BWE wrote:Romansh's post can also work for me although it veers a little bit into ontological territory for my tastes. But pattern is pattern regardless of ontology. As I said upthread, the only thing we are forced to take as a given is consistency at our scale.

That is Progress with a capital 'P'. What did you think I have been talking about besides ontologically independent patterns?

Consistency at our scale would be a function, and we ARE that function, applied to some thing, whatever it is, that is the state of things that feed that function above.

But you seem to think there is some error in the function. How could there be?

To give away the plot here I am still trying to find some common ground with you where we might get some traction on the nature of our being. As it is there doesn't seem to be any way to clear anything up with you. You erode any starting point. My suggestion was that you admit that I do exist and you do as well and that we are not the same thing. Because if we are the same thing I don't see how we could be having this disagreement.

Now I know that this modern idealism feels good and allows one to say anything at all about anything and attribute it to the subjective, or even say nothing at all and yet say it a lot.

SpeedOfSound wrote:
But you seem to think there is some error in the function. How could there be?

I'd be guessing, but I think BWE would go with the premise that we don't have an anchor for 'consistency', and establishing an anchor by fiat doesn't seem to be the direction he wants to go.

To be fair, I think 'regularity' and 'consistency' are only results of thinking about it. We can become so overwhelmed with relief that we can agree with anyone about anything at all that we pick on the implication that there must be some error and try to disagree with that. I'd be speculating, but I think that's what BWE means when he says language confounds ontology.

But why stop there?

SpeedOfSound wrote:

BWE wrote:Romansh's post can also work for me although it veers a little bit into ontological territory for my tastes. But pattern is pattern regardless of ontology. As I said upthread, the only thing we are forced to take as a given is consistency at our scale.

That is Progress with a capital 'P'. What did you think I have been talking about besides ontologically independent patterns?

Consistency at our scale would be a function, and we ARE that function, applied to some thing, whatever it is, that is the state of things that feed that function above.

But you seem to think there is some error in the function. How could there be?

To give away the plot here I am still trying to find some common ground with you where we might get some traction on the nature of our being. As it is there doesn't seem to be any way to clear anything up with you. You erode any starting point. My suggestion was that you admit that I do exist and you do as well and that we are not the same thing. Because if we are the same thing I don't see how we could be having this disagreement.

Now I know that this modern idealism feels good and allows one to say anything at all about anything and attribute it to the subjective, or even say nothing at all and yet say it a lot.

What "is" is available through our senses. Everything else is words about that. I'm not arguing an idealism perspective. I'm arguing that value is internal to our modeling functions and not a feature of the organism's environment, whatever that is. And, I'm arguing that the valuation process so powerfully obscures what is (which, remember, I am saying is available through our senses) that it cannot meaningfully describe the nature of those perceptions from and ontological position. Furthermore, everything that "is" is unique and not a category. That is, we can point out a tree, but the commonalities between that tree and another tree are commonalities of pattern but not repetitions of pattern. Every eddy in a river is its own "thing" even though it may have a few similarities it shares with other eddies. There is no tree "out there", there is only this tree or that tree. Before you specify, you are using information from the model to pragmatically predict certain features.

BWE wrote:
What "is" is available through our senses. Everything else is words about that. I'm not arguing an idealism perspective. I'm arguing that value is internal to our modeling functions and not a feature of the organism's environment, whatever that is. And, I'm arguing that the valuation process so powerfully obscures what is (which, remember, I am saying is available through our senses) that it cannot meaningfully describe the nature of those perceptions from and ontological position. Furthermore, everything that "is" is unique and not a category. That is, we can point out a tree, but the commonalities between that tree and another tree are commonalities of pattern but not repetitions of pattern. Every eddy in a river is its own "thing" even though it may have a few similarities it shares with other eddies. There is no tree "out there", there is only this tree or that tree. Before you specify, you are using information from the model to pragmatically predict certain features.

Taking a unique perspective rather than categorising means one learns nothing and cannot pin anything down.

