Split from 'The Illusions of Atheism'
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DavidMcC wrote:SpeedOfSound wrote:Okay we figured out that instinct is a crappy term that we can't agree on.O figured that out ten years ago. What is it's pertinence to this overall discussion?
It is only "crappy" because it historically includes several different processes, such as reflex reactions, and various "folk" uses, which includes learned habits (and which actually replace reptilian-style instincts, but are not of genetic origin).
The pertinence of true "genetic"instincts to the OP topic is that the mammalian replacement of reptilian instincts with learned habits requires conscious study by the infant to acquire good habits, so that it might survive without the instincts that might anyhow have become inappropriate, due to changes in the locakl environment that may occur faster than evolution can keep up with. Thus my version of mammalian C is a product of that evolution. It's what I've been saying all along in these threads.
DavidMcC wrote:The pertinence of true "genetic"instincts to the OP topic is that the mammalian replacement of reptilian instincts with learned habits requires conscious study by the infant to acquire good habits, so that it might survive without the instincts that might anyhow have become inappropriate, due to changes in the locakl environment that may occur faster than evolution can keep up with. Thus my version of mammalian C is a product of that evolution. It's what I've been saying all along in these threads.
Wilkinson et al wrote:Social learning in a non-social reptile (Geochelone carbonaria)
The ability to learn from the actions of another is adaptive, as it is a shortcut for acquiring new information. However, the evolutionary origins of this trait are still unclear. There is evidence that group-living mammals, birds, fishes and insects can learn through observation, but this has never been investigated in reptiles. Here, we show that the non-social red-footed tortoise (Geochelone carbonaria) can learn from the actions of a conspecific in a detour task; non-observer animals (without a conspecific demonstrator) failed. This result provides the first evidence that a non-social species can use social cues to solve a task that it cannot solve through individual learning, challenging the idea that social learning is an adaptation for social living.
Federico wrote:I quote:
"......[i]The brain may make some decisions up to 10 seconds before those decisions bubble up to conscious thought, a new study shows.
mindhack wrote:Are you sure you meant 10 seconds? Ten seconds seems an aweful long time between the point of decision and its conscious thought.
SpeedOfSound wrote:The cerebellum is primarily a prediction and correction device. Kind of like a gyroscope. You will not find much support for episodic memory there.
Wilkinson [i]et al[/i]. wrote:This result provides the first evidence that a non-social species can use social cues to solve a task that it cannot solve through individual learning.
DavidMcC wrote:there has to be some structure with an awful lot of neurons, and is not part of the "conscious" mind, but is contacted by it when we try to remember things, and when we are trying to deliberately memorise things.
Mr.Samsa wrote:It should be obvious, but for clarity I'll just point out that reptiles don't rely on instincts for much of what they do.
DavidMcC wrote:SpeedOfSound wrote:The cerebellum is primarily a prediction and correction device. Kind of like a gyroscope. You will not find much support for episodic memory there.
There may not be much support at the moment, and I may be wrong about it, but there has to be some structure with an awful lot of neurons, and is not part of the "conscious" mind, but is contacted by it when we try to remember things, and when we are trying to deliberately memorise things. Also, there are several distinct regions of the cerebellum, all with the same structure, but not the same exact function. Furthermore, if long term memory is entirely in the neocortex (to which it is claimed memories are transferred for long term storage:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Episodic_memory#The_hippocampus.27s_role_in_memory_storage
But if episodic memories are stored long term in the neocortex, it is odd that we are not always conscious of long term memories, only occasionally so (when they are brought into working memory).
Thus, experiments that show that the hippocampus is "involved" in episodic memory actually only show that it is important to the process of "programming"/transferring to the long term memory, not that it IS the long term memory.
GrahamH wrote:Do you have some particular reason to rule out memory distributed across the brain? Fro example, why can't a visual element of a memory be part of the visual cortex, an auditory element in the auditory cortex and some movement spacial element somewhere else? I'm just wondering about why we should expect there to be a "central database" for memory.
DavidMcC wrote:SOS, if the neocortex is the long tem memory store, doesn't that show that it is not in the "C" loop? Otherwise, we would be permanently aware even of long term memories, and that obviously isn't so.
DavidMcC wrote:GrahamH wrote:Do you have some particular reason to rule out memory distributed across the brain? Fro example, why can't a visual element of a memory be part of the visual cortex, an auditory element in the auditory cortex and some movement spacial element somewhere else? I'm just wondering about why we should expect there to be a "central database" for memory.
But it is so distributed when it is shorty-term memory. I just wonder whether it still would be after consolidation, which has to be to somewhere else.
DavidMcC wrote:GrahamH wrote:Do you have some particular reason to rule out memory distributed across the brain? Fro example, why can't a visual element of a memory be part of the visual cortex, an auditory element in the auditory cortex and some movement spacial element somewhere else? I'm just wondering about why we should expect there to be a "central database" for memory.
But it is so distributed when it is shorty-term memory. I just wonder whether it still would be after consolidation, which has to be to somewhere else.
b. Memory isn't in a place. It's the same delusion as C being in a place.
GrahamH wrote:Why does it have to be somewhere else?
DavidMcC wrote:As with a computer, different parts do different things, even though the control areas need the controlled areas to function.
SpeedOfSound wrote:What we tend to mean by C is the many things we are attending to during the occurrent process of being alive. Along with a cognitive certainty that we do it through time.
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