Will S wrote:

(You remind me, obliquely, of a favourite cartoon of mine: depressed looking middle-aged man sitting at a dinner table in a restaurant with a very obviously glamorous young woman. Caption: 'Goodness! Everybody understands me!)

Sophie T wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:

. . . Or it could be because, though you are created with free will, you would freely choose to reject God (perhaps even in all possible worlds) - I would only accept the latter.

Freely choose to reject God? How can a person who is created with a sin nature "freely choose" to do anything?

There are a number of different interpretations of original sin and the consequences which followed from it. I don't know them very well, but to my knowledge, it's only the five-point Calvinist view (total depravity) which would hold that the sinful nature inherited from the Fall is such that no person has the ability to choose the good without divine assistance. That's not my view though. A sinful nature may render one predisposed to choose wrong actions, but not determine one to choose them.

Sophie T wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:

. . . Also, many Christians would disagree that a lack of faith in Christ is sufficient for eternal punishment (General Revelation, for instance). It may be that it is only necessary.

Many Christians admit that their faith in Christ is a result, not of their own cleverness, humility, or anything else, but is, in and of itself a gift from God. In other words, when a person "accepts Jesus as his Lord and Savior" (or however it is you want to word it), I have heard Christians thank God for this. They tend to give God the credit for changing their own hearts and minds (or the hearts and minds of another person) in such a way that that person was able to make a decision to trust Christ as his or her savior.

Well in one sense the Christian would maintain that all good things are, either directly or indirectly, gifts from God (being the creator and sustainer of the universe). While I certainly think it makes sense to thank God for the unmerited gift of forgiveness he offers, and perhaps for bringing about the circumstances which allows one to accept it. While some Christians may go further than that, by thanking God for making them accept Christianity, I find that problematic for a number of reasons. One, for instance, is that a morally perfect being would respect the choices of persons; the notion that God coerces people into trusting him implies a moral deficiency in God.

Sophie T wrote:Are you saying that your own decision to do this is somehow a result of your own cleverness or goodness or willingness to see your own need for Christ and that another person's failure to do this is a result of that person somehow being more stubborn, more stupid, or more prideful than you are?

given my track record, I'm certainly not in any position to accuse non-theists (or anyone else really) of pridefulness or stubbornness. As for why they haven't accepted Christianity, there are all sorts of different factors that play into it. Most significant being, I would think, the person's noetic structure, and his surrounding culture and upbringing of which it is largely a product. Generally, I don't see this as a failure at all on the part of the non-Christian, because doxastic voluntarism is false; hence, one can't choose one's beliefs. And in order for one to realistically consider choosing to accept and trust Christ, there are certain prerequisite beliefs which may be more or less necessary (such as the belief that God exists, perhaps), and certain which may be more or less incompatible (such as the belief that "the cosmos is all there is, was, or ever will be"). In neither case can one choose to hold the beliefs necessary for, nor choose to reject the beliefs inconsistent with, Christian theism. To the degree that one's beliefs preclude Christian theism as an intellectually acceptable position, I would say that one should not be held responsible or blameworthy for not choosing to accept it. There are countless other factors I'm sure - perhaps one's circumstances, past experiences, interests, character, and so on.

If so, then it seems to me that you are basically saying that any such "decision" to have saving faith in Christ is in itself a work. Your faith becomes a commodity by which you purchase your own salvation. And if salvation really is a free gift, as most Christians I know claim it is, then it cannot be obtained through any "work" including the work of having saving faith in Christ.

Will S wrote:Naturally, where you have two extreme and objectionable statements like this, people look for a compromise. Only I can't see how any such compromise is possible. For example, suppose you take up the idea that you've got to do something (perhaps something quite small) towards your own salvation, then God takes over and does the rest. Well, then you actually have secured your own salvation by your own efforts - you did all that was possible for you or necessary.

Hence, as I said, the fog. Can any Christian around here do anything to dispel it?

I'm not really sure it matters whether we call the choice in question a 'work.' That's become a dirty word among protestant Christians, and it's thrown around quite loosely. There are different degrees of 'work,' which I take to mean something like an action which one accomplishes (in some degree) without divine assistance. Now, in all soteriological theories, except to my knowledge universalism, the attainment of salvation involves some kind of work (so defined). Whether it's earned through one's own Pelagian good work bootstrapping, or attained through simply choosing to accept the gift God offers, there is some degree of 'work'. My view is the latter. And as I've said, if there was no component of 'work' at all, not even of exercising one's free will, then this implies a morally inadequate conception of God.

What is the difference between you and me that you have saving faith in Christ and I don't? Did you make a "better" decision than I did? If so, then it seems like you are taking credit for your own salvation, at least to some extent.

Hmm, well because I do in fact believe that the Christian position is true, and that it is better to have true beliefs than false ones, I cannot help reasoning that it was better for me to make that decision than not. But did I make a "better" decision than you? I'm not sure which decision on your part you are referring to. I'm assuming it's not the decision not to trust Christ, because that would suggest that you believe God exists (otherwise, you wouldn't be able to reject his offer). I don't see yours as a decision so much as it is a lack of belief (or perhaps disbelief, depending on whether you're an agnostic or an atheist), and as I say, I don't think one can choose one's beliefs.

Or did God open your eyes to see in way that he has not done for me and for others? If so, then it is God who has failed to give me and other non-Christians what it is that God requires of us in order to be saved.

Has God given me something that he hasn't given to others? I have no idea, as I don't have any of your or anyone else's experiences to compare to my own. As to the last point there, it is impossible for God to punish people for lacking a requirement which was not accessible to them, because that would be unjust and immoral. As "God" denotes a morally perfect being, if God exists then he only does good actions. Thus, either all persons will be dealt with fairly by God according to what was available to them, or God does not exist. Any being who deals out unjust punishments cannot be God, by definition.

RichieDickins

Your last post distils some ideas I have been chewing on for a while. I notice that you say that we cannot choose our beliefs or lack of them. This seems incontrovertible, since I cannot right now choose not to believe in God, nor I guess, can an atheist choose to believe.

As you say, some Calvinists might say now that I have been made to believe, and the atheist, made not to believe, by God, but there is something rather odd about that, and shall we say, counter-intuitive. Or in simple terms, I am not aware of having been made to believe.

But nor am I aware of having chosen to believe. In fact, I consider that belief is something of a smelly fish here. When I go to church, I don't sit having beliefs. Praxis not doxis. Is God something to believe in or not, or something to participate in? But how do I choose that more than breathing?

Anyway, final point, which you have already made - how can we be punished or rewarded for something that we did not choose, and over which I have no control?

In many ways, these points, simplistic as they seem, seem to throw a hefty hand-grenade into many Christian ideas of reward and punishment.

RichieDickens—thank you for your response. I am inclined to agree that we do not choose our beliefs. With this in mind, though, I would wonder why it is that a loving God would not reveal himself to every person in such a way that they would know that he exists.

You said that it would be immoral for God to punish people for failing to have what he alone can give them. I think a good Calvinist might ask you what standard of morality you are using to make such an assessment.

It would seem that using the reasoning you have offered, one could also reason that Jesus did not die on the cross for our sins. We can know this because any God who would punish one person for the sins of another is immoral. If you disagree, I wonder why you disagree. Who gets to decide what is moral and what is immoral?

tytalus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
So you are suggesting that it is necessarily true that all of the constants and quantities are as they are? As for the other point, from my reading it is uncontroversial among physicists that the universe is finely tuned - the disagreements consist in how they go about explaining it.

I suggest it is a possibility, and that we don't know, and therefore there is no reason to believe in the fine-tuned universe. And it took me about ten seconds to find some credible evidence that it is in dispute.

Granting that it's possible that the constants and quantities are necessarily as they are, and that we don't know, it doesn't follow that there is no reason to believe in fine-tuning. The issue of necessity here pertains to how the fine-tuning might be accounted for, not whether the universe is actually fine-tuned. And it isn't a question of whether we know for certain here, but rather the question of what is most probably true.

