BWE wrote:
I'm a little confused. What would your claim be if not a claim to absolute ontological truth? Either trees are externally real entities, i.e. from any vantage point, trees would retain their treeness, or trees is a word to describe a patterned set of perceptions from our own vantage point in which case there is no treeness externally but rather that is an internal quality used in navigation and prediction. No?
Here it is:
Either trees are externally real entities, i.e. from any vantage point, trees would retain their treeness,
This definition of externally real is what you are thinking. Not what I am saying at all. I think your idea of 'treeness' is the impostor. Not the thing I am referring to as 'treeness'. My 'treeness' is Some Thing x, that when filtered through a Specific Vantage Point. our vantage point in the case of trees, will always yield treeness.
Our VP is required for the treeness. Right? You would agree with that. What I am saying is that there would be no 'treeness' without the x as well as our VP.
This is called physicalism because it insists that the VP as well as the x are both of the same type. The VP is not a spirit mind but rather a part of physicality and the interaction within the physical is why we get treeness from x.
Looked at in that way it is undeniable that there is something about the x that produces, when filtered by our specific VP, treeness, and if we now run that same x through a new VP, say for a caterpillar, that there is now something in common and that is what we conceive to be trees when thinking in this greater abstraction.
That's how we humans know how to find caterpillars!