Considering only single entities is a bit like quantum mechanics - one can only discuss probabilities. When one categorises the external environment approximates to Newtonian physics, so concrete conclusions can be derived and tested.

BWE wrote:What "is" is available through our senses. Everything else is words about that. I'm not arguing an idealism perspective. I'm arguing that value is internal to our modeling functions and not a feature of the organism's environment, whatever that is. And, I'm arguing that the valuation process so powerfully obscures what is (which, remember, I am saying is available through our senses) that it cannot meaningfully describe the nature of those perceptions from and ontological position. Furthermore, everything that "is" is unique and not a category. That is, we can point out a tree, but the commonalities between that tree and another tree are commonalities of pattern but not repetitions of pattern. Every eddy in a river is its own "thing" even though it may have a few similarities it shares with other eddies. There is no tree "out there", there is only this tree or that tree. Before you specify, you are using information from the model to pragmatically predict certain features.

This kind of chatter only has consequences for those who like to categorize what is, arguing as if our senses were not good enough, so that is at least not inappropriate here, but you assign no consequences to this 'valuation'. It often seems as if you'd recommend a whole different set of categories from what physicalism gives us, even that you have actually stated this. If that is not the case, you should say so explicitly, because all the weight of your analysis is in the consequences of your view, still only implied. I can't imagine why you'd twirl all that around in front of us every time the topic of trees comes up without going the rest of the way to wherever you really are on this. Don't simply avoid going into the details, even if it ends up sounding as idiotic as idealism does, or even if you have nowhere to go from the vague hand-waving you do, above, and finally have to say so right up front. That's when ontology really gets confounded by language.

Pebble wrote:

BWE wrote:
What "is" is available through our senses. Everything else is words about that. I'm not arguing an idealism perspective. I'm arguing that value is internal to our modeling functions and not a feature of the organism's environment, whatever that is. And, I'm arguing that the valuation process so powerfully obscures what is (which, remember, I am saying is available through our senses) that it cannot meaningfully describe the nature of those perceptions from and ontological position. Furthermore, everything that "is" is unique and not a category. That is, we can point out a tree, but the commonalities between that tree and another tree are commonalities of pattern but not repetitions of pattern. Every eddy in a river is its own "thing" even though it may have a few similarities it shares with other eddies. There is no tree "out there", there is only this tree or that tree. Before you specify, you are using information from the model to pragmatically predict certain features.

Taking a unique perspective rather than categorising means one learns nothing and cannot pin anything down.

Considering only single entities is a bit like quantum mechanics - one can only discuss probabilities. When one categorises the external environment approximates to Newtonian physics, so concrete conclusions can be derived and tested.

I absolutely agree with that though. Knowledge is inherently pragmatic. I just don't agree with and ontological inferences we might draw from that.

Cito di Pense wrote:

BWE wrote:What "is" is available through our senses. Everything else is words about that. I'm not arguing an idealism perspective. I'm arguing that value is internal to our modeling functions and not a feature of the organism's environment, whatever that is. And, I'm arguing that the valuation process so powerfully obscures what is (which, remember, I am saying is available through our senses) that it cannot meaningfully describe the nature of those perceptions from and ontological position. Furthermore, everything that "is" is unique and not a category. That is, we can point out a tree, but the commonalities between that tree and another tree are commonalities of pattern but not repetitions of pattern. Every eddy in a river is its own "thing" even though it may have a few similarities it shares with other eddies. There is no tree "out there", there is only this tree or that tree. Before you specify, you are using information from the model to pragmatically predict certain features.

This kind of chatter only has consequences for those who like to categorize what is, arguing as if our senses were not good enough, so that is at least not inappropriate here, but you assign no consequences to this 'valuation'. It often seems as if you'd recommend a whole different set of categories from what physicalism gives us, even that you have actually stated this. If that is not the case, you should say so explicitly, because all the weight of your analysis is in the consequences of your view, still only implied. I can't imagine why you'd twirl all that around in front of us every time the topic of trees comes up without going the rest of the way to wherever you really are on this. Don't simply avoid going into the details, even if it ends up sounding as idiotic as idealism does, or even if you have nowhere to go from the vague hand-waving you do, above, and finally have to say so right up front. That's when ontology really gets confounded by language.