Who, Stenger? Much of his dissent reduces to a dispute of the definition of "life," not whether the universe is fine-tuned with respect to the definition used. The various complaints mentioned about anthropocentrism, argumentum ad ignorantiam, and even "the logical flaw of hubris...in its assertion that humans are the purpose of the universe" are red herrings, and the last accusation there is not a logical fallacy, though the objection itself constitutes a straw man. This is because the claim that the universe is fine-tuned makes no assertions at all with respect to teleology. It's only a statement regarding the proportion of all the different possible initial condition values which yield a life-permitting universe (the proportion of universes which are life-permitting is vanishingly small). That is either true or false; charges of "hubris" and the like are completely beside the point.

Do you have answers for these questions? Do we know whether or not the various constants of physics have the capacity to vary? Do we know what these variances will do? Do we have other examples of universes to compare to ours?

I'll understand if you take those questions to be rhetorical. But perhaps you'll understand in turn if I dismiss this evidence-free argument.

I don't know what you mean by the constants having the capacity to vary. If you mean do I know whether it is nomologically possible that they vary, then no, I don't know for certain; I would however argue that it is more probable that it is possible in that way. If you mean do I know whether it is logically possible, then yes, I do know for certain. There is certainly no contradiction implied in the supposition that there be a universe with different initial values than the actual universe, and there are an infinite number of logically possible distinct universes, each with a different set of initial conditions, constants and so on. And again, the proportion which are life permitting is extraordinarily smaller than that of possible life-prohibiting universes.

We do know what the variances will do, in the sense that we know what all the necessary conditions for the existence of life are, and that any variance which precludes any one of those necessary prerequisites will result in a universe without life.

Do we have other examples of universes to compare ours to? Well I think there is only one universe. But I don't see the point - if there existed some other examples of universes to compare ours to, they would necessarily already be among the set of logically possible universes, any of which we can already compare to ours.

Larkus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
This presumes that if S has some goal x, and a necessary condition of achieving x is y, then S has y as a goal. Of course I deny that. I may find some particular state of affairs desirable without finding the necessary condition of that state of affair's occurrence desirable; in taking up the desirable state of affairs as my goal, I certainly don't make the undesirable prerequisite my goal as well in doing so.

"if S has some goal x, and a necessary condition of achieving x is y, then S has y as a goal." This is true, if it depends on the choice of S, whether y exists in the first place.

If God allmighty wants to

1) "creat[e] a world in which humans can freely choose to help [humans], that are suffering [from natural evil]",

then it is a necessary condition, that human suffering from natural evil exists. God allmighty can not not want, that human suffering from natural evil exists in such a world. To create such a world, God allmighty must want, that human suffering from natural evil exist - and

I disagree with you again on this point: if 'S wants x', and 'if x, then y', then 'S wants y'
I deny this because, as I said before, one can want something without wanting the necessary conditions for its attainment. I want money, but that doesn't mean I want to get a job. I want to eat dinner, but that doesn't mean I want to go to grocery store and buy the food, take it home and prepare it. Suppose some person S commits a heinous crime; I want justice to be carried out so that he is properly punished for his offense; but that doesn't mean I want it to be the case that he committed the crime in the first place (which is a necessary condition for what I want). And so on.

1a) create a world containing human suffering from natural evil.

RichieDickins wrote:

Larkus wrote:2) "creating a world in which humans can freely choose to help [humans]"

Goal 2) however is possible to achieve without human suffering, at least without human suffering by natural evil.

Let's insert this goal:

If God is all-powerful, then he could achieve "creating a world in which humans can freely choose to help [humans]" in any possible way, including, but not limited to without human suffering, at least without human suffering by natural evil.

Since the above sentence entails no contradiction, the above sentence is true.

First off, even if I grant that the sentence is true, [...]

Do you agree, that the sentence is true?

No. The proposition that "God could create a world in which humans can freely choose to help humans in any possible way", which is contained in your sentence, is not necessarily true, and is probably false. A state of affairs may be logically possible in itself, but it doesn't follow that it is logically possible for God to bring about that state of affairs.

RichieDickins wrote:Secondly, even if the sentence contains no contradiction, it doesn't follow that it is true.

I wrote, that it entails no contradiction. It entails no contradiction with itself and neither with God's nature, of which only one aspect is important for the purpose of my argument. I claim, that whatever God's actions are, those actions are consistent with God's nature and that it is consistent with God's nature not to have the goal of human suffering from natural evil.

As I say above, the sentence isn't necessarily true, as it may very well entail a contradiction. It may be that there is a logical possible state of affairs which is impossible for God to actualize.

I agree, God's actions are necessarily consistent with his nature. I also agree that it's consistent with God's nature not to have the goal of human suffering from natural evil - but this doesn't imply that it is inconsistent with his nature to have that goal.

RichieDickins wrote:This presupposes that "God is omnipotent" (or all-powerful, if you will) means that God can do anything which is logically possible, which is an inadequate definition. For there are certain things which, though logically possible as such, are not logically possible for God to do.

Such as? Having a sinless nature and sin? Being omnibenevolent and create a world which contains human suffering from natural evil? Sure, I agree, that would be against God's nature.

If you have a more appropriate definition of "omnipotent", then please provide it.

For example, some will grant that "it's logically possible that God does not exist" is true. Supposing it is, then there is a logically possible state of affairs which God cannot bring about. This is because it is not possible for God to bring it about that he does not exist, as this would be inconsistent with God's nature to do this, and God's nature is by definition necessary.

Another example. It is logically possible that time not exist (that there be a timeless state). But it is not possible for God to bring it about, subsequent to creating the universe, that time no longer exist. He cannot, after creating time and space at the big bang, bring about a timeless state, because any such state will necessarily be temporal, for it will always be true that such and such occurred before any subsequent state that God might bring about. It is not logically possible, after God's creation, for God to make it so that there is no time; yet it is logically possible that there is no time; thus God cannot do anything which is logically possible.

'God is omnipotent': this means that God can do anything which is logically possible for God to do.

RichieDickins wrote:Additionally, your responses here rest on a distinction between human suffering as such and human suffering from natural evil. It's not clear to when when some instance of evil is of a natural or moral sort. How would the cause of some instance of evil Q being either direct or indirect bear on the nature of Q (with respect to its being either natural or moral)? That is, suppose a free agent does action A, which naturally causes some event B, which naturally causes C, which naturally causes Q. Would Q then be an instance of either natural or moral evil?

Do you deny, that natural evil exists?

For the reasons I gave there, I would have to suspend judgment until the definition of "natural evil" is specified so as to clarify the issues mentioned.

You must maintain, for your argument, that natural evil does exist. After providing a definition, I would be curious to see how you would go about establishing that premise.

RichieDickins wrote:How do you know that, for any goal x, x is possible?" The issue is not whether God can achieve goals that are possible - of course he can - rather, the issue is whether the goal is question is actually possible.

RichieDickins wrote:The issue isn't whether "x" is possibly true; rather, the issue is whether "God achieves x" is possibly true. [...]

1. "How do you know that, for any goal x, x is possible?" 2. "the issue is whether the goal is question is actually possible." 3. "The issue isn't whether [goal?] "x" is possibly true."

What do you mean exactly?

1: For instance, is it possible that God have created a world W* which contains less evil than the actual world W, and that W* is a better world, all things considered, than W? Now, is that possible or impossible? I would side with van Inwagen here, by exercising a bit of what he calls "modal skepticism." I don't think we are in a position to ascertain whether or not it is possible.

2: This is the same basic point as 1, in original context. That all of God's actions be possible is not disputed (it's necessarily true); what is disputed is whether or not certain actions or goals are in fact possible ("God should have done x; he didn't; qed, God doesn't exist" of course it's the atheist's burden to show that x is possible).

3: In context, here I was making the distinction between an action's being logically possible, as such, and the logical possibility of God doing that action. As explained above, the possibility of the former does not necessarily entail the possibility of the latter.

RichieDickins wrote:

tytalus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
So you are suggesting that it is necessarily true that all of the constants and quantities are as they are? As for the other point, from my reading it is uncontroversial among physicists that the universe is finely tuned - the disagreements consist in how they go about explaining it.

