing their preferences because someone else is clearly (to an outside observer) deciding their preferences for them. In the first case we might be inclined to say that the person is still exercising all the free will they need as humans, but in the second case we would be inclined to say that they are not successfully exercising the kind of free will we want to have, even if they were happily unaware of being under another person’s control.

We have no way to tell if our preferences are due someone else's will, some other determinism, pure chance or whatever.

We do, as a part of ordinary social life, check whether we are being unduly influenced by other people, it is something we can judge, though imperfectly. One of the ways we do it is by watching to see whether other people are being unknowingly influenced, and then checking back to see if it’s happening to us. Of course, an evil demon could be controlling us at all times, but that’s invisible pink unicorn territory.

GrahamH(#2150) wrote:
How could we be any more or less free in ourselves, whichever case applied?

We’ve evolved to want to avoid, as far as possible, being controlled by others without knowing it – individuals who let it happen would be less likely to pass on their own genes. Human groups cooperate closely, we let ourselves be controlled by others in order to gain the benefits of cooperation, but we need to be careful not to be over-controlled. This is why I think we are careful to allow each other a measure of independence, the social free will which is real and useful and not an illusion.

GrahamH(#2150) wrote:
"all the free will they need as humans".
"the kind of free will we want to have".

Do we need "free will"?
Is there any reason to think that it would have to be "The sort we want to have"?

I think we do want social free will, the sort that slaves and children and mentally disabled people have far less of because they are controlled by others. It’s also the sort that we would not have if someone else was determining our preferences for us through direct manipulation of the brain. We need it in the sense that we’ve evolved to want it badly, because individuals in earlier generations who failed to get it were also less successful in passing on their genes. (That, in the end, is the reason we want or need anything: food, shelter, status, answers to philosophical questions, whatever.)

GrahamH(#2150) wrote:
Some people like the idea that they are above nature, some pure creative force. So what?

Sure. I think it’s an illusion we fall into very easily, but we can do without it.

Certainly if we are able to identify obstacles, such as a person conspicuously exerting control over us, we may engage our evolved problem solving faculties to break free of that control. On the other hand we may prefer some control. Few people want to live in a state of anarchy. Most prefer to live with all sorts of "external control".

It seems foolish to suppose that all control is conspicuous. If you don't don't see it you don't know you are un-free.

I'm abandoning this thread, because there is too much ignorance-based sarcasm from certain posters, who seem to think humans are really, really special. There is simply no arguing with such people.

Matthew Shute wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

Schopenhauer makes roughly the same point, or a very similar point, that your question makes, using the idea of motivation.

Arthur Schopenhauer wrote:I can do what I will: I can, if I will, give everything I have to the poor and thus become poor myself—if I will! But I cannot will this, because the opposing motives have much too much power over me for me to be able to. On the other hand, if I had a different character, even to the extent that I were a saint, then I would be able to will it. But then I could not keep from willing it, and hence I would have to do so.

Arthur Schopenhauer wrote:[A]s little as a ball on a billiard table can move before receiving an impact, so little can a man get up from his chair before being drawn or driven by a motive. But then his getting up is as necessary and inevitable as the rolling of a ball after the impact. And to expect that anyone will do something to which absolutely no interest impels them is the same as to expect that a piece of wood shall move toward me without being pulled by a string.

ughaibu wrote:I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean.

I think that it was pretty clear what Graham was asking, given the context. Do you genuinely need these "spelling-it-out" sessions, or are you putting off having to answer awkward questions?

DavidMcC wrote:I'm abandoning this thread, because there is too much ignorance-based sarcasm from certain posters, who seem to think humans are really, really special. There is simply no arguing with such people.

Do you mean this dedication to the idea that humans have something unique in nature called "free will"?
If you are suggesting humans aren't that special and are very much part of the natural world then I agree with you.

GrahamH wrote:

Matthew Shute wrote:

GrahamH wrote:Do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?

Schopenhauer makes roughly the same point, or a very similar point, that your question makes. . .

ughaibu wrote:I don't know, you'll have to spell out, clearly, what you mean.

I think that it was pretty clear what Graham was asking, given the context. Do you genuinely need these "spelling-it-out" sessions, or are you putting off having to answer awkward questions?

Should I take your approval of Matthew Shute's post to indicate that by "do you agree that if someone controlled your preferences they would control your will?", you were asking whether I think that having preferences is inconsistent with having free will?

DavidMcC wrote:I'm abandoning this thread, because there is too much ignorance-based sarcasm from certain posters, who seem to think humans are really, really special. There is simply no arguing with such people.

That's it. Now I'm going to have to spend the entire week-end in the shop, getting my irony meter repaired.

I don't think all humans are special. It's a continuum, from the special to the really pedestrian, and back again. The essence of the fat part of the bell curve is non-specialness. The fat part exists only in relation to the tails of the distribution.

The spoon-bending distribution is described by a delta function rather than by a Gaussian.