I really am at the place where ontology is useless and damaging if we accept it as true. Any ontology. We have data and form conditional hypotheses. Knowledge is inherently pragmatic in that it infor.s prediction. Any further down that road and we get to the place where we are defending our truths which are in no way guaranteed to be universal and in fact are likely to be wrong in the light of history, rather than holding them loosely as truths and instead defending the predictive performance/value/utility of our models which allows us to amend them much easier than if we also have to amend our self worth which we intertwine with our truths.

BWE wrote:

Pebble wrote:

BWE wrote:
What "is" is available through our senses. Everything else is words about that. I'm not arguing an idealism perspective. I'm arguing that value is internal to our modeling functions and not a feature of the organism's environment, whatever that is. And, I'm arguing that the valuation process so powerfully obscures what is (which, remember, I am saying is available through our senses) that it cannot meaningfully describe the nature of those perceptions from and ontological position. Furthermore, everything that "is" is unique and not a category. That is, we can point out a tree, but the commonalities between that tree and another tree are commonalities of pattern but not repetitions of pattern. Every eddy in a river is its own "thing" even though it may have a few similarities it shares with other eddies. There is no tree "out there", there is only this tree or that tree. Before you specify, you are using information from the model to pragmatically predict certain features.

Taking a unique perspective rather than categorising means one learns nothing and cannot pin anything down.

Considering only single entities is a bit like quantum mechanics - one can only discuss probabilities. When one categorises the external environment approximates to Newtonian physics, so concrete conclusions can be derived and tested.

I absolutely agree with that though. Knowledge is inherently pragmatic. I just don't agree with and ontological inferences we might draw from that.

I suppose the way I would look at is the there are limits to the knowledge that can be gained. While identifying some categories of external objects as potential food, or as solid, liquid, gas; animate and inanimate does provide some knowledge of their 'nature' and as a consequence of our nature. Understanding the 'laws' of nature and being able to work out the age of the universe provides further insights into the nature of everything we can interact with etc.
I would posit that knowledge is more than just pragmatic, just not as deep or firm as philosophy would aspire to.

Just as long as we don't get hung up on any of it being true, that's what science does is make better models.

BWE wrote:Just as long as we don't get hung up on any of it being true, that's what science does is make better models.

Well while truth may be unattainable, there are justified and unsupported beliefs, we are entitled to discriminate between these, otherwise every opinion is equally valid.

I would posit that knowledge is more than just pragmatic

I think actionable needs to come into play .... and to be effectively actionable there needs to be reasonable predictability.
That sabretooth MIGHT lie down for a belly rub but more likely have you for lunch.

That we can hear the big bang on an old radio and actually create the wavicle experiment on our own brings some of the more esotoeric questions/knowledge into the actionable realm even as individuals.

BTW I DETEST the word truth .....about as useless

Pebble wrote:

BWE wrote:Just as long as we don't get hung up on any of it being true, that's what science does is make better models.

Well while truth may be unattainable, there are justified and unsupported beliefs, we are entitled to discriminate between these, otherwise every opinion is equally valid.

Exactly ... some models are more accurate or pragmatically more useful descriptions of how the universe ticks than others.

BWE wrote:I really am at the place where ontology is useless and damaging if we accept it as true. Any ontology. We have data and form conditional hypotheses. Knowledge is inherently pragmatic in that it infor.s prediction. Any further down that road and we get to the place where we are defending our truths which are in no way guaranteed to be universal and in fact are likely to be wrong in the light of history, rather than holding them loosely as truths and instead defending the predictive performance/value/utility of our models which allows us to amend them much easier than if we also have to amend our self worth which we intertwine with our truths.

That just goes a little too far, unless you want to say how it's 'damaging'. Saying that it is damaging to accept it as true is more than simply saying ontology is superfluous.