I suggest it is a possibility, and that we don't know, and therefore there is no reason to believe in the fine-tuned universe. And it took me about ten seconds to find some credible evidence that it is in dispute.

Granting that it's possible that the constants and quantities are necessarily as they are, and that we don't know, it doesn't follow that there is no reason to believe in fine-tuning. The issue of necessity here pertains to how the fine-tuning might be accounted for, not whether the universe is actually fine-tuned. And it isn't a question of whether we know for certain here, but rather the question of what is most probably true.

It's interesting that while you make claims of reasons and probabilities, I have been shown no math. Your tacit surrender regarding fine-tuning as supposedly 'uncontroversial' is noted.

Who, Stenger? Much of his dissent reduces to a dispute of the definition of "life," not whether the universe is fine-tuned with respect to the definition used. The various complaints mentioned about anthropocentrism, argumentum ad ignorantiam, and even "the logical flaw of hubris...in its assertion that humans are the purpose of the universe" are red herrings, and the last accusation there is not a logical fallacy, though the objection itself constitutes a straw man. This is because the claim that the universe is fine-tuned makes no assertions at all with respect to teleology. It's only a statement regarding the proportion of all the different possible initial condition values which yield a life-permitting universe (the proportion of universes which are life-permitting is vanishingly small). That is either true or false; charges of "hubris" and the like are completely beside the point.

And again, claims without evidence. This is no church, sir; your word about these probabilities is insufficient.

Do you have answers for these questions? Do we know whether or not the various constants of physics have the capacity to vary? Do we know what these variances will do? Do we have other examples of universes to compare to ours?

I'll understand if you take those questions to be rhetorical. But perhaps you'll understand in turn if I dismiss this evidence-free argument.

I don't know what you mean by the constants having the capacity to vary. If you mean do I know whether it is nomologically possible that they vary, then no, I don't know for certain; I would however argue that it is more probable that it is possible in that way.

And again, claims without the math, easily dismissed, etc. Go ahead -- argue it. Make a case. Supply some credible evidence. Otherwise, why should anyone care what you would argue, but don't?

If you mean do I know whether it is logically possible, then yes, I do know for certain. There is certainly no contradiction implied in the supposition that there be a universe with different initial values than the actual universe, and there are an infinite number of logically possible distinct universes, each with a different set of initial conditions, constants and so on. And again, the proportion which are life permitting is extraordinarily smaller than that of possible life-prohibiting universes.

It's amusing, this tendency toward baseless repetition. When you can demonstrate the probabilities you baselessly claim, that would be interesting. I suspect this will remain only a logical possibility, however. Though that may be giving it too much credit.

We do know what the variances will do, in the sense that we know what all the necessary conditions for the existence of life are, and that any variance which precludes any one of those necessary prerequisites will result in a universe without life.

So we automatically know what results from any and all variances? Funny, it seemed to me from reading about the subject that it took a bit of work. You claim to know, but won't show me? I see. Stenger, by contrast, did some work.

Do we have other examples of universes to compare ours to? Well I think there is only one universe. But I don't see the point - if there existed some other examples of universes to compare ours to, they would necessarily already be among the set of logically possible universes, any of which we can already compare to ours.

The point here is that if you had other examples that did vary you could point to them and say look, they vary. It would be a demonstration that they did in fact -- which is somewhat more interesting than philosophical bloviation about what is logically possible. It is amusing that you don't see the point of having credible evidence, as opposed to what is logically possible.

MS2 wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:An inerrantist believes that the Bible is correct in all that it teaches - thus they only have to believe as you say so long as that is the intended teaching of the biblical authors.

This suggests to me you believe (assuming what you said in the third person actually applies to you):

1. it is possible to know the authorial intent behind each bit of the Bible
2. and from this to derive the 'intended teaching'
3. Each such teaching is correct
4. Where such a teaching impinges in any way on any matter under discussion on this thread or anywhere else, whatever you say must be consistent with that teaching

I think 1 and 2 are true. I suspend judgment regarding the truth of 3, as I don't know whether each intended teaching of the Bible is true (I haven't checked them all out yet). I don't think that 4 is true, and though ideally an inerrantist would want to try and speak consistently with what the Scriptures teach, it's not part of inerrantism as such.

3 is clearly a faith position, and 4 follows from it, but are you really so naive as to hold 1 and 2 to be correct? Do you really think you or anyone else is capable of achieving anything approaching certainty about what the person who wrote down the words found in Genesis 1, Romans 9 or any other passage of the Bible intended to teach by them? In my view that is an indefensible position.

Yeah, I think most people who affirm that 3 is true do so simply because that's what everybody else in their congregation believes. But come to think of it, it's not necessarily a "faith position" - in principle, if one had reason or evidence sufficient to render it more probable than not that A) the Resurrection accounts are veridical; and B) the Biblical passage(s) in which Jesus is recorded as making statements which imply that he believes that the Scriptures are divinely inspired represent him accurately; then, one could conclude that it is more probable than not that the Scriptures are true in all that it teaches, because A & B jointly imply that the Bible is divinely inspired, and its being divinely inspired entails that it does not contain false teachings. But that would take a lot of work ; it is by no means my intention to attempt a defense of that argument here.

I appreciate you probably only said what you did as an aside, and in that sense this is a distraction from the main theme of this thread. But if my point 4 is correct, everything you have to say in this thread or anywhere else has at its heart this massive flaw.

While it's true that if I was convinced of biblical inerrancy, it would be a great concern of mine not to contradict any intended Biblical teachings; and true, this would quickly become problematic, given the difficulty of hermeneutics.

Still, I would say that the same kind of concern ought to apply to everything one says, not just with respect to Scripture. One ought always, when making truth-claims of any kind, only make claims which are true. And the same is so for one's beliefs - the set of one's beliefs ought to affirm only true propositions and no false ones. Needless to say, neither of these maxims are any less difficult to satisfy. I think the same kind of difficulty faces everyone in their epistemic endeavors (what Plantinga calls the human condition - 'being subject to being wrong'), not just the Christian biblical inerrantist

tytalus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:

tytalus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
So you are suggesting that it is necessarily true that all of the constants and quantities are as they are? As for the other point, from my reading it is uncontroversial among physicists that the universe is finely tuned - the disagreements consist in how they go about explaining it.

I suggest it is a possibility, and that we don't know, and therefore there is no reason to believe in the fine-tuned universe. And it took me about ten seconds to find some credible evidence that it is in dispute.

Granting that it's possible that the constants and quantities are necessarily as they are, and that we don't know, it doesn't follow that there is no reason to believe in fine-tuning. The issue of necessity here pertains to how the fine-tuning might be accounted for, not whether the universe is actually fine-tuned. And it isn't a question of whether we know for certain here, but rather the question of what is most probably true.

It's interesting that while you make claims of reasons and probabilities, I have been shown no math. Your tacit surrender regarding fine-tuning as supposedly 'uncontroversial' is noted.

I didn't actually crunch any of the numbers myself, so regrettably, I have no math to present . I've come accross a good number of publications by prominent physicists in which the constants and quantities in question are discussed in detail, and from what I've read, that the universe is finely-tuned seems to be, as I've said, rather uncontroversial (if I gave the impression of conceding that point, it wasn't my intention). What I had in mind was the sort of concurrence expressed by Hawking with respect to the big bang "almost everyone now believes..." Of course there will always be some dissenters.

RichieDickins wrote:Who, Stenger? Much of his dissent reduces to a dispute of the definition of "life," not whether the universe is fine-tuned with respect to the definition used. The various complaints mentioned about anthropocentrism, argumentum ad ignorantiam, and even "the logical flaw of hubris...in its assertion that humans are the purpose of the universe" are red herrings, and the last accusation there is not a logical fallacy, though the objection itself constitutes a straw man. This is because the claim that the universe is fine-tuned makes no assertions at all with respect to teleology. It's only a statement regarding the proportion of all the different possible initial condition values which yield a life-permitting universe (the proportion of universes which are life-permitting is vanishingly small). That is either true or false; charges of "hubris" and the like are completely beside the point.

And again, claims without evidence. This is no church, sir; your word about these probabilities is insufficient.

As for Stenger, see his book "God: The Failed Hypothesis," or his debate with William Craig, where he expresses his concerns about the definition of life and fine-tuning. As for the probabilities, don't take my word for it, listen to the physicists themselves: Kuhn has some good interviews on this topic:
http://www.closertotruth.com/topic/Why-a-Fine-Tuned-Universe-/10
http://www.closertotruth.com/topic/What-does-a-Fine-Tuned-Universe-Mean-/92

I don't know what you mean by the constants having the capacity to vary. If you mean do I know whether it is nomologically possible that they vary, then no, I don't know for certain; I would however argue that it is more probable that it is possible in that way.

And again, claims without the math, easily dismissed, etc. Go ahead -- argue it. Make a case. Supply some credible evidence. Otherwise, why should anyone care what you would argue, but don't?
[/quote]

It's more a question of modality than of doing calculations - I claimed that it's probably nomologically possible, but any such argument would have to consist of metaphysical considerations rather than physical ones (what you might call "credible evidence" ), given that the modality refers to whether or not x is possible in light of the physical laws and antecedent states of the universe, the very things in question. If the big bang occurred at t0, then presumably the universe's physical laws have been in force since t0, and there was no time tn < t0 at which the physical laws obtained. Since the constants and quantities in question are the initial conditions of the universe, then in principle, there can be no sense in which, on the condition that the physical laws and antecedent states are such and such, that the values in question are necessary. If so, then variance of said values would have to be nomologically possible ("~[]" implies "<>")

The laws themselves do not determine what the values of the constants are, but even if a theory of everything were discovered according to which those values are nomologically necessary, this would only serve to push the question back a step.

RichieDickins wrote:If you mean do I know whether it is logically possible, then yes, I do know for certain. There is certainly no contradiction implied in the supposition that there be a universe with different initial values than the actual universe, and there are an infinite number of logically possible distinct universes, each with a different set of initial conditions, constants and so on. And again, the proportion which are life permitting is extraordinarily smaller than that of possible life-prohibiting universes.

It's amusing, this tendency toward baseless repetition. When you can demonstrate the probabilities you baselessly claim, that would be interesting. I suspect this will remain only a logical possibility, however. Though that may be giving it too much credit.

Actually the fine-tuning argument from logical possibility takes on a very different form. I'm not really sure what kind of demonstration you are looking for - there is an infinite number of distinct, possible universes, and I don't have time to go through and count how many of them meet the necessary conditions so as to determine exactly what proportion of logically possible universes are life-permitting. It makes little difference though, for the following reasons:

given that there are an infinite number of possible universes (and an infinite range of values for all of the various constants and quantities), the prior probability that any given universe will be life-prohibiting will be exceedingly greater than that of life-permitting universes, because in order for life to be possible, the values for each of them must fall within an extremely narrow range, and because all life-permitting universes in virtue of the many conditions which they must satisfy to sustain life will display a very high degree of complexity, their intrinsic probability is thereby greatly reduced. On the other hand, there will be an infinite number of maximally simple life-prohibiting universes which all enjoy a high degree of probability a priori

RichieDickins wrote:We do know what the variances will do, in the sense that we know what all the necessary conditions for the existence of life are, and that any variance which precludes any one of those necessary prerequisites will result in a universe without life.

So we automatically know what results from any and all variances? Funny, it seemed to me from reading about the subject that it took a bit of work. You claim to know, but won't show me? I see. Stenger, by contrast, did some work.

No I only said we can know what will result from variances with respect to their effect on the existence of life.
You might find Paul Davies work worth looking at - he's on the interviews I posted above. Or check one of his books: http://books.google.com/books?id=9hxsTybfLWsC&pg=PA143&dq=electromagnetism+gravity+fine+tuning+paul+davies&hl=en&ei=k0RGTKrJCcH88AaG2ITjBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

me wrote:Do we have other examples of universes to compare ours to? Well I think there is only one universe. But I don't see the point - if there existed some other examples of universes to compare ours to, they would necessarily already be among the set of logically possible universes, any of which we can already compare to ours.

The point here is that if you had other examples that did vary you could point to them and say look, they vary. It would be a demonstration that they did in fact -- which is somewhat more interesting than philosophical bloviation about what is logically possible. It is amusing that you don't see the point of having credible evidence, as opposed to what is logically possible.

I'm not sure what that would get you exactly. So yeah, suppose there existed a second universe, that we 'somehow' were able to discover that it exists, and determine that this universe had different initial conditions than our own universe. What conclusion could you draw from that? Well, it wouldn't be that the initial conditions of our universe are not physically necessary. It would have to be some broader modality, like metaphysical or alethic possibility (you're just a step away from logical possibility btw )

RichieDickins wrote:

Will S wrote:Naturally, where you have two extreme and objectionable statements like this, people look for a compromise. Only I can't see how any such compromise is possible. For example, suppose you take up the idea that you've got to do something (perhaps something quite small) towards your own salvation, then God takes over and does the rest. Well, then you actually have secured your own salvation by your own efforts - you did all that was possible for you or necessary.

Hence, as I said, the fog. Can any Christian around here do anything to dispel it?

I'm not really sure it matters whether we call the choice in question a 'work.' That's become a dirty word among protestant Christians, and it's thrown around quite loosely. There are different degrees of 'work,' which I take to mean something like an action which one accomplishes (in some degree) without divine assistance. Now, in all soteriological theories, except to my knowledge universalism, the attainment of salvation involves some kind of work (so defined). Whether it's earned through one's own Pelagian good work bootstrapping, or attained through simply choosing to accept the gift God offers, there is some degree of 'work'. My view is the latter. And as I've said, if there was no component of 'work' at all, not even of exercising one's free will, then this implies a morally inadequate conception of God.

I certain recall once having a long, long debate with an earnest Christian, of what I think you might call the neo-Calvinist school. He insisted that all you needed to do to secure your salvation was, in effect, to throw some kind of 'master switch' in your mind. As I recall, the way he put it was that you had to acknowledge the fact that Jesus had already forgiven you your sins. Once you'd done that, your salvation was certain.

This was completely at variance with the kind of Christianity in which I was brought up, under which 'conversion' was not a single once-off event, but a continuing, life-long process, involving advances and back-slidings, in which the individual Christian was assisted and supported by God's grace and the sacraments. Your life was seen as a kind of training school (or even boot camp!) to get you ready for life in Heaven. In principle, at least, your salvation wasn't certain until you were dead.

As I understand it, both views are orthodox, and both are held by different groups of Christians (or even by the same Christian at different times!). What this shows is that there's an obvious and deep division between Christians - and about something absolutely fundamental. (Of course, it corresponds roughly, but only roughly, to the Protestant / Catholic split).

Isn't it fair to say that what we have here are really two separate religions, although they use much of the same terminology and the same holy book?

RichieDickins wrote:

tytalus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
Granting that it's possible that the constants and quantities are necessarily as they are, and that we don't know, it doesn't follow that there is no reason to believe in fine-tuning. The issue of necessity here pertains to how the fine-tuning might be accounted for, not whether the universe is actually fine-tuned. And it isn't a question of whether we know for certain here, but rather the question of what is most probably true.

It's interesting that while you make claims of reasons and probabilities, I have been shown no math. Your tacit surrender regarding fine-tuning as supposedly 'uncontroversial' is noted.

I didn't actually crunch any of the numbers myself, so regrettably, I have no math to present . I've come accross a good number of publications by prominent physicists in which the constants and quantities in question are discussed in detail, and from what I've read, that the universe is finely-tuned seems to be, as I've said, rather uncontroversial (if I gave the impression of conceding that point, it wasn't my intention). What I had in mind was the sort of concurrence expressed by Hawking with respect to the big bang "almost everyone now believes..." Of course there will always be some dissenters.

You may of course go on claiming that the concept of fine-tuning is uncontroversial, but given that I have offered evidence in counter, I think it beats your unfounded claims about what you've read. Not to mention that you want to make claims about math without offering any, whether you crunched the numbers or someone else did. Just to reiterate the evidence that I offered, wasn't that hard to find:

tytalus wrote:I suggest it is a possibility, and that we don't know, and therefore there is no reason to believe in the fine-tuned universe. And it took me about ten seconds to find some credible evidence that it is in dispute.