Furthermore, in what I commented on, you said that the valuation obscures something.

Your tone is admonitory. Why? Where did you get that authority? It must be that you've thought really, really deeply about it.

Pebble wrote:

BWE wrote:Just as long as we don't get hung up on any of it being true, that's what science does is make better models.

Well while truth may be unattainable, there are justified and unsupported beliefs, we are entitled to discriminate between these, otherwise every opinion is equally valid.

Of course. Models have an absolute metric - their predictive utility.

Cito di Pense wrote:

BWE wrote:I really am at the place where ontology is useless and damaging if we accept it as true. Any ontology. We have data and form conditional hypotheses. Knowledge is inherently pragmatic in that it infor.s prediction. Any further down that road and we get to the place where we are defending our truths which are in no way guaranteed to be universal and in fact are likely to be wrong in the light of history, rather than holding them loosely as truths and instead defending the predictive performance/value/utility of our models which allows us to amend them much easier than if we also have to amend our self worth which we intertwine with our truths.

That just goes a little too far, unless you want to say how it's 'damaging'. Saying that it is damaging to accept it as true is more than simply saying ontology is superfluous.

Furthermore, in what I commented on, you said that the valuation obscures something.

Your tone is admonitory. Why? Where did you get that authority? It must be that you've thought really, really deeply about it.

Well, I wrote a book about it several years ago. That probably does make me approach the matter as if I'm explaining rather than discussing. It's not my intention to present myself as an expert though. SoS presented a hypothesis which I find troubling because, in my opinion, it encourages the behavior we call stereotyping in certain cases or map territory errors in general cases. Afaict, he's arguing that this particular truth that he wants to accept is somehow different than other truths which compete for the same title and by extension of it being a truth, the logic assumes that adopting it would actually reduce that issue -reduce stereotyping. I am trying, using a phone to organize my words, which probably isnt the best way, to argue that map territory errors are based in a misunderstanding of the concept of the map. I am arguing that models are a general category of knowledge with predictive utility and that they are, by nature, highly compressed with lossy compression. There is currently no known way to identify what elements are discarded, 'lost', in any model but we can be certain those elements exist because models cannot, even in mathematics, retain infinities without reducing them to symbols. That's fine if you are talking about modeled infinities like an infinite series of ones or something, but it's notable that infinities never make it through the grinder in the current physics paradigm, the model that SoS seems to think should be representing this truth. It seems redundant to point out that physics is a method and the paradigm is a model and paradigms do shift. But I dunno. My heart may not be in this one enough to make my contribution more than just arguing a point that I don't expect to be understood on. I don't think that's the case but it's certainly possible. It was a long time ago that SoS got me interested in his topic and it had to do with an experience he had which was similar to one I had and how he interpreted it. The years have been kind to me but are rapidly degrading many of my faculties too so I might just be senile and raving. I obviously wouldn't be the one to judge that.

BWE wrote:Well, I wrote a book about it several years ago. That probably does make me approach the matter as if I'm explaining rather than discussing. It's not my intention to present myself as an expert though. SoS presented a hypothesis which I find troubling because, in my opinion, it encourages the behavior we call stereotyping in certain cases or map territory errors in general cases. Afaict, he's arguing that this particular truth that he wants to accept is somehow different than other truths which compete for the same title and by extension of it being a truth, the logic assumes that adopting it would actually reduce that issue -reduce stereotyping. I am trying, using a phone to organize my words, which probably isnt the best way, to argue that map territory errors are based in a misunderstanding of the concept of the map. I am arguing that models are a general category of knowledge with predictive utility and that they are, by nature, highly compressed with lossy compression. There is currently no known way to identify what elements are discarded, 'lost', in any model but we can be certain those elements exist because models cannot, even in mathematics, retain infinities without reducing them to symbols. That's fine if you are talking about modeled infinities like an infinite series of ones or something, but it's notable that infinities never make it through the grinder in the current physics paradigm, the model that SoS seems to think should be representing this truth. It seems redundant to point out that physics is a method and the paradigm is a model and paradigms do shift. But I dunno. My heart may not be in this one enough to make my contribution more than just arguing a point that I don't expect to be understood on. I don't think that's the case but it's certainly possible. It was a long time ago that SoS got me interested in his topic and it had to do with an experience he had which was similar to one I had and how he interpreted it. The years have been kind to me but are rapidly degrading many of my faculties too so I might just be senile and raving. I obviously wouldn't be the one to judge that.