As for Stenger, see his book "God: The Failed Hypothesis," or his debate with William Craig, where he expresses his concerns about the definition of life and fine-tuning. As for the probabilities, don't take my word for it, listen to the physicists themselves: Kuhn has some good interviews on this topic:
http://www.closertotruth.com/topic/Why-a-Fine-Tuned-Universe-/10
http://www.closertotruth.com/topic/What-does-a-Fine-Tuned-Universe-Mean-/92

Thanks, I will check these out as time permits.

I don't know what you mean by the constants having the capacity to vary. If you mean do I know whether it is nomologically possible that they vary, then no, I don't know for certain; I would however argue that it is more probable that it is possible in that way.

And again, claims without the math, easily dismissed, etc. Go ahead -- argue it. Make a case. Supply some credible evidence. Otherwise, why should anyone care what you would argue, but don't?

It's more a question of modality than of doing calculations - I claimed that it's probably nomologically possible, but any such argument would have to consist of metaphysical considerations rather than physical ones (what you might call "credible evidence" ),

Note my amusement likewise at your laughing dismissal of credible evidence. After all, you have been claiming all along there are reasons to believe these religiously-inspired claims, but then seem satisfied with what is logically possible. There is a vast gulf between this and a demonstrated point. You may of course go on deriding the desire for credible evidence as foolish, and go on thinking that 'logically possible' proves something important. I find the argument fails to be compelling.

given that the modality refers to whether or not x is possible in light of the physical laws and antecedent states of the universe, the very things in question. If the big bang occurred at t0, then presumably the universe's physical laws have been in force since t0, and there was no time tn < t0 at which the physical laws obtained.

Sorry, but this is undemonstrated; our understanding fails at the Planck time, and the observed expansion we can see is not based on time = 0. Philosophy may not help to describe what was going on at that time.

Since the constants and quantities in question are the initial conditions of the universe, then in principle, there can be no sense in which, on the condition that the physical laws and antecedent states are such and such, that the values in question are necessary. If so, then variance of said values would have to be nomologically possible ("~[]" implies "<>")

The laws themselves do not determine what the values of the constants are, but even if a theory of everything were discovered according to which those values are nomologically necessary, this would only serve to push the question back a step.

That's as may be, but I am still more interested in what is true than in what is logically possible. If we can discover whether this is true or not, it will improve our understanding. I count that better than philosophizing on the logically possible.

It's amusing, this tendency toward baseless repetition. When you can demonstrate the probabilities you baselessly claim, that would be interesting. I suspect this will remain only a logical possibility, however. Though that may be giving it too much credit.

Actually the fine-tuning argument from logical possibility takes on a very different form. I'm not really sure what kind of demonstration you are looking for - there is an infinite number of distinct, possible universes, and I don't have time to go through and count how many of them meet the necessary conditions so as to determine exactly what proportion of logically possible universes are life-permitting.

I think you know what I'm looking for, Richie; I'm looking for a demonstration of reality. If I wanted endless philosophizing there is a separate forum for that. Nevertheless, although you admit here that you can't determine the proportions of what is logically possible, you go right ahead and make claims about such proportions below. Naturally, I find this laughable. But hey, at least we're both having fun.

It makes little difference though, for the following reasons:

given that there are an infinite number of possible universes (and an infinite range of values for all of the various constants and quantities), the prior probability that any given universe will be life-prohibiting will be exceedingly greater than that of life-permitting universes, because in order for life to be possible, the values for each of them must fall within an extremely narrow range, and because all life-permitting universes in virtue of the many conditions which they must satisfy to sustain life will display a very high degree of complexity, their intrinsic probability is thereby greatly reduced. On the other hand, there will be an infinite number of maximally simple life-prohibiting universes which all enjoy a high degree of probability a priori

This, of course, is just playing games with infinity. I could just as well claim that your supposed 'extremely narrow range' represents just as much of an infinite number. But your argument fails because you haven't demonstrated this 'extremely narrow range.' Unlike you I have cited evidence of someone having done the work, the math, suggesting that ~25% of the possibilities may support life. What have you got? Another empty claim. And I dismiss it as such.

RichieDickins wrote:We do know what the variances will do, in the sense that we know what all the necessary conditions for the existence of life are, and that any variance which precludes any one of those necessary prerequisites will result in a universe without life.

So we automatically know what results from any and all variances? Funny, it seemed to me from reading about the subject that it took a bit of work. You claim to know, but won't show me? I see. Stenger, by contrast, did some work.

No I only said we can know what will result from variances with respect to their effect on the existence of life.
You might find Paul Davies work worth looking at - he's on the interviews I posted above. Or check one of his books: http://books.google.com/books?id=9hxsTybfLWsC&pg=PA143&dq=electromagnetism+gravity+fine+tuning+paul+davies&hl=en&ei=k0RGTKrJCcH88AaG2ITjBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false

Again, I'll see what I can do to investigate.

The point here is that if you had other examples that did vary you could point to them and say look, they vary. It would be a demonstration that they did in fact -- which is somewhat more interesting than philosophical bloviation about what is logically possible. It is amusing that you don't see the point of having credible evidence, as opposed to what is logically possible.

I'm not sure what that would get you exactly. So yeah, suppose there existed a second universe, that we 'somehow' were able to discover that it exists, and determine that this universe had different initial conditions than our own universe. What conclusion could you draw from that? Well, it wouldn't be that the initial conditions of our universe are not physically necessary. It would have to be some broader modality, like metaphysical or alethic possibility (you're just a step away from logical possibility btw )

Based on what I've read, I disagree with your claim here. If the idea is that universes have to be thus and so and we find a second example that's not, I think we've gone well beyond what might have been or could be true. If we had other, differing examples the 'possibility' would be real, it'd be staring you in the face.

Sorry if this disappoints, but I am interested in what can be demonstrated. If you haven't got anything, I've got better things to do.

Will S wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
I'm not really sure it matters whether we call the choice in question a 'work.' That's become a dirty word among protestant Christians, and it's thrown around quite loosely. There are different degrees of 'work,' which I take to mean something like an action which one accomplishes (in some degree) without divine assistance. Now, in all soteriological theories, except to my knowledge universalism, the attainment of salvation involves some kind of work (so defined). Whether it's earned through one's own Pelagian good work bootstrapping, or attained through simply choosing to accept the gift God offers, there is some degree of 'work'. My view is the latter. And as I've said, if there was no component of 'work' at all, not even of exercising one's free will, then this implies a morally inadequate conception of God.

I certain recall once having a long, long debate with an earnest Christian, of what I think you might call the neo-Calvinist school. He insisted that all you needed to do to secure your salvation was, in effect, to throw some kind of 'master switch' in your mind. As I recall, the way he put it was that you had to acknowledge the fact that Jesus had already forgiven you your sins. Once you'd done that, your salvation was certain.

This was completely at variance with the kind of Christianity in which I was brought up, under which 'conversion' was not a single once-off event, but a continuing, life-long process, involving advances and back-slidings, in which the individual Christian was assisted and supported by God's grace and the sacraments. Your life was seen as a kind of training school (or even boot camp!) to get you ready for life in Heaven. In principle, at least, your salvation wasn't certain until you were dead.

Yeah those are big points of dispute among Christians, not just how one attains salvation, but also whether or not one can lose it afterwards. In a sense I agree with both of the positions you described above - as I said earlier, I tend to think that the decision/choice/acknowledgment alone is sufficient (though perhaps not a necessary condition). I don't know anything about "conversion experiences" or quick switch-flippings or whatnot; mine was a very gradual transition. And, it seems to me, it must be the case that one can lose one's salvation, because if one couldn't, that would be inconsistent with the freedom to choose. In that sense, one doesn't have certainty that one won't reject Christianity at some future time.

As I understand it, both views are orthodox, and both are held by different groups of Christians (or even by the same Christian at different times!). What this shows is that there's an obvious and deep division between Christians - and about something absolutely fundamental. (Of course, it corresponds roughly, but only roughly, to the Protestant / Catholic split).

Isn't it fair to say that what we have here are really two separate religions, although they use much of the same terminology and the same holy book?

Certainly it's a fundamental issue, and it's one of the central points of disagreement among Christians. Although, I think it's hard to say how much of a variance among practitioners' beliefs would be required before we say they're not practicing the same religion any more. I'm inclined to just say that the meaning of a word is determined, for the most part, by how it's used. And generally, I've found that Christians still consider those that hold an opposing view on that issue to be members of the same religion; that is, they still call them "Christians" (including the Catholic Church these days, ever since Vatican II).

tytalus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
It's more a question of modality than of doing calculations - I claimed that it's probably nomologically possible, but any such argument would have to consist of metaphysical considerations rather than physical ones (what you might call "credible evidence" ),

Note my amusement likewise at your laughing dismissal of credible evidence. After all, you have been claiming all along there are reasons to believe these religiously-inspired claims, but then seem satisfied with what is logically possible. There is a vast gulf between this and a demonstrated point. You may of course go on deriding the desire for credible evidence as foolish, and go on thinking that 'logically possible' proves something important. I find the argument fails to be compelling.

Oh I'm all about credible evidence. I was laughing because, for many people on this forum, their definition of the term extends no further than physical considerations (empiricism and naturalism being very common around here). As I see it though, evidence for some claim h is something like this: any proposition d which, if true, makes the probability P of h higher than it would otherwise be . That is, d is "credible evidence" IFF P(h/d) > P(h).

Tytalus wrote:

given that the modality refers to whether or not x is possible in light of the physical laws and antecedent states of the universe, the very things in question. If the big bang occurred at t0, then presumably the universe's physical laws have been in force since t0, and there was no time tn < t0 at which the physical laws obtained.

Sorry, but this is undemonstrated; our understanding fails at the Planck time, and the observed expansion we can see is not based on time = 0. Philosophy may not help to describe what was going on at that time.

Hmm you might be right about the helpfulness of philosophy . Look at it this way though, either the universe began to exist or it didn't. If it did, then there has to be some time t0 such that there was no prior time tn when the universe existed. Now, I think you would agree that physical laws are only descriptions of how things in the universe behave, not abstract entities which exist independently. If so, that means no laws until the universe began to exist. If you think the universe has always existed, then all that's beside the point (but I would be curious to hear what model you find most persuasive, if you don't mind).

Tytalus wrote:

Since the constants and quantities in question are the initial conditions of the universe, then in principle, there can be no sense in which, on the condition that the physical laws and antecedent states are such and such, that the values in question are necessary. If so, then variance of said values would have to be nomologically possible ("~[]" implies "<>")

The laws themselves do not determine what the values of the constants are, but even if a theory of everything were discovered according to which those values are nomologically necessary, this would only serve to push the question back a step.

That's as may be, but I am still more interested in what is true than in what is logically possible. If we can discover whether this is true or not, it will improve our understanding. I count that better than philosophizing on the logically possible.

True, I suppose in the case of most questions, possibility doesn't get you very far. It's significant here however, because if different values for the initial conditions were not possible, then it is not at all surprising that the universe has the constants and quantities it does (for it couldn't have been otherwise). But if it is possible, then just the opposite is the case.

Tytalus wrote:

Actually the fine-tuning argument from logical possibility takes on a very different form. I'm not really sure what kind of demonstration you are looking for - there is an infinite number of distinct, possible universes, and I don't have time to go through and count how many of them meet the necessary conditions so as to determine exactly what proportion of logically possible universes are life-permitting.

I think you know what I'm looking for, Richie; I'm looking for a demonstration of reality. If I wanted endless philosophizing there is a separate forum for that. Nevertheless, although you admit here that you can't determine the proportions of what is logically possible, you go right ahead and make claims about such proportions below. Naturally, I find this laughable. But hey, at least we're both having fun.

You want a demonstration of reality? I'd have to know what you mean by reality - are you a materialist?

Tytalus wrote:

It makes little difference though, for the following reasons:

given that there are an infinite number of possible universes (and an infinite range of values for all of the various constants and quantities), the prior probability that any given universe will be life-prohibiting will be exceedingly greater than that of life-permitting universes, because in order for life to be possible, the values for each of them must fall within an extremely narrow range, and because all life-permitting universes in virtue of the many conditions which they must satisfy to sustain life will display a very high degree of complexity, their intrinsic probability is thereby greatly reduced. On the other hand, there will be an infinite number of maximally simple life-prohibiting universes which all enjoy a high degree of probability a priori

This, of course, is just playing games with infinity. I could just as well claim that your supposed 'extremely narrow range' represents just as much of an infinite number. But your argument fails because you haven't demonstrated this 'extremely narrow range.' Unlike you I have cited evidence of someone having done the work, the math, suggesting that ~25% of the possibilities may support life. What have you got? Another empty claim. And I dismiss it as such.

So you're saying that there are an infinite number of life-permitting universes, and there's also an infinite number of life-prohibiting universes? So what's the probability that any given universe would be life permitting vs prohibiting? They can't both be 1, that's a contradiction. I think you're the one playing games with infinity here. You can always go on dividing indefinitely, but Achilles is still going to win the race

Who was that btw? I don't remember seeing that on the wiki page.

Tytalus wrote:

I'm not sure what that would get you exactly. So yeah, suppose there existed a second universe, that we 'somehow' were able to discover that it exists, and determine that this universe had different initial conditions than our own universe. What conclusion could you draw from that? Well, it wouldn't be that the initial conditions of our universe are not physically necessary. It would have to be some broader modality, like metaphysical or alethic possibility (you're just a step away from logical possibility btw )

Based on what I've read, I disagree with your claim here. If the idea is that universes have to be thus and so and we find a second example that's not, I think we've gone well beyond what might have been or could be true. If we had other, differing examples the 'possibility' would be real, it'd be staring you in the face.

Sorry if this disappoints, but I am interested in what can be demonstrated. If you haven't got anything, I've got better things to do.

If we found another universe with different values, how would that show it to be physically possible that our own universe could have had different values than it does? Possible based on what, if nomological possibility is a factor of antecedent states of the universe and its physical laws? And why wouldn't you just say, as you have with regard to the actual universe, that it may be physically necessary that this second universe's constants and quantities are what they are, too?

RichieDickins wrote:

Will S wrote:I certain recall once having a long, long debate with an earnest Christian, of what I think you might call the neo-Calvinist school. He insisted that all you needed to do to secure your salvation was, in effect, to throw some kind of 'master switch' in your mind. As I recall, the way he put it was that you had to acknowledge the fact that Jesus had already forgiven you your sins. Once you'd done that, your salvation was certain.

This was completely at variance with the kind of Christianity in which I was brought up, under which 'conversion' was not a single once-off event, but a continuing, life-long process, involving advances and back-slidings, in which the individual Christian was assisted and supported by God's grace and the sacraments. Your life was seen as a kind of training school (or even boot camp!) to get you ready for life in Heaven. In principle, at least, your salvation wasn't certain until you were dead.

Yeah those are big points of dispute among Christians, not just how one attains salvation, but also whether or not one can lose it afterwards. In a sense I agree with both of the positions you described above - as I said earlier, I tend to think that the decision/choice/acknowledgment alone is sufficient (though perhaps not a necessary condition). I don't know anything about "conversion experiences" or quick switch-flippings or whatnot; mine was a very gradual transition. And, it seems to me, it must be the case that one can lose one's salvation, because if one couldn't, that would be inconsistent with the freedom to choose. In that sense, one doesn't have certainty that one won't reject Christianity at some future time.

Will S wrote:As I understand it, both views are orthodox, and both are held by different groups of Christians (or even by the same Christian at different times!). What this shows is that there's an obvious and deep division between Christians - and about something absolutely fundamental. (Of course, it corresponds roughly, but only roughly, to the Protestant / Catholic split).

Isn't it fair to say that what we have here are really two separate religions, although they use much of the same terminology and the same holy book?