You wrote a book about it, huh? It makes a difference to me whether you did it through some academic press or whether you're one of those self-published characters, a lot of whom are floating around these days. At any rate, you're finding it necessary to hobble your account either to hold onto your anonymity or to avoid showing you have no expertise in what you appear to be critiquing. I get it that you're just contending with something that SOS posted, and are trying to get a leg up in that argument by suggesting to him that you have expertise. Don't mind me; I have only a passing interest in whether you're some kind of real deal that just happened to get side-tracked into this particular forum. That's as deep as my interest goes, because I don't believe there's any such thing as expertise in these topics unless you start showing some. There may be credentials, including having published, but nothing I'd call 'expertise' has shown up in your posts. What you get from having written a book on such topics is knowing the literature in that area. People who do publish in the disciplines that traffic in 'map-territory errors' often have a tendency to really start believing their own bullshit. That's the way you come off, and that may only be the product of having to hamstring your account to retain your anonymity, which you should not relinquish, here. Name-dropping terms like 'map-territory', 'modeling' and 'infinities' doesn't amount to showing me that you really have any expertise at all in such areas. You have a long history here of posting hip-sounding commentary that's a mile wide and an inch deep. When pressed, you beg off by admitting your heart may not really be in it. Shit or get off the pot.

I leave your assessment of me to you. The inch deep issue is also yours to determine. I only mentioned my experience in reference to the fact that it might be a fair criticism to say it appears I am explaining or even preaching rather than engaging. I certainly don't want my words to be accepted uncritically. The topic is slightly tangential to the topics where I have actual expertise so I have tried not to make any argument from asserted authority. If I have, it was accidental or incidental and should not be taken as authoritative. Part of my perspective involves a rejection of authoritative capacity on the matter of ontology anyway so there it is. You are free to judge my contribution however you want. Of course, you were free to do that anyway but at least I am not challenging that right.

BWE wrote:I leave your assessment of me to you.

You said you wrote a book about it. To me, that was one of the most interesting things I've ever seen you write, here.

Cito di Pense wrote:

BWE wrote:I leave your assessment of me to you.

You said you wrote a book about it. To me, that was one of the most interesting things I've ever seen you write, here.

You're saying I need to up my game?

BWE wrote:

Cito di Pense wrote:

BWE wrote:I leave your assessment of me to you.

You said you wrote a book about it. To me, that was one of the most interesting things I've ever seen you write, here.

You're saying I need to up my game?

I dunno, BWE. It would seem there's more than a few people who find the level of discourse about this kind of stuff in this kind of forum so compelling that they're going to collect the ideas they come up with and write a book. There's something pathetic about that, because they seem to think their position is being tested by reading different opinions from anonymous sources. What I'm hoping is that you're not one of those. It's not that I can't imagine you have identified a theme, and all. What really helps in this context is for you to cite anyone else who's thinking about the same sorts of things, so we can at least guess at what you've written your book about. If all you can cite are the opinions you've read online, then we know which sort of author you are. You could always write a book about something in which you have real expertise, but maybe you don't have that much going, there. The bald fact that you've written a book about it (so you say) is empty boasting when you never write anything more cogent than the stuff you've written in this thread. Go read the way Spinozasgalt writes about philosophy on those rare occasions when she gets serious. It's as if she's read stuff by somebody other than anonymous shitheads online. Just for the record, I'm generally not pushing a thesis in these discussions other than that I've caught a whiff that somebody doesn't really know what he's talking about. You'll notice I don't, for example, question Vaz Scep when he talks category theory.