Certainly it's a fundamental issue, and it's one of the central points of disagreement among Christians. Although, I think it's hard to say how much of a variance among practitioners' beliefs would be required before we say they're not practicing the same religion any more. I'm inclined to just say that the meaning of a word is determined, for the most part, by how it's used. And generally, I've found that Christians still consider those that hold an opposing view on that issue to be members of the same religion; that is, they still call them "Christians" (including the Catholic Church these days, ever since Vatican II).

But why are you so laid back about it?

In the past, Christians said (and some today still continue to say) that one of those views is right and the other is wrong. They said that it's important to take the right view, because if you take the wrong view, then you'll be damned, or at least your salvation will be seriously at risk. A Roman Catholic would tell a Calvinistic Methodist that he'd best join the Catholic Church, or it would be the worse for him - and vice versa.

So why are you, and other present day Christians, simply shrugging off something which is (apparently) so important?

For what it's worth, my interpretation is that, these days and for many Christians, the notions of 'salvation', 'damnation', 'Heaven', 'Hell' don't have the same reality that they used to possess. That is, they have become misty and 'symbolic': fewer and fewer Christians believe that it's a stark fact of life that each of us will either be saved or damned, and will end up either in Heaven or in Hell.

Or, if that's not the correct interpretation, then what is going on?

Will S

I think one thing that is happening is that universalism is cutting a swathe through grass-roots Christians. To what extent it is also cutting a swathe through orthodox theology, I don't really know, although Catholics have told me that JP2 was a covert universalist (and Benedict isn't!).

It's interesting that one Orthodox view is that hell consists in being with God. This view is also finding some favour with the non-Orthodox, in my experience. Flux, eh?

RichieDickins,
I split my answer to you.

RichieDickins wrote:

Larkus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
This presumes that if S has some goal x, and a necessary condition of achieving x is y, then S has y as a goal. Of course I deny that. I may find some particular state of affairs desirable without finding the necessary condition of that state of affair's occurrence desirable; in taking up the desirable state of affairs as my goal, I certainly don't make the undesirable prerequisite my goal as well in doing so.

"if S has some goal x, and a necessary condition of achieving x is y, then S has y as a goal." This is true, if it depends on the choice of S, whether y exists in the first place.

If God allmighty wants to

1) "creat[e] a world in which humans can freely choose to help [humans], that are suffering [from natural evil]",

then it is a necessary condition, that human suffering from natural evil exists. God allmighty can not not want, that human suffering from natural evil exists in such a world. To create such a world, God allmighty must want, that human suffering from natural evil exist - and

1a) create a world containing human suffering from natural evil

I disagree with you again on this point: if 'S wants x', and 'if x, then y', then 'S wants y'

You omitted the conditional sentence and thereby changed my argument:

"if S has some goal x, and a necessary condition of achieving x is y, then S has y as a goal." This is true, if it depends on the choice of S, whether y exists in the first place.

Moreover, keep in mind, that my argument is about an omnipotent, omniscient creator of the universe.

RichieDickins wrote:I deny this because, as I said before, one can want something without wanting the necessary conditions for its attainment.

Not when it depends on your choice, whether the necessary conditions for its attainment exist in the first place.

RichieDickins wrote:I want money, but that doesn't mean I want to get a job.

A job isn't a necessary condition for the attainment of money.

You could rob a bank, inherit a fortune, marry rich, win the lottery, talk Bill Gates into adopting you or live from charity, just to name a few examples and if you are an all-powerful being, you can simply wish for as much money as you can eat.

RichieDickins wrote:I want to eat dinner, but that doesn't mean I want to go to grocery store and buy the food, take it home and prepare it.

Going to a grocery store and buying food, taking it home and preparing it is not necessary for having a meal.

You could just pay someone to cook you dinner. Restaurants exist for a reason and if you happen to be an all-powerful being, you can will your dinner into existence.

RichieDickins wrote:Suppose some person S commits a heinous crime; I want justice to be carried out so that he is properly punished for his offense; but that doesn't mean I want it to be the case that he committed the crime in the first place (which is a necessary condition for what I want). And so on.

Not when it depends on your choice, whether the crime exists in the first place. You can not not want it to be the case that person S committed the crime in the first place (which is a necessary condition for what you want, namely that S is properly punished for committing a heinous crime), if it depends on your very choice whether person S does commit the crime in the first place.

Lark 1:15 wrote:And the LORD spoke and said: "Let there be crimes, so that justice may be carried out." And lo, there were crimes and there was justice carried out, as the LORD had said.

Lark

nunnington wrote:Will S

I think one thing that is happening is that universalism is cutting a swathe through grass-roots Christians. To what extent it is also cutting a swathe through orthodox theology, I don't really know, although Catholics have told me that JP2 was a covert universalist (and Benedict isn't!).

It's interesting that one Orthodox view is that hell consists in being with God. This view is also finding some favour with the non-Orthodox, in my experience. Flux, eh?

Interesting! But is it just universalism? Isn't it also the idea that there isn't really, literally, a life after death? Or even that there isn't really, literally a God?

It seems to me that, with traditional Christianity, if you let go of anything, then you're on a slippery slope, and you end by letting go of everything. (This is why I have some sympathy for the traditionalists - I think I understand their problem.) For example, if you say that perhaps Noah's Flood didn't really happen, or that it's something which you must interpret metaphorically, then perhaps the resurrection of Jesus ..... ooops! The slippery slope!

Will S

Yet haven't slippery slopes always existed within Christianity? Thus, on the resurrection, we find in the New Testament that some groups just didn't believe in it (thus Paul: 'how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?' (1 Cor. 15: 12)), some believed in a physical resuscitation, and probably some in a spiritual resurrection (flesh and blood shall not inherit the kingdom). Or in Gnostic language, imperishability descends upon the perishable.

Of course, the hierarchy have always tried to exert a monolithic control over doctrine, yet somehow the green shoots of unorthodoxy always seem to spill out.

Larkus wrote:

RichieDickins wrote:
I disagree with you again on this point: if 'S wants x', and 'if x, then y', then 'S wants y'

You omitted the conditional sentence and thereby changed my argument:

"if S has some goal x, and a necessary condition of achieving x is y, then S has y as a goal." This is true, if it depends on the choice of S, whether y exists in the first place.

Moreover, keep in mind, that my argument is about an omnipotent, omniscient creator of the universe.

Oh I see. But I still don't see how that would make y his goal, even if y exists IFF S creates it. more on this below:

RichieDickins wrote:I deny this because, as I said before, one can want something without wanting the necessary conditions for its attainment.

Not when it depends on your choice, whether the necessary conditions for its attainment exist in the first place.

God could not choose to make it such that y is or isn't a necessary condition for x in this case, because it would be contradictory to suppose that you could have a world where people help others that are suffering without others that are suffering.

RichieDickins wrote:I want money, but that doesn't mean I want to get a job.

A job isn't a necessary condition for the attainment of money.

You could rob a bank, inherit a fortune, marry rich, win the lottery, talk Bill Gates into adopting you or live from charity, just to name a few examples and if you are an all-powerful being, you can simply wish for as much money as you can eat.

RichieDickins wrote:I want to eat dinner, but that doesn't mean I want to go to grocery store and buy the food, take it home and prepare it.

Going to a grocery store and buying food, taking it home and preparing it is not necessary for having a meal.

You could just pay someone to cook you dinner. Restaurants exist for a reason and if you happen to be an all-powerful being, you can will your dinner into existence.

Yes that's right, but I was mostly just trying to get the point across

RichieDickins wrote:Suppose some person S commits a heinous crime; I want justice to be carried out so that he is properly punished for his offense; but that doesn't mean I want it to be the case that he committed the crime in the first place (which is a necessary condition for what I want). And so on.

Not when it depends on your choice, whether the crime exists in the first place. You can not not want it to be the case that person S committed the crime in the first place (which is a necessary condition for what you want, namely that S is properly punished for committing a heinous crime), if it depends on your very choice whether person S does commit the crime in the first place.

Sure you can. Just because you make a choice, that doesn't mean it was a choice you desired to make. Often one makes decisions that one doesn't want to make, because there is some more important overriding reason for doing so.

You must be defining "choose" in such a way that S chooses x only if S wants x
But as I say, it could be that S chooses y only because he wanted x, for which y is a necessary condition.

Lark 1:15 wrote:And the LORD spoke and said: "Let there be crimes, so that justice may be carried out." And lo, there were crimes and there was justice carried out, as the LORD had said.

I don't remember that passage. Which translation are you using?

RichieDickins wrote:

tytalus wrote:
Note my amusement likewise at your laughing dismissal of credible evidence. After all, you have been claiming all along there are reasons to believe these religiously-inspired claims, but then seem satisfied with what is logically possible. There is a vast gulf between this and a demonstrated point. You may of course go on deriding the desire for credible evidence as foolish, and go on thinking that 'logically possible' proves something important. I find the argument fails to be compelling.

Oh I'm all about credible evidence. I was laughing because, for many people on this forum, their definition of the term extends no further than physical considerations (empiricism and naturalism being very common around here). As I see it though, evidence for some claim h is something like this: any proposition d which, if true, makes the probability P of h higher than it would otherwise be . That is, d is "credible evidence" IFF P(h/d) > P(h).

I don't see any reason to outright dismiss such a construction, but I could understand not placing much value on it, or placing greater value on something more substantial than probability and statistics. Do you find such probability calculations satisfying? Making up a percentage for the sake of argument, does a 51% chance of the xian god existing satisfy your desire for evidence before worshipping the supposed entity? Can you understand why someone used to finding evidential support in reality for things existing might not be satisfied by a probability calculation alone?

RichieDickins wrote:

Tytalus wrote:Sorry, but this is undemonstrated; our understanding fails at the Planck time, and the observed expansion we can see is not based on time = 0. Philosophy may not help to describe what was going on at that time.

Hmm you might be right about the helpfulness of philosophy . Look at it this way though, either the universe began to exist or it didn't. If it did, then there has to be some time t0 such that there was no prior time tn when the universe existed. Now, I think you would agree that physical laws are only descriptions of how things in the universe behave, not abstract entities which exist independently. If so, that means no laws until the universe began to exist. If you think the universe has always existed, then all that's beside the point (but I would be curious to hear what model you find most persuasive, if you don't mind).

I don't hold a position on whether or not our universe has always existed; I don't see much reason to pick one over the other right now. That said, it doesn't seem as if the 'laws of the universe' are as easy to pin down as your description makes it seem. Again, the wiki article proves useful in pointing out some alternate possibilities.

wikipedia wrote:Top-down cosmology

Stephen Hawking, along with Thomas Hertog of CERN, proposed that the universe's initial conditions consisted of a superposition of many possible initial conditions, only a small fraction of which contributed to the conditions we see today.[22] According to their theory, it is inevitable that we find our universe's "fine-tuned" physical constants, as the current universe "selects" only those past histories that led to the present conditions. In this way, top-down cosmology provides an anthropic explanation for why we find ourselves in a universe that allows matter and life, without invoking the current existence of a multiverse.

I've read that the laws 'break down' at the Planck epoch, though that may be too much of a layman's term, I don't know. But it may also be too simplistic to claim that they suddenly popped in out of nowhere.

RichieDickins wrote:

Tytalus wrote:

The laws themselves do not determine what the values of the constants are, but even if a theory of everything were discovered according to which those values are nomologically necessary, this would only serve to push the question back a step.

That's as may be, but I am still more interested in what is true than in what is logically possible. If we can discover whether this is true or not, it will improve our understanding. I count that better than philosophizing on the logically possible.

True, I suppose in the case of most questions, possibility doesn't get you very far. It's significant here however, because if different values for the initial conditions were not possible, then it is not at all surprising that the universe has the constants and quantities it does (for it couldn't have been otherwise). But if it is possible, then just the opposite is the case.

Again, we don't know if they can vary, or if they can, by how much. The proposed infinite variation is, again, merely what is logically possible. Any result would be 'surprising.' Just like the particular series of cards dealt by a properly shuffled deck.

RichieDickins wrote:

Tytalus wrote:I think you know what I'm looking for, Richie; I'm looking for a demonstration of reality. If I wanted endless philosophizing there is a separate forum for that. Nevertheless, although you admit here that you can't determine the proportions of what is logically possible, you go right ahead and make claims about such proportions below. Naturally, I find this laughable. But hey, at least we're both having fun.

You want a demonstration of reality? I'd have to know what you mean by reality - are you a materialist?

After checking up on it a bit, I'm inclined to think so, yes. I could be wrong, but I wonder how it could be demonstrated. Are you planning a 'demonstration of reality' that cannot be detected by scientific investigation? Of what use would that be?

At this point, it seems clear that a series of semantic games is about to ensue. It's sad to consider how the mighty have fallen, here. It used to be so easy for the believer to point to something in reality and say 'look, there's god, that was god's doing'. Fire, lightning, earthquakes, plagues...look, there he is! And we still have these belief systems predicated on the idea. But the idea has gone extinct with the advance of science and real understanding; instead, we get dictionary wars and arguments over whose worldview e-peen is the biggest. Accusations of closed-mindedness seem nigh inevitable.

RichieDickins wrote:

Tytalus wrote:This, of course, is just playing games with infinity. I could just as well claim that your supposed 'extremely narrow range' represents just as much of an infinite number. But your argument fails because you haven't demonstrated this 'extremely narrow range.' Unlike you I have cited evidence of someone having done the work, the math, suggesting that ~25% of the possibilities may support life. What have you got? Another empty claim. And I dismiss it as such.

So you're saying that there are an infinite number of life-permitting universes, and there's also an infinite number of life-prohibiting universes? So what's the probability that any given universe would be life permitting vs prohibiting? They can't both be 1, that's a contradiction. I think you're the one playing games with infinity here. You can always go on dividing indefinitely, but Achilles is still going to win the race

Who was that btw? I don't remember seeing that on the wiki page.

Oh, I was definitely playing a game there, just to demonstrate the absurdity of yours. I just don't see the utility of a baseless claim that life-supporting possibilities are extremely narrow. Some evidential support would be great.

As for the 25% figure, that's one of the citations here. Since it is apparently difficult to make good predictions on the possibility of a universe supporting life in great detail, scientists like Victor Stenger and Fred Adams have done math based on the possibility of star formation, which seems a useful prerequisite. Here is where the 25% figure pops up.

wikipedia wrote:Computer simulations suggest that not all of the purportedly "fine-tuned" parameters may be as fine-tuned as has been claimed. Victor Stenger has simulated different universes in which four fundamental parameters are varied (electromagnetic interaction, strong nuclear interaction, electron mass, and proton mass; tuning of other parameters such as the cosmological constant was not considered). He found that long-lived stars could exist over a wide parameter range, and concluded that "... a wide variation of constants of physics leads to universes that are long-lived enough for life to evolve, although human life need not exist in such universes".[7] Fred Adams has done a similar study, investigating the structure of stars in universes with different values of the gravitational constant G, the fine-structure constant α, and a nuclear reaction rate parameter C. His study suggests that roughly 25% of this parameter space allows stars to exist, but not necessarily to form. His analysis also does not take into account variations of other fundamental constants or considerations of habitability.[8]

Stenger's calculations on stellar lifetimes using different constants indicated over half the universes could support star lasting at least a billion years. What I found interesting about his article (a pdf from cite note 7) was that he didn't dispute that life as we know it wouldn't exist; it could be something radically different. Perhaps humanocentrism is part of the fine-tuning mindset that isn't spoken of.

RichieDickins wrote:

Tytalus wrote:Based on what I've read, I disagree with your claim here. If the idea is that universes have to be thus and so and we find a second example that's not, I think we've gone well beyond what might have been or could be true. If we had other, differing examples the 'possibility' would be real, it'd be staring you in the face.

If we found another universe with different values, how would that show it to be physically possible that our own universe could have had different values than it does? Possible based on what, if nomological possibility is a factor of antecedent states of the universe and its physical laws? And why wouldn't you just say, as you have with regard to the actual universe, that it may be physically necessary that this second universe's constants and quantities are what they are, too?

Not necessarily variance in our universe in particular; in general. An example of another, different universe would show that these constants can vary